Telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng
Xiaoping1
(October 12, 1945, 1:00 P.M.)
	 1.	 It will take least one month for our main forces in Shandong and Central
China to move to the region of Hebei, Rehe, Liaoning, and the Northeast.
After each unit arrives, it will take at least another two to three months for
them to arrange the battlefields, familiarize themselves with the topography,
and complete preliminary preparations. Consequently, it is our serious strategic task at the moment to impede and delay the northward march of the diehard armies. In order to gain time, we should gather our local military corps,
guerrilla units, and militia along the vital communication lines in our central
regions to coordinate with a small number of our main forces to stop, attack,
and cut off the diehard enemy along the railway lines and highways, use
land mines extensively to blow up the enemy, destroy communication lines,
dismantle fortified castles, level and destroy city walls, and delay, exhaust,
and wear down the diehard enemy and the puppet troops so as to facilitate
the appropriate amassing of our main forces and to seize the opportunity to
wipe out one or several divisions of every group of the diehard enemy and
puppet troops. Depending on the results of the above plan and the situation
at the time, you can decide whether your main forces should go to eastern
Hebei for a decisive campaign.
	 2.	 The Sixteenth Army, which is marching northward along the Tongpu railway, has amassed along the Yuci and Taigu front. Under enemy cover crossing the Zhengtai railway, it is difficult to find an opportunity to wipe out a
division or regiment. As far as the Thirty-second and Seventh divisions of
the Third Army are concerned, we still have an opportunity to wipe out some
units of their forces. It seems that the nearly 50,000 troops in the main forces
and local forces in Taiyue District2 will be enough to deal with them. Amass
a main force of 15,000 to 20,000 to wipe out one or two regiments each time.

If we fight two or three campaigns like this, the Third Army will not be able
to advance. It is also possible that the Sixteenth Army will be pinned down
along the Zhengtai railway and that part of it will be exposed to our attacks.
Our Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan3 districts may be able to amass a
main force of more than 60,000, and under the direct and unified command
of Liu and Deng can deal with the diehard enemies that are marching northward along the [Bei]Ping-Han[kou] railway. Strive to wipe out part or most
of it. Please consider the above suggestions and let us know what you think.

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan. Neibuben, pp. 373–74.

--- Notes

1.  Liu Bocheng (1892–1986, native of Sichuan) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997,
native of Sichuan) were the commander and political commissar, respectively, of the
Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu) Military Region.

2.  Taiyue District was a military district under the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan
Military Region, situated in the Taiyue and Zhongtiao mountains in southern Shanxi Province.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-42

3.  The Taihang and Ji-Lu-Yu (Hebei-Shandong-Henan) districts were two military
districts subordinate to the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. The Taihang
Military District was located in the northern Taihang Mountains between Qi county and
Siting in Shanxi, and Handan and Shijiazhuang in Hebei. The Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District included areas east of the Beiping-Hankou railway and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area.