Based on the discussions held here by Chen, Su, Li, and Bo, we believe that a comprehensive consideration of the strategic issues concerning work in the new liberated areas is necessary. In these new areas, full use must be made of the experiences gained during the War of Resistance Against Japan. For a considerable period following liberation, we should implement social policies such as rent and interest reductions, along with appropriate adjustments to seed and food supplies, together with a fiscal policy of reasonable burden-sharing. The targets of decisive punitive measures should be limited to those prominent counter-revolutionary elements who have firmly aligned themselves with the Kuomintang and are resolutely opposed to us—just as during the War of Resistance only collaborators were arrested and their property confiscated—rather than adopting a policy of radical social reforms involving the distribution of surplus property and land.

For premature distribution of surplus property would be welcomed only by a small number of courageous individuals, while the broad masses would not benefit from it, leading to widespread dissatisfaction. Moreover, the rapid dispersal of social wealth would be detrimental to the army. Similarly, too early a redistribution of land would place the entire military supply burden prematurely upon the peasants rather than upon the landlords and rich farmers. It is therefore preferable not to distribute surplus property or land; instead, rent and interest reductions should be universally implemented as part of social reform, so that the peasants actually derive tangible benefits. At the same time, a fiscal policy of reasonable burden-sharing should be adopted, requiring landlords and rich farmers to contribute more financially. In this way, social wealth will remain concentrated, social order will be more stable, and all forces can be better focused on annihilating the Kuomintang.

Over one, two, or even three years, higher-level Party organizations in large base areas should pursue precisely this same strategy. Leading cadres may, according to circumstances, submit such individuals to plenary sessions of poor-peasant associations or general peasant assemblies for criticism or review and impose appropriate disciplinary sanctions. Among them, those whose offenses are judged by the masses to be relatively minor may, after a specified period of observation and verification that they have indeed reformed, have their Party membership individually restored. However, this applies only in special cases. As a rule, every branch contains a certain number of good Party members. It is the responsibility of higher-level leaders to skillfully identify these worthy comrades, rely on them as the core force, recruit fresh elements, and transform the branch, rather than abandoning or neglecting it.

The rectification of the Party and the screening of cadres must be carried out with both seriousness and prudence. We must take a serious stance toward impurities within the Party, yet at the same time bear in mind that our Party has already stood the test of a long struggle, enjoys immense prestige among the masses, and is advancing victoriously. It must be acknowledged that, in the course of the war and land reform, some class-alien elements will inevitably be purged from the Party, while at the same time a large contingent of revolutionary activists will undoubtedly flow into its ranks. Therefore, Party committees at all levels, in carrying out the work of Party rectification, should address problems on a case-by-case basis. Those who have clearly committed grave offenses and have thus forfeited the most basic qualifications for Party membership should be expelled. Class-alien elements who have infiltrated the Party, as well as incorrigible degenerates within its ranks, should be resolutely purged. With regard to intellectuals and other Party members who, though originating from exploiting classes, have voluntarily renounced their former class positions, if they have committed serious errors but have not yet lost their fundamental eligibility as Party members, provided they acknowledge their mistakes, express a willingness to correct them, and secure the consent of non-Party masses, we should adopt an attitude of observation and education rather than immediate expulsion. As for Party members who have committed less serious offenses, regardless of their background, an educational approach should be taken.