Today I am not delivering a report myself, but rather conveying Chairman Mao’s instructions and tasks concerning the current situation. It has now been eight months since Japan’s surrender, since the defeat of the fascist powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and since the end of World War II. During these eight months, on the one hand, we have seen the fascist forces overthrown and democratic forces throughout the world experiencing unprecedented growth. On the other hand, democratic and reactionary forces worldwide have been engaged in a serious struggle; the international situation has ebbed and flowed. As communists, we must form a fundamental understanding of this changing situation so as not to lose our bearings. Accordingly, at a meeting of the Central Committee, Chairman Mao offered an important analysis of the situation—an analytical framework for assessing the times. With his permission, I shall now convey this to Party cadres:

Chairman Mao’s instructions consist of four points:  (1) “During the Second World War, the anti-fascist nations, led primarily by the Soviet Union and the peoples of those countries, united to overthrow the fascist regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan, along with their satellites, thereby opening up a path for the advance of democratic forces worldwide.”

By “Second World War,” we mean the period from 1939 to 1945. During that time, the fascist powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan launched aggressive wars, which in turn brought the anti-fascist nations together in a common front against fascism. The Communist Parties of these countries, especially the Soviet Communist Party, played the leading role. Under their guidance, the peoples of those nations fought resolutely and ultimately defeated the Axis powers and their satellite states—Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and others. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union grew stronger, and the popular masses, particularly the Communist Parties, were greatly reinforced. Comrades should pay close attention to reports on the development of Communist Parties in various countries; those engaged in research might compile statistics on this trend, which would be highly valuable for study within each branch. When Stalin debated Churchill, he drew upon just such data, demonstrating that Communist Parties had made powerful gains not only in Eastern Europe but also across Europe—for example, in Finland and Hungary. Within the invaded countries themselves, Communist Parties likewise experienced unprecedented growth—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and others. This stands in stark contrast to the aftermath of the First World War. Although Stalin did not discuss Asia in that exchange, Communist forces there too expanded remarkably: in Japan, Kan’no Susumu, who had previously been active in Yan’an, is now based in Tokyo; the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Party has been established; the Philippine Communist Party led the war effort; the Indonesian Communist Party continues to fight alongside the people against Dutch and British imperialism; and the Indian Communist Party has grown substantially. Moreover, the Annamite Communist Party has entered the government. Most importantly, the Chinese Communist Party has advanced still further. Consider how much progress has been made: after the First World War, what was the CCP’s strength? Hardly any. It was only founded in 1921. By contrast, following the Second World War, the Party numbered over one million two hundred thousand members and led a liberated area home to more than one hundred million people. In short, whether in Europe or Asia, Communist Parties have become immensely powerful, thus paving the way for the forward march of democratic forces worldwide. Only under these conditions could armistice agreements and resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference come into being; only then could China enter a new stage of peace and democracy.

When comrades analyze the current situation, they must recognize that the onset of this new phase of peace and democracy was no accident. It was not brought about by the conciliatory attitudes of Zhang Qun, Shao Lizi, and others, nor by the eloquent words of any single Party comrade. Rather, it was predicated on the broader international and domestic circumstances outlined in Chairman Mao’s first point—a foundation built upon the developments he described.

This principle was clearly set forth in “On the United Front Government” and has now been reaffirmed through further clarifications in light of the evolving situation. It constitutes a major issue: the path that both the world and China must follow. Without grasping this, we cannot properly understand the shifting dynamics of the times. At the conclusion of the Seventh Congress, Chairman Mao stated, “Only by gaining a clear understanding of ‘universal’ and ‘massive’ questions can we truly grasp the situation.” What he referred to here are precisely those “universal” and “massive” realities—the defeat of fascism and the widespread consolidation of democratic forces. Regrettably, when analyzing the situation, comrades often overlook these overarching issues. As the saying goes in China, “One sees the sesame seeds but misses the watermelon”—this captures the essence of the problem.

(2) “The remnants of fascism in Germany, Italy, and Japan, together with pro-fascist reactionary forces within the anti-fascist camp—namely, the bourgeois right wing, figures like Churchill, Dai Li, He Yingqin, and the Chinese fascist faction—are already engaged, and will continue to engage, in frenzied campaigns against the Soviet Union, against the Communist Party, and against democracy, seeking to provoke a third world war. These two currents have now converged and constitute the long-term, principal enemies facing both China and the world. Unless they are overcome by the popular forces, a third world war will be inevitable.”

