(1)

The current situation is a matter of concern for comrades. What is the situation like? What is our Party's policy? The situation is developing rapidly. Japan has surrendered—what does this surrender entail? Japan has not yet formally issued orders to surrender; negotiations are still ongoing. Japan has requested to surrender, and the Allied countries have permitted it to do so. As for how the Japanese Emperor will be dealt with, comrades are all aware. According to the latest news, Japan has sent a reply to the Allied countries, but its contents are not public and remain unknown. It is probably bargaining, as it still retains some leverage—unlike Germany, which was pushed back to the city of Berlin; the United States has not yet reached the Japanese mainland. Japan still maintains its military forces in China and Southeast Asia, and the most critical issue at present remains Manchuria, which lies before the Red Army. The surrender might take a few more days, or it could happen tomorrow. Japan has requested to surrender, the Allied nations have granted permission, but how the Emperor will be handled and whether Japan will immediately order a surrender is still under negotiation. The general trend of Japan's surrender is already decided, with the decisive factor being the strength of the Soviet Union; Japan is surrounded on all sides.

After eight years of war, the general trend of Japan's surrender is set, though bargaining continues. The decisive force has been the Soviet Union striking from the rear—a force that is irresistible. Under these circumstances, has the historical phase of the War of Resistance passed? It should be regarded that the historical phase of the War of Resistance has concluded. The general trend of Japan's surrender is decided, but there remains a small tail called a transition. Like a river in winter, where a small bridge is built, the current bridge represents the transition—the entire phase has passed. Now, because Japan has not yet laid down its arms and the Allied occupation of Japan and our recovery of lost territory will take some time, Europe is in a similar situation. On the day Germany announced its surrender and signed the acceptance of surrender, Stalin said: "The European war is over, and the era of peaceful development has arrived."

As just mentioned, the general trend of Japan's surrender is decided. When it accepts the Allied conditions and orders its troops to surrender, and representatives of both sides sign a treaty—as Germany did—then the era of peaceful development will come. Nevertheless, for now, firstly, no treaty has been signed; secondly, even after signing, disarmament and occupation must still occur. We are currently in a transitional state. What I am discussing today pertains to this situation.

(2)

What is the current relationship among the various classes and parties in China? What might it become in the future? Representing the two major classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the rulers and the people—each has a party: the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In addition, there are third parties, intermediate forces and factions.

What about the Kuomintang? Comrades know what the Kuomintang is like. By examining its past, one can understand its present; by examining its past and present, one can foresee its future. This party fought a ten-year civil war against us from 1927 to 1937. During the War of Resistance, it stood aside, waiting for victory. This policy was executed rather well—it adamantly refused to fight, yet victory still arrived. It predicted that Japan and the Soviet Union would inevitably clash, and that Japan and the United States would inevitably fight, and its predictions proved accurate. The representative of China's landlord and bourgeois classes, Chiang Kai-shek—a person everyone knows is a cunning fellow—pursued a policy of standing aside and waiting for victory. Now he has arguably achieved his goal. With a few American guns and some rearmament, the Generalissimo is now preparing to descend from the mountain. Over the past eight years, we have swapped positions with him. Previously, we were on the mountain, and he was by the water’s edge. During the War of Resistance, we were behind enemy lines, and he was on the mountain. Now, he is about to come down. The current political situation is this: in the past, he stood aside and waited for victory; now, the Generalissimo wants to come down and seize the fruits of the War of Resistance.

