Current Tasks and Operational Methods for the Central China Forces

(August 16, 1945)

Comrades Zhang, Rao, Zeng, and Lai:[1]

Your telegram of the 13th at noon[2] has been received. (1) The Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region has already dispatched ten small regiments, totaling 10,000 men, south to the area east of the Yellow River, located north of the Kaifeng–Guide[3] line and east of Xinxiang. Their task is to seize opportunities to capture the Kaifeng–Guide line and Xinxiang. There are originally 8,000 men east of the Yellow River. In Henan, the forces under Wang Shusheng, Dai Jiying, Wen Niansheng, and Zhang Qilong[4] total over 20,000 men, and the main force of Li Xiannian’s unit[5] will soon shift to southern Henan. All these are sufficient to tie down Li and He,[6] making it impossible for them to move eastward in full strength. (2) Success in operations depends on the method of fighting. Do not fight recklessly; do not engage unless annihilation is certain. Conserve strength and build up energy, using superior numbers to defeat inferior numbers—for example, using five or six regiments to strike one regiment, making annihilation possible. (3) Take winning battles as the objective, not occupying territory. If the entire Tianjin–Pukou Railway[1] can be occupied, then occupy it all; if not, occupy part of it; if even that is not possible, then let the diehard puppet forces fully take over the positions of the Japanese invaders. Even this would be better than the previous situation. As long as Japan surrenders, the overall situation will be favorable to us. (4) Do not redeploy the forces in Jiangnan. There is a great possibility of holding the current positions, expanding victories, and creating a vast base area stretching hundreds of li across the borders of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, thereby shaking the entire Jiangnan region (the same applies to the forces north of the Yangtze). Unless it is a moment of absolute necessity, do not lightly speak of moving to Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi. This directive should be conveyed to Su and Ye,[2] and the entire Party, army, and people should be mobilized to strive for this goal. Accomplishing this task also depends on winning battles, with the same method of fighting as described above. They fought well in the past three engagements,[3] though the degree of annihilation was still somewhat insufficient. Rather than transferring two brigades north of the Yangtze, it would be more advantageous to keep them in Jiangnan for coordinated operations along both sides of the river.

Mao Zedong

16th, 05:00

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[1] Zhang and Rao refer to Zhang Yunyi and Rao Shushi, who at the time served respectively as Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army and Acting Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department. Zeng refers to Zeng Shan, then Director of the Organization Department of the Central China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Lai refers to Lai Chuanzhu, then Chief of Staff of the New Fourth Army.

[2] This refers to the telegram sent at noon on August 13, 1945, by Zhang Yunyi, Rao Shushi, Zeng Shan, and Lai Chuanzhu to the CPC Central Committee. The main points of the telegram were: (1) With the existing strength of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangtze, it would be quite difficult to accomplish the tasks of occupying all cities east of the Tianjin–Pukou Railway and north of the Yangtze River, eliminating puppet forces, and repelling the recalcitrant forces of the Kuomintang’s 10th War Zone that might invade. (2) It was proposed to transfer two brigades from the New Fourth Army’s forces in Jiangnan to carry out the above tasks north of the Yangtze. (3) The tasks in Jiangnan would be undertaken by the remaining two brigades (excluding the Jiangnan forces of the New Fourth Army’s 7th Division), and if necessary, these two brigades could enter Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi to create a new situation.

[3] Guide, an old prefectural name, refers to present-day Shangqiu in Henan Province.

[4] Wang Shusheng and Dai Jiying served respectively as Commander and Political Commissar of the Henan Military District of the Eighth Route Army at the time. Wen Niansheng and Zhang Qilong served respectively as Commander of the 3rd Guerrilla Detachment and Political Commissar of the 2nd Detachment of the Eighth Route Army.

[5] Li Xiannian’s unit refers to the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army, with Li Xiannian serving as both Division Commander and Political Commissar.

[6] Li and He refer to Li Pinxian and He Zhuguo, who at the time served respectively as Commander and Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang’s 10th War Zone.

[1] Tianjin–Pukou Railway refers to the railway line from Tianjin to Pukou, now part of the Beijing–Shanghai line.

[2] Su and Ye refer to Su Yu and Ye Fei, who at the time served respectively as Commander and Deputy Commander of the Jiangsu–Zhejiang Military District of the New Fourth Army.

[3] This refers to the three counter-offensive operations against recalcitrant forces conducted by the troops of the Jiangsu–Zhejiang Military District of the New Fourth Army in the Tianmu Mountain area of western Zhejiang from February 14 to 18, March 1 to 27, and May 29 to June 23, 1945.