In the first point, Chairman Mao emphasized that fascism had been vanquished, that the world was moving toward peace, that the people demanded peace, and that the Soviet Union had emerged strengthened. He noted that internal difficulties within the anti-fascist camp rendered an immediate outbreak of war unlikely. However, the second point makes clear that reactionary forces remain formidable—both the remnants of fascism, including collaborators like Quisling in various countries, and the reactionary elements of the bourgeois right wing, such as Churchill and others. These forces have long been bent on organizing campaigns against the Soviet Union, against the Communist Party, and against the people, and they continue to do so today and will likely persist in the future. Their aim is to stir up a third world war. It is evident that they are not content with mere rhetoric; they seek to act with reckless abandon. Such forces represent the primary adversaries confronting China and the world over the long term. They are irreconcilable with the popular masses and will never compromise. Indeed, this point was fundamentally addressed in “On the United Front Government”: “The reactionary forces remain strong, and history teaches us that severe setbacks may yet occur. If we fail to recognize this reality, we shall make grave errors.” What deserves particular attention here is that the Chairman has issued a new directive, explicitly identifying the principal enemies currently facing the people—the remnants of fascism and the bourgeois right wing—as the primary foes, with other reactionary elements serving as secondary targets. While the Seventh Congress document did not spell this out so plainly due to considerations of public dissemination, it nonetheless underscored that unless the popular forces prevail over the reactionaries, a third world war will be unavoidable. At present, progressive trends are evident in many countries, reactionary forces face internal difficulties, and the Soviet Union remains robust; therefore, a third world war is not imminent. Nevertheless, this does not mean that such a conflict could never erupt. Consider Stalin’s speech of February 9, in which he observed: “Marxists have repeatedly pointed out that the very nature of the capitalist economic system harbors the seeds of war and aggression.” From this perspective, we can reflect on the situation in China.

To sum up, while we are indeed entering a phase of peace and democracy, China cannot defy the general trend of the world. Nor does the commencement of this phase imply that the reactionaries have relinquished their arms or that the danger of civil war has entirely disappeared. On the contrary, the underlying factors that could ignite another conflagration remain intact. China is pursuing a course of peace and democracy, yet the reactionary forces have not yet laid down their weapons.

(3) “The First World War delivered a fatal blow to the global capitalist system, leaving its crisis insurmountable. After the Second World War, it has become exceedingly difficult for the capitalist world to establish a stable order. Consequently, a profound crisis looms. Even the United States, which experienced unprecedented prosperity during the war owing to its distorted boom, will soon confront an equally severe crisis.” (Chairman Mao spoke of a “fatal blow.” The October Revolution inaugurated a new stage in world history. In “On New Democracy,” he argued that capitalism was in decline, while socialism and new democracy were on the rise. The Second World War dealt capitalism an even greater “fatal” blow. Three capitalist powers were shattered, while the Soviet Union emerged vastly strengthened. Several new democratic states arose in Europe—Yugoslavia, Poland, and others—and in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party commanded a population of over one hundred million. At the Seventh Congress, Chairman Mao remarked that capitalism had been struck once in the leg during the First World War and again in the Second. Thus, he concluded, capitalism was effectively crippled; what remained was a “crawling” form of capitalism. This assessment, made a year ago, has since proven all the more accurate: the capitalist crisis is now virtually insoluble. Following the October Revolution, the stability of the capitalist order was shattered, giving rise to an incurable systemic crisis. Subsequent revolutionary movements in various countries failed, and although a relative temporary stability prevailed between 1921 and 1929 after the great depression of those years, this stability was inherently fragile, existing merely as a respite within the broader crisis; hence the term “relative stability.” Today, such stability is scarcely attainable. A severe crisis is therefore imminent. Chairman Mao predicted that this would occur “not long from now,” certainly within a decade. Recently, the renowned economist Varga asserted that it would happen “within five years.” The same holds true for the United States. During the war, America enjoyed a brief resurgence—a peculiar kind of prosperity. Chairman Mao acknowledged that U.S. capitalism had flourished considerably in the Second World War, but he cautioned against celebrating “long live capitalism.” That prosperity, he insisted, was merely a temporary rebound. We should not assume that a panic will break out in America tomorrow. Rather, we ought to recognize that the country possesses substantial productive capacity, that wartime demand exceeded supply in consumer sectors, and that a brief postwar boom was possible as domestic markets reopened and foreign markets expanded. However, the overall contraction of the capitalist market—driven by the Soviet Union’s growth and the emergence of new democratic states in Europe—means that even as American markets continue to expand, domestic production will soon outstrip domestic absorption, giving rise to acute contradictions. Consequently, conflicts between domestic and international markets and between American productive forces are likely to intensify in the near future, portending an unprecedented catastrophe. In an article published in Issues 3–4 of the journal Masses, Varga wrote: “Overall, the means of production have not been destroyed and, in some countries—such as the United States—have even been improved. Productivity may continue to rise over the next two to four years. However, it will inevitably decline as the production cycle enters a crisis. This downturn will be more prolonged than the panic of 1921–1929.”

