Electoral Policies of the Seventh Central
Committee1
(May 24, 1945)
Comrades, we are having a very successful congress. Three items on the agenda
have already been passed, and the conclusion of the congress can be drawn in a
couple of days.
The fourth item on the agenda concerns the election of the Central Committee.
As regards the general policy for the election, the Presidium has had several
exchanges of views and has made a decision. Now I report it to you comrades.
I. Criteria for Election
We are going to elect a leading organ for the whole Party—that is, the supreme
leading organ for the whole Party between this congress and the next one—the
Central Committee. What criteria are we going to adopt, and what principles are
we going to use in the election? The chair of each delegation has reported the
opinions of many comrades, this kind and that kind. The Presidium thinks that
we should adopt such criteria under which the Central Committee will consist of
comrades who can guarantee implementation of the line of this congress. It is
relatively good and appropriate to adopt such a principle. This principle should
also be our principle in electing the Central Committee.
This time we are going to elect to the Central Committee many comrades who
were not members of the Central Committee in the past. That is, two groups of
people will be elected to the Central Committee. One group consists of comrades who were members of the Central Committee in the past. There are not many of
them. It has already been seventeen years since the Sixth Party Congress. During
the past seventeen years, there have been several elections, at the Third Plenum,2
the Fourth Plenum,3 the Fifth Plenum,4 and the Sixth Plenum,5 yet only twentyfive members remain on the Central Committee. Of these twenty-five people, the
majority should continue to be elected to the Central Committee, for they have a
great deal of experience. In addition, we should elect a large number of people
who have never previously worked on the Central Committee, since they, too,
have a lot of experience. The new Central Committee must be enlarged from the
old twenty-five-member committee in the past. Our congress must adopt the
policy of expanding the Central Committee. Such a policy fits the present
situation of our Party, the present domestic situation, and the international
situation. That is, the new Central Committee should be neither too small nor too
large, but it must be larger than the present Central Committee. Only in this way
can it fit the present situation of the Party and its future development, as well as
the domestic and international situations.
Based on these criteria and principles, we propose: (1) Should we or should we
not elect those comrades who made mistakes? There are now two opinions. One
holds that they should not be elected; the other believes that they should. (2)
During this election of the Central Committee, we are going to promote many
comrades who have never previously worked on the Central Committee. Do we
have to take every group into consideration? That is, do we have to take different
mountain-tops [shantou]6 into consideration? There probably are two different
viewpoints as well. One holds that we should not; the other believes that we
should. (3) The qualifications and criteria for a Central Committee member are
whether he will be able to carry out the line of this congress. This is very
important, but what about the requirements for this capability? Does it mean that
we are going to elect only persons who have all kinds of knowledge? Or is it all
right to select them if they have only one kind of knowledge, or a few kinds of
knowledge? Our comrades also raised this question. In sum, these are the three
questions in this election.
On the first point, should we or should we not elect those comrades who have
made mistakes of line? We will elect only those who have never made any line
mistakes; those who have made line mistakes will not be elected. The Presidium thinks that this is a good expectation, a good ideal. This kind of opinion is
reasonable, for we suffered great losses in the past because some of our comrades
made line mistakes. Comrades! This congress of ours is very different from all our
past congresses. I was present at three of these congresses. Generally speaking,
the representatives were not very serious about the elections, and only a few of
them took them seriously. This time, however, all our comrades are very serious
about the election. What does this prove? It proves that we now have experience.
In the past, our experience was far from sufficient. [We] thought, since I myself
will not be elected to the Central Committee anyway, you just go nominate a
group of people whom you like. I will elect anyone whom you nominate. As a
result, we ourselves were punished. Things have changed this time. Everyone
takes the election very seriously. So there are reasons for raising this question.
Nevertheless, in fact, if we do not elect those who made line mistakes in the past,
even to the point of electing none of them, that would not be good and would be
inappropriate.
Let me talk a little bit about the history of our Party.
