CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S NEW YEAR SPEECH AND THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE
7 January 1946
[Text] It is reported that the Political Consultative Conference, postponed
time and again by the Kuomintang, will convene on the 10th of this month.
Though the Kuomintang government agreed to call the conference last October,
it is reported that even today, some 3 months later, the Kuomintang has not
made "preparations" or given any constructive indications. The Chungking
press has long indicated that the Kuomintang takes a superficial attitude
toward this conference, which has the unanimous serious attention of all
fields here and abroad, and that it does not intend to solve any issue by it.
This attitude has been completely verified in the New Year broadcast of
National Government chairman and Kuomintang director general Chiang Kai-shek.

Why do all of China and the whole world pay serious attention to the
Political Consultative Conference? In a word, they hope that it will find
a solution for China's current dangerous political situation, i.e., stopping
the civil war, and make decisive reforms in the dictatorial system, which is
the source of the civil war. The one-party, military, and personal
dictatorship of the National Government should have been abolished long ago.
As early as in the fall of the year before last, public opinion of China and
foreign countries (primarily America) proposed the formation of a coalition
government and a coalition command headquarters. Immediately thereafter the
Chinese Communist Party, based on this proposal, made a formal written
suggestion to the Kuomintang authorities which won the support of President
Roosevelt. Thereafter, though, as President Roosevelt stated, "everything
now seems to be hopeless, because the Kuomintang expressed entirely
fallacious opposition to the revisions proposed by Yenan" (Snow: "The Model
of Soviet Political Power," Ch 8), and China's democratic parties and
factions not only did not abandon the proposal but demanded that a conference
of delegates of all parties and factions and democratic elements without
party or factional affiliations be held first, so that a coalition government
and a coalition command headquarters could be realized through the conference.
At the end of last August, when Comrade Mao Tse-tung, upon Chiang
Kai-shek's invitation, went to Chungking to discuss national affairs, he

again brought up the issue of calling such a conference. As the arrogant
Kuomintang authorities adamantly refused to accept such designations as
"party and factional conference" or "political conference," while the
Communist Party delegates, striving for unity, did not wish to argue
endlessly on the subject, the designation was recorded in the "Synopsis
of Negotiations" as the Political Consultative Conference. But its tasks
were still described as "ending political tutelage; introducing constitutional politics discussing the issues of national affairs, peaceful
national construction, and the National Congress." What is the meaning of
discussing national affairs and the National Congress? Obviously, the
fundamental issue of national affairs today, aside from stopping the civil
war, is to end the so-called "political tutelage" of one-party, military,
and personal dictatorship. As the Kuomintang "National Congress,"
exclusively created by the Kuomintang "political tutelage" authorities,
opposes democracy, strengthens dictatorship, sabotages unity, aggravates
division, and attempts to legalize the one-party dictatorship and extend
it indefinitely, in order to end the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship
the National Congress exclusively handled by one party must be simultaneously
ended, a coalition government and a coalition command headquarters created,
a true National Congress prepared and convened by the coalition government,
and democratic constitutional politics introduced. The fundamental crux of
China's national affairs was clearly expressed in U.S. President Truman's
announcement of 15 December last year. President Truman demanded that "the
National Government and the Chinese Communist Party and China's other
dissident armed units negotiate and cease hostile actions" and that "a
conference of delegates of the major political factions in the entire
nation be convened in order to solve the current internal dispute promptly
and hasten China's unification." Meanwhile, to solve the internal dispute
and hasten unification, the delegates conference must possess the power to
end the one-party dictatorship and reorganize the National Government.
President Truman said: "The United States well knows that the current
Chinese National Government is a one-party government and believes that, if
the foundation of this government is enlarged to include other domestic
parties and factions, it will promote China's peace, unity, and democracy.
Therefore, the United States strongly advocates that the delegates of all
China's major political elements hold a national conference and decide on
the means to enable them to enjoy fair and effective representation in the
Chinese National Government. The United States Government feels that it
will require the revision of the one-party political tutelage system
created by Dr Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Republic of China, as a
temporary measure during the nation's advance toward democracy."
President
Truman affirmed that political democratization is the prerequisite for the
nationalization of the armed forces. He said: "Once an extensive
parliamentary representative government is formed
the autonomous
military forces and all armed units in China must be effectively combined
into a Chinese national army." On 27 December the official report of the
Moscow three-nation foreign ministers conference reiterated the necessity
for the democratization of the National Government, and its language was

