First, the current situation is that China's stage of the War of Resistance has ended, and we have entered a phase of peaceful construction.

The whole world, including Europe and the East, has also entered a phase of peaceful construction.

It is certain that a third world war will not break out for the time being.

We could have entered the phase of peaceful construction under two sets of circumstances: one, if we had been able to obtain some large cities, and the other, if we had not.

As it stands, we have not obtained them.

We fought hard to enter several large cities—such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Taiyuan—before entering the phase of peace, but we did not succeed.

There are two reasons for this. First, the Soviet Union, for the sake of international peace and due to the restrictions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, [2] could not and was not in a position to help us.

Our weapons are rifles, and without external assistance, it is very difficult to capture large cities occupied by the Japanese army.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed after Japan announced its surrender, and its contents have not yet been made public. It is likely that the Soviet army’s operational area is limited to the three northeastern provinces, and its entry into Rehe and Chahar [3] was of a temporary nature.

If the Soviet Union openly helped us, the United States would openly help Chiang Kai-shek, and a major war might break out, making peace unattainable.

Second, Chiang Kai-shek exploited his legitimate status to ensure that the invading Japanese army surrendered only to the Kuomintang forces. We sought to secure a share of the right to accept the surrender but could not, because we lack legitimate status.

Although we are still demanding this right to accept surrender from the Kuomintang, in reality, there is no hope.

Because of these two factors, we have been unable to secure the fruits of victory we had fought so hard for.

We can only acknowledge this fact. It is not the result of a failure to fight for them; we simply must enter the phase of peace without obtaining the large cities.

This is the first point.

Second, regarding Chiang Kai-shek’s position.

His advantages are his legitimate status and the large cities.

His disadvantages are the existence of the powerful Liberated Areas before him, internal conflicts within his own ranks, and his inability to meet the people’s demands for democracy and people’s welfare.

Third, regarding our position.

Our advantages are: our contributions to the resistance against Japan, which Chiang Kai-shek cannot erase; the high standing our Party currently enjoys in the eyes of the people nationwide, a level unmatched during the Great Revolution or the civil war; the existence of the vast Liberated Areas, which Chiang Kai-shek cannot blockade; and our Party’s program of striving for democracy and people’s welfare, which can resolve problems that Chiang Kai-shek cannot.

Our disadvantages are: we have not obtained the large cities, we do not have a mechanized army, and we lack legitimate status.

Fourth, the reason we have not obtained the large cities or a mechanized army is, on the one hand, due to a lack of external assistance, and on the other, because we did not do our urban work and military work (in relation to the puppet troops and the Kuomintang forces) well enough.

Of course, even if we had done this work well and obtained Beiping and Tianjin, it is not certain we could have held them.

But the fact remains that we did not do our work well, and therefore we could not prevent the Kuomintang army’s actions in occupying the large cities.

Fifth, can peace be achieved?

Can civil war be avoided?

Our current slogans are peace, democracy, and unity; our past slogans were resistance, unity, and progress.

Peace is achievable because the Chinese people need it, and the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain also need it and do not support a civil war in China.

In the past, China faced a powerful enemy; now it is riddled with scars. The Liberated Areas at the front have suffered severe losses, the people need peace, and our Party needs peace.

The Kuomintang cannot resolve to start a civil war just yet, because its house is not in order and its forces are scattered.

Hu Zongnan [4] currently has only three armies encircling us (three other armies have gone to Shanxi, three are in Henan, and the whereabouts of one army are unknown). If we strike out, he will be at a loss.

At the same time, there are many internal conflicts within the Kuomintang forces. This time, they confiscated one million rifles from the Japanese invaders, which may spark new conflicts.

The Central Army and the Miscellaneous Units together number two million, plus 800,000 incorporated puppet troops, making a total of 2.8 million. Their strength is in any case inferior to that of the Japanese and puppet forces combined, while our army can still expand.

The Kuomintang has these difficulties of its own, along with the existence of the Liberated Areas, the fact that the Communist Party is not easily wiped out, and domestic and international opposition to the Kuomintang waging civil war. Therefore, civil war can and must be avoided.

The three major slogans of peace, democracy, and unity put forward by our Party have a realistic foundation and can win broad sympathy at home and abroad.

Sixth, Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of wanting to eliminate the Communist Party has not changed and will not change.

He may adopt a temporary peace only because of the various conditions mentioned above. He still needs to nurse his wounds and strengthen his own power so as to ultimately eliminate us.

We should make use of this period of temporary peace.

Seventh, the conditions we demand are contained in the fourteen points of the “Present Urgent Demands.” [5] If everyone agrees, they can be adopted, with revisions made by the Secretariat.

Of the fourteen points, all except the third, fourth, and fifth are long-standing demands, with emphasis on issues of democracy and people’s welfare.