We did this sort of thing before, that is, at the Sixth Party Congress we refused
to elect Chen Duxiu7 to the Central Committee. Was the result good or not? Later
Chen Duxiu ran away from the Party and did bad things. Now we can see that it
was wrong not to elect him. Is it true that because we did not elect Chen Duxiu at
the Sixth Party Congress, our Party never makes any mistakes, everything under
heaven is peaceful, and all problems have been solved since then? The Central
Committee elected at the Sixth Party Congress was very pure; Chen Duxiu was
not there, yet our Party still had shortcomings, it still had disputes, made
mistakes, and suffered losses. It is not true that we did not have any disputes, did
not make any mistakes, and did not suffer any losses because we did not elect
him. There was one reason we did not elect Chen Duxiu—that is, ease and
convenience. I talked about this at the preparatory meeting. I said that in the past
we did not want to have too much trouble and wanted everything to be simple,
and we were unwilling to cooperate with those who had different opinions. This
sentiment still exists in our Party, and it is very serious. Another time was the
Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress, when Li Lisan8 was expelled from the
Politburo and was asked to give up his position on the Central Committee.
Though nominally he was still a member of the Central Committee, in reality he had left his position. Everybody thought that in this way the problem of the Lisan
line would be solved once and for all. Did it really solve the problem? We drove
Chen Duxiu out of the Party once and for all, and as a result we still suffered
losses. Li Lisan did not go outside the Party, nor did he do any harmful things. He
is still our comrade. But he was forced to leave his position on the Politburo and
was also forced to leave his position on the Central Committee. Yet we suffered
losses at the Fourth Plenum, and actually we made a mistake on the very day on
which we drove Li Lisan away, and we made quite a few mistakes after that.
Both of these past two experiences are well worth our attention and study.
Our Party has experience of the other side as well. In the past ten years, from
the Zunyi Conference9 in January 1935 to the present Seventh Party Congress,
what has been the state of the Central Committee? The backbone members of the
Central Committee were elected at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums. Only five
members are left from those who were elected at the Sixth Plenum.10 That is, of
the present twenty-five Central Committee members, the majority was elected at
the Fourth and Fifth Plenums—that is, they were elected at the two plenums at
which we made mistakes. Three were elected at the Sixth Plenum. It is precisely
during these past ten years that we have made fewer mistakes, and there was also
less trouble and we made some progress in our work. Isn’t it true that this
experience is very important? It is indeed very important experience. At the
Zunyi Conference in January 1935, it was those strongly supporting the Fourth
Plenum and making line mistakes in the third “Leftist” line who stood out and
began to oppose the third “Leftist” line. Together with other comrades they
opposed this “Leftist” line. Now many people give this credit to me. I must make
it clear that without these comrades as well as many other comrades—all of those
who opposed the “Leftist” line, including some of the comrades who played an
important role in the third “Leftist” line—without their support, the success of the
Zunyi Conference would be unthinkable. The second time is the Sixth Plenum of
the Sixth Party Congress. Everybody knows that the Sixth Plenum was crucial;
without it we would not be able to have such a prosperous situation now. If we
had not overcome that kind of tendency at that time, that is, the tendency of not
supporting the policy of giving free rein to mobilizing the masses, of being
frightened, and of willingly tying ourselves up, if we had not supported the policy
of giving free rein to mobilizing the masses, developing ourselves, developing the

Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and expanding the liberated area,
and of not being restricted by the policy of the Guomindang reactionaries while
at the same time not breaking away from the policy of the United Front, today’s
situation would be quite different. Who were those people who attended the
Sixth Plenum? They were the same group of people. Without the support of those
comrades who made mistakes in the past, it would have been impossible for the
Sixth Plenum to correct the tendency of Rightist capitulationism. However, from
the documents as well as the records of the Sixth Plenum, you can hardly see any
sharp criticism of anything by us, for back then, it was impossible to criticize
anybody, nor should we have done so. Instead, we confirmed some of the issues
positively—that is, we solved the practical problems. As far as the past three years
since the rectification of 1942 are concerned, the situation changed even more.
