Recently, developments have been rapid. Since the Soviet Union’s intervention and Japan’s surrender, the past three months have been rather chaotic—not only for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but also for the United States.
At present, we have set our course firmly on track.
The former guerrilla units are now being reorganized into powerful field armies.
When General Sha Ke, commanding the Manchurian People’s Self-Defense Force, refused to allow U.S. Lieutenant General Barber to disembark, the Nationalist landing was thwarted.
The next two weeks are critical.
The likelihood of our gaining control over Northeast China is increasing.
Although the Soviets had authorized the Nationalists to land at Huludao and Yingkou, those operations have not materialized.
China’s Foreign Minister has demanded that Communist forces withdraw, but the Soviets have stated that this is an internal Chinese matter.
It remains possible that the Nationalists may never succeed in landing; their only remaining option is to fight for Shanhaiguan. The Kuomintang’s forces have yet to concentrate: they must defend Peiping and Tianjin, and the five divisions stationed around Shijiazhuang are in disarray. Taking advantage of gaps, they have moved five divisions into Shijiazhuang and two into Jinan, but now neither group can advance further.
They are now planning to transfer a division from Peiping to Changchun, yet the Tianjin command reports that Communist forces number 100,000 in that area, making such a move impossible. At most, they may be able to redeploy three corps.
Regarding Northeast China, we can only act; speaking publicly about it would be unwise.
We have already taken over portions of the local administration, seizing 120,000 firearms, along with some artillery pieces, and certain factories. Within another week or two, before the Soviets depart, the full handover must be completed. This requires both personnel and troops; however, actual operations near Shenyang remain limited, creating intense competition and fierce contention.
What remains outstanding are Changchun and Harbin. We need to establish a regimental-level presence there, ready to assume control immediately upon the Soviets’ withdrawal.
Reports suggest that Washington may deploy 200,000 troops to China, though this has not been confirmed and may not come to fruition. Even if such a force were deployed, its density across China would be quite low, rendering it weak.
American workers have expressed solidarity with us, as evidenced by demonstrations in New York, to which Comrade Zhou Enlai has responded with telegrams.
The fundamental weaknesses of Chiang’s forces lie in two areas: wavering morale among the troops and lack of popular support. Additionally, they suffer from shortages of ammunition and food, relying heavily on firepower. A single determined charge from our side can shatter their lines, and a single grenade can disable five machine guns.
Moreover, unfavorable weather conditions exacerbate their difficulties, particularly given the predominance of southern soldiers ill-equipped for northern climates.
Above all, however, it is the disconnect between the military and the populace.
Achieving this goal will help restore the vitality of the people.
Should landlords’ land be confiscated? The guidelines adopted at the Seventh Congress still emphasize rent and interest reductions, aiming for thorough implementation to undermine landlords’ authority.
In terms of production, next year should see organized efforts to increase the output of grain and daily necessities.
Large-scale military operations entail significant resource consumption.
As for industrial production, we lack major cities and rely primarily on medium-sized ones.
Without thorough rent reductions, public morale will remain low, and there will be little incentive for productive work.
It is essential to clearly delineate front-line and rear-area responsibilities to prevent neglect of rear-area tasks.
It will likely take another two months before we can fully stabilize our position.
[11] Sha Ke (1907–1993), born in Dandong, Liaoning Province.
He was Chief of Staff of the Jizhong Military Region.
[12] Cao Lihua, born in 1909 in Xingning County, Hunan Province (now Zixing).
He served as Chief of Staff of the Jinji-Luyu Military Region.
[13] Huang Yongsheng, then Commander of the Second Training Brigade of the Shaan-Gansu-Ningxia-Jin-Sui Joint Defense Force.
[14] Liu Zhuanlian (1912–1992), from Chaling County, Hunan Province.
He was Commander of the Second Detachment of the Eighth Route Army’s Southern Advance Unit.
[15] Yang Guofu (1905–1982), from Huoqiu County, Anhui Province.
He was Commander of the Seventh Division of the Shandong Military Region.
[16] Liang Xingchu, then Commander of the First Division of the Shandong Military Region.
[17] Xiao Hua (1916–1985), from Xingguo County, Jiangxi Province.
He served as Commander and Political Commissar of the East Manchuria Provisional Command.
[18] Wan Yi, born in 1907 in Jin County, Liaoning Province.
He was Deputy Commander of the Coastal Military Region and Commander of the Coastal Detachment.
[19] Huang Kecheng, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army.
[20] Soviet forces originally planned to withdraw from Northeast China by late November 1945, but the withdrawal was postponed until March 1946, completing by early May.
[21] Luo Ronghuan, then Second Political Commissar of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army.
