Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations
Delivered in the Auditorium of the
Yan’an Party School
(October 17, 1945)
Comrades, let us talk about the present situation. First, about the negotiations in
Chongqing. This time the negotiations have lasted for dozens of days. As you all
know, the results have been published in the newspapers. The representatives of
the two parties are continuing to negotiate.
The negotiations have been held against the background of a new situation.
The two parties held many negotiating sessions during the War of Resistance, but
none of them bore any fruit. This time, however, agreement has been reached on
some points, whereas there has been no agreement on some other points. A compromise will be necessary in the end, but this will take some time.
The agreed-upon points are ones that were not settled previously. But they still
are only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. A very great effort
must be made before they can be turned into reality.
Anyway, the negotiations this time have borne fruit. During the negotiations,
some comrades, both in Yan’an and Chongqing, are pessimistic. They think that
is no hope for peace and compromise and that a civil war will break out. This idea
is shared by some foreigners. Nonetheless, the results have shown that hope does
exist. Others are too optimistic. They believe an agreement will soon be reached
and everything can be resolved based only on our willingness. Many comrades
Our source for this text is from Gang’ersi Wuhan daxue zongbu, zhongnan minyuan
geweihui xuanchuanbu and Wuhan shiyuan geweihui xuanchuanbu, eds., Mao Zedong
sixiang wansui (1968), pp. 74–79. This report was revised and included in the 4th volume
of Xuanji (1960), pp. 1155–64, and its title was changed to “On the Chungking Negotiations.” Like many other speeches by Mao, this report has been greatly revised. More
importantly, we still cannot find the master copy used by the editors of Xuanji. The master
copy and the edition of Mao Zedong sixiang wansui used here may not be the same version. In other words, Mao’s speech was recorded by different people, and their respective
records are quite different. The Wansui text and The Xuanji text can almost be regarded as
two different works. Therefore, we decided to translate the full text of the Wansui text, but
not to mark the differences with the Xuanji text. See the English edition of Xuanji, Vol. 4,
pp. 53–63, and the entry “On the Chongqing Negotiations,” supra.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-47

in Yan’an and the Great Rear Areas think in this way. These two ideas are not
right. It has already been proved and will continue to be proved by the facts. Let
us talk about the agreements on the principles of peace and democratic rights. The
two parties accepted the principle of peace and agreed that civil war should be
averted and they should cooperate in peace to build a new China. But, in fact, in
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi—
where there are Liberated Areas—fighting is going on or preparations for fighting
are being made. Because the Guomindang has mobilized so many troops to attack
us, we cannot wait until they attack.
The very first article of the “October 10 Agreement” is about peace. Don’t
these words on paper contradict the reality? Yes, they do. That is why we say it
still will require effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. And we
should be well-prepared for when the Guomindang launches a major strike on
our troops in the Liberated Areas. Why does the question of the Liberated Areas
remain unsettled? Because long ago, the Guomindang made up its mind to occupy
the major cities, launch a major offensive attack against us, and wipe us out. Most
of all, it wants to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, it hopes to worsen our situation and to improve its own situation. On the one hand, this is a contradiction
between the thoughts of the Guomindang and the thoughts of the people all over
the world. Peace, though written into the agreement, has not in fact been realized.
Who knows what will happen in the future? Now there is large-scale fighting.
For example, in Shanxi Yan Xishan sent twelve divisions to attack us. Shouldn’t
we follow the policy of tit-for-tat and fight for every inch of land? This time,
we engaged in tit-for-tat and did a very good job of fighting. In other words, we
wiped out all twelve divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men, and we
only deployed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 forces, 35,000 were destroyed, 2,000
fled, and 1,000 were scattered. Such fighting will continue. They desperately want
to seize our Liberated Areas. This seems difficult to resolve. Why are they so
anxious to fight? Isn’t it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands? Yes,
but that is only what we think and what the people think. They think differently.
If they thought so too, then there would be unity and we would all be “comrades”
gathered here in the auditorium. But not all people in the world are comrades.
They cannot see why they should not oppose us. For our part, we cannot see why
we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. When two “can’t-see-whys” come
together, fighting begins. When it is natural that they will grab our Liberated
Areas, then we will fight back. Since there are two “can’t-see-whys,” then why
have they engaged in negotiations? And why have they concluded the joint communiqué and declared lasting cooperation? In this world, things are complicated
and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from many different
perspectives, not from just one perspective. Our thinking is thus complicated. In
Chongqing, some people think that Chiang Kaishek is unreliable and deceitful
and that negotiations with him will lead to nowhere. I was told so by many people whom I met, including some members of the Guomindang. I told them what