At present, the most realistic and the point both sides are contending over is the first one, which calls for recognition of the Liberated Areas and the Liberation Army.

The third, fourth, and fifth points—demanding participation in all important work related to the handling of Japan’s surrender and in accepting the Japanese surrender—are demands that we have no choice but to raise. Of these, except for the item on participating in peace conferences and United Nations meetings, which may have the kind of hope seen at the San Francisco-style [6] discussions, the rest offer no hope.

The debate over the first point will certainly be very intense. The two sides may fight and pause alternately, and we may even have to deal Chiang Kai-shek some painful blows to force concessions from him. In any case, he will not satisfy our demands.

Over the past years, after much debate, he only agreed to our organizing twelve divisions, precisely so he could bargain with us once he secured the large cities. Now that the Japanese are gone, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are face to face, and the issue can no longer be delayed.

Eighth, we originally decided to pause criticism of the Kuomintang, but because Japan announced its surrender and Chiang Kai-shek ordered us to “stay stationed and await orders,” we had no choice but to criticize him again. From now on, this should gradually ease.

Thereafter, our policy will still be: “When Chiang opposes us, we oppose him; when Chiang stops, we stop.” We will achieve unity through struggle, doing so with reason, advantage, and restraint.

It is impossible to imagine that under Chiang Kai-shek’s high-handed pressure, we could secure our position without struggling for it.

Ninth, the military advances of the last two weeks [7] were necessary. They concentrated our forces and boosted morale, and the number of county seats under our control has increased to 134.

In the coming period, we should continue these advances, capturing more small and medium-sized cities, mobilizing the masses, and training and consolidating our forces.

The Liberated Areas have expanded in both population and armed forces, but we face financial difficulties. How will we solve the problems of clothing and feeding the people?

Thereafter, we must reduce troop numbers and launch production campaigns.

This winter, we must train and consolidate our forces, displaying to Chiang Kai-shek and the United States a posture indicating that waging civil war would not be easy, so as to secure a relatively favorable resolution during negotiations.

We must not let our momentum slacken; if it slackens, negotiations will not go well.

Tenth, the two important tasks in peacetime—urban work and military work—are extremely important. We did not do them well in the past, and from now on we must devote full effort to carrying them out seriously.

Without learning to do these two tasks well, the final liberation of the Chinese people will be impossible.

Eleventh, the prolonged, circuitous, and tortuous path we spoke of at the Seventh Congress, where we prepared for the greatest difficulties, is now to be put into practice.

At present, across the whole country, a government under bourgeois leadership with proletarian participation may possibly be formed.

If a coalition government is established in China, there may be several forms.

One such form is the current dictatorship with some elements of democracy added, and it will exist for a fairly long period.

In the case of this type of coalition government, we should still participate in it. Participating in it is to “wash Chiang Kai-shek’s face” rather than to “chop off his head.”

Taking this detour will enable our Party to mature further in all respects and make the Chinese people more conscious, so that we can ultimately establish a new-democratic China.

China, with its 450 million people, is roughly comparable to a Europe. In Europe, many countries have not yet achieved victory, or are not completely under communist leadership.

We must be prepared to make concessions.

We must be ready to deal with the greatest difficulties, such as lack of foreign aid, possible reductions in our army due to negotiations, internal disunity, and so forth.

At present, the situation in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang is extremely precarious.

But the decisive factor is our internal unity. So long as we ourselves are united, the enemy cannot crush us.

Twelfth, we plan to issue a declaration [8] in the name of the Central Committee, presenting a new posture of peace, democracy, and unity.

Comrade Enlai will go immediately to Chongqing for negotiations and will return after two days. I will follow, together with Hurley. [9]

This time, there should be no delay; we should go, and we estimate there will not be any major danger.

Thirteenth, each Liberated Area must make plans for the long term.

The concentration of forces has gone well this time, but in places where excessive concentration is not advisable, adjustments should be made based on factors such as food, clothing, and available firearms.

The Liberated Areas may need another round of “better troops and simpler administration.”

In fighting, we must ensure it is to our advantage; we should avoid battles where victory is uncertain. As long as we keep the army in our hands, there will be ways to manage.

Do not increase the burden on the people. This winter, we must carry out large-scale rent reductions, and next spring, large-scale production campaigns.

So long as we stand firm and keep a clear head, we need not fear any great storms.

Second, the opinions of everyone here are very good. The current guiding policy was set at the Seventh Congress, and the policy of the Seventh Congress is one of opposing civil war.

At present, the threat of civil war exists, but the Kuomintang faces great difficulties. At the very least, there will be no large-scale civil war this year; peace is possible.

Under these circumstances, should we advance or retreat?

The main course, of course, is to advance—advancing within the context of peace—but there will be partial retreats.

Chiang Kai-shek will never fully recognize the 100 million people and one-million-strong army of the Liberated Areas.

