Mainly Fight the Enemy and Puppet
Troops, Only Fight the Diehard Troops
in Self-Defense 1
(June 24, 1945)
Comrades of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi [Border] Region Party Committee and the
Military and Political Committee of the Hunan People’s Anti-Japanese National
Salvation Army:
1. It is neither militarily nor politically advantageous to concentrate our troops
and repeatedly fight large-scale battles against the superior forces of the
Guomindang in the Guomindang-occupied area.
2. The strategic policy for our army is to carry out a dispersed guerrilla warfare
in the territories occupied by the Japanese bandits, set up and expand the
liberated area, shrink the enemy-occupied territory, build up and enlarge our
army, guerrillas, and militia, weaken the enemy’s army, the puppet troops, and
the diehard troops that are attacking us in concert with the invaders. We should
not go beyond self-defense in dealing with the troops of the Guomindang. We
can only concentrate on a fairly large force and counterattack the Guomindang
troops in self-defense and defeat them when the Guomindang army is attacking
us, obstructing our War of Resistance Against Japan in the enemy-occupied area,
and when we have a superior military force. The purpose of this is to facilitate
our Party build-up of the liberated areas in enemy-occupied territory. We should
not inculcate the officers and soldiers with the idea that we are fighting
particularly, or mainly, against the diehard troops. Instead, in order to raise their
understanding and feelings for setting up liberated areas in the enemy-occupied
territory, we should inculcate them with the idea that we are mainly fighting

against the invaders and the puppet troops and that we only fight against the
diehard troops in self-defense.
3. We estimate that now there will be only a year and a half left before the
collapse of the Japanese bandits. We are pressed for time. Nonetheless, it is
currently possible to set up liberated areas in the districts of Hengyang, Baoqing,
Xiangtan, and Liling in central Hunan. It will be very difficult to maintain and
hold on to these after the collapse of the Japanese bandits. At that time, it is quite
possible that our troops will be in an extremely difficult position and may even
be forced to return to the north. Moreover, we cannot connect with our forces in
Guangdong, which is against our strategic purpose of opening up a new flank in
the south in order to restrict one wing of the Guomindang when its starts the
civil war. This policy applies to a different region from what we told you in
Yan’an, but we think that this policy is correct.
4. Therefore, your present principal forces and the reserve troops under Zhang
[Qilong] and Wen [Niansheng] should all march south by way of the enemy occupied territory (take a zig-zag course along the line between the enemy and
the diehard troops) until you have reached the border between Hunan and
Guangdong and then connect with our troops in Guangdong. You should be
prepared to divide up the cadres and troops into several parts. Build many
dispersed guerrilla base areas on the border between Guangdong and Jiangxi,
centered in the three counties of Qiannan, Longnan, and Dingnan in the Yizhang;
Pingshi, Lechang, Nanxiong area, in the Chenzhou, Daozhou, Linwu, Lanshan,
and Lianxian areas; and in the border region between Hunan and Guangxi
centered in Yongming, Guanyang, and Gongcheng (if they are occupied by the
enemy and the puppet troops). Gradually, they will become consolidated base
areas. We should prepare for all conditions so that our army will persist and
further develop around the base in the Wuling mountain range when the
Japanese bandits collapse and the Guomindang launches civil war. You should be
prepared to be cut off from each other and to fight on your own. The only direct
support will be your internal unity, your own correct military policy, and the
correct policy of uniting the people. If you make serious mistakes in these
policies, you will have to accept defeat. You must anticipate this. You must
anticipate the most difficult, most dangerous, and the darkest possibilities. In
addition, starting from this, you can set out to overcome the difficulties to obtain

bright and victorious prospects.
5. Every leading cadre must be modest, be on guard against arrogance, be
extremely cautious, and be on guard against impulsiveness. They should be
completely united and avoid and eventually eliminate possible disagreements of
opinion. If the situation permits, you should adopt democratic discussion in a
committee style, gather the opinions of the majority of comrades, and resolutely
carry them out.
6. The current overall situation favors us. If we can unite within our Party and
if we do not lose this opportunity and do not make major mistakes in our policy,
we believe that you can accomplish the great mission that the Central Committee
has assigned you. We hope that you can inform us of your ideas by telegram.
The Central Committee
June 24, 4 p.m.
Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 801–3, where it is reproduced from Mao
Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1. Mao drafted this telegram to the Party Committee of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region and the
Military and Political Committee of the Hunan Anti-Japanese Salvation Army on behalf of the Central
Committee.