December 12, 1945.
The question of whether it is both possible and necessary to launch a large-scale military-civilian production campaign within the relatively secure base areas behind enemy lines has long since been settled; it is no longer in dispute.
However, in the guerrilla zones—those regions even deeper behind enemy lines—the answer remained uncertain in many people’s minds until recently, owing to a lack of concrete evidence.
Now, such evidence is at hand.
According to Comrade Zhang Pingkai’s report on the production movement among the Jin-Cha-Ji guerrillas (see page 3 of this newspaper, January 18), extensive production activities were carried out in numerous guerrilla areas of Jin-Cha-Ji during 1944, with outstanding results.
Among the units and detachments cited in Comrade Zhang’s report are the Sixth Division of Central Hebei, the Fourth District of the First Subregion, the Eighth District of the Fourth Subregion, the Xu Ding Detachment, the Baomian Detachment, the Yun Biao Detachment, as well as the Daiding and Guo County units in Shanxi.
The operating environment in these areas was extremely harsh: “Enemy and puppet strongholds and pillboxes stood densely packed; trench networks and roadblocks formed an intricate web.
Taking advantage of their superior military position and convenient transportation links, the enemy frequently launched raids, encirclements, and ‘mopping-up’ operations against us.
To cope with these conditions, the guerrilla forces often had to shift positions several times a day.”
Despite these difficulties, they managed to organize productive efforts during lulls in combat.
As a result, “the troops’ rations improved markedly: each man now received an additional 5 qian of oil and salt, a pound of vegetables, and a pound and a half of meat per month.
Moreover, items that had been unavailable for years—such as toothbrushes, toothpaste, and literacy materials—are now all in short supply.”
So much for the claim that guerrilla zones cannot engage in production!
Many argue that densely populated areas lack arable land.
Is this really the case?
Consider Jin-Cha-Ji: “Following an agricultural priority policy, the land problem was resolved through nine different methods.
First, blockade trenches and walls were leveled.
Second, crops were planted along both sides of the roads.
Third, small tracts of wasteland were brought into cultivation.
Fourth, armed units provided cover for civilian militia members to secretly sow seeds beneath enemy fortifications under the cover of night.
Fifth, troops joined forces with farmers who lacked labor to till their fields cooperatively.
Sixth, disguised units cultivated land adjacent to enemy strongholds in a semi-public manner.
Seventh, riverbanks were embanked and sandbars reclaimed to create new farmland.
Eighth, assistance was given to farmers to convert dryland into irrigated land.
Ninth, mobile units traveled from village to village, helping local residents plant wherever they went.”
Agriculture is clearly feasible; but what about handicrafts and related industries?
Can they not be developed as well?
Again, Jin-Cha-Ji provides a definitive answer: “Production by units operating beyond the front lines was not confined to agriculture.
Like their counterparts in the secure zones, they also established handicraft and transport enterprises.
The Fourth District opened a felt-hat workshop, an oil mill, and a flour mill.
Over seven months, these enterprises generated 500,000 yuan in profit, which not only alleviated the units’ own financial difficulties but also met the needs of the local population.
Soldiers were able to provide themselves with knitted sweaters and socks without relying on external supplies.”
Given the frequent fighting in guerrilla zones, one might wonder whether engaging in production would compromise combat readiness.
Is this assumption valid?
Once more, Jin-Cha-Ji offers insight: “The principle of combining labor with military action was put into practice, giving equal weight to combat missions and production tasks.”
Take the Fourth District of the First Subregion as an example.
When spring plowing began, a special detachment was dispatched to strike at the enemy while simultaneously conducting a vigorous political offensive.
This dual approach proved highly effective: military operations intensified, and the unit’s combat effectiveness improved.
From January through early September, this small force conducted seventy-one engagements, capturing key positions such as Zhudong Village, Shangzhuang, Yezhuang, and Fengjiazhai, including the Cliffhead stronghold.
They killed or wounded 165 enemy and puppet troops, took ninety-nine prisoners, and seized three light machine guns and 101 rifles and pistols.
By coordinating military operations with publicity campaigns promoting the Great Production Movement, a powerful political offensive was launched: “Anyone who attempts to sabotage the Great Production Movement will be dealt with accordingly.”
In the towns of Dai and Guo, the enemy questioned the local populace: “Why have the Eighth Route Army become so formidable lately?”
The villagers replied, “Because you have been disrupting the Great Production Movement!”
Pseudo-soldiers below murmured among themselves, “They’re busy with production—no wonder they’re so strong.”
Could the people living in guerrilla zones also participate in a production drive?
In areas where rent reductions had yet to be implemented, or were incomplete, would farmers be interested in increasing output?
Jin-Cha-Ji’s experience affirms that they would.
“The launch of production activities by units operating beyond the front lines provided direct assistance to the local population.
On the one hand, military force was used to safeguard civilian production; on the other, troops actively lent a hand.
Some units allocated fifty percent of their strength during peak farming seasons to assist the people free of charge.
As a result, the morale of the civilian population soared, relations between the army and the people grew closer, and everyone had enough to eat.
Popular sympathy for and support of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army further deepened.”
It is clear that guerrilla zones can and must undertake a comprehensive military-civilian production campaign; all doubts have now been dispelled.
We call upon all military, administrative, and service personnel in the liberated areas, especially those working in guerrilla zones, to fully grasp this reality—to understand both the “possibility” and the “necessity”—so that this initiative can be broadly implemented.
Jin-Cha-Ji itself began precisely in this way: “Thanks to a transformation in the mindset of cadres, who came to value production and to integrate labor with military action, heroic models emerged among the masses.
In the preliminary tally, sixty-six such role models were identified.
Within just five months, our units operating beyond the front lines not only fulfilled their production targets on schedule but also introduced numerous practical innovations.”
In 1945, the entire liberated area must unite in launching a military-civilian production campaign on a larger scale than before, with tangible results expected by this winter.
Meanwhile, our adversaries are likewise urging their armed forces to increase production.
At a session of the enemy’s House of Representatives held on January 15, Member Sansen Nobufusa asked: “This year, 30,000 *tan* of military-owned land have been made available for cultivating 1.7 billion *kan* of sweet potatoes.
Will the labor required for land reclamation also be supplied by the military?”
Defense Minister Sugiyama replied, “From the standpoint of ensuring adequate food and fuel supplies, this production target must be met at all costs.
Aside from releasing some of the land currently occupied by the military, we intend to undertake this expansion ourselves.”
War is not merely a military and political contest; at its material foundation, it is also an economic struggle.
If we are to defeat Japanese aggression, we must, among other things, make every effort to strengthen our economy.
We look forward to achieving even greater results in 1945 than before.
This is the earnest hope of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to all personnel throughout the liberated areas and to the entire population.
We trust that this plan will be successfully realized.