even clearer: "All the democratic elements in the nation must be widely
absorbed into all (or all levels of) the structures of the National
Government." On 30 December U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes in his
broadcast also repeated this theme and clearly pointed out that unity could
be attained only through peace and democracy: "To assure a united, peaceful,
and democratic China under the National Government, the civil war must be
stopped and the democratic elements must be permitted broad participation
in the National Government." Now the facts are clear: The tasks of the
Political Consultative Conference are to realize unconditional cessation of
the civil war, to end the one-party dictatorship, to reorganize the National
Government, to form a democratic coalition government, and to provide
extensive, fair, and effective representation of all democratic elements in
all structures of the entire democratic coalition National Government.
Since this democratic coalition government must unconditionally and
effectively end the one-party political tutelage system, it naturally must
unconditionally and effectively end the one-party National Congress, the
bastard of one-party political tutelage; naturally the 5 May "transfer of
power" arranged by the Kuomintang authorities to the mysterious bastard,
which is not recognized by any democratic element, prior to the formation
of an "effective" democratic government (which is entirely possible),
making China more dictatorial and divided and embellishing such a "transfer"
as "constitutional politics" in order to hoodwink our countrymen, must not
be permitted. The Political Consultative Conference, hoped for and
closely watched by all of China and the whole world, is a plenary conference
with the power to stop the civil war and end the one-party dictatorship
unconditionally. On this point there is no room for any distortion or
evasion.

The Kuomintang authorities expressed their consent to President Truman's
announcement and the official report of the three-nation foreign ministers
conference. Chiang Kai-shek even said that "President Truman's announcement
and mine are identical; his views are my views"; therefore, the people
entertained high hopes regarding the meeting date of the Political
Consultative Conference he announced and his simultaneous broadcast speech.
The people hoped that they would hear, in his speech, his views on the
conference which would begin 10 days later and which would determine China's
historical direction hereafter. Unfortunately, though lavishly embellished
with phrases about peace and democracy, Chiang Kai-shek in his 5,000-word
speech purposely refrained from mentioning the Political Consultative
Conference or the announcements of President Truman and the three foreign
ministers. What is even more regrettable is that he has, in fact,
absolutely rejected their suggestions on China and absolutely refused to
confer any power on the Political Consultative Conference, not even the
power to discuss the holding of the National Congress. The Kuomintang
authorities, without going through any discussions, declared last November
that the National Congress would be convened on 5 May, and Chiang's speech
also confirmed it over and over again, though still maintaining that it was
in response to the opinions of the various parties and factions. In his

