Northeast Bureau and Lin [1]: (1) We concur with Lin Zhenzi’s telegram [2], which prioritizes concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy over holding cities; overall strategic considerations should guide long-term planning.


(2) If Changchun has reliable internal support and if our forces enjoy a favorable balance of power, then it should be occupied. Otherwise, the occupation plan should be abandoned, but a portion of our forces should seize the airfield to disrupt enemy air transport, thereby facilitating negotiations.

(3) Jian Caifang [3] has already achieved significant results by disrupting railway lines in Suizhong. We urge you to attach great importance to this tactic as a key means of defeating the enemy.


(4) Pay close attention to organizing militia units, and implement a universal militia system throughout Manchuria [4].


(5) Focus on establishing guerrilla detachments under the command of county and district authorities; every county in Manchuria should have its own guerrilla units.


(6) Set up armed work teams in enemy-occupied areas—several teams per county, each consisting of dozens of members—spread widely across those regions.


(7) Your recent battles have been well fought, and the enemy is now in dire straits. We recommend issuing orders of commendation to the units that have won these victories to boost morale.


(8) Implement rent and interest reductions universally throughout Manchuria, mobilize the masses, consolidate the rear area, and base all actions on a long-term perspective.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript, edited by Central Office, Mao Wen.
Notes: [1] “Lin” refers to Lin Biao, who at the time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Democratic United Army. [2] This refers to a telegram sent by Lin Biao at 1:00 a.m. on April 11, 1946, to both the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Committee itself. The telegram stated: Given Chiang Kai-shek’s continued reinforcement of his troops in Northeast China, the prospects for our forces to either hold Siping or capture Changchun and thereby swiftly achieve peace in the region are slim. Therefore, our main objective should be to destroy the enemy rather than to defend urban centers, lest we fail to protect the cities while also depleting our strength, leaving us unable to defeat the enemy even when more favorable conditions arise. Our current policy should move away from being forced into defensive engagements and adopt an offensive posture instead. As for cities that are difficult to capture and hold, there is no need to press the advantage unduly. It is recommended that our forces adopt the principle of prioritizing the destruction of the enemy’s living forces as the fundamental guideline for their immediate operations; accordingly, the attack on Changchun should be halted, and the vast majority of the forces currently engaged against that city should be rapidly redeployed toward Siping to concentrate our combat strength there. The same approach should also be adopted in South Manchuria. [3] Jian Caifang (1907–1992), a native of Huang’an (now Hong’an) in Hubei Province, served at the time as Commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Region. [4] “Man” refers to Manchuria, i.e., Northeast China.