The Central Committee’s Resolutions
Regarding Our Party’s Tasks after Japan’s
Surrender1
(August 11, 1945)
	 1.	 Japan announced its surrender after the Soviet Union entered the war, and
the Guomindang has since been actively preparing to recover the lost territory from among the areas we have liberated, to take by force the fruits of
victory in this War of Resistance. This impending conflict will be extremely
violent.
	 2.	 Under such circumstances, our Party’s tasks can be divided into two stages.
	A.	 At the present stage, we should primarily focus our efforts on forcing
the enemy and the puppet regime to surrender to us. Regarding those
who do not surrender, we should launch attacks in accordance with specific conditions and destroy them one after another. We should vigorously expand the extent of our Liberated Areas and occupy all the
large cities, small towns, and vital traffic lines that we can and indeed
must occupy. We should seize weapons and resources and go all-out to
arm and equip our basic masses. There should not be any tentativeness
in any of this. For this purpose, leaders in every area should immediately assemble the majority of our army and should disengage from
their dispersed guerrilla warfare. These troops should, according to the
categories of A, B, and C, be reorganized into regiments, brigades, or
divisions and be turned into extra-regional regulars. These regulars are
to act together to guarantee our army’s triumph when dealing with both
the enemy and the puppet regime. After dealing with the enemy and
the puppet regime, our main force should be brought together for reorganization and training to improve its combat readiness and to prepare
it for civil war. However, all areas should retain sufficient local troops
and guerrilla bands and should go all-out to give local cadres command
of the troops in the interest of local defense. Local militiamen should
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from published original materials preserved in the Central Archives.
1.  Mao Zedong drafted this resolution on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-7

be allowed to retain their guns, and their arms by no means should be
centrally mustered. At this stage, there must be sufficient forces in areas
such as Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia], Shanxi-Suiyuan, Taiyue, Henan,
Hubei, central Anhui, western Zhejiang, Hunan, and Guangdong to
guard against the Guomindang’s offensive. All other forces will be
used to deal with the enemy and the puppet regime. As for areas with
special situations, the Central Committee has already issued specific
instructions.
	B.
It is possible that the Guomindang will mount a large-scale offensive
against us at a future stage. Our Party should prepare to mobilize forces
to deal with this civil war. The quantity, scale, and scope of our forces
will depend on the situation. The duration of the first stage may be very
short in some areas, such as the Yangzi Delta, Henan, Hubei, Shanxi,
and Suiyuan, and we should make an adequate assessment of this.
	 3.	 We should immediately strengthen our work in urban areas, particularly our
work in cities that our Party may and indeed must seize. We should dispatch
many capable cadres to these cities. These cadres should then quickly learn
how to manage urban finances, banking, and economics. They should use
whomever they can engage in urban work and to deal with the maintenance
of law and order in the cities. They are to resolutely suppress the resistance
of reactionaries, but they should refrain from killing rashly. The focus should
be on the use of military strength and the employment of cadres; otherwise,
nothing can be accomplished.
	 4.	 We should grasp the [Party’s] policy and none of our actions should
depart from [the interests of] the masses. Although it is necessary to expand
our army, this should not be done at the expense of the people’s financial
capabilities. While it is also necessary to accumulate material resources, we
cannot look out only for the interests of the army and disregard the interests
of the people, and we certainly must not work against the interests of the
people. Central control and strict discipline are necessary while we seize
strongholds and capture cities. We should train the cadres immediately and
quickly strengthen the army’s political work.
	 5.	 Militiamen are human resources for our army, and those who defend the
rural areas are also these militiamen, so we must quickly expand the militia
organization.
	 6.	 During this winter and the coming spring, we must go all-out to reduce rent
for the multitudes (those who have already had their rents reduced will not
be affected). We should reduce rent uniformly in all Newly Liberated Areas,
devote ourselves to rousing and organizing the masses, establish local Party
organizations and local governments, and promote local cadres to rapidly
establish our Party’s foundation among the basic masses and rapidly consolidate all Newly Liberated Areas. However, we are never to infringe upon the
interests of the middle peasants (for they also constitute the basic masses).

As for the rich peasants, aside from reducing rent, which is a part of feudal
exploitation, we should not further attack them. Even landlords should be
allowed to make a living. It is far too soon to confiscate and redistribute land.
If there are areas where land has already been redistributed, make no further
changes. But we need to provide relief for landlords, draw rich peasants to
our side, and compensate middle peasants for their losses. Ignoring these
matters will break our rural united front and isolate our Party to the advantage of the Guomindang.
	 7.	 We will consider resuming negotiations with the Guomindang based on
the new developments in the international and domestic situations. Yan’an
will temporarily adopt a conciliatory attitude regarding criticism from the
United States and the Guomindang. Nevertheless, those in every area should
harbor absolutely no illusions about Chiang Kaishek [1887–1975, native of
Zhejiang] and should expose his fraudulence among the people and prepare
psychologically for the threat that Chiang Kaishek might unleash a civil war.
However, at the present stage, we should concentrate our main efforts on
dealing with the enemy and the puppet regime and on striving to achieve
the greatest victory with bravery, resolution, and thoroughness; we must not
divert our attention. At the same time, we should continue to provide help
and assistance to the American personnel who are in a difficult situation.
We should still prepare mutually beneficial coordination for the landing of
the American troops and show our good intentions to the American people
and to democrats within the government. Nonetheless, the possibility of a
Scobie2 peril has yet to pass.
	 8.	 It is hoped that those in every area will consider implementing this policy,
taking local conditions into account.
2.  Lieutenant-General Ronald Scobie (1893–1969), commander of the British troops,
was sent to Greece following the defeat and withdrawal of the German and Italian forces in
1944. His mission was to prevent a one-sided seizure of power in Athens by the Communist
ELAS guerrillas, but Mao regarded his role to be to support the Greek reactionaries against
the Greek People’s Liberation Army, which had long been resisting the German invaders.