speech Chiang, without naming names, fiercely censured and maligned the
Communist Party, blaming it for the civil war and all the destruction
resulting from it. But we do not wish to argue excessively, because in
the past few months the Kuomintang (especially the HO-P'ING JIH PAO of the
Political Department of the Kuomintang Military Affairs Commission) has
consistently propagandized that "the Communist Party is anti-civil war"
while the Kuomintang is "anti-anti-civil war." Just this one thing alone
is sufficient to explain everything. Our concern is Chiang's view of
China's political future, as it is directly linked with the destiny of 450
million people. Chiang has firmly declared that "the only prerequisite
for the solution of the current dispute and unrest" is not peace and
democracy but "the unification of military and political commands," regardless of whether such military and political commands are against the
interests of the state and the nation or whether they are against the
people's fundamental rights and universal desire. He also maintains that
it is possible to end the civil war, (which he fastidiously refers to as
"concluding military actions"; though the whole world is discussing China's
civil war, China's Military Affairs Commission chairman has refused, even
now, to admit its existence in China), but not without conditions.
"Communications must first be restored," i.e., the means for him to
escalate the civil war must first be restored. He says that the National
Government can be enlarged, but not before the unification of the armed
forces. On the contrary, before the democratization of the government,
the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army must first be handed over to the
Kuomintang, i.e., to him. In other words, the means for expanding his
dictatorship must first be assured. He says that democracy can be realized,
but not by means of a coalition government. It must be accomplished by
first convening, 4 months hence, a so-called National Congress, or a
dictatorial congress exclusively handled by one party, as "the fundamental
laws cannot be changed," i.e., the dictatorial laws cannot be changed.
Chiang's interpretations are clearly opposed to the views of all the
democratic elements in China and of President Truman and the foreign
ministers of the three nations. According to his interpretations, there
is no need to hold the Political Consultative Conference. Therefore,
before the inauguration of the conference we must first look straight at,
examine, and solve this fundamental division: On the one hand are the
demands of all the democratic parties, factions and democratic figures
and the entire population of China, as well as the desires of the people
of America, the Soviet Union, and England as expressed by President Truman
and the three foreign ministers--the unconditional cessation of the civil
war, the ending of dictatorship, and the creation of a democratic coalition
government via the Political Consultative Conference, thereby realizing the
unification of China; on the other hand are the attempts of Chiang Kai-shek
and the few military, party, and financial overlords in the Kuomintang--
forbidding the Political Consultative Conference from solving any issue,
continuing the dictatorship, and backing up the continued dictatorship by
means of continuing the civil war. The former has the support of all of
China and the entire world and, until the publication of Chiang's speech,

the verbal support of the Kuomintang authorities. But now Chiang has
begun to attack these views, and the division has come to the surface.
Over a long period of time this paper has not taken notice of the
despicable rumors and vilifications of the Kuomintang papers and the
Kuomintang CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, but when it comes to a division linked
with the future of the state and the nation created by Chiang's speech,
we, on the eve of the Political Consultative Conference, have no choice
but to express our opinions. Solving this division will involve a serious
and complex process of struggle. However, it will greatly educate the
Chinese people and afford them every opportunity to discern the right and
wrong, recognize the political theories of each and every party and faction,
newspaper, and individual, and determine their stand--whether they support
or oppose the people.

When criticizing Chiang's speech, the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE asked, "How
can peace in China be attained by repeating the old tunes?" Though the
views expressed in the speech are tedious repetitions of old tunes long
rejected by the people of the entire nation and clearly opposed to the
views of the democratic elements in China and the democratic nations in
the world, for the sake of being careful we will make a patient and objective
examination of them and see whether they contain certain partial truths.
Chiang's fundamental view, similar to what the Kuomintang papers have been
propagandizing in recent days, is that all Chinese affairs should be handed
over to him and the small group around him for their dictatorial decisions;
as long as the people relinquish all their fundamental democratic rights
and unconditionally obey all the military and political orders of the
dictatorial group, then China will be unified and, after unification under
the dictatorial group, the people will naturally be granted the opportunity
for peaceful construction, democratic politics, and improvement of their
lives. However, if Chiang's dictatorial plans are not accepted, China will
never be unified; it will always suffer from civil war, dictatorship,
poverty, and aggression. Therefore, we wish to ask two questions according
to the facts: First, will China be able to attain democracy by means of
such dictatorial unification? Next, will China be able to attain
unification by means of such a dictatorial method?

The answer to the first question is in the negative. In foreign countries,
Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan's emperor all practiced such dictatorial
unification. However, under their unification they did not attain peace,
democracy, or prosperity. They claimed that national defense was
consolidated, but the result was the destruction of their own nations.
As for China, the Chinese people have had much experience in such
unification. China has had a history of unification for several thousand
years, and the unification was accomplished by dictatorial, or "political
tutelage," means (Chiang on innumerable occasions extolled the "democracy"
in China's era of tyranny and criticized the "excessive freedom" of the
people at that time), but after several thousand years of tutelage" no
democracy was created as a result. Since the founding of the republic,

