Rapidly Annihilate the Enemy in the Northeast to Gain the Advantage Before the Ceasefire[1]

(April 15, 1946)

Lin and Peng:

(1) Marshall can arrive in Chongqing within a few days. The true stance of the Kuomintang and the United States toward us—whether for peace or war—will become clear in a short time. (2) Where has the 71st Army advanced to at present? Is it possible for us to concentrate superior forces to annihilate, rout, or block the attacking enemy south and southwest of Siping? (3) Regarding our forces on the Benxi front, order them to speedily reorganize in preparation for further combat.[2] (4) Apart from Changchun, where your Hanmao telegram[3] already contains correct dispositions, all other locations evacuated by Soviet forces and areas occupied by bandits must be swiftly seized and the bandit groups eliminated, so as to gain the advantage before the ceasefire. In general, all important operational issues must be resolved within about ten days. (5) The enemy plans to use aircraft to support combat. Pay attention to the safety of command organs.

Central Committee

Shanwu

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[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and Peng Zhen, First Political Commissar.

[2] In early April 1946, troops of the Southern Manchurian Military District of the Northeast Democratic United Army twice repelled attacks by the Kuomintang’s 25th and 14th Divisions during the operation to defend Benxi, annihilating over 4,000 enemy troops. On April 14, Mao Zedong, in a telegram drafted for the Central Committee to Peng Zhen, Lin Biao, and others, stated: The victory at Benxi “will certainly bring about changes favorable to us. Issue a general order to the entire army to boost morale and crush the stubborn enemy’s offensive.”

[3] The Hanmao telegram likely refers to the Maohan telegram. The Maohan telegram was sent by Lin Biao on April 14, 1946, to Zhou Baozhong, Commander of the Jilin-Liaoning Military District; Chen Guang, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff; Zhang Qilong, Deputy Political Commissar; and reported to the Central Committee. The telegram stated: Against the enemy firmly defending Changchun, we should not adopt a plan of total encirclement aimed at resolving the battle within 48 hours. Only a small number of troops should be dispatched for pinning actions, without launching formal attacks. The focus should be on seizing the airfield to cut off their airlift, then gradually capturing various objectives within the city by successive assaults. For selected attack targets, localized encirclement and assault must be employed; forces must not be evenly dispersed. Hasty attacks without sufficient reconnaissance and preparation must be prevented. If there is no plan to fully occupy Changchun, we should boldly abandon the plan for total capture and adopt a strategy of occupying a portion to confront the enemy, thereby facilitating negotiations.