We fought for eight years, waging war behind enemy lines. Not every shot was fired by us—he also fired a few—but the main fighting was done by us. We fought heroically and endured bitter hardships, while he stood aside. Without our fighting, would there be a Generalissimo? He hid on the mountain, with others guarding him. We stood guard, held positions, and fought the enemy, which is why a region with a population of 200 million was never occupied by the enemy. What is the reason for this? The "Generalissimo's" passive resistance, with a few shots fired in support, is also a factor, but the heroic resistance of the Liberated Areas was primary. Defending these 200 million people was also defending the Generalissimo. This allowed him to stand aside and gain the time needed for victory. Without us, he could not have stood aside. Standing aside required us to fight while he merely boasted, and this gave him time. Over eight years, we established territories with a population of 200 million. These conditions were provided by us. So, does the Generalissimo feel grateful to us? No! This man has never known gratitude. How did he rise to power? Who gave him such great authority? It was the Northern Expedition, the first KMT-CPC cooperation during the Great Revolution, and the people’s support that propelled him to power. It was the people who gave it to him, yet after rising to power, he showed no gratitude; instead, he slapped the people down and kicked them aside. This history, comrades all know. This time, the Chinese people once again defended him. He has a few guns—who are the ones holding those guns? Not local tyrants and evil gentry, nor capitalists, but the Chinese people. The Kuomintang's army of over one million soldiers—to whom do the soldiers belong? Not to tyrants, but to Chinese workers and peasants. Not to mention the 100 million people in the Liberated Areas, our million-strong army, and several million militiamen. Now that victory has come and Japan has surrendered, he absolutely does not thank the Chinese people. On the contrary, he is leafing through the history of 1927, wanting to repeat it. He has not yet issued an order for punitive expedition. In the past, they did not call it civil war but "Communist suppression." Whatever it is called, it ultimately means killing people. Is it not killing? At our Seventh Congress, we said he would kill people, and the risk of civil war is very serious. Although a nationwide civil war has not yet begun, many people across the country and within the Party do not see the issue as we just described. They do not necessarily believe that he will inevitably kill, thinking that such a thing is still far off and that civil war is not yet widespread, open, or large-scale. There are many who think it may not happen, and among them are those whose views differ from our Party’s stance, as well as many who fear civil war. Having endured ten or eight years of war in the past, it is natural to be afraid. Therefore, we oppose civil war, do not endorse it, and want to prevent it. Our slogan to the nation is "Oppose civil war, prevent civil war." But civil war is coming. Because Chiang Kai-shek's policy is to come down from the mountain and seize the fruits of victory, opposing the people. According to his policy, he wants civil war; according to ours, we do not. It is the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people who do not want civil war—regrettably, Chiang Kai-shek is not among them. Not wanting it is one side; one side does not want it, the other does. If neither side wanted it, it would be impossible to start. Now, there is one side that does not want it, but our strength on this side is not yet sufficient to prevent it. Civil war will break out, and the danger is great. Our Party has repeatedly, without missing any opportunity, pointed this out: before, during, and after the Seventh Congress, and now before Japan's surrender, we have sufficiently and clearly highlighted this point to the people, ensuring that the Chinese people, our Party, and our army are fully mentally prepared. This is very important; having this preparation is vastly different from lacking it. In 1927, during our Party’s infancy, we were completely mentally unprepared for Chiang Kai-shek’s sudden betrayal, and as a result, the fruits of victory gained by the people were quickly lost, subjecting the people to prolonged suffering and turning a bright China into a dark one. Now, the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat, with enhanced political awareness and maturity. It has issued warnings to the entire nation and the whole Party, placing everyone in a state of preparedness. Now, we are prepared to disarm the Japanese and ultimately eradicate them. The Generalissimo wants to seize the fruits of the War of Resistance. The fruit is ripe, and he wants to eat it, to monopolize it, to eat it all by himself. He wants to start a civil war. We have clearly explained this, and we are prepared. What if civil war comes? Civil war is being forced upon the Chinese people by him. The same was true of fighting Japan—it was forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism. Had it not invaded China, China would have been at peace. If he forces us to accept war in this way, with one hand holding a large knife and the other hand also holding a large knife, we are compelled to take up large knives in both hands as well. This is based on investigation and research. No one pays attention to this investigation and research. When he holds something in his hand, we must investigate. It is a knife. A knife has two uses: one is to cut vegetables, and the other is to kill people. A knife does not harm people by itself; it requires a hand to wield it. Further investigation reveals that the Chinese people also have hands and knives. If they don’t have knives, they can forge one. After prolonged investigation and research, the Chinese people have discovered this truth: "Local tyrants and evil gentry have knives and use them to kill; fascists have knives and use them to kill." Once the people understand this, they can act accordingly. Some of us do not investigate. Chen Duxiu did not know that a knife could kill—it is common sense. Some might say, how could the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party not know? It’s questionable. He did not investigate and research, which is why it is called opportunism. Without investigation and research, there is no right to speak. In 1927, his right to speak was revoked. The right to speak is in our hands. If anyone wants to use a knife to kill, we will act accordingly. We must put the knife in the hands of all who are politically aware. If others sharpen their knives, we too will sharpen ours. In the Guanzhong region, they have mobilized over a dozen divisions; six divisions have come nearby, with three divisions penetrating our border area—spanning 900 li in width and 20 li in depth. This happened in July and August. We followed their example, eliminating them across an area 100 li wide and 20 li deep. Where they built blockhouses and stationed several companies, we too can build blockhouses. He, like the foreigners, incurs huge losses while calculating petty accounts—calculating from Heilongjiang to Chongqing as nothing, but insisting on calculating over 100 li, leaving five companies to hold the fortifications. We eliminated them resolutely, cleanly, and completely, according to our will. Now he is fuming and redeploying troops. Whether he will strike again remains unknown. Our policy is: "Tit for tat, struggle for every inch of land." The rights the Chinese people have gained must never be lightly surrendered; they must be fought for. If we lose, we cannot blame heaven or earth—we can only blame ourselves for not winning and allowing him to seize our land and people. In the Southern Anhui Incident involving the New Fourth Army, though we can blame that bastard Chiang Kai-shek, why were we, with guns in hand, robbed? Tit for tat, struggle for every inch—this means not easily giving up the land we have acquired.

