Address at the Politburo Meeting before
Attending the Chongqing Talks
(August 26, 1945)
Based on reactions from various places, some comrades in the Party are experiencing some anxiety because we cannot enter the major cities, He Yingqin1
has not allocated us a place to receive the surrender and disarmament [of the
Japanese troops], and the Soviet Red Army will not cross into the region south of
the Northeastern Provinces. Actually, in the recent past we have had some major
victories. There are no longer any traces of Chiang Kaishek in Chahar and Rehe
provinces; most of the area between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers, Shandong,
Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan provinces could all be within our grasp. The indignation of our comrades is understandable, but they should make some careful
calculations. After this telegram of ours2 is sent out, it can resolve this problem.
The question of my going to Chongqing was discussed last night by seven
Politburo comrades along with Comrade [Wang] Ruofei,3 and they decided I
should respond to Wedemeyer’s telegram4 and go to Chongqing. In this way, we
can completely gain the initiative. In going to Chongqing I must fully consider
the possibility that Chiang Kaishek may press me under duress to come to terms, but it is still for me to sign the deal. One naturally must make certain concessions
when negotiating, and only under conditions that will not hurt the fundamental
rights and interests of both sides can an agreement be reached. The first area
where we are prepared to make concessions is the base area from Guangdong to
Henan, the second is the base area south of the Yangzi, and the third is the base
area north of the Yangzi. This all depends on the circumstances of the discussions,
and concessions can be considered under favorable conditions.5 We must have the
advantage from the Longhai railway northward to Outer Mongolia. We also need
to have the upper hand in the Northeast, where the high-ranking administrative
officials belong to the Guomindang, and if we send cadres there, we can certainly
make an issue of it. If these conditions are still not met, we will not accept the
agreement under duress, and I am prepared to go to jail. In the history of our Party,
except for the He Ming Incident,6 we have never casually surrendered our guns,
so we certainly must not be frightened. If I am put under house arrest, it is nothing
to be afraid of. I would actually like to get some things done there. Right now, the
Soviet Red Army will not cross the [Shanhai] Pass, and the U.S. Army will not
land [on our shores]. Ostensibly, China will solve its own problems, but in reality,
three countries7 are involved in the situation, three countries that are not willing
to let China fight a civil war, and this international pressure is not favorable to
Chiang Kaishek’s autocratic rule. The Sino-Soviet Treaty8 benefits the Chinese
people, and the occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces by the Soviet Red
Army has a major influence. So I can and must go to Chongqing. I can send a
cable to Chiang Kaishek saying that I am going to go, and the newspaper can publish the news tomorrow.9 The core of the Party’s leadership is still in Yan’an, and
there will not be any disruptions within the Party. In the future we can have even
more comrades go outside. As long as there is a center on the inside, the center on
the outside can be protected. We will not move from Yan’an without good reason.
In the future, when the National Assembly meets, whether or not the
Communist Party members will vote for Chiang Kaishek as president will depend on the situation. Chiang Kaishek is an enemy of the Communist Party, but we
cannot avoid forming a partnership with him.
Due to four conditions—our strength, the will of all China’s people, Chiang
Kaishek’s own difficulties, and the intervention of foreign countries—this trip to
Chongqing might solve some problems.

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 15–17, where it is reprinted
from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  He Yingqin was chief of the General Staff of the Guomindang army, commander-in-chief of its General Headquarters, and the highest commanding official within the Chinese
war zone to accept Japan’s surrender.

2.  The reference is to the Central Committee circular of the same date, “The CPC
Central Committee Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese
Surrender,” in this volume.

3.  Wang Ruofei (1896–1946, native of Guizhou) was secretary of the Chongqing Work
Committee responsible for the daily work of the southern bureaus. He accompanied Mao
Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Chongqing for the negotiations on August 28, 1945.

4.  This is in reference to Mao Zedong’s August 25 telegram responding to General
Albert Wedemeyer (1896–1989, born in Omaha, Nebraska), commander of the U.S. Army
in the Chinese war zone. The telegram said, “I have received three invitation telegrams
from Committee Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], and Ambassador [Patrick] Hurley has twice
expressed his desire to come to Yan’an. This sincerity has truly moved me. Owing to this,
I welcome Ambassador Hurley to come to Yan’an to meet us and then to fly with General
Zhou Enlai and me to Chongqing to respond to Committee Chairman Chiang’s treaty and
to quickly discuss these matters of great importance.”
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-25

5.  The territories that the Central Committee felt could be conceded were the eight
anti-Japanese base areas of Guangdong, Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, central Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan (not including northern Henan).

6.  During the peace talks in July 1937, the 1,000-strong Minnan Red Army Independent Third Regiment of Workers and Farmers commanded by He Ming (1903–1939, born in
Wanning, Guangdong), acting secretary for the Chinese Communist Party’s special committee on the Fujian-Guangdong border, was surrounded and annihilated by Guomindang
troops.

7.  The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

8.  This is a reference to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed by
the Guomindang government and the Soviet Union in Moscow on August 14, 1945.

9.  On August 27, 1945, Liberation Daily announced that “Chairman Mao has decided
to proceed to Chongqing to discuss the great plan for establishing a unified nation.”