Following his economic analysis, Chairman Mao observed: “Under these circumstances, on the one hand, reactionary forces are spurred to intensify their struggle, attempting to establish reactionary rule domestically and to provoke a world war internationally. Yet, at the same time, this very situation encourages the peoples of all nations to unite and drives a schism within the global bourgeoisie, thereby facilitating the formation of a united front against the reactionaries.” (These attempts to rally against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party do not attest to the stability of the reactionary camp; rather, they reveal its decline and mounting panic. Churchill’s reactionary speeches serve as a case in point. Similarly, the Nationalist Party’s Second Plenary Session, with its brazen fascist rhetoric, did not demonstrate the regime’s stability, but rather exposed its inability to endure, prompting calls for “reform.” At the same time, however, these developments have served to strengthen popular unity and to sow discord and fear within the bourgeoisie, making it easier for the people to organize a united front. Historically, the bourgeoisie has never been a unified force. During the Second World War, it was divided into fascist and non-fascist camps. Likewise, in China, the bourgeoisie has long been fractured into left, center, and right factions, and this division persists to this day. In fact, the recognition of this inherent disunity within the bourgeoisie constitutes a fundamental tenet of Marxist theory, yet it is often overlooked by certain comrades. Some mistakenly believe that the global and Chinese bourgeoises are monolithic entities—“as solid as a rock.” Based on this misconception, two opposing conclusions have emerged: either “the Chinese and global bourgeoises should join forces to attack the CPC and the people” (eliminate everything), or “all sides should unite” (unite everything). The former represents “left” opportunism, while the latter embodies “right” capitulationism.

A careful examination of Chairman Mao’s writings reveals that his understanding of the Chinese bourgeoisie was grounded in precisely this recognition of its internal divisions—a crucial and indispensable aspect of his thought. Without embracing this perspective, one cannot claim to be a Marxist. Only by adopting Chairman Mao’s viewpoint can our strategy be formulated along the lines of “exploit contradictions, unite the majority, isolate the minority, and defeat them one by one”—a concise four-point formula.

Such an approach greatly facilitates the formation of a united front against the reactionaries. How, specifically, can we “exploit” the current situation? Chairman Mao instructs us: “Every country comprises several distinct social forces: (1) the working class, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie, whose political consciousness has been profoundly raised during the war and who constitute the mainstay of the democratic movement; (2) the left wing within the bourgeoisie—such as Huang Yanpei and the China Democratic League—who advocate “peace with the Soviets and the Communists”; and (3) the centrist faction—the Du’s, Ah’s, and Chiang Kai-shek—who currently hold power in their respective countries. These centrist figures possess the capacity to compromise with the democratic forces, biding their time until a favorable moment arises to crush the popular resistance.”

Chairman Mao places Chiang Kai-shek among the centrists. Some may argue, “Doesn’t that mean Chiang has become somewhat revolutionary?” Such an interpretation would be entirely mistaken. Let me emphasize: we need not debate whether Chiang is revolutionary or not. His fundamental objective remains the annihilation of the Communist Party—indeed, he is “determined to see it destroyed before he dies.” The reason Chairman Mao categorizes him as a centrist lies in his dual nature: on the one hand, he seeks to eliminate the popular forces; on the other, he is willing to engage in temporary compromises in order to buy time and wait for a more opportune moment to strike. Chiang embodies the character of a comprador bourgeois operating within a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. He acts under the dictates of the international bourgeoisie, having previously taken orders from the fascists of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and now following the directives of President Truman. He is, in essence, a feudal comprador turned fascist—a “half-fascist,” if you will. This duality defines him, and it is precisely this nuanced understanding that we must cultivate.

Chairman Mao further observes: “The bourgeoisie in every country, then as now, remains divided into left, center, and right wings. This internal fragmentation enables the Communist Party not only to unite broad sections of the populace but also to forge alliances with the leftist elements within the bourgeoisie, while simultaneously engaging in principled compromises with the centrists and applying pressure on the rightists. Through this strategy, democratic forces can achieve significant advances, overcome reactionary obstacles, and avert a world war. In some countries, this may lead to the implementation of socialist measures; in others, to the establishment of new democratic systems. Whenever the popular forces grow strong enough to neutralize the reactionaries, the likelihood of success increases dramatically. Conversely, if the reactionaries cannot be subdued, a world war will ensue. In such cases, the peoples of all nations must resort to revolutionary warfare to counter the counterrevolutionary onslaught and thereby establish peace and democracy worldwide.”

In essence, the internal division of the bourgeoisie presents an opportunity for the people. Two outcomes are possible, depending on the balance of power between the popular forces and the reactionaries. Ultimately, whether or not the reactionaries can be defeated will determine whether the world can move toward a brighter future.