The changes were even greater on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress when
we issued the Resolution on Certain Historical Questions. I believe that after the
Seventh Party Congress, such an important supreme conference of the leadership
of our Party, our Party will be able to march in an even better direction. This
kind of confidence and estimation has a solid foundation. Although there have
been some disputes during the past ten years, we are making relatively smooth
progress. It has little in common with the three mistakes of line we made during
the Civil War (it would be four times if we count the one led by Zhang Guotao).11
During the Civil War, we liked things to be simple and convenient, and we were
unwilling to work together with those who made line mistakes. The style of
“brushing aside with a single push” and pursuing “simplicity and clarity” is not
good. In the past ten years, we have adopted an attitude of tolerance, and such a
policy has helped us a great deal. Consequently, the Seventh Party Congress
should absorb past experience, that is, we should not push aside those who made
line mistakes in the past. In the Central Committee in the past, some made fewer
mistakes than others, and some made more mistakes. Today I must state clearly
that I made many mistakes. Are there any people who have never made any
mistakes? I would say there are not. How is it possible that someone will never
make any mistakes in the world? Hence we say that “everyone makes mistakes; it
is only a difference of degree.”
This is indeed the case. If we adopt such a policy and unite these comrades,
based on our past experience, we have confidence and reason to predict that we will have a better future. That comrades who have made line mistakes should not
be elected, in my opinion, is not as good as adopting the following principle:
although he made line mistakes, he has admitted his mistakes and is determined
to correct his mistakes, so we can still elect him. Our Bolshevik party is never
ambiguous about our Party principles. Unlike the capitalist class, we must have a
policy of “admitting mistakes and correcting them.” Under the guidance of such a
principle, we can elect him. This policy is different from the policy of not electing
him. That policy is a very fine ideal. Although one must have ideals, one must
also be coordinated with a thing called “reality.” We are realists who have ideals,
or you may call us revolutionary realists. We are not unprincipled realists.
Idealism means principle, and realism means flexibility. The principle of idealism
and the flexibility of realism should be combined. This is the revolutionary
realism of Marxism-Leninism. None of those who have made mistakes should be
elected—this is the ideal. But it is insufficient simply to adopt such a policy. One
point is missing, which is that we should elect these people if they recognize and
correct their mistakes. Our Party must have a principle that it is not good to make
mistakes, but it is good to admit and correct mistakes. We must definitely add
this last point, for only in this way will it be complete. These two principles must
definitely be combined. Otherwise we are going to make mistakes, we may lose
our merits, and we may develop shortcomings and even make mistakes. Only if
we establish a very good electoral method can we avoid making past mistakes. In
view of the pitfalls we suffered in the past, we should be more careful this time.
We should not say that we will not elect those who made mistakes; as long as
they admit their mistakes and are determined to correct them, we can still elect
them. This is realism; this is also a principle. Although these two principles seem
not to be consistent, only by combining these two principles will we be able to do
a good job. This is the only correct way. Otherwise, it would not be entirely
correct, we would not be able to do a good job, and we would make mistakes. I
do not believe that there is any comrade who wants to make mistakes and says, “I
am determined to make mistakes.” It will not do if we fail to analyze the problem
that some comrades make mistakes, fail to make a concrete analysis of history,
and fail to adopt revolutionary realism. That is, if we fail to combine idealism and
realism, fail to combine principle and flexibility, we are likely to create defects,
shortcomings, and even mistakes. I must point this out for our comrades.

Emotionally, we are reluctant to elect those who made mistakes, but rationally
we can. At present, we should unify emotion and rationality, and they can be
unified. That is to say, putting emotion under the guidance of rationality,
rationality should be primary. For historical reasons, and for the sake of the
future, the people of the entire nation, and the whole Party, we must adopt such a
policy—a realistic policy. In the past, we were simple and direct toward Chen
Duxiu and Li Lisan. Emotionally, we really felt relaxed, happy, and without
vexation, however, the result was not joyful but very irritating. Things in this
world are always like this. When you want to be happy, you may end up with
just the opposite—unhappy; but when you are prepared for unhappiness, it is
quite likely that you may have less of it. Therefore, we must resolve not to fear
trouble and resolve to cooperate with those comrades who made mistakes. If you
seldom come to visit me, I will go to your place. If you have many complaints, I
have two ears. If one is not enough, I will also use the other; if you say that the
window on this side is not completely open, I will open the one on that side as
well. We must practice cooperating with those who had disputes with us, who
disagreed with us in principle, and who retaliated against us and deprived us of
our Party membership. We will unite and cooperate with them under the
principle that they must admit and correct their mistakes. We must indeed
practice this. We will not be able to do it without practice, but we will be able to
do it if we do practice it. Hence, the contradiction between emotion and
rationality can be resolved.