Last year, a journalist asked: "Who gave you the authority to do these things?" I replied: the common people. Who else but the common people? Neither Chiang Kai-shek, nor foreigners, nor God gave it. When the people seek liberation, they entrust their authority to those who can represent their interests and faithfully speak on their behalf—namely, the Chinese Communist Party, namely, all of you. As representatives, we must represent well. Chen Duxiu did not represent well; his approach was "no tit for tat, no struggle for every inch"—just a few characters off—and within months, he completely squandered the power of the Great Revolution. This time, we are different from Chen. We must pursue tit for tat and struggle for every inch. "Struggle for every inch" does not mean, as in the civil war period, "never cede an inch of the Soviet Area's land." This time, we abandoned an area 100 li wide and 20 li deep, but we abandoned it in July and retook it in August. The Kuomintang liaison officer asked about the movements of our forces. I said: You are in Yan’an every day, how could you not be clear? "When you attack, I attack; when you halt, I halt." Now it is: "When Chiang counterattacks, I counterattack; when Chiang halts, I halt." We follow your methods. After investigating and researching, we act accordingly—you, sir, are the model.

Thus, we can currently see that, generally speaking, there is a very brief phase focused on dealing with the Japanese. Because Japan has not yet surrendered, territory has not yet been occupied, and guns have not yet been surrendered. Once territory is occupied, guns surrendered, and Japanese soldiers taken prisoner, that phase will end. For now, we are still in a transitional phase (continuing from the first phase). During this phase, our primary attention remains on dealing with the enemy and the puppets. Whether we can handle them depends on our methods of struggle. Who will obtain the fruits of victory? Consider, for example, a fruit tree. The tree bears fruit—peaches, which are the fruits of victory. Chiang Kai-shek stretches out such a long hand to pluck the peaches, and we also stretch out such a long hand to pluck the fruit. Who should pick them? It depends on who carried the water and irrigated the tree. Chiang did not carry a single bucket. In our Liberated Areas, we water the tree every day. Now, those who did not water it also want to pick the peaches, claiming: "The ownership of these peaches is mine." I say he is bragging. We carried the water, so we should pick them. Now he has issued an order forbidding us to pick, saying he is the landlord and we are the tenant farmers. In today’s newspaper, we refuted him; tomorrow, we will refute him again. "Your authority is very limited. You did not water the tree, so you cannot pick. The authority should belong to me." But in whose hands the fruit ultimately ends up is another matter. Comrades, do not assume it will reliably end up in our hands. Some will reliably be ours: large swaths of rural areas in Hebei, Chahar, Rehe, most of Shanxi, Shandong, and northern Jiangsu, where the villages are interconnected, along with seventy to eighty cities grouped into five or six large, medium, and small clusters—twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, sixty—these are reliable. Our strength can secure these fruits. The probability of obtaining this batch of peaches is high. Gaining such fruits is unprecedented in our history. Historically, in the second half of 1931, when our Soviet Area first emerged in 1938, we had 21 county towns clustered together—no prefectural cities yet—and with those 21 county towns, we achieved such great victories. At its peak, the population was two million, and we were able to persist for so long and crush such large-scale "encirclement campaigns." Later, we lost, but we cannot blame Chiang—we must blame ourselves for not fighting well. If this time we secure fifty to sixty large and small cities in five or six clusters, with five or six areas larger than the Central Soviet Area, then things will indeed be firmly established. This can be said to be certain. Achieving this—obtaining a batch of medium and small peaches—is historically unprecedented. The second batch consists of the large peaches we cannot obtain: Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Nanjing. We can still hold the villages, and we might make a move on the big cities, but it is broadly foreseeable that these peaches belong to him. We carried the water, but the peaches go to Chiang, because the principle of "land to the tiller" has not yet been realized.

