Concentrate a Superior Force to Launch
Several Large Decisive Battles South and
North of Siping
(April 19, 1946)
To Peng [Zhen] and Lin [Biao]:1
	 1.	 En route from Siping to Shenyang, Du Yuming2 reportedly stated that
although there are great disparities between the Communist forces of more
than 400,000 men and the Guomindang forces of over 100,000 men, they
would have to resolve to continue fighting, that more than one hundred tanks
would be sent to Shenyang, that planes would be used as well, and so on.
To defeat this diehard enemy and defend Changchun we must therefore be
prepared to deal with planes and tanks (officers and soldiers who took part in
the resistance against Japan know how to deal with them) and we must amass
a superior military force and launch several major decisive battles south and
north of Siping. This is the only way to solve the problem.
	 2.	 Under the condition that work in the localities not be weakened, many cadres should be transferred to strengthen work in the area around Changchun
and Harbin, i.e., north of Siping and Hailong, south of Qiqihar and Hailun,
east of Taonan,3 and west of the Mudan River. There appear to be approximately thirty or forty counties and towns where more cadres should be sent
to mobilize the masses, reform governance, organize the militia, resolve land
problems, take charge of industry and commerce, and build this area into
the center of a democratic Northeast. Cadres should be transferred mainly from southern Manchuria4 (without compromising the work in southern
Manchuria itself), an area where the work has been more penetrating and
where there are relatively more cadres. Please consider whether this is feasible. This plan has been conceived based on our being able to guarantee the
defense of the three cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar, or at least the
defense of Harbin and Qiqihar. Guaranteeing defense depends on whether or
not we can destroy large numbers of the enemy in the Siping area. Therefore,
striving for victory in battle is the key link.
	 3.	 If the Northeast Bureau moves to Changchun, it should settle in a safe place
in the suburbs and handle the work of all of Manchuria and resolve all important problems regarding the overall situation rather than directly managing
work in the city of Changchun. If you feel that Changchun is not yet stable,
this move can be delayed for the time being.
The Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 173–74, where it
is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Peng Zhen was first political commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and Lin Biao was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic
Allied Army.

2.  Du Yuming (1904–1981, native of Shaanxi) was commander-in-chief of the Northeast Security Headquarters of the Guomindang army.

3.  Taonan county was later merged with Baicheng county to form Tao’an county in
Jilin Province.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-116

4.  Southern Manchuria refers to the central Liaoning area east of the Shenyang-Dalian
section of the Chinese Changchun railway, which encompassed Andong (today’s Dandong),
Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and southeastern Shenyang.