(4) “Our Party’s line consists of broadly uniting the masses, forging alliances with the leftist elements of the bourgeoisie, and engaging in principled compromises with the centrist faction. Our goal is to combat the reactionary elements within the bourgeoisie and bring about a peaceful settlement domestically. In pursuing this objective, we should prioritize democratic methods over armed struggle. Armed force should be employed only as a last resort—to halt violations of agreements by the reactionaries. This constitutes our modus operandi. The centrist bourgeoisie tends to undermine agreements because it is firmly committed to suppressing the Communist Party. When compromise proves impossible, they adopt a policy of temporary accommodation: whatever can be eliminated must be eliminated without delay; whatever cannot be eliminated must be preserved for future action. It follows that centrist figures may eventually shift toward the right wing. We must remain vigilant in this regard.”

What, specifically, does Chairman Mao have in mind when he speaks of this line and this policy?

I would argue that it embodies the Marxist-Leninist approach: neither total annihilation nor unconditional unity, but rather a strategy of exploiting contradictions to target specific objectives.

Our methods of struggle are not rigidly fixed. After the armistice, we adopted democratic means; however, in order to prevent the reactionaries from sabotaging the agreement, we were compelled to take up arms. Following Comrade ××’s report, a certain confusion arose among our comrades in Yan’an: some came to believe that armed struggle was of little importance in the Chinese revolution, and a few even expressed frustration, lamenting that they had chosen the wrong vocation. To address this, I reminded them: “If the Chinese revolution loses its armed forces, it loses everything.” Without revolutionary armed struggle, there can be no democracy; without the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, there would be no ceasefire order, no Political Consultative Conference, no plan for demobilizing the troops, and no reorganization of the government. Consider this: even the aircraft shuttling between Yan’an and Beiping today rely on armed protection. At the Party School, someone asked, “What kind of government will result from the reorganization?” Some suggested “dictatorship plus a degree of democracy,” while others called it a “united government.” I replied that, regardless of how the agreement is implemented, the reconstituted government will still be a dictatorship with a limited measure of democracy. The reasoning is simple: the Nationalist-controlled areas still retain the guns; if things were truly as rosy as the Political Consultative Conference seemed to suggest, then we would not be Marxists. The Chinese revolution lost its army, and with it, everything else—this truth holds true today as it did yesterday and will continue to do so in the future. For instance, can land reform or rent-and-interest reductions be carried out in Nationalist-held territories? Even within our own liberated zones, implementing such measures is no easy task. Therefore, we can conclude that, while armed struggle remains an important component of the Chinese revolution, the primary mode of struggle at present is not armed confrontation.

Finally, Chairman Mao elucidates the essential nature of the bourgeois centrists. He points out that they are as determined as the right wing to destroy the Communist Party. It is crucial to understand that, in this respect, Chiang Kai-shek is no different from Ho, Chen, Du, or He. So why, then, did the ceasefire and the Political Consultative Conference come about? Simply put, complete elimination was not feasible at the time, so they chose to postpone it, reserving the option to act later. There are distinctions in timing, policy, and method between those who seek immediate annihilation and those who adopt a more gradual approach. The so-called “right wing,” for its part, insists on eliminating the enemy at all costs. Chiang and Du, for example, are taking a roundabout route to achieve this goal, presenting us with a contradiction that we can exploit. How should we respond? What tactics should we employ? Clearly, we cannot simply allow ourselves to be wiped out. Any offer of compromise—even a temporary one—is welcome, provided we remain fully aware of their true intentions. The ceasefire, the Political Consultative Conference, and the subsequent initiatives undertaken by Marshall, Truman, and Chiang Kai-shek—all represent strategies designed to defer the ultimate destruction of the Communist Party. As circumstances evolve, these figures may well drift toward the right wing. Churchill serves as a telling illustration. Yet their repeated attempts to eradicate the Communist Party and the people invariably fail, often yielding results quite the opposite of what they intend. Hitler provides a striking example: under sustained pressure, the people tend to become more alert. After the ceasefire, some may have grown complacent, but following the Political Consultative Conference—especially after the Jiaochangkou incident and the brutal assault on the Xinhua Daily—it became abundantly clear that Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary stance poses a genuine threat.

To summarize:

Point 1 underscores the imperative of advancing democracy worldwide.

Point 2 highlights the enduring strength of the reactionary forces.

Point 3 emphasizes that the people’s strength is advantageous: they possess both a vast main force and a substantial reserve, ensuring ultimate victory regardless of the specific circumstances.

Point 4 outlines the Party’s line—uniting the broad masses with the leftist and centrist wings of the bourgeoisie to combat the reactionaries and realize the cause of peace and democracy.

This represents a further elaboration of Chairman Mao’s line as articulated at the Seventh Congress. I urge comrades to integrate these insights with the fundamental principles set forth in “On the United Front Government.” Only by addressing the overarching issues can we hope to analyze the complexities of the changing situation. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao has repeatedly stressed that further deliberation and consultation with comrades are necessary, and that these matters should not yet be made public.