Let me give you another example of Marx and Engels, which is an
international experience. While organizing the First International, in order to
unite the masses of Spain, France, and Italy, Marx and Engels once cooperated
with the anarchists; they also cooperated with the liberal bourgeoisie and the
democratic faction of the bourgeoisie in Italy, and with Mazzini.12 Marx and
Engels set a model for us, which tells us that we should avoid factionalism, for in
essence this is a matter that concerns the broad masses. Back then the anarchists
had a lot of supporters among the masses, so it was necessary to cooperate with
them, gradually transform them, and change them by persuasion. Later, the
anarchists broke away and the Italian democrats also refused to cooperate, but it
did not hurt Marxism at all. If you do not want to do it, then don’t!
Both Chinese and foreign experiences tell us that within the Party we should do our utmost to unite. What is our principle? It is to do our best to unite as
many people as possible under our program and to win them over to unite and
cooperate with us. I have already said in my report that we should unite with any
comrade, as long as he is willing to abide by the program and constitution of the
Party and to obey the resolutions of the Party. There is a principle for our unity,
namely, that a member must abide by the outline and constitution of the Party
and obey the resolutions of the Party. We must unite all our comrades under the
guidance of such a principle. This is one problem.
As regards the second point, should we take every aspect into consideration?
This question is actually the issue of giving consideration to different
mountaintops.13 There are also two kinds of solutions. One solution is that we
should give consideration to this; the other is that we should not. The Presidium
believes that giving consideration to different mountaintops is the only correct
solution. Comrade Fu Zhong14 made a very good speech here yesterday. I agree
with every word he said. In the election, should we give consideration to
different mountaintops? Should we give consideration to every aspect? In my
opinion, the idea that we should not give consideration to different mountaintops
and different aspects is also an ideal, but it is not practical in reality. In reality, it
is better if we do give consideration. Giving consideration will benefit us more
than not giving consideration. There are many mountaintops and units in the
Chinese Revolution. During the Civil War period, there was the Soviet area and
the enemy-occupied area. Within the Soviet area itself there were many different
units. This is the reality of the Chinese Revolution. Without this reality, there
would be no Chinese Revolution. After the Civil War came the eight years of the
War of Resistance. There were also mountaintops during the War of Resistance.
That is, there were many anti-Japanese base areas, and there were also many
enemy-occupied areas in the north as well as in the south. Is this a good thing? In
my opinion, it is an excellent thing. This is the reality of the Chinese Revolution;
without these circumstances there would be no Chinese Revolution. Therefore,
they are not bad things but good things. The bad thing is mountaintopism and
sectarianism rather than mountain tops. What is bad about the mountaintop?
What is bad about the Qingliang mountains? What is bad about the Taihang
mountains? What is bad about Wutai mountain? Nothing. Nevertheless,
wherever there is mountaintopism, this is not good. Therefore, we should analyze these problems. I do not mean to say that in any base area everybody is a
mountaintopist. The sentiment of mountaintopism varies in degree. Take the First
and Fourth Front armies, for example. There are several units within the First
Front Army, as Comrade Fu Zhong said yesterday. There are differences between
the First, Second, and Fourth Front armies; there are also differences between the
Third, Seventh, and Tenth armies. Because each unit works in a different place,
the situation varies. If the relationship between each other is not properly
managed, it will lead to mountaintopist tendencies; but it is also true that some of
them are the result of our poor management. Yesterday Comrade Fu Zhong
talked about the relationship between those within and without the mountaintop.
If the relationship between them is good, mountaintopism may be eliminated.