each and every warlord practicing military or personal tyranny declared that
there would be peace and democracy under his unification. But in all those
35 years no one has yet honored his promise. Are there differences between
Chiang Kai-shek and his warlord forebears? There are. First, he has a
nationwide one-party gestapo dictatorship which is a tool of terror
undreamed of by the warlords of the past. Next, his military tyranny is
much more powerful than theirs, because he possesses an unprecedentedly
huge, private, and secret service-type army on a scale also undreamed of
by the warlords of the past. Finally, the extent to which his personal
power is concentrated also far exceeds that of any warlord of the past.
Whether in the party, army, or government, he reigns supreme. His personal
"hand orders" can change the decision of any government or military organ.
Therefore, aside from resistance by the people, there is no power which can
restrict his activities. Does Chiang have a greater "democratic" ideal than
the warlords of the past? Absolutely not. Chiang claims that he is unable
to introduce democracy at present because of the lack of unification. Such
logic will not stand. He has at least "unified" most of China over a period
of 18 years, but when and where has he introduced the least bit of democracy
or improved in the least bit the people's living conditions? The
"unification" of Chiang's area of control in the past 18 years has expanded
year after year, while democracy has diminished year after year, because
his secret service organ and secret service-type army have developed year
after year. The poverty of the people and the economic crisis of the state
have been aggravated year after year, because the control of his bureaucratic capital and corrupt and tyrannous group has grown year after year.
Though his troops and military budget have swelled year after year, facts
since the 18 September incident, and especially since the 7 July incident,
have proved that the national defense strength of his army has dropped
alarmingly, because his army is intended only for the purpose of fighting
civil wars and can only fight civil wars, and civil wars, which are
destructive of the national defense strength in both the spiritual and
material aspects, have never ceased in the past 18 years. The saying
"expert in civil war, amateur in foreign war" is an accurate evaluation by
the people of his military leadership. He wishes to blame everything on
the lack of unification, but don't the facts contradict this, and aren't
they all the results of his dictatorial "unification"? Let us look at it
another way: It is true that he has not "unified" the entire country, but
compared with him the Communist Party has "unified" the country even less.
Chiang possesses the political power of the Central Government and the
greater part of China, while the Communist Party can only exert leadership
over a small part of China. Yet why is it that the Communist Party, in
areas under its leadership, whether provinces, counties, districts, or
towns, can introduce popular elections, reduce rent and interest, and
develop production? The equipment and supplies of the troops led by the
Communist Party were not good, yet they could persevere for 7 years on
the frontline and repel the greater part of the enemy army and almost the
entire puppet army. It is because the Communist Party has "unified" the
entire country while Chiang has not? Chiang says that the troops led by

the Communist Party are "a tremendous disgrace and loss to the state."
Does he mean that resisting the enemy and puppet troops was a tremendous
disgrace and loss, while the army which disintegrated on contact, covered
1,000 li in one retreat, watched and avoided battles, tried to save the
nation in a roundabout way, created a 1-million-man puppet army, and even
now coexists peacefully with the enemy and puppet troops and joins with
them in resisting the communists is a tremendous glory and asset? In his
speech Chiang censures the Communist Party for obstructing construction
and preventing the people from living in peace and being content in their
occupations, but why does he not permit the people to travel freely and
compare and decide for themselves whether Yenan or Chungking, Peiping or
Kalgan, are the areas in which the people can live in peace and be content
in their occupations and pursue construction? The Communist Party
vigorously strives to restore communications in peaceful areas, while
Chiang, by means of the civil war, not only forces the Communist Party
to destroy military communications in belligerent areas, but also disrupts
the peaceful communications of nonbelligerent areas by blockading the
Liberated Areas, of areas under his control by transporting troops, and
of the Liberated Areas by bombing. Then who is guilty of destroying
communications? Do not all these facts indicate that Chiang's defense
of his own crimes on the grounds of lack of "unification" is completely
uncreditable? Moreover, in areas which were once liberated by the Communist
Party but which have been occupied by the Kuomintang authorities, areas
which, according to Chiang's view, have been "unified," the original
political, economic, and military reforms have been cruelly destroyed
under the "unified" control of his military and political commands and
his corrupt officials, secret service agents, and evil usurpers.
situation is also common knowledge throughout the world. Does it not
indicate that all areas "unified" by Chiang and in which his followers
faithfully implement his military and political commands are precisely
the areas where no political, economic, or military reform can exist? To
put it candidly, not only can the areas "unified" by Chiang not compare
with the democratic autonomous areas built under the leadership of the
Communist Party, but they are even inferior to areas under the control of
those whom he has accused of being warlords. On the grounds that Lung Yun
was a warlord, Chiang expelled him from Yunnan by force in order to
realize the "unification" of his military and political commands.
But
look: What was the difference between Lung Yun's and Tu Yu-ming's Yunnan?
Didn't Chiang have to summarily dismiss Tu Yu-ming by way of apology?
After Tu was gone, Kuan Ling-cheng took his place. How did Kuan do in
Yunnan? Didn't Chiang again have to summarily dismiss Kuan by way of
apology? Even so, Lung Yun was not restored to his former position, while
Tu Yu-ming, upon leaving Yunnan, immediately proceeded to Liaoning and
Jehol to "unify" the military and political commands in these areas.
to the bloody tragedy, unprecedented since the beginning of the Republic,
which resulted from sending troops and police into the school, Kuan
Ling-cheng had to temporarily lie low. Not only did he escape punishment
according to the law, but he was awarded a "loyalty medal." The conse-
This
Due