The third batch must be seized—taken by force of power. The medium and small peaches in areas like the Jin-Pu Railway, the Jiao-Ji Railway, the middle section of the Ping-Sui Railway, the Zheng-Tai and Bai-Jin Railways, the De-Shi Railway, and the Longhai Railway east of Zhengzhou must be contested. These are all areas we have irrigated. As for the western section of the Ping-Sui Railway, the Jin-Pu Railway south of Taiyuan, the Hu-Ning and Hang-Hu corners, the Yangtze River and southern Sichuan—these we give to Chiang Kai-shek. Even if we don’t give them, they will be taken. North of the Yangtze, we must strive with all our might. It has only been a few days so far; it is still hard to say what the outcome will be. In two or three months, we can discuss it. For now, we can only speak of two words: “strive mightily.”

There is another issue. Chiang has U.S. aid—who is aiding us? Up to today, there has been none. We must see what the future holds. The Red Army is still far from us. The Berlin Conference—what opinions are being voiced have not yet been made public. What has been published? That old line? The idea that foreign powers will come to help us has not been written into any document. On what basis should we rely? We should base ourselves on our own strength, called self-reliance, while striving for foreign assistance. Civil war is a struggle over the fruits of victory. In this period, there is opportunism—those who isolate themselves and willingly hand the fruits to Chiang, even though the people are not yet conscious of it. It is natural to give away the fruits to others; history has examples of this. The Russian February Revolution was like that: because the majority of workers were not sufficiently awakened, they trusted the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and willingly gave the fruits to the bourgeoisie. In the October Revolution, the workers rejected the Mensheviks, chose the Bolsheviks, and thus achieved victory. Today, the people of China’s liberated areas have chosen China’s Bolsheviks. Whom the people in the occupied areas will welcome is not yet decided; it depends on our extensive propaganda and organization. The people’s awakening is not easy; we must discard their backward elements, eliminate the dark aspects. Opportunism must be swept away with a political broom. As you all know, when you sweep a room with a broom, if you sweep three corners and leave one unswept, the dust will not automatically run out of the Chinese people’s minds. Backward elements must be removed by our efforts.

A portion of the Chinese people have not yet awakened. They trust Chiang, not us, because our propaganda and organizational work is insufficient. Marxism is realism. It has never been said that there is dust that goes away without sweeping. Will a strong wind rise and remove it? No. Our Party’s rectification campaign works the same way: wherever it was carried out, petty-bourgeois thinking fled; where it was not carried out, petty-bourgeois thinking remained. Such a situation is logical. Our broom is the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. Others also have brooms—they sweep away the CCP, sweep away the people, sweep through Guanzhong. Hu Zongnan swept a swath a hundred li wide, and for now I am not sweeping it back.