Nevertheless, since so many things are dealt with blindly, the work is not well
done. This is the question we must first analyze. Now we are removing stones
and mending relationships. Now let us have a conclusive method and remove all
the stones, big and small. In this way, the relationships can be improved
somewhat, the number of mountaintops will be reduced and so will
mountaintopism. Thus half of it will be eliminated. If we improve relations
between us even more, the other half will also be gone. There will be
mountaintops but not mountaintopism. Besides, we will call it an ism—Marxism,
called Marxism on the mountain. In the past, some people claimed that there was
no Marxism on the mountain. Now let us change this “no,” saying there is
Marxism on the mountain. If there is no Marxism on the mountain, it means that
there is no Marxism at the Seventh Party Congress, for the Seventh Party
Congress is being held in the Qingliang mountains.
We must definitely understand mountaintops. In the past we said that we must
recognize mountaintops, admit that there is such a thing in the world. Or it
would be more accurate to say to understand mountaintops, we must get to know
them. We must definitely take account of them, but we cannot do that until we
have understood them. Only in this way can consideration gradually reduce them
before finally eliminating them. Therefore, to eliminate mountaintops we must
first understand them, give consideration to them, and reduce them. This is a
dialectical relationship. If the relationships of the mountaintops are properly
managed, first within the mountain, then outside it, mountaintopism will soon be
eliminated; hence, we do not have to be afraid. Many years in the future, railway lines will look like a spider web around the whole country. More planes will be
coming and going than in the past few days. By then, you will not be able to find
any mountaintops even if you try to. Without the development of industry and
the convenience of transportation across the whole country, it will be impossible
to eliminate mountaintopism completely. Now our revolution has developed.
There are more base areas, and they are stronger and bigger. If we get rid of our
blindness and are fairly good at resolving contradictions, we will definitely be
able to solve the problem in a more satisfactory way.
The Central Committee of the past, that is, the Central Committee before the
Seventh National Congress, failed to reflect this reality. That is, it failed to reflect
the various aspects of the revolutionary forces in terms of organizational
composition. Consequently, that Central Committee was incomplete and had its
shortcomings. Since rectification began, we have been suggesting that we should
recognize mountaintops and give consideration to mountaintops. This is reflected
in policy, but it is not reflected in terms of organizational composition. This is a
defect; it is not good. Because of this, we must pay attention to this problem
during the election. The new Central Committee should be able to reflect this
aspect of our circumstances. It must become a Central Committee with the fewest
defects. It is difficult to avoid any shortcomings completely, but we should reduce
the number and we can reduce the number.
If we take into consideration the first point just mentioned, we can elect those
who made mistakes of line. If we take into consideration the second point, our
Party will be able to reflect all aspects of the revolutionary forces. This way, our
shortcomings will be fewer.
The third point, should every Central Committee member know everything
about all aspects of knowledge? Here, too, there are two views. One believes that
every Central Committee member should know everything; the other holds that
it is not necessary that every Central Committee member knows everything. The
Presidium thinks that the first view is a very good ideal; it has some truth to it. It
is certainly a good thing if it can be done. But in reality, no one can master all
aspects of knowledge. This so-called knowledge of everything refers to the logic
of development of everything. Stalin has said: There are all kinds of human talent
in the Soviet Central Committee. There are cultural and educational experts, and
there are also experts on economic development. We have all kinds of talent. Our new Central Committee should also be one which comprises all kinds of talent. It
should do its best to take into consideration every aspect, every unit, and every
faction. I am talking about doing our best to give consideration to it, but if every
aspect is taken care of carefully and completely, that will probably become only a
formality. That is not good, nor is it good to completely ignore it. Therefore, we
must carry on the struggle between two fronts. As far as those who made
mistakes in the past are concerned, if we elect them without taking account of
principle and they refuse to admit their mistakes and to correct their mistakes,
yet we still want to elect them, this is rightism. But if these people have already
admitted their mistakes and have corrected their mistakes, but we keep saying
they should not be elected, this is “leftism.” The same is true of the requirement
for knowledge, they should try their best to know as much as possible.
