Jia, Yi, and Xun sent a brief telegram to Bing and Ding: All details are contained in Telegram No. 2.


(1) At present, during the negotiations, our positions on the issue of restoring transportation have become somewhat passive. We must carefully consider our next steps and regain the initiative. It has been decided that tomorrow’s edition of the Liberation Daily will publish a statement by a CPC spokesperson [3], emphasizing the need to immediately halt the civil war. The three major issues—surrender procedures, collaborationist forces, and regional autonomy—must be resolved first before transportation can be restored; otherwise, such restoration would amount to aiding the civil war. With regard to the surrender question, it is imperative that the liberated areas assume responsibility for receiving the surrender, while all other troops are to withdraw to their original defensive positions.


(2) The Handan Campaign [4] has yielded a large quantity of documents proving that the government possesses a comprehensive plan for a full-scale anti-CPC civil war. Please consider whether we can use this as an opportunity to adopt a firm stance. Do not revert to the earlier four-point proposal [5]. Instead, state plainly that while the government claims to be negotiating, it is simultaneously launching a massive offensive and making extensive troop movements. All its talks are nothing but deception, and we cannot place any trust in it. If the government wishes to gain our confidence, it must immediately resolve the three major issues of surrender (including troop withdrawal and redeployment), collaborationist forces, and regional autonomy.


(3) Not only are we prohibited from advancing along the transportation routes where they are present, but they are likewise barred from entering areas under our control. Any forces that have already penetrated these zones must withdraw; otherwise, a civil war is inevitable.


(4) Both sides should refrain from stationing troops along the transportation lines. Those units already stationed there must return to their original defensive positions and may not remain within our liberated areas.


(5) After both sides have withdrawn their forces from the transportation routes, administration should be entrusted to the autonomous governments of the liberated areas.


(6) We should not agree to the establishment of a transportation inspection commission. Instead, the three issues of surrender (including troop withdrawal and redeployment), collaborationist forces, and regional autonomy—the root causes of the civil war—must be resolved first. Once these issues are addressed, the liberated areas will take charge of restoring transportation; at present, however, resumption is absolutely out of the question.


(7) There is no need to rush a response to the six points proposed by the other side, nor should we fear their public announcement. In fact, Wu Guozhen [6] had already made a statement to the Associated Press on the 4th, and this evening we will issue our own critical commentary here.


(8) We agree to postpone discussion of the Northeast issue for the time being.


(9) Regarding the exposure of the civil war and U.S. military interference, several relevant organs have been instructed to mobilize and gather more material, which can be significantly expanded.


(10) News from Xi’an indicates that Chiang [7] has ordered Hu Zongnan [8] to proceed immediately to Zhengzhou and launch a large-scale offensive. The other side shows no sign of backing down, which warrants close attention.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.


Notes [1] This is a telegram from the CPC Central Committee to the CPC delegation in Chongqing.


[2] Refers to Zhou Enlai’s telegram to the CPC Central Committee dated November 4, 1945.


[3] Namely “The Truth About the Kuomintang’s Offensive” (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 1167–1170).


[4] The Handan Campaign, also known as the Pinghan Campaign, see Note [1] on p. 38 of this volume.


[5] Refers to the four provisional measures proposed by Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei in their telegram to the CPC Central Committee on October 26, 1945. See Note [2] on p. 52 of this volume.


[6] Wu Guozhen (1903–1984), native of Jianshi County, Hubei Province. At the time, he served as Minister of Propaganda of the KMT Central Committee.


[7] “Chiang” refers to Chiang Kai-shek.


[8] Hu Zongnan was then Commander-in-Chief of the KMT’s First War Area.