The CPC Central Committee Directive on the
Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the
Japanese Surrender1
(August 26, 1945)
Comrades on the Party Committees of the Districts and Bureaus:
The speedy surrender of the Japanese invaders has changed the entire situation.
The Soviet Red Army is advancing with caution so as not to wreck the peace in the
Far East (this is absolutely right), and Chiang Kaishek has monopolized the right
to accept the surrender. These two points generally determine that for the time
being (for one stage) the major cities and the important lines of communication
will not be in our hands. Nevertheless, in northern China we should still fight hard,
and fight with all our might to take all we can. During the past two weeks our army
has recovered fifty-nine cities of various sizes and vast rural areas; including those
already in our hands, we now control 175 cities, thus winning a great victory. In
northern China, we have recovered Weihaiwei, Yantai, Longkou, Yidu, Zechuan,
Yangliuqing, Bikeji, Bo’ai and yesterday we recovered Zhangjiakou, Pingdiquan,
and Fengzhen. The might of our army has shaken northern China, and together
with the sweeping advance of the Red Army2 and the Outer Mongolian forces to
the Great Wall, this has created a favorable position for our Party. In the coming period, we should continue the offensive and do our best to capture the [Bei]
ping–Sui[yuan] railway, the northern section of the [Da]tong–Pu[zhou] railway,
and the Zheng[ding]–Tai[yuan], De[zhou]–Shi[jiazhuang], Bai[kui]–Jin[cheng],
and Dao[kou]–Qing[hua] railways, and also to cut up the [Bei]ping–[Liao]ning,
[Bei]Ping–Han[kou], [Tian]jin–Pu[kou], Jiaoji[Qingdao–Ji’nan], Longhai, and
Lu-Ning[Shanghai–Nanjing] railways. We should gain control of whatever
we can, even if only temporarily. At the same time, according to the CPCCC
Directive of August 22, the necessary forces should be employed to take as many villages, county towns and higher administrative centers, and small towns as
possible. For example, a highly favorable situation has been created because the
New Fourth Army has occupied many county towns lying between Nanjing, Lake
Taihu, and the Tianmu Mountains, and between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers, because our forces in Shandong have occupied all of the Eastern Shandong
Peninsula and because our forces in the Shanxi–Suiyuan (Jin-Sui) Border Region
have occupied many cities and towns north and south of the [Bei]ping–Sui[yuan]
railway. After another period of offensive operations, it will be possible for our
Party to control most of the areas north of the lower Yangzi River and the Huai
River, most of Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan, all of Rehe and Chahar (so
as to welcome the advance of the Red Army and the Outer Mongolian forces), and
part of Liaoning.
At present, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain all disapprove of civil war in China; at the same time, our Party has put forward the three
great slogans of peace, democracy, and unity, and is sending Comrades Mao
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing to meet Chiang and to discuss3 the great issues of unity and national reconstruction. Thus, it is possible
that the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated. Besides, if
they were to wage a civil war, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain
might intervene. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and
if the conditions are favorable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defense to
wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely (we do not strike
rashly, but when we do strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the
bluster of reactionaries. The Guomindang has now strengthened its position by
recovering Shanghai, Nanjing, and other places, reopening sea communications,
taking over enemy arms, and incorporating the puppet troops into its own forces.
Nevertheless, it is riddled with a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable
inner contradictions, and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that following the negotiations the Guomindang, under domestic and foreign pressures, may
conditionally recognize the status of the Party. Our Party may likewise conditionally recognize the status of the Guomindang. This would bring about a new stage
of cooperation between the two parties (plus the Democratic League, etc.) and
of peaceful development. In such an event, our Party should strive to master all
methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Guomindang areas in the
three main spheres of the cities, the villages, and the army (all weak points in our
work there). During the negotiations, the Guomindang is sure to demand that we
drastically reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of the
millions in the Liberation Army, and stop issuing currency. On our side, we are
prepared to make whatever concessions that are necessary and that do not damage the fundamental interests of our Party.4 Without such concessions, we cannot expose the Guomindang’s civil-war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, canthoughts of the Central Committee. But the Guomindang has many weak spots
and its areas are vast; our comrades will be fully able to deal with the situation,
provided they make no major mistakes in military policy (movements and operations) and in the policy of uniting with the people, and provided they are modest
and prudent, not conceited or rash. In addition to receiving the necessary directives from the Central Committee, the comrades in these areas must use their own
judgment to analyze the situation, solve their problems, surmount difficulties, be
self-reliant, and expand their forces. When the Guomindang is unable to do anything with you, in the negotiations between the two parties it may be compelled
to recognize your forces and agree to arrangements that are advantageous to both
sides. But you definitely must not rely on the negotiations and you must definitely
not hope that the Guomindang will be kind-hearted because it will never be kindhearted. You must rely on your own strength, on the correct guidance of activities,
on brotherly unity within the Party, and on good relations with the people. Firmly
rely on the people, that is your way out. The Central Committee has decided to
send over 1,000 cadres led by Comrade Lin Feng9 to the Northeast. The Army led by Comrade Fang Yi10 should advance to the border of Rehe and await orders
there. If we are allowed to advance to the Northeast, we can continue. If not, the
army can expand forces in Rehe, thus fostering a strong Rehe base area (Rehe
and Chahar are not covered by the Sino-Soviet Treaty).
To sum up, our Party is confronted with many difficulties that must not be
ignored and all Party comrades must be well-prepared psychologically. But the
general trend in the international and domestic situations is favorable to our Party
and to the people. As long as the whole Party is united as one, we shall be able to
overcome all difficulties step by step.
Central Committee

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Notes
Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanzheng wenjian xuanbian (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), pp. 13–14.
ing the Japanese Surrender → On Peace Negotiations with the Guomindang — Circular of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
opinion and
6.  our Party. → the People.
and if the conditions are favorable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defense to wipe
them out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely (we will not fight rashly, but we
must win when we do fight). We must never be cowed by the bluster of the reactionaries.

--- Notes

# The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender
# Date: 1945-08-26
# Source: en:MRP


2.  Red Army → Soviet army
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-26

3.  meet Chiang and discuss → discuss with Chiang Kaishek

4.  our Party. → the People.

not win the sympathy of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as well
as5 the middle-of-the-roaders within China, and cannot obtain in exchange legal
status for our Party and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions;
the concessions are based on the principle that they must not damage the fundamental interests of our Party.6
If the Guomindang still wants to launch a civil war after our Party has taken the
above steps, it will be placing itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and
the whole world, and our Party will be justified in waging a war of self-defense to
crush its attacks.7 But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and never forget, these
principles: unity, struggle, and unity through struggle; to wage struggles with good
reason, with advantage, and with restraint; and to make use of contradictions, win
over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one.
In Yue, Xiang, E, Yu8 and some other provinces, our Party forces are in a
more difficult position than they are in northern China and in the area between
the Yangzi and the Huai rivers. The comrades in those places are much in the

8.  Yue, Xiang, E, Yu → Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, Henan
Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the PRC, he served as vice-chairman of the 2nd
and 3rd Standing Committees of the National People’s Congress.
founding of the PRC.


--- Notes

Our source for this text is Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang’anguan, eds.,

1.  The CPC Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Follow

5.  Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as well as → international public

7.  its attacks. → its attacks. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us

9.  Lin Feng was then political commissar of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Command Area of the

10.  Fang Yi was a prominent leader in economic and technological affairs after the