We will adopt such a policy: It is unnecessary for us to demand that everyone
has all kinds of knowledge. It is sufficient if they have knowledge of one or more
aspects. If we put these people together, it becomes a Central Committee that
knows everything. There is an old saying in China: Three clumsy craftsmen make
one Zhuge Liang.15 If we have people from everywhere, and each person knows
one aspect or has several skills, and if we elect several dozen people like this, our
Central Committee will be relatively complete. We seek perfection from the
collectivity, not from the individual. It is better if we are perfect or relatively
perfect, yet in a few years our Central Committee will be imperfect again. For
instance, economic construction has just begun. In the future we will develop
large-scale industry. Comrade Chen Yun says that we should not destroy the
machinery since we are quite new at managing large-scale industry. Why do we
propose the policy of not destroying the machinery at this conference? Because
we do not have any knowledge in this field. In the past, we did destroy the
machinery because of the lack of such knowledge. After entering the cities, we
broke the glass and destroyed the machinery as well. For this reason, we raise the
issue of not destroying the machinery. Because the past Central Committees were
never perfect, the election of another Central Committee may not lead to
perfection either. Therefore, we have a learning assignment. Are we superior in
military affairs now? Two days ago Comrade Lin Biao said that we are somewhat
better than the Guomindang in certain respects. However, we are worse than
they are in other respects. For instance, we do not know how to drive tanks, how to fly airplanes, and how to fire artillery. Our Party is imperfect in this respect,
nor is it perfect in economic or cultural construction. What shall we do? We
should be relatively perfect, promote realism, and study once again. In electing a
Central Committee, we should elect those who have the motivation to learn new
things. It does not matter if they do not know this; we will elect them and tell
them to learn. Our election should be carried out under the guidance of the
following policy: that is, instead of seeking perfection from individuals, we seek
perfection from the collectivity and from learning about reality.
In sum, our representatives to this congress should have hope to have a Central
Committee which consists of a large number of comrades who have never made
any mistakes of line (we do not mean that they have never made any mistakes
but that they have never made any mistakes of line). It should also include a
group of people who made line mistakes in the past but have made it clear today
that they will give up the wrong line and accept the correct line. It should include
large numbers of people who are influential nationally (that is, those who have
made a name nationwide and are influential around the country). It should also
include large numbers of comrades who were very influential locally in the past
and who will probably have national influence in the future. They should be
promoted to the Central Committee, and we should improve them since we will
continue to develop in the future. We now have a population of approximately
100 million. It will continue to grow in the future, and before long we will
probably have a population of 200 million, or perhaps a bit more. Therefore, we
should start training leaders now, but first of all we should train the Central
Committee members. The Central Committee is the leader of our Party. The
whole Party should look to it. This is training; to make speeches eloquently is also
training; to open the window and let the air in is also training. Though our
Central Committee in the past was not large, with only twenty-some members, it
really did some work. It should now be expanded somewhat. Hence, we should
purposely train some leading cadres. This does not mean to say that we should
purposely make “famous cadres,” but if such a possibility exists we should make
it happen so as to adapt to the ever-developing Chinese Revolution. This Central
Committee should also include a group of comrades who know relatively many
things. It should also include a large number of comrades who know relatively
fewer things, or who specialize in a certain aspect. In sum, the new Central

Committee should include such kinds of comrades: a large number of comrades
who have never made any line mistakes; a group of comrades who made line
mistakes but have corrected their mistakes; a large number of comrades who
have national influence; a large number of comrades who now have local
influence but who will probably have national influence in the future; a group of
comrades who are knowledgeable about many things, and a large number of
comrades who know relatively fewer things. If after consideration of the
comrades and if this organizational line of the Presidium is approved, we believe
that such a Central Committee will be a Central Committee that has fewer
shortcomings. Such a Central Committee will guarantee that the line of the
congress will be carried out, including both the political line and the
organizational line. That is, this new Central Committee will have both a good
grasp of ideology and will be able to unite comrades. Comrades! This congress of
ours must elect such a Central Committee. This congress has too many
representatives. Some comrades do not want to be representatives, and many
comrades asked not to be elected to the Central Committee. This is a good
attitude. Confucius once said: “Be cautious when approaching any situation; be
good at planning for success.”16 Never say that it is because I was not elected to
the Central Committee that the revolution failed; such an attitude is not good.