quences of Chiang's military and political command in the so-called
recovered areas under "unification" furnish a particularly chilling lesson
to the Chinese people. Chiang's "unification," in certain aspects, is
not much different from the "unification" of the enemy and puppet troops,
the people's living conditions are even harder than before, and even
TA KUNG PAO, which is famous for supporting Chiang, has been forced to
appeal loudly against "losing all public support." Do these facts not
indicate that, under Chiang's present methods, the greater the "unifica-..
tion," the more tragic become democracy and the people's living conditions?
These are the past and current conditions of the Chiang-style "unification."
What about the future? Even according to Chiang's speech this time, the
outcome will be merely one of calling a one-party National Congress, a
dictatorial congress. All the "delegates" will be elected by coercion,
bribery, proxy, or appointment, and it will be the ugliest congress in the
history of the world and the Republic. Through this dictatorial congress
and through such a dictatorial constitution, Chiang promises an antiliberal
and anticommunist "popular government" emulated by the world's fascists and
copied by "China's Destiny," the fascist classic of China. Such will be
the Chiang-style "democracy" after the Chiang-style "unification." Can
the Chinese people accept such "unification" and such "democracy?" Like
the people of foreign countries, the Chinese people naturally desire
national unification. But the unification desired by the Chinese people
is unification which will protect the state and the people, a democratic
unification. Can such unification and Chiang's "unification" be discussed
on the same level?

The answer to the second question, whether China will be able to attain
unification by means of this dictatorial method, is also in the negative.
Whether in foreign countries or in China, there was a historical period
when "unification" of this kind could be accomplished, but that period
has gone forever. In China it has been at least 50, if not 100, years
since such "unification" could be accomplished. For the past 50 years
the Chinese people, desiring freedom and independence, peace and
prosperity, have always hoped for China's unification--a firm unification
on the foundation of democracy. Yet China's dictators invariably rejected
it. To preserve their dictatorship they always split with the people,
though they then turned around and blamed the people for destroying "unity."
Since the time when the emperor in the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty
blamed the "autonomous troops" organized by Dr Sun Yat-sen for destroying
his "unification of military and political commands" and attempted to
preserve by force his own "unification," the situation of division has
never been fundamentally changed. In his speech Chiang Kai-shek asks the
people not to "sit on the sidelines and watch the nation repeat the
mistakes of the early years of the Republic and sink into the desperate
situation of division and collapse in the early years of the Republic?
Even Chiang himself admitted that "Yuan's usurpation of the nation, the
dangers of the Republic, and the inability of the citizenry to truly
express its free will and demonstrate its strength created the