they said was justified and well-founded and that we are firmly convinced by
eighteen years of experience that this will be the case. The Guomindang and the
Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting, and
sure to break with each other. But that is only one aspect of the matter. The other
aspect is that many factors are bound to make Chiang Kaishek have misgivings.
Among these, there are three main factors: opposition to a civil war by the people
in the Great Rear Areas and in the Liberated Areas, the international situation, and
the might of the people and the army in the Liberated Areas led by the Communist
Party. The majority of people in the Great Rear Areas and the people in the newly
recovered areas desire peace and require democracy. People who have not been
to Chongqing do not feel this way. It is only when I was there in Chongqing that
I had this profound sense of the warm support given to us by the broad masses of
people and friends. They are dissatisfied with the Guomindang government. Many
capitalists are dissatisfied because of the economic panic. They called on me and
asked me to talk to them, and they also invited me to dinner. Some college professors, even including some from Central University, said they no longer wanted to
teach in Chongqing. I tried to persuade them to continue there, but they seemed
impatient. Some figures from cultural, theatrical, and film circles said they did not
want to perform anymore. I again persuaded them, but they still expressed their
unwillingness and some even wept. They had hoped that my visit there would
generally bring about peace and resolve everything. I told them I had come to be
examined. Who are the examiners? You and the Chinese people at large. I am
afraid I cannot fulfill your expectations. How I wish everything will be settled.
Yet, I told them, things are not determined only by me or by the Communist Party.
If only other parts of China were like the Liberated Areas! There is real freedom
in the Liberated Areas, where one can teach or work as long as one is willing to go
there. But I was just a guest in Chongqing and I was invited there for the negotiations. That is also the case for many foreigners. The U.S. government did a good
job fighting against Japan. But it also had many reactionary policies, for example
supporting Chiang Kaishek and opposing the people. That being said, you should
not take it for granted that all foreigners are reactionaries. I saw many foreigners,
including some journalists, air force fighters, economists, and even some from
the foreign embassies, who were sympathetic with us and enthusiastic about the
negotiations. In other words, most foreigners, dissatisfied with China’s reactionary forces, are willing to see the rise of the Chinese people. Among the foreign
countries, there is one country that is different. That is the Soviet Union. It has
signed a treaty with China and has legal relations with China.
Is the treaty beneficial to China? At most, it is beneficial and absolutely beneficial to the Chinese people. In the very beginning, some from the Guomindang
and the U.S. government happily thought the Sino-Soviet Treaty would be good
for the Guomindang and would isolate the Communist Party. Nevertheless,
after only a bit more than one month, they changed their attitude. One general
from the Guomindang said: The Sino-Soviet Treaty gave them a shot, a shot of

malaria rather than a shot of blood, making them feel alternately hot and cold.
These words were not from our mouths, but from the mouths of the Guomindang.
Today, I’d like not to make any more comments on this point. This year, in every
Liberated Area as well as in Yan’an, on the day of the October Revolution we
should celebrate the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and call for earnest implementation of the treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, China is forbidden to join
any bloc against the Soviet Union. The Chiang Kaishek government, as the legal
Chinese government, signed this treaty. It is best that the Chiang Kaishek government signed the treaty because all previous anti-Soviet talk came from this
reactionary clique. After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, it is impossible for
Chiang Kaishek to wage such a large-scale civil war against the Communist Party
as it did in 1927. This is the general trend. Things have changed under the treaty
and the launch of a civil war cannot now be decided merely by Chiang Kaishek.
In other words, it is Chiang Kaishek’s subjective desire to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his
way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. At present, all Chinese people, not
only people in the Liberated Areas but also among the Allies, do not wish to see
a civil war. The outbreak of a civil war in China will have a direct bearing on the
entire world. Moreover, our Party is not the same as it was in 1927. Our status
has improved. Previously our Party was not recognized as a legal equal, but now
it has been recognized, which is clearly revealed in the joint communiqué. This is
the first time the Communist Party has become legitimate and has been treated as
an equal. In addition, work in the Liberated Areas and by the Communist Party in
other parts of China has impacted all of China and even the entire world. Against
this backdrop, Chiang was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going
to Chongqing to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chongqing on August 28.
During that first evening, I told Wang Shijie that the country has needed peace
and unity ever since the September 18 Incident of 1931. We had asked for peace
and unity, but it never materialized. Peace and unity materialized only after the
Xi’an Incident of 1936 before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on July 7,
1937. I mentioned this point not only to other representatives of the Guomindang
but also to Chiang Kaishek. During those eight years we fought together against
Japan. This was the main factor, though the civil war never really ended—we
had different fighting methods and there were various conflicts amongst us. To
say that there was no civil war is deceptive and does not square with the facts,
but the general trend of fighting against Japan was not overshadowed. During the
past eight years, we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate as long as
they made some changes. At our Seventh Party Congress, we declared the policy
of “washing faces.” We wanted them to “wash their faces.” They refused, so our
desire was not fulfilled. But now they have proposed washing; they washed, and
we have accepted. This time we have reached many agreements concerning the
principles of peace and democratic rights. On the one hand, it will require efforts
to turn these words on paper into reality. On the other hand, we should not deem