We must elect prudently and carry out our duties with care; only such an attitude
is a good one. Only such a Central Committee can guarantee that the line of this
congress will be carried out. Such a Central Committee will avoid, or largely
avoid, repeating our shortcomings and mistakes of the past. Only such a Central
Committee fits into the present state of development of our Party and will fit into
its state of development in the future. Only such a Central Committee can have a
positive influence on our comrades in the entire Party and on the people in the
entire nation. Such a Central Committee will be a Central Committee that has
fewer shortcomings, a Central Committee that is relatively dependable, a Central
Committee that you can count on. Historical experience demonstrates that if you
plan for an easy go, you will not get it; if you plan for trouble, you will have
fewer troubles. Generally speaking, that is how things work in the world.
Several other problems need explaining. Some comrades might say that such a
Central Committee would be too cumbersome. Others are worried that a group of
people would inevitably fall behind and drop out. This raises the question of what we should do if they make mistakes again. Can we guarantee that they will
never make mistakes again? Others say that such an election is not very fair.
There are only a limited number of representatives on the list, and since we must
give consideration to this aspect or that aspect, this would necessarily mean that
some comrades, even those who are relatively very capable, will not be elected,
and this is unfair.
First, let us talk about the issue of being cumbersome. Our Party was
cumbersome in the past. I will now talk a bit about the history of that
unwieldiness. Our Party was cumbersome during the late period of the Great
Revolution. There was an erroneous Chen Duxiu line that was not exposed and
cleaned up. What was the result? Because of this unwieldiness, the Great
Revolution failed; it was a bad result. After the revolution failed, thousands and
thousands of people suffered; the Party was also greatly reduced and was forced
to go underground. This was the first period. The second period was from the end
of the Great Revolution to the Zunyi Conference. During this period there was
once a line of putschism and a Lisan line in our Party. Though they were exposed
and criticized later, the problems were not resolved. Besides, there was also the
third “Leftist” line, which was not exposed and corrected for a long time, and the
subsequent Zhang Guotao line. Was such a situation unwieldy or not? Yes, it
was. And much worse, it was an unwieldy line. Did we suffer? Yes, we did, and
we suffered great losses. This is already written in the “Resolution on Certain
Historical Questions.” The third period was from the Zunyi Conference to the
Seventh Party Congress. This period can once again be divided into two stages.
During the first stage, from the Zunyi Conference to the Sixth Plenum, the rule of
the third “Leftist” line in the Party Central Committee was already over, but it
had not yet been exposed and corrected ideologically. Whatever a thing is, if you
do not solve the problem thoroughly, you will never be able to solve the problem
once and for all. As a result, we made some other mistakes. The second stage was
from the Sixth Plenum to the Seventh Party Congress. During this period, we
gradually and thoroughly exposed and criticized the “Leftist” line. If we compare
the above three periods, which period was not cumbersome? The first period had
an unwieldy line; the second period had unwieldy lines several times; the third
period was a little bit unwieldy before the Sixth Plenum. After the Sixth Plenum,
particularly after the three-year rectification, the problem of unwieldiness was solved. The number of people is still the same—twenty-five Central Committee
members. Isn’t this a fact? Yes, it is. Therefore, we should look at those comrades
who made mistakes and suffered losses in the past with new eyes. Although it is
a fact that they did make mistakes, it is inappropriate to say that they are
continuing to make mistakes now. It is ten years since the Zunyi Conference,
seven years since the Sixth Plenum, and three years since rectification. We have
gradually changed our past history of unwieldiness; relatively speaking, we are
not now that cumbersome. One is cumbersome, and the other not; they are
different in character. Is it a difference in quality or quantity? It is a difference in
quality, a difference in nature. We must grasp this nature; otherwise, it won’t do.
We must remember this history. We must not be frightened by the problem of
unwieldiness; to re-elect them will not put our new Central Committee in danger.
Second, will some comrades fall behind? Will they make mistakes again? Some
comrades who made line mistakes made very good self-criticisms. Every one of
our representatives to this congress welcomes this. When they speak, they hope
that with the help of the representatives to this congress that they will correct
their mistakes. In my opinion, this tells us a