In the border region, there is a place called Jiezi River. South of the river is Luochuan, north of it is Fuxian. South of the river belongs to others, and it is full of filth. South of the river and north of the river are two different worlds. Some of us over-trust political influence—this is superstition. Look at Yan’an: its political influence can be said to be quite significant. When there are political problems, if we sweep them, people engage in self-reflection; if we don’t sweep, they don’t reflect. All backward, dark things cannot be removed without sweeping them with a broom. The Soviet Union has the greatest political influence, yet Finland and Estonia near Leningrad were not influenced. Only when the Red Army arrived were the counter-revolutionaries swept away. In 1936, when we were in Bao’an, there was an earthen stronghold. Our capital was in Bao’an—its political influence can be said to have been immense—but sweeping from the south and north failed. Only when we swept from within did they concede defeat. Everything in the world is like this: a table won’t move unless you carry it; the Red Army won’t enter the Northeast unless it moves; Japan won’t surrender unless our army attacks. If we do not go and strike them, they will not surrender. They will not lay down their arms until they are forced to. Within the Party, there is a sentiment of trusting in political influence. Zhu Xi said: “Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard and doorstep.” Dawn is when the sky is about to brighten but has not yet. Someone told me, giving me a task, saying to work hard and strive with my whole body. Only by thinking this way and acting this way can there be benefit. China’s territory is very vast, and we must sweep it inch by inch.

Will civil war break out? There are international and domestic factors. The domestic factor is the degree of our awakening. By awakening, we mean that nothing deceptive can fool us; we maintain a clear-headed mind and refuse to be deceived. We should admit that Chiang Kai-shek is very formidable. His political tactics, his tricks, his experience in opposing communism and the people—acknowledging this is beneficial. We must never think that others are incapable. Therefore, we must have a clear-headed mind, including correct policies, and not make mistakes.

On the whole, the stage of the War of Resistance has passed. The national war has ended. The new situation and task is domestic struggle. Whether international and domestic factors might delay the outbreak of civil war—logically, there is such a possibility. It is certain that Chiang will go down to pick the fruits; seizing the fruits means struggle. Some fruits we pick, some he picks; in many places, we vie with him to pick them. In this process of scrambling for fruit, war will erupt. For a time, there may be many localized scrambles.

We have strength: ① The 100 million people in the liberated areas; ② The awakened people in the Kuomintang-ruled areas who oppose civil war, which may constrain Chiang’s forces; ③ Some within the Kuomintang do not approve of civil war—these are the domestic factors. There is also the Soviet Union to the north. The liberated areas have 100 million people. In the Kuomintang areas, many people oppose civil war. China is as large as forty-five Greeces. What Churchill did in Greece—China is different. There is an observer group in Yan’an, led by Colonel Barrett. He said to me: “You must listen to Hurley’s words and send a few people to serve as officials in the Kuomintang government.” I replied: “Being an official with your hands tied is no good. If we are to do it, we must act freely, with hands released and feet unbound, striding boldly—that is a coalition government.” He said: “Not doing it will bring trouble: first, Americans will scold you; second, the U.S. will give money to Chiang.” I said: “You Americans eat bread and are willing to prop up Chiang’s back—I won’t interfere. But there is one point: whose China is it? It is absolutely not Chiang Kai-shek’s. You can prop him up for a hundred years—even a hundred and one. I give you orders: you are forbidden to prop up Chiang. If you insist, I can’t help it. Right now, I have millet plus rifles; you have bread plus cannons. If you want to scold, go ahead and scold.” This is intimidation. Imperialism has its bag of tricks; some people in the colonies fear intimidation. They don’t know there are people who are not afraid. We criticized this point in the past because many Chinese people did not understand and said: “You are plucking whiskers from the tiger’s mouth.” We are lawless and fearless. You never spoke with us about any treaties, and Chiang does not recognize us. We participated in the National Political Council as a cultural group. We said we are a martial group, not a cultural group. On March 1 this year, Chiang said: only after the CCP hands over its army will it have legal status. I did not hand it over, so I still have no legal status. Among over sixty countries in the world, not one recognizes us. So we are lawless and fearless. Our responsibility is to be accountable to the people. Every policy, every word is accountable to the people. If we make mistakes, we must correct them—that is being accountable to the people. The United States does not recognize us and helps Chiang attack us. Toward the U.S. and toward Chiang, we bear no responsibility whatsoever.