balkanization of the country by the warlords, resulting in the revolution
since 1913, the 2d year of the Republic." In other words, the one who
caused the division and collapse of the nation was none other than usurper
warlord Yuan Shih-k'ai, who won the recognition of the nations of the
world and who, sitting in the Central Government, vociferously advocated
"unification of military and political commands." Naturally, Yuan Shih-k'ai
would not admit his own act of warlord balkanization but blamed Dr Sun
Yat-sen and the Kuomintang military governors for it. His only charm to
ward off the 1913 revolution was "unification." He said: "Today it is
not the issue of reconciling the north and the south but the issue of the
local areas' refusing to obey the Central Government and how the latter
must accomplish unification.... In the administrative system the Central
Government must find the means of unification." But today, after the dust
has settled, though Dr Sun (and Chiang, a subordinate of Dr Sun) organized
an "autonomous army" and was blamed for destroying the unity of military
and political commands and for sabotaging communications, he could be
considered, after all, antiwarlord, revolutionary, democratic, and unity-minded. In his late years Dr Sun went north and negotiated for peace and
unity with another usurper warlord, Tuan Ch'i-jui, hoping that Tuan
would introduce democracy. This was the source of the slogan, "Save China
by peaceful struggle," cited by Chiang in his speech. Tuan Ch'i-jui,
intoxicated with dictatorship, refused to negotiate with Dr Sun and forced
the outbreak of China's great revolution. China originally had hopes of
accomplishing unification in the great revolution, but, unexpectedly,
Chiang's usurpation of the nation, the dangers of the Republic, and the
inability of the citizenry to truly express its free will and demonstrate
its strength created the balkanization of the country by the warlords,
resulting since 1927 in the armed self-defense and democratic movement of
the Communist Party and the revolutionary people of the entire nation
against Chiang's extreme White terror. Under his dictatorship and civil
war policy the 18 September Incident occurred. Putting aside the old
grudges and following the spirit of "saving the nation by peaceful
struggle," the Communist Party appealed for the cessation of the civil war
and the united resistance against Japan. This appeal did not begin to be
realized until after the peaceful solution of the Sian Incident in 1936,
but Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng, who were instrumental
in the peaceful solution, have not, even today, regained their freedom,
while Chiang since 1939 has never, even for a day, stopped his armed
attacks on the Communist Party. After the conclusion of the resistance
war, the Communist Party still followed the spirit of "saving the nation
by peaceful struggle" and appealed for the cessation of the civil war
and the united construction of the nation, but since the publication of
the "Synopsis of the Kuomintang-Communist Negotiations" last October
Chiang has become more adamant than ever, secretly ordering "suppression
of the bandits," sending 2 million troops, which had been transferred
to the far rear, to the Northeast and to East, Central, and South China
to fight a civil war of an unprecedented scale, while vociferously
announcing "demobilization" and plunging the entire country into discord

and unrest. China's history of the past 50 years is thus filled with such
civil wars created by the dictators. But look: Has China been "unified"
in the hands of the dictators? Or has it been divided? Are not all the
divisions the outcome of the "unification" policy of the dictators?
Dictatorial "unification" can only produce division. Only by uniting
with the democratic forces will unification be truly accomplished. Had
Tuan Ch'i-jui accepted Dr Sun Yat-sen's demands, or had Chiang Kai-shek
accepted the demands of the Communist Party, other democratic factions, and
the people of the entire country, China's unification would have long been
accomplished. Chiang and his faction claim that the local autonomy of the
Liberated Areas hampers unification, but isn't the people's election of
their own government the fundamental law of all democratic nations in the
world? Chiang himself declares that the political power will be returned
to the people, but why does he wish to seize the power from the people
in areas where the political power has been returned to them? When the
people decide their own political orders on a local level, why are such
orders considered not unified? Does it mean that only when all 450
million people except one are deprived of their freedom of action will
the political command be considered unified? Due to their refusal to
recognize the people's commonplace rights to elect local governments and
decide on local laws, Chiang and his faction have created the political
division in China today. They delude themselves with the idea of solving
the political division by means of armed unification. As a result, instead
of armed unification, what they get is armed division. Why is it an
armed division? Because in the past 50 years the political strife between
dictatorship and democracy has often led to military strife between the two.
Political dictators always rely on private, dictatorial armies to eliminate
the democratic elements, forcing the politically democratic faction to
create true national, or popular, armies. As they are compatible with the
needs of history and the people, the national, or popular, armies, instead
of being eliminated by the dictator, become ever more powerful. Their main
body today is the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army. The Chinese people do
not utilize these armies to seek division. On the contrary, they utilize
them to seek democratic unification. Therefore, when the resistance war
broke out, these troops became a part of the unified National Revolutionary
Army. Nevertheless, Chiang-Kai-shek, insisting on a private, dictatorial
army, was unwilling to nationalize and popularize his own troops by
following the example of these troops. On the contrary, he refused to
recognize the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army in fact and in law, maligning
them as "disloyal troops" and "bandit troops" making all-out efforts to
"encircle and exterminate" them, thus creating today's armed division.
Since Chiang, by his own action, has proved that he follows the policy of
division, proved that his armies are completely factional, private, and
dictatorial, and refused to tolerate any national and popular troops,
then, to assure the nationalization and popularization of China's troops,
naturally, in the absence of a democratic coalition and a coalition command
headquarters, the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army, as the nucleus of China's
military reform, cannot be delivered to the dictatorship for extermination.