[22] Ye Fei, then Commander of the First Column of the New Fourth Army.
However, due to changes in the CPC Central Military Commission’s plans, Ye Fei and his unit did not deploy to Northeast China.
[23] Tan Zheng (1907–1988), from Xiangxiang County, Hunan Province.
He served as Deputy Political Commissar and Director of Political Affairs of the Shaan-Gansu-Ningxia-Jin-Sui Joint Defense Force.
[24] Yang Dezhi, then Commander of the First Column of the Jinji-Luyu Field Army.
Due to changes in the CPC Central Military Commission’s plans, Yang Dezhi and his unit did not go to Northeast China.
[25] Chen Geng, then Commander of the Fourth Column of the Jinji-Luyu Military Region.
His unit also did not deploy to Northeast China following revised commission directives.
[26] Refers to the Nationalist forces’ advance and attacks on the liberated areas of North China in mid-August 1945, proceeding eastward and northward along three railway lines—the Ping-Sui, Tongpu, Pinghan, and Jinpu railways—in three separate columns. On the western front, Fu Zuoyi’s four corps advanced from western Sui, occupied Gui-su (now Hohhot) and Jining, then moved eastward along the Ping-Sui Railway toward Zhangjiakou. Hu Zongnan’s eight corps exited Tongguan from the Central Plains, with the main force advancing eastward along the Longhai Railway and a portion turning north onto the Tongpu Railway, preparing to continue eastward via the Zhengtai Railway to seize Shijiazhuang and advance toward Peiping and Tianjin. Meanwhile, Yan Xishan’s seven corps primarily controlled the Tongpu Railway corridor, while a contingent invaded the southeastern Jinji-Luyu region around Changzhi, which was under Communist control. On the central front, Sun Lianzhong’s three corps departed from western Henan near Zhengzhou, advancing northward along the Pinghan Railway with the aim of connecting with Hu Zongnan’s forces at Shijiazhuang. On the eastern front, Li Pinxian’s two corps occupied Pukou and Bengbu, moving northward along the Jinpu Railway to rendezvous with Li Yanyan’s four corps in Xuzhou. The Kuomintang’s objective was to swiftly secure strategic locations and transportation arteries in North China, fragment the liberated areas, open a passage to Northeast China, and compel the Communists to concede in negotiations through overwhelming military pressure.
[27] Refers to the Suiyuan Campaign, see note [1] on page 34 of this volume.
[28] The Shangdang Campaign, see note [8] on page 35 of this volume.
[29] The Pinghan Campaign, see note [1] on page 38 of this volume.
[30] Wu Huawen (1904–1962), from Yexian County, Shandong Province.
He served as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Fifth Route.
[31] Hu Zongnan, then Commander of the Nationalist Army’s First War Zone.
[32] Refers to the Kuomintang military conference presided over by Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing from November 9 to 16, 1945, during which a decision was made to crush Communist forces within six months and subsequently implement a “military encirclement” strategy across designated zones.
[33] Refers to the Shangdang Campaign, the Suiyuan Campaign, and the Handan Campaign.
[34] “Zhu” refers to Zhu De.
“Peng” refers to Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), from Xiangtan, Hunan Province, who at the time served as Vice Commander of the Eighteenth Group Army, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, and Chief of the General Staff.
[35] Sun Liangcheng (1893–1951), from Jinghai County, Hebei Province (now part of Tianjin).
He served as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Second Route.
[36] Zhang Lanfeng (1902–1952), from Zhecheng County, Henan Province.
He was Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Third Route.
[37] Liu Rumming (1895–1975), from Xian County, Hebei Province, who served as Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Army’s Fifth War Zone.
Cao Fulin (1891–1964), from Jingzhou County, Hebei Province, who held the position of Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Army’s Second Corps and Commander of the Fifty-Fifth Division.
Shang Zhen (1887–1978), from Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, who served as a member of the Nationalist government’s cabinet.
Feng Zhijian (1896–1954), from Gucheng County, Hebei Province, who served as Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Army’s Sixth War Zone and Commander of the Thirty-Third Corps.
[38] Refers to the Nationalist Army’s Thirty-Eighth Corps.
In May 1946, the corps’ deputy commander, Kong Congzhou, led a revolt with his unit in Gong County, Henan Province.
[39] Gao Shuxun (1898–1972), from Yanshan County, Hebei Province.
Originally serving as Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Army’s Eleventh War Zone and Commander of the New Eighth Army, he led a rebellion involving approximately ten thousand troops from his unit and local militia on October 30, 1945.
See note [1] on page 38 of this volume.
[40] Bai Chongxi (1893–1966), from Lingui County, Guangxi Province (now Guilin).
He served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Military Council.
[41] “Shaoqi” refers to Liu Shaoqi.
Another long march stretching thousands of miles is underway: over thirty thousand cadres dispatched to Northeast China are already en route. Peng Zhen [2] has reported receiving three thousand, not including those sent from Shandong.


Our newly formed field armies—counting both those already deployed and some currently moving—include: Nie Rongzhen’s [3] First Field Army, originally planned for seventy thousand troops but now fewer than that; He Long’s [4] Third Field Army, also intended for thirty thousand but now below that figure; Liu Bocheng’s [5] Seventh Field Army; Chen Yi’s [6] Seventh Field Army; Li Xiannian’s [7] Third Field Army; and Su Yu’s [8] Fifth Field Army.


Together with these six major military regions within China, plus one in Northeast China led by Lin Biao [9] with two hundred thousand troops, there are seven large military areas in total.


The six domestic regions comprise 320,000 field troops, while Northeast China accounts for another 200,000, bringing the grand total to 520,000. In a few more weeks, the reorganization should be substantially complete.


Sending 190,000 troops to Northeast China marks the first large-scale military deployment in the history of the Communist Party.
Ninety thousand have already arrived, and another 100,000 are en route.
Units under Li Yunchang [10] have reached 10,000; Sha Ke [11], 2,000; Cao Lihua [12], 2,000; Huang Yongsheng [13], 4,000; Liu Zhuanlian [14], 5,000; Yang Guofu [15], 7,000; Liang Xingchu [16], 7,000; Xiao Hua [17], 20,000; and Wan Yi [18], 15,000.
Huang Kecheng’s [19] force of 35,000 will cross the pass in a few days.
Li Yunchang arrived early, and his unit has since expanded to 100,000 troops.
Fighting is now raging at Shanhaiguan, having continued for a week.
From a timing perspective, we still have the last eighteen days of this month to act, as Soviet forces are scheduled to withdraw by the end of the month [20].
If Huang Kecheng’s troops reach Jinzhou, veteran fighters along that front will number over sixty thousand.
At Huludao and Yingkou, Nationalist forces have yet to land—and may not do so at all.
All combat is confined to Shanhaiguan, leaving us ample time.
Chiang Kai-shek plans to airlift additional troops, but the Americans are withholding pilots, and without the departure of Soviet forces, such air drops cannot proceed. If we can hold out at Shanhaiguan for another two weeks and prevent the Nationalists from landing at Huludao or Yingkou, securing these two objectives will give us a viable strategy.

We are currently mobilizing 101,000 troops: Luo Ronghuan’s [21] force of 40,000, Ye Fei’s [22] 22,000, Tan Zheng’s [23] contingent of 5,000, Yang Dezhi’s [24] 22,000, and Chen Geng’s [25] 12,000, forming a combined strike force against the Nationalist army.
We are transporting these troops by sea, six thousand at a time every three days, and so far, no incidents have occurred.
With a population of over thirty million in Northeast China, the number of cadres and soldiers we have sent there is already substantial.
Within China proper, we can say that the Nationalists’ three-pronged offensive [26] has been effectively broken.
In August of this year, Fu Zuoyi led a force of over sixty thousand troops eastward along the Ping-Sui Railway, occupying towns we had previously liberated. Their advance was aggressive.
After roughly a month of assembly and training for the troops of the Jinchaji and Jin-Sui Military Regions, our initial counterattack drove Fu’s forces back to Pingdiquan and continued onward toward Gui-su.
Yesterday, we launched a general assault on Gui-su, with plans to push further to Wuyuan and Linhe [27].
Fu’s original plan has thus been shattered. Even if we do not ultimately capture Gui-su or Baotou, any subsequent offensive he attempts will face significant difficulties.
In the Shangdang Campaign [28], Yan Xishan’s main force was annihilated, and twenty-seven officers were captured.
This victory holds great strategic significance, freeing us from concerns about our rear areas.
The Shangdang region serves as a key base for troop and supply mobilization.
The Pinghan Campaign [29], which lasted ten days, was a pivotal engagement among these operations, effectively halting the Nationalists’ northward advance with hundreds of thousands of troops.
Currently, thirty Nationalist divisions are concentrated between Tongguan and Xuzhou. Due to this battle, they are unable to advance further. Li Xiannian’s forces, together with the New Fourth Army in North Jiangsu, have successfully contained them.
Only two brigades of the New Fourth Army were initially transferred to Shandong, yet they joined with local Shandong forces to destroy Wu Huawen’s [30] unit. A few days later, four additional brigades arrived, totaling eighteen regiments, significantly bolstering our strength.
Along the Tongpu Railway, Chen Geng’s column captured Hongdong and Zhaocheng.

Following Chen Geng’s redeployment from Taiyue, several regiments there must now be organized to guard against Hu Zongnan [31].
Chiang Kai-shek convened a meeting in Chongqing [32], ostensibly to discuss strategies for countering us.
At present, the Kuomintang’s maximum available strength amounts to 127 divisions (49 corps). However, the new First Division in Guangzhou can muster only a single regiment, and the Sixth Corps in Nanjing can barely send a detachment to Pukou. Therefore, the effective number of deployable corps does not exceed fifty.
We have already neutralized nine of their corps, leaving forty remaining.
Reinforcements are now difficult for them to assemble. Beyond garrison duties, only about half of their forces are capable of field operations, whereas our own field armies are largely in place.
During this period, we have seized 200,000 firearms.
Our policy is twofold: to pursue negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek while simultaneously preparing for inevitable conflict. By adopting a dual approach similar to his own, we avoid letting diplomatic efforts compromise our military preparations. We have concentrated our forces and conducted three major campaigns [33], while also dispatching cadres to Northeast China.
In essence, we anticipate Chiang’s aggression and are resolute in our response.
It would be premature to claim that we have secured control over Northeast China or achieved dominance in North China. Only after decisive victories can such assertions be made. It is then that we can raise the issue of Northeast China’s autonomy.
Should we control Northeast China, would we bar the Kuomintang from entering? The answer is yes—but only conditionally.
However, the Kuomintang has consistently sought to prevent our own presence. Today, the U.S.-Kuomintang alliance is exerting immense pressure on us, leaving us with no choice but to resist through force.
Negotiations remain necessary.
We will not establish a central government. Should Chiang issue a decree to suppress us, we will simply demand its revocation. We could also convene a conference of representatives from the liberated areas. If he dissolves the Eighteenth Group Army, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai [34] would proceed to form a People’s Liberation Army. Furthermore, we might send telegrams demanding the cancellation of erroneous policies.
There is also the possibility that Chiang may refrain from issuing such a decree.
The United States is indeed interfering in China’s internal affairs, yet it possesses vulnerabilities. A formal declaration of non-interference would be beneficial.

There is also the risk of defection among auxiliary units, such as Sun Liangcheng [35], who may switch sides, or Zhang Lanfeng [36].
Other potential defectors include Liu Rumming, Cao Fulin, Shang Zhen, and Feng Zhijian [37], along with the Thirty-Eighth Army [38].
Gao Shuxun [39] has had a profound impact; his appeal has spread widely, prompting celebrations nationwide.
Road-blocking has also become a propaganda tool. They accuse us of obstructing demobilization, while we maintain that it is one of the measures to prevent civil war.
We established a Road-Blocking Command, balancing public and private interests. Local residents have actively contributed rails and sleepers, demonstrating strong participation.
Chiang’s forces are advancing aggressively, placing tremendous pressure on us. Resistance remains our only viable option.
Failure to engage would almost certainly result in our annihilation, and even if we do fight, we still risk defeat. Why, then, should we not fight? Our chances of emerging victorious are very high.
Could continued fighting escalate into a world war? I believe not.
The Soviet Union needs to recover after the war and has no desire for another global conflict. Such a war could only be triggered by an attack on the Soviet Union itself.
Given the current circumstances and without Soviet assistance, we have little to fear.
While the United States is indeed intervening in China, its stance will depend on our continued successes.
Many doubted the possibility of defeating the Soviet Union during World War II; even greater skepticism exists regarding our ability to prevail today.
Bai Chongxi’s [40] secretary has stated that Bai firmly believes Chiang’s forces cannot win.
If we can sustain our resistance for six months, both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States may reconsider their positions.
Liberated areas are now focusing on production and rent reductions, while newly liberated zones are launching comprehensive, sweeping rent-reduction campaigns.

Economic development poses a major challenge in Northeast China. Who will manage enterprises like Benxi Lake and Fushun? As Comrade Liu Shaoqi [41] has already indicated, whoever is best positioned should take responsibility.
Those operating trains along the Ping-Sui Railway today are largely elderly individuals.
Northeast China accounts for eighty percent of the nation’s industry. Revitalizing this industrial base is feasible with the assistance of Japanese technicians.
Printed based on the verbatim record of speeches preserved in the Central Archives.
Notes [1] This is Mao Zedong’s address at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Peng Zhen, then Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Political Commissar of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army.
[3] Nie Rongzhen, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Jinchaji Military Region.
[4] He Long, then Commander of the Jin-Sui Military Region.
[5] Liu Bocheng, then Commander of the Jinji-Luyu Military Region.
[6] Chen Yi, then Commander of the New Fourth Army and Commander of the Shandong Military Region.
[7] Li Xiannian, then Commander of the Central Plains Military Region.
[8] Su Yu, then Commander of the Central China Field Army.
[9] Lin Biao, then Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army.
[10] Li Yunchang, born in 1908 in Leting County, Hebei Province.
He served as Second Deputy Commander of the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army.


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