The Soviet Union has come—this is an event unprecedented since the three emperors and the creation of the world by Pangu. No book records anything like it: a foreign army aiding China to fight fascism, within Chinese territory. The impact of this change is immeasurable. If anyone tries to use an atomic bomb to sweep away the political influence of the Red Army, they cannot sweep it away. Some of us believe in the atomic bomb. Wrong. The atomic bomb does exist, but it cannot decide wars, and it cannot make Japan surrender. If there is an atomic bomb without struggle, the atomic bomb is empty. If the atomic bomb could solve problems, why invite the Soviet Union? After one atomic bomb was dropped, why did Japan not surrender? Yet as soon as the Soviet Union entered the war, Japan surrendered. We are Marxist-Leninists. When we discuss problems and think about problems, we must not deviate from our standpoint. Some of us are not even as good as aristocrats. Britain’s Lord Mountbatten said: “It is wrong to think that the atomic bomb can settle war.” Some among us are not even as good as Mountbatten. He has a bit of dogmatism, but they do not view problems from a materialist historical perspective. Where do these influences come from? They come from bourgeois schools and bourgeois newspapers—when they propagandize it, some believe, though they are miles away from studying Marxism-Leninism. We must cleanse our minds of bourgeois influences. There are two worldviews and methodologies—bourgeois and Marxist-Leninist. Some people routinely toss the Marxist-Leninist worldview aside, like bureaucracy… one could list twenty examples, blurting them out. The atomic bomb issue is one. The U.S. may not necessarily directly aid Chiang to fight a civil war; the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas are dragging Chiang down. This civil war is different from that of 1927? It certainly differs. At that time, we did not have such international and domestic conditions. Then, the Party was young, without a clear head, without experience in armed struggle, and without the policy of tit-for-tat and contending for every inch. Now it is different. Does Chiang Kai-shek still have influence? Yes, to some extent. Quite a number of people still trust him.

We must never assume that everyone is like us. In Yan’an, there was a discussion on “On Coalition Government.” Does Chiang Kai-shek have any revolutionary character? That pamphlet has already made it clear—it just didn’t write the five words “no revolutionary character.” His decrees are fascist decrees; his military orders are defeatist military orders. What revolutionary character is there? To state it clearly, should the Central Committee issue a proclamation calling for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek? Not yet, not at present. We are still on the defensive. “If Chiang opposes us, we oppose him; if Chiang stops, we stop.” He steps down but doesn’t permit us to hand over our guns. I’ll ease up a bit more—but no, we must answer him. We have issued orders; this is called tit-for-tat. If Chiang opposes, we oppose.

The current international and domestic situation may confine civil war to a local scope, but it will move toward open rupture. We must be mentally prepared. He speaks of punitive expeditions and suppressing the communists, regardless of the name. He wants to kill: no matter when the rupture comes—even if it breaks tomorrow—we must be prepared. On the other hand, with the Soviet Union taking action, given our strength and international factors, for the time being there will be localized civil wars between us and Chiang. The first scenario I am prepared for; the second has long been the case. Now, fighting has already broken out in several places.

In summary, we have now entered a new stage. This new stage is the end of the War of Resistance and the beginning of the domestic national-democratic struggle. Today is a transitional phase. We must seize arms, seize territory. Whether things are stable or unstable, domestic struggle will intensify. Previously, there was the Anti-Japanese United Front. In 1927, there was the National United Front—after all, we are one nation. After the War of Resistance, Chiang wants to “build the nation.” What kind of nation? The forthcoming struggle is over what kind of nation. Will it be a new democratic nation, led by the proletariat and serving the masses, against imperialism and feudalism? Or an old, semi-colonial, semi-feudal fascist nation, led by local bullies and evil gentry, big landlords, and the big bourgeoisie? This struggle is very complex, different from 1927. We must prepare ourselves and be able to handle this situation appropriately.