these agreements as outright deceptions. This is determined by a variety of forces.
The power of the people in the Liberated Areas and the Great Rear Areas as
well as the general trend in the international situation are bound to make Chiang
Kaishek a little more realistic.
The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation.
Everyone agrees there are many contradictions. In the negotiations between the
Guomindang and our Party, why is there agreement on some issues and not on
others? Why does the communiqué speak of peace and unity, while fighting is
actually still going on? Some comrades just cannot understand such contradictions. Other comrades cannot understand why we are willing to negotiate with
Chiang Kaishek, who has always been anti-Communist. Was our Party right or
wrong in deciding at its Seventh Congress that we were willing to negotiate with
the Guomindang, provided that it changed its policy? What I have said is meant
to answer these questions.
Some comrades have asked why we should concede the eight Liberated Areas.
It is a pity to make this concession, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity?
Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built by the people with their sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the
people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas that are to be conceded.
Why should we concede these areas? All means of propaganda in China, except
for those in the Liberated Areas, are now controlled by the Guomindang. They
are all rumor factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the
rumor that the Communist Party only wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to
principles, it is permissible to make certain concessions. It should be known that
this is not our first concession in dealing with Chiang Kaishek; in the past, we
made even larger concessions. Do you know we formerly formed the “Workers’
and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government” in the Central Soviet Area? But, at the
beginning of spring and summer of 1937, we voluntarily conceded this government and area to bring the Guomindang into the War of Resistance. In the past, we
also carried out an agrarian revolution by confiscating the land of the landlords.
But to rally the landlords around the nationwide resistance, we changed our policy
to one of reducing rents and interest. For a concession this time, we will not set
up a separate kitchen and form a new government; we will continue the policy
of reducing rents and interest rather than the policy of giving land to the tiller. In
terms of areas, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have revealed our willingness to concede and we have completely exposed the Guomindang’s rumors
before the people of all of China. This is also the case in terms of the problem of
the armed forces. First, we proposed cutting our present strength to forty-eight
divisions. As the Guomindang has 236 divisions, this means our strength would
be only about one-sixth of the total. But Guomindang propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. Therefore, we proposed further cutting our strength to forty-three divisions and we allowed them