We must be prepared to make concessions, making some compromises in numbers to gain legitimate status, trading partial concessions for legitimate status nationwide, and conserving our strength to meet the new situation.

We must be ready for these concessions.

On the other hand, we must also prepare to go on the offensive within the framework of legal work, to use the platform of the national congress to attack, and to learn how to wage legal struggles.

This is a new environment for us, different from the periods of the Northern Expedition, the civil war, and the War of Resistance, because this is a time of peace.

We very much need to use such a period to educate the people of the whole country and to train ourselves.

Only by learning to do all kinds of work will we gain the ability to handle work nationwide and in the large cities.

The question of opportunism does not exist.

That the Soviet Red Army did not enter inside Shanhai Pass was not a matter of our subjective will; that the Japanese army would not surrender their arms to us was something we fought for.

Is our expansion in various places “left” opportunism?

No, it is not.

In some areas, we occupied territory and then withdrew. “If we had known this earlier, why did we bother in the first place?”

Such thinking is wrong. In the places from which we withdrew, the masses received an education nonetheless.

When staking claims, we make them broad; when times of peaceful settlement arrive, we narrow them down.

After three periods of war, we now have a period of peace. We must prepare to undertake urban work.

What about work in the Northeast?

It is decided that we will send cadres there, but whether to send military forces cannot yet be determined; it depends on the situation, and it is possible we cannot send them.

If the negotiations fail and the Kuomintang attacks us, should we fight?

We should, but we must win.

Should we convene a People’s Representative Conference of the Liberated Areas?

If peace is achieved, we will hold a conference of peace, democracy, and unity.

Should I go to Chongqing?

The meeting today decided that I should go, not that I should not.

But the timing will be decided by the Political Bureau and the Secretariat.

Therefore, the telegram replying to Hurley [10] said that Comrade Enlai would be sent first.

If Hurley and Shao Lizi [11] come to invite me, I will go together with them. This posture is relatively better.

While I am in Chongqing, Comrade Liu Shaoqi will act on my behalf, and the Secretariat will additionally designate Comrades Chen Yun and Peng Zhen [12] as alternate secretaries, so that after Comrade Enlai and I depart, there will still be five people in the Secretariat to convene meetings.

As for the issue of delineating territorial areas, we will not raise it, because we demand recognition of all Liberated Areas, but Chiang Kai-shek will certainly raise it.

Comrade Bo Gu〔13〕 proposed condensing the fourteen points into six, which is a very good suggestion and should be referred to the Secretariat for further consideration and decision.〔14〕




Printed based on the preserved transcript of the speech in the Central Archives.




Note〔1〕This comprises Mao Zedong’s speech (Part One) and conclusions (Part Two) at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.




〔2〕This refers to the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" signed between the National Government of China and the Government of the Soviet Union in Moscow on August 14, 1945.




The treaty was formally published on August 26.




〔3〕"Re" refers to Rehe Province, which was abolished in 1955. At the time, its jurisdiction covered the northeastern part of present-day Hebei Province, the southwestern part of Liaoning Province, and the southeastern part of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. "Cha" refers to Chahar Province, which at the time covered the northwestern part of present-day Hebei Province and the Xilingol League of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In 1949, its jurisdiction was adjusted to include the northwestern part of Hebei Province and the northern part of Shanxi Province, and it was abolished in 1952.




〔4〕Hu Zongnan (1896–1962), a native of Xiaofeng, Zhejiang (now part of Anji County).




At the time, he served as the Commander of the First War Zone of the Nationalist Army.




〔5〕The fourteen points of the "Immediate Urgent Demands" were drafted by Zhou Enlai on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, with amendments by Mao Zedong, intended to be presented to the Nationalist Party. The content included: "1. Recognize the democratically elected governments and anti-Japanese armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas.




2. Withdraw the Nationalist troops encircling and attacking China’s Liberated Areas to prevent a civil war that would harm the entire Chinese people and disrupt international peace.




3. Delineate the areas where the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Anti-Japanese Columns shall accept the surrender of Japanese forces.




4. Allow the anti-Japanese armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas and their representatives to participate in all important tasks related to handling the aftermath of Japan’s surrender.




5. Permit representatives elected from China’s Liberated Areas to take part in future peace conferences and United Nations meetings concerning the settlement of Japan.




6. Severely punish traitors and disband puppet forces.




7. Release patriotic political prisoners.




8. Provide relief to compatriots who have suffered.




9. Recognize the legal status of all political parties.




10. Abolish secret police agencies.




11. Abolish all decrees that impede the freedoms of the people and all censorship regulations on press and publications.




12. In all recovered areas, organize local democratic coalition governments that include members of the Communist Party of China and anti-Japanese democrats from all walks of life.