Such an action would be not only a reckless risk but also a crime--a crime
against China's military reform and democratic unification. Since the
Chinese people have firmly struggled for democratic unification for 50
years, and since they did not accept the dictatorial unification of the
Manchus, or that of Yuan Shih-k'ai and Tuan Ch'i-jui, or that of Chiang
Kai-shek in the past 18 years, then if Chiang does not abandon his
dictatorial policy today, even if he threatens continued civil war, such
threats will not produce any "unification." Therefore, not just politically,
but also militarily, the history of the past 50 years has proved that
China's unification can be accomplished only by walking the path of
democratic unity, never the path of dictatorship.

In view of the above, Chiang's views cannot withstand the test of facts;
they contain no truth. His "unification" will bring neither democracy
nor unity to China. On the contrary, only by acceding to the demands of
the democratic parties and factions of China and the democratic powers
of the world, calling a plenary Political Consultative Conference,
stopping the civil war unconditionally, ending Chiang's one-party,
military, and personal dictatorship, and reorganizing the National
Government into a democratic coalition government in which all democratic
elements will enjoy extensive, fair, and effective representation will
China attain democracy and unification. Democracy is the cause and
unification the effect; stopping the civil war is the cause and restoring
communications the effect; political democratization is the cause and
army nationalization the effect; forming a democratic coalition government
is the cause and creating a true National Congress the effect. Is it
conceivable that Chiang fails to understand such simple relations between
cause and effect? Naturally he understands them. That he intentionally
reverses the cause and effect is merely for the purpose of seeking an
excuse to preserve his dictatorship. Actually, the Chinese people, like
the world's democratic powers, have, since the peaceful solution of the
Sian Incident, recognized the National Government as a convenient
instrument for realizing democratic unification. They never intended
to overthrow this government and start something new. Therefore, Chiang
will retain a definite position, though absolutely not dictatorial
position, in the reorganized National Government. Chiang says that he
"cannot abandon his revolutionary responsibilities." We feel that
sacrificing the personal and obeying the people, sacrificing dictatorship
and obeying democracy, constitute his greatest responsibility toward the
revolution. His persistence in the policy of civil war after the end of
the resistance war, as he himself stated, has actually led to the
"instant drop in the position of the state and the national glory gained
through 8 years of bloody sacrifices" and the danger of "China becoming
a scorned international straggler." Therefore, Byrnes, in his broadcast
of 30. December, openly declared: "China, divided by civil war, will not
be able to take its proper position among the allies or efficiently
perform its international obligations." Unfortunately, Chiang has, in
his New Year speech, repeated his own past mistakes. Nevertheless, the

direction of history has been determined. No matter how much he and his
faction resist, peace and democracy in China, with the firm struggle of
the Chinese people and the sympathetic support of friendly democracies,
will gain a decisive victory. What we hope for are unity and unification.
Therefore, we still hope that Chiang and his faction will make good use
of the opportunity, abandon their preconceived ideas, fully cooperate
with all the democratic elements in China, and make the Political
Consultative Conference successful, thereby enabling China to advance
promptly on the bright highway of peaceful construction and regain its
proper international position.

。
CHIEH-FANG JIH PAO (Editorial), 7 January 1946
* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party,"
Vol 5


+ "Collection of Military Affairs Documents on the Chinese People's
Liberation War" (1)


--- Notes

--- Notes