Central Directive on the Current Work Policy in the Northeast

(March 27, 1946)

Northeast Bureau and Lin:

Your telegram of the 25th at 5:00 a.m. has been received. At the present juncture, of the two tasks—dealing with Chiang and dealing with the bandits—the first is dealing with Chiang. In order to prevent the northward advance of the Chiang army and to strive for our army’s occupation of Changchun, Harbin, Qiqihar, and the entire Chinese Eastern Railway line (whether this is possible is mainly to be decided by our friends, but we should strive for it with all our might), it is necessary to use the main forces and to act swiftly to seize the opportunity; delay will be of no avail. This is entirely correct. However, in order to prevent the Chiang army from linking up with the bandit gangs and setting up strongholds in our areas, which would bring harm in the future (the United States and Chiang will surely demand that cease-fire teams be sent to the bandit gang locations to supervise the cease-fire), it is necessary at the same time to leave secondary forces in the rural areas to coordinate with the local Party and government authorities in swiftly suppressing the bandits. You must issue two general orders: one to the main-force troops, defining their task as dealing with the Chiang army, as in the orders you have issued in recent days; the other to the local corps and local Party and government authorities, defining their task as suppressing the bandits, mobilizing the masses, and consolidating the rear. In particular, those bandit gangs that have already established radio contact with the Chiang army must not be overlooked. The responsible comrades of the local corps and local Party and government authorities must be earnestly admonished that they must on no account regard their own work as unimportant or fix their eyes solely on the occupation of Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar. It is hoped that you will deploy forces and guide the work in accordance with the above policy.

Central Committee

Ganshen