Lin and Peng [1]: Received your telegram of the 13th at 7 p.m.
The Kuomintang’s 13th Army and 52nd Army are currently concentrating in the Qinhuangdao–Funing area. It is estimated that another army will follow, bringing their total to at least three before they launch an offensive along the Shanhaiguan–Suizhong line.

At present, the fighting around Shanhaiguan does not constitute a decisive engagement. My forces under Huang and Liang [2], numbering 42,000 men, have just arrived from a long march, and both officers and soldiers are exhausted; moreover, they are unfamiliar with the terrain. If we advance them now to Yiyuankou and Zhuchayying, we can expect nothing more than inconclusive skirmishes. Even if we manage to destroy part of the enemy, this would be merely a tactical victory, while our main body would be exposed, deprived of rest and recuperation, and inevitably placed on the defensive.

To avoid these drawbacks, it would be prudent to hold back our principal forces and reserve them for a future decisive battle aimed at settling the issue once and for all. Accordingly, I propose ordering the units under Li Yunchang and Yang Guofu [3] to hold fast along the Shanhaiguan–Suizhong line, mounting delaying actions at every stage to wear down and exhaust the enemy. Meanwhile, the forces of Huang and Liang should advance covertly via Lengkou and Jielingkou, converging in the triangular region bounded by Jinzhou, Jinxi, and Xingcheng, where they can operate from within the enemy’s lines, allow their troops to rest and recover, replenish ammunition, familiarize themselves with the local geography and conditions, prepare the battlefield, and conduct night-fighting exercises. Once the enemy has advanced into the Suizhong or Xingcheng area and has been sufficiently worn down and depleted, we shall be able to concentrate our maximum strength—Huang Kecheng’s 35,000, Liang Xingchu’s 7,000, Yang Guofu’s 7,000, plus at least 20,000 drawn from Li Yunchang and Sha Ke [4] who are currently positioned between Panshan and Jinzhou along the Shanhaiguan front—totaling approximately 70,000 men. At the most favorable time and place, personally commanded either by Lin Biao or by Rong Huan [5], we will launch a counteroffensive, conducting a series of engagements to annihilate two or three enemy divisions in each encounter, ultimately wiping out all three enemy armies and thereby resolving the strategic problem.

Two field brigades have already been formed in Eastern Hebei and could be moved to the western mountainous terrain behind the Shanhaiguan–Suizhong–Xingcheng line, where they would remain concealed. When the main force engages in a decisive battle on the front, these units would strike from the flank, cutting off the enemy’s lines of communication and supply.

In summary, from the standpoint of operating from within the enemy’s lines, this course of action is clearly the most advantageous. Do you concur? Please consider carefully and reply by telegraph.

Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript, with deletions made by him. Notes: [1] Lin and Peng refer to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen, who at the time served respectively as Commander-in-Chief and First Political Commissar of the Northeast People’s Self-Defense Force. [2] Huang refers to Huang Kecheng, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army. Liang refers to Liang Xingchu, then Commander of the First Division of the Shandong Military Region. [3] Li Yunchang was Deputy Commander No. 2 of the Northeast People’s Self-Defense Force and Deputy Commander of the Ji-Re-Liao Military Region. Yang Guofu was Commander of the Seventh Division of the Shandong Military Region. [4] Sha Ke was Chief of Staff of the Central Hebei Military Region. [5] Rong Huan refers to Luo Ronghuan, then Second Political Commissar of the Northeast People’s Self-Defense Force.