13. Reorganize the armed forces fairly and reasonably, and handle demobilization.




14. Immediately convene a political conference with representatives from all political parties and non-partisans to discuss urgent measures following the end of the War of Resistance, formulate a democratic administrative program, end political tutelage, establish a democratic, nationally united coalition government, and prepare for a free and unfettered national congress with universal suffrage."




〔6〕From April 25 to June 26, 1945, the United Nations Founding Conference was held in San Francisco, USA.




The Chinese delegation to this conference was composed of representatives from the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and the Democratic League.




On behalf of the Communist Party of China, Dong Biwu represented the Liberated Areas at the conference.




The term "San Francisco model" referred to here means that the Chinese delegation to international conferences should be jointly composed of representatives from the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and other democratic parties.




〔7〕This refers to the comprehensive counteroffensive launched by the armed forces of the Liberated Areas against the Japanese forces over the nearly two-week period from August 11 to 23.




On August 10, 1945, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De of the Yan’an Headquarters issued an order to all armed forces in the Liberated Areas, setting a deadline for the Japanese and puppet forces to surrender.




On August 11, the Yan’an Headquarters issued six consecutive orders: ordering the armed forces led by He Long in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, the armed forces led by Nie Rongzhen in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area, and the armed forces of the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Liberated Area to advance into Inner Mongolia and the Northeast; ordering the armed forces of the Shanxi Liberated Area to eliminate Japanese and puppet forces along the Tongpu Railway line and in the Fen River basin; and ordering the armed forces of all Liberated Areas to launch active offensives on all enemy-occupied key communication routes, compelling the Japanese and puppet forces to surrender.




The armed forces of the Liberated Areas resolutely carried out these orders and achieved significant victories.




〔8〕That is the "Declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation," later published on August 25, 1945.




The declaration stated: "The Communist Party of China holds that in this new historical period, the major tasks facing our entire nation are: to consolidate domestic unity, guarantee domestic peace, achieve democracy, and improve the people’s livelihood, so that on the basis of peace, democracy, and unity, we may realize the unification of the whole country, build a new China that is independent, free, and prosperous, and in cooperation with Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and all allied nations, consolidate lasting international peace."




The declaration demanded that the National Government immediately implement six urgent measures: "(1) Recognize the democratically elected governments and anti-Japanese armed forces of China’s Liberated Areas, and withdraw the troops encircling and attacking the Liberated Areas, in order to achieve immediate peace and prevent civil war.




(2) Delineate the areas where the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Anti-Japanese Columns shall accept the surrender of Japanese forces, and grant them the right to participate in all work concerning the settlement of Japan, so as to ensure fairness.




(3) Severely punish traitors and disband puppet forces.




(4) Reorganize the armed forces fairly and reasonably, handle demobilization, provide relief for suffering compatriots, and reduce taxes to alleviate the people’s hardships.




(5) Recognize the legal status of all political parties, abolish all decrees restricting the freedoms of assembly, association, speech, and publication, abolish secret police agencies, and release patriotic political prisoners.




(6) Immediately convene a conference with representatives from all political parties and non-partisans to discuss the major issues following the end of the War of Resistance, formulate a democratic administrative program, end political tutelage, establish a nationally united democratic coalition government, and prepare for a free and unfettered national congress with universal suffrage."




〔9〕The arrangement mentioned here for Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to go to Chongqing for negotiations was altered by a decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 25, 1945, which resolved that both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai would go to Chongqing together to negotiate with the Nationalist Party.




On the same day, Mao Zedong also sent a telegram in reply to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander of the U.S. Forces in the China Theater, welcoming Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley to Yan’an and stating that Zhou Enlai and he could accompany Hurley on the same plane to Chongqing.




〔10〕This refers to Mao Zedong’s telegram of August 23, 1945, replying to Wedemeyer.




The telegram read: "Your telegram has been received and noted with great appreciation.




In the interest of China’s unity and peace in the Far East, I am most willing to proceed to Chongqing to discuss crucial matters with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.




I hereby first send General Zhou Enlai to make contact. Please convey this to Ambassador Hurley and kindly facilitate transportation."




〔11〕Shao Lizi (1882–1966), a native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang.




At the time, he served as Secretary-General of the National Political Council and was a representative of the Nationalist Party in the Chongqing negotiations.




〔12〕Chen Yun (1905–1995), a native of Qingpu, Jiangsu (now part of Shanghai Municipality).




Peng Zhen, born in 1902, a native of Quwo, Shanxi.




Both were elected members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.




〔13〕Bo Gu, i.e., Qin Bangxian (1907–1946), a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu.




At the time, he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.




〔14〕Following this enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, the Secretariat condensed the originally drafted fourteen immediate urgent demands into six urgent measures that the National Government should immediately implement, and included them in the "Declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation" of August 25, 1945.