Speech at a Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China[1]

(October 11, 1945)

The summary of the Chongqing talks was drafted by Comrade Enlai, with slight revisions incorporating opinions from the Kuomintang side. Among the issues, the National Assembly and the Liberated Areas remain unresolved. What is important to us are the issues of peace and the Liberated Areas. Chiang Kai-shek is unwilling to grant us several provincial chairmanships in the Liberated Areas, though positions below the provincial level can be given. We then proposed maintaining the status quo, to be resolved in the future. Before Hurley returned to the United States, he demanded that we hand over the Liberated Areas, saying that we must either recognize Chiang Kai-shek’s demands or face a rupture. I said we would neither recognize them nor rupture; the issue is complex and requires further discussion. It was originally said that a communiqué would be issued after resolving the matter of army numbers, but later it was said that the communiqué would only be issued after resolving the Liberated Areas issue, and from then on it was delayed for several days. The Democratic League said our tone was too low. Thus, we began an offensive, and within ten days Enlai carried out activities among cultural, women’s, industrial, journalistic, minor party, and Kuomintang democratic faction circles. But we kept our commitments; the negotiations could be spoken of orally but not published in newspapers. We clearly expressed our desire for peace, but they could not say the same. These words were well received in the Great Rear Area, where the longing for peace is extremely strong. Yet they cannot deliver peace; their policy cannot be resolute and clear. Our line is clear, but our tone is very low. Public opinion made it impossible not to issue a communiqué on the talks. The first advantage of this summary of talks is that it was formally signed by both sides in an equal manner, something unprecedented in history. Second, the six points on which agreement was reached are all beneficial to the Chinese people. For example, local self-government; after the summary was published, we proposed the popular election of provincial governments, for which we can find a basis, as Sun Yat-sen spoke of it. There are also freedoms of speech,

[1] This is part of Mao Zedong’s speech at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the course of the Chongqing negotiations.

assembly, publication, and so on. I originally planned to leave on the 9th, but Chiang Kai-shek asked me to stay for the Double Tenth Festival. Zhang Zhizhong said it would not do to not publish this summary of talks; since you have come with such great prestige, something must be produced. The issue of the Liberated Areas will still require struggle. I said to Wang Yunsheng[1]: “Regarding the Kuomintang, we only offer some criticism, leaving room for maneuver, and have no intention of setting up a separate kitchen.” Upon hearing this, Wang Yunsheng said that for years he had written editorials without a guiding principle, but now he has one. Chen Lifu indicated that he was the first to advocate signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Many people say the CC Clique sabotaged the negotiations; I think many figures in the CC Clique, including Chen Lifu, are wavering.

[1] Wang Yunsheng was then editor-in-chief of the Chongqing edition of Ta Kung Pao.