to maintain 236 divisions. Then the Guomindang said it would reduce its armed
forces to 120 divisions, 100 divisions, or even 90 divisions. We said we would
reduce by the same proportion to twenty divisions, which would still be only onesixth of theirs. In the Guomindang army the proportion of officers to soldiers is
unduly large and the complement of a division is less than 6,000. By this standard,
should we surrender our guns to them? No, not that either. If we hand over our
guns, won’t the Guomindang have too many? The arms of the people, every gun
and every bullet, must all be retained and must not be handed over. But we still
proposed cutting our strength. Therefore, the Guomindang can say nothing more
and all their rumors are bankrupt. About recognition of the rest of the Liberated
Areas in the south, will the Guomindang recognize their existence? We proposed
this question as many as five times in the past and there will still be arguments
back and forth in the future. Since fighting for every inch of land is our principle,
why have we conceded almost every inch of land? You may feel puzzled. In
fact, fighting for every inch of land is a slogan. Just imagine, they have already
placed their beds there. But if we are also there, they will not sleep easily. They
are returning to Nanjing and will therefore fight for those places in Zhejiang at all
costs because those places are just near their beds. Therefore, we have to concede.
Moreover, we are not able to hold these areas. Why shouldn’t we be generous
and voluntarily withdraw? We even should withdraw from some areas as soon as
possible! Take Guangdong as an example. General Wang Zhen took a long and
tortuous route but finally arrived there. But not long after he arrived, the Japanese
invaders surrendered! He had to return. This shouldn’t have been a big matter.
But what an arduous way he and his army traversed from Yan’an to Guangdong
and then to Hubei! The Guomindang troops attacked them all the way. Some of
the troops blocked them from the front while others chased them from behind.
Nonetheless, they didn’t stop us. We moved ahead unhindered as if the Monkey
King were in Heaven. Finally, we retreated to the north of the Yangzi River.
Arduous as it was, we won a great victory. In the negotiations, we also made
some concessions in the Liberated Areas of Hunan. Take the Liberated Areas in
eastern Zhejiang as another example. Although Gu Zhutong’s troops stood in our
way of retreat, finally we arrived near Shanghai, rather than being forced to cross
the Yangzi River. Calculating these gains and losses in a holistic way, we find the
gains outweighed the losses. The principle of fighting for every inch of land still
works, because our losses in one place are soon compensated for in another place.
We lost one inch in one place but we gained one foot in another place. Therefore,
we gained 11 inches.
How to engage in “tit-for-tat” depends on the situation. Is tit-for-tat only
reflected in not participating in the negotiations? Sometimes, not participating
in the negotiations is tit-for-tat, and sometimes participating in the negotiations
is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to participate before, and we were also right
to participate this time; in both cases we engaged in tit-for-tat. They sent three
telegrams in succession to invite us, and we finally accepted. But they were totally

unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. We exposed the rumor spread
by the Guomindang that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity. Our
task now is to uphold the agreement, to demand that the Guomindang honor it,
and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely,
and then peace will follow. Take the fighting in the Shangdang area as an example. This area, surrounded by the Taihang, Taiyue, and Zhongtiao Mountains, is
like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, so the reactionary Yan Xishan sent his
troops to grab it. We wiped them out, and they were convinced. Wipe out some,
some persuasion; wipe out some more, more persuasion; wipe out the whole lot,
complete persuasion. China’s problems are complicated, and our brains must also
be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we will fight back. But peace will not
be broken. This is determined by the general trend.
Now a few more words about our work. Some comrades present here will
be leaving for the front. Some will stay here for study and work. For all of you,
I must offer suggestions. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with one another
for the opportunity to go to the front. If they want to go, we will give them sendoffs. Please rest assured that these “send-offs” are not like those given by the
Guomindang to Wang Zhen. Such an active and fervent spirit is valuable, but I
want to throw in some cold water. There are a few comrades who have mistaken
ideas, who don’t think of the many difficulties to be overcome and believe that
everything will be plain sailing at the front and they will have an easier time than
in Yan’an. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. Some comrades want to go to the Northeast to recuperate rather than to work. I think it is
better to recuperate in Yan’an than in other places. I went to Chongqing, but I feel
Yan’an is more suitable. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes,
it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. In those places there are difficulties
for us to overcome and resolve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome
these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is hard. Hard work is like a load
placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Before us there are two loads—one
weighs 40 kilos and the other weighs 50 kilos. Which one should we choose? (Of
course, the choice is only applicable to people with enough strength; we cannot
expect a 14-year-old boy to shoulder such heavy work.) Some people prefer a
lighter load, but they feel embarrassed to speak out. Therefore, they dodge about,
asking “how about the weather.” Yet other comrades are different. Rather than
asking about the weather, they ask which load is heavier. On hearing the answer,
they directly shoulder the heavy load. We should all learn from their spirit.
Many local comrades will be leaving their native places for the front in the
Northeast. All the comrades going to the Northeast should be psychologically
prepared, and, once there, they should take root, blossom, and bear fruit. Not
too long ago, Liberation Daily published an article entitled “To Take Root and
Blossom in a Local Place” (published on August 28). This is a good article and
it is worthy of being broadcast. Many southern-born comrades who joined the

Eighth Route Army took root and blossomed in Yan’an, and now they are going
to the Northeast to take root, blossom, and bear fruit. The place is like the people
and those few going there are like the seeds. The seeds must be planted in the
soil. They must unite with the people, take root, and blossom. We must unite with
the masses; the more masses we unite with, the better. This is also the line laid
down at our Seventh Party Congress. Wherever our comrades go, they should
shoulder the 50-kilo load when two loads are placed before them. They should
choose to eat one less steamed bun and leave one more steamed bun for the others. Comrades acting in this way are the best comrades and the best Communists,
deserving respect and admiration.
For those who will stay here, I also have some words. I hear that some comrades need to be persuaded to stay here. Some comrades may ask why they are
asked to stay here to study while others are allowed to eat and work for a better life. Why am I being kept in Yan’an while others can go the Northeast? Of
course, going to the front is a revolutionary requirement and it is good that some
comrades are active and fervent in choosing to go to the front. Still, Yan’an also
needs comrades. If we now were to hold a vote to decide whether to abolish the
Central Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region Government,
I am afraid none of you present would raise your hand. The work of the Central
Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region Government also
needs to be done. Therefore, not everyone should leave for the front. Otherwise,
who will do the work here? So, I have to decide whether you stay or whether
you leave. Some people say that the lot has already been cast and the Central
Committee is about to leave. Why not leave before the Central Committee? I tell
them that the lot has not yet been cast, so the Central Committee will remain here.
When will the Central Committee leave? We will not leave until such a situation
exists that moving is better than not moving. Now it is better not to leave, even
though leaving is very easy. “The tortoise creates a bumpy, mud road at the front,
so the tortoise in the back can follow.” This will help those left behind. Since tens
of thousands have tested the road, isn’t it easy for the Central Committee to follow that path and leave? Nevertheless, we still need comrades and cadres to work
here in the Central Committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Border Region
Government, as well as in their lower organs. Therefore, those who stay here, I
advise you had better focus your minds on your work.
The Chinese Revolution is a long struggle and victory must be won gradually. It is unrealistic for us to swallow the whole of China in just one mouthful.
The results of the negotiations depend on how we struggle. In about half a year,
the situation will still be full of unrest. We must struggle to achieve a situation
that generally favors the people of the whole country. While the prospects are
bright (despite so many difficulties), the road will have many twists and turns.
Our Seventh Party Congress assumed that the difficulties will be many, for we
prefer to assume there will be more difficulties rather than fewer difficulties. Some
comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts: we

should recognize as many difficulties as there are. We Communists, as realists,
should not adopt a “policy of non-recognition.” Such a policy of non-recognition
can only be applied to the traitor Wang Kemin and his ilk. Those traitors should
be beheaded. Nonetheless, this policy is not applicable to difficulties. We must
recognize difficulties, analyze them, and combat them. I hope that comrades,
whether they leave or remain, will all think in this way and avoid looking at problems one-sidedly.
The world after World War II has a bright future. This is the general trend.
Does the failure of the conference of the foreign ministers of the five Allied powers in London mean that a third world war is about to break out? No. A third
world war will not break out soon. There will be compromise. Compromise will
be advantageous; in the past, compromise was advantageous for fighting against
fascism and now it is advantageous for safeguarding peace. Why will there be
compromise between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries? There is
no need to explain this. A third world war would be a war against the people and
against Yan’an, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and communism. Therefore, the
proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to an anti-Soviet
and anti-Communist war, which will make war impossible. In Chongqing, I told
many people that people around the age of 40 all watched the outbreak of two
world wars. World War I began in August 1914 and ended in 1918; World War
II began in 1939 or 1941 and ended in August 1945. Between these two world
wars there was an interval of twenty-eight years. People who died before August
1914 and those who will be born after August 1945 are not blessed enough to have
observed the outbreak of two world wars within thirty years.
In the half a million years of human history, it is only during the last thirty
years that world wars have been fought. Why have two world wars broken out in
the last thirty years? It is because of the collision of the two classes—the capitalists and the socialists. When they meet each other, they will squeeze each other
and conflicts will be unavoidable. When there are large conflicts, large-scale wars
will emerge. After World War I, the world made great progress. After World War
II, the world is sure to make even faster progress. After World War I, the Soviet
Union was born and scores of communist parties that did not yet exist were established. After World War II, what changes will take place in the Soviet Union?
How will China change? What changes will occur in Europe? What will happen
in the United States? The political and class consciousness of the proletariat and
the people of the United States are much higher, and the progressive forces of the
world are more united. Therefore, a third world war can be avoided, the bluster of
the reactionaries can be frustrated, and the world can be progressive and bright.
We should engage in constant propaganda among the people on these points. At
the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there will be
twists and turns along the way and there are no straight roads in the world. We
must be prepared to follow a tortuous road and not try to get things on the cheap.

It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will get down
on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects for the world
are bright, the road will have many twists and turns. By uniting all the people in
China and the people in the world at large, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and achieve victory.