To All Comrades of the Central Bureau of Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan: Under your leadership, you have successfully concluded the Shangdang Campaign [2], thereby creating the conditions for our forces to achieve another victory of equal or greater magnitude.  All forces under your command, except those in Taiyue who are fully engaged along the Tongpu Railway to secure the necessary gains, must concentrate their efforts in Taihang and Jin-Hebei-Luyu to ensure victory in the Pinghan Campaign.  The forthcoming new Pinghan Campaign is aimed at repelling the main offensive by the Nationalist forces and at securing a peaceful settlement. The outcome of this campaign will have an extremely significant impact on the overall situation. You should be prepared to devote more than one and a half months to a series of successive battles, with the objective of annihilating roughly half or even more of the 80,000 stubborn enemy troops before the issue can be resolved.  It is hoped that you will draw upon the experience of the Shangdang Campaign, mobilize all available resources in the Taihang and Jin-Hebei-Luyu regions, place Liu and Deng [3] personally in command, meticulously organize each engagement, and thus secure a second victory comparable to that of Shangdang.  Among the 80,000 stubborn enemy troops, several corps possess considerable combat strength and should not be underestimated. However, these forces have recently arrived, are unfamiliar with the local terrain and the sentiments of the populace, lack unified command structures, face difficulties in resupply, are eager for quick success, and tend to underestimate our capabilities—conditions that provide us with opportunities to exploit.

It is imperative to encourage both the military and the civilian population, maintain unity, seize every favorable moment, and, in the spirit of the Shangdang Campaign, strive for victory in the Pinghan Campaign.  Central Committee, Youxiao Day, 2nd Year: Liu, Deng, Bo, Zhang, and Li [4] have received the Youyou telegram [5]. The deployment is quite appropriate. Once additional reinforcements arrive and our forces have had time to rest and regroup, the enemy will inevitably become hungry and exhausted, exposing its weaknesses. At that point, we should concentrate our main forces to target these vulnerabilities, destroy one or two enemy divisions, and decisively demoralize the enemy.  The Hu detachment in Shijiazhuang [6] sent a Youyou telegram [7] to Hu [8], ordering one division to cooperate with Hou Ruyong [9] in advancing toward Gaoyi to link up with the forces moving north from Anyang. This unit’s combat effectiveness is inferior to that of the enemy directly confronting us, and local forces can be employed to delay its advance. There are a total of eight stubborn enemy divisions stationed in Shijiazhuang and Xinxiang, while you are facing six divisions; together, this amounts to no more than fourteen divisions. When you eliminate one or two of the enemy divisions directly opposed to you, reinforcements may be dispatched from both the north and the south. Therefore, you must be ready to destroy a total of four or five enemy divisions over several successive engagements, which would fundamentally alter the strategic situation.

On the Suiyuan front [10], the forces commanded by Nie and He [11]—numbering over 50,000 men—began operations on the 18th. The enemy proved exceptionally tenacious; initially, we managed only to destroy one regiment, rout one cavalry division and one infantry division, and neutralize several miscellaneous units. After a week of hard fighting, we captured Fengzhen and Liangcheng, and by the 24th had captured Jining, marking a turning point in the campaign. He Wending [12], commanding the 26th Division (a Chiang Kai-shek faction unit), was destroyed by our forces at Zhuozi Mountain, prompting Fu Zuoyi [13] to order his main force—the 101st and 32nd Divisions—to retreat westward. We are currently pursuing them toward Gui-su [14].

In the Eyu region, my Fifth Field Army Corps has now been formed and has occupied Tongbai, where it has joined forces with Wang Dai and Wang Zhen [15]. I have instructed them to act independently and coordinate their operations with you.

It is essential that you pay close attention to mobilizing the people to participate in the war effort, implementing scorched-earth tactics against the enemy, and concentrating all possible resources to defeat the immediate threat. Food supplies must be planned with a long-term perspective in mind.  Military Commission, Yougan Day, 3rd Year: Three divisions of the Sixteenth Army are being dispatched south as reinforcements. Upon reaching Gaoyi, it is anticipated that one division will be positioned at Lincheng, Baixiang, and Gaoyi to safeguard our rear and flanks, while the other two divisions will continue their advance southward. If we launch a vigorous mine warfare campaign using local units and militia, misleading the enemy into believing that we have a major force deployed in the area, we could delay their advance for many days, giving us valuable time to first eliminate the enemy directly confronting us and then deal with any reinforcing units—a highly advantageous strategy. You are currently facing six enemy divisions, with two additional divisions from the Sixteenth Army, bringing the total to just eight. By adopting a policy of destroying the enemy piecemeal and concentrating overwhelming superiority to obliterate one division at a time, after eliminating two or three divisions over the course of two or three engagements, the entire strategic situation will undergo a fundamental transformation.

Printed by the Military Commission on the 29th, based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Notes [1] The Pinghan Campaign, also known as the Handan Campaign. In October 1945, Nationalist forces advancing northward along the Pinghan Railway from Xinxiang launched an attack on Handan, the central city of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Liberated Area, aiming to swiftly reopen the Pinghan Railway. On October 24, the main forces of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region encircled the Nationalist Third, Fourth, and New Eighth Armies south of Handan. On the 30th, Gao Shuxun, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eleventh War Zone and commander of the New Eighth Army, led approximately 10,000 troops—including his own unit and local militia from Hebei—in a revolt. The campaign concluded on November 2, resulting in the annihilation of over 20,000 Nationalist soldiers and the capture of Ma Fawu, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eleventh War Zone and commander of the Fourth Army.  [2] See note [8] on page 35 of this volume for details on the Shangdang Campaign.  [3] Liu refers to Liu Bocheng (1892–1986), a native of Kaixian County, Sichuan Province, who at the time served as Commander of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, born in 1904 in Guang’an County, Sichuan Province, who at the time held the post of Political Commissar of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region.  [4] Bo refers to Bo Yibo, born in 1908 in Dingxing County, Shanxi Province, who at the time served as First Deputy Political Commissar of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region. Zhang refers to Zhang Jichun (1900–1968), a native of Yizhang County, Hunan Province, who at the time held the posts of Second Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region. Li refers to Li Da (1905–1994), a native of Meixian County, Shaanxi Province, who at the time served as Chief of Staff of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu-Henan Military Region.  [5] Refers to the telegram dated October 26, 1945, sent by Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da to the Central Military Commission of the CPC.  [6] The “Hu detachment” refers to the Third and Sixteenth Armies of the Nationalist Hu Zongnan Group, which had advanced to Shijiazhuang at the time.  [7] Hu refers to Hu Zongnan, who at the time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist First War Zone.  [8] Hou Ruyong was at the time the Commander-in-Chief of the Advance Force of the Nationalist First War Zone.  [9] Suiyuan refers to Suiyuan Province, see note [3] on page 17 of this volume.  [10] Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992), a native of Jiangjin County, Sichuan Province, who at the time served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Jincha-Ji Military Region. He refers to He Long (1896–1969), a native of Sangzhi County, Hunan Province, who at the time commanded the Jin-Sui Field Army.  [11] He Wending was at the time the commander of the Nationalist Sixty-Seventh Army.  [12] Fu Zuoyi was at the time the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Twelfth War Zone.  [13] Gui-su is now Hohhot City.  [14] Wang refers to Wang Shusheng (1905–1974), a native of Macheng County, Hubei Province, who at the time served as Commander of the Henan Military Region. Dai refers to Dai Jiying, born in 1907 in Huang’an County, Hubei Province (now Hong’an County), who at the time held the post of Political Commissar of the Henan Military Region. Wang Zhen (1908–1993), a native of Liuyang County, Hunan Province, at the time commanded the Eighth Route Army’s Southern Advance Detachment.