The Present Orientation Regarding
Propaganda and Negotiations1
 (November 7 and 8, 1945)
From AB to CD on November 7:
American policy merits close attention, and the opinions of our friends2 are
worth considering. But given that the Americans and Chiang persist in their policy of attacks, we cannot possibly yield, and self-defense is our only option. In
the Northeast, there was an exchange of gunfire at the Shanhai Pass on the 3rd,
and with the support of American troops, the Fifteenth Division has launched an
offensive from Qinhuangdao. Beforehand they demanded that our army retreat
from the Shanhai Pass and evacuate the railroad, but our local forces refused to
accede, so the other side attacked and we routed them. Whether Shenyang is won
or lost will be decided by the outcome on the battlefield; if within this month we
can wipe out the first two or three divisions that attack and gain enough time to
amass our military strength and organize and train our reserves (which will take
two months), and then we will be able to basically annihilate their attacking force,
the Northeast will likely be ours, and if the Guomindang tries to make a move at
that time, we will have something to talk about. At present, we can refrain from
making public our propaganda and demands for an autonomous army and comprehensive self-government, but war is unavoidable. If we are unsuccessful in
battle and Chiang takes Shenyang and Changchun, then our side can obtain only
second-rate localities. Even if this is the case, war is the only way to solve the
problem, as Taonan, Longjiang, Jiamusi, and other such places cannot be gained
through negotiations. If the Central Army pulls back a bit from North China,
then during the negotiations matters can be raised in an appropriate way; there
can be differences between propaganda and negotiations, but the solution to the
North China problem likewise can only be decided through warfare. At present,
the other side is using negotiations purely as a stalling tactic and it has no sincere
desire to resolve any problems. Every single arrangement by the other side is for
the purpose of exterminating our Party. There are many weaknesses in our side’s
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 69–70, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
1.  The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent this telegram to its
representatives in Chongqing.
2.  The editors of the Wenji indicate that this means the Soviets.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-79

propaganda, and the ideas you put forth are quite right; we should adopt the stance
of the “aggrieved,” take the centrists into account, and not be rattling sabers and
drawing daggers but rather show the utmost forbearance. The general situation,
however, is that we are on the inner front and the other side is on the outer front;
we are on the defensive and the other side is on the offensive, and after a period
all sides will see things clearly. Our present guiding orientation for negotiation
is to allow a certain amount of leeway as long as our hands are not tied in such a
way that we have nothing to say in future. Please consider the whole picture, draw
up a detailed draft, and add your analysis for us, so that after we have thoroughly
studied the matter, we may present it to the other side.
From AB to CD on November 8: Before this telegram was sent, we received
your telegram of November 7,3 and our opinions are in complete accord, so things
should be done as stated in your telegram. Today Xinhua News Agency will publish in detail the designation numbers of the more than one million Guomindang
troops that are attacking us, which will go a long way toward exposing the deception of the other side.
3.  The editors of Wenji indicate that this refers to a telegram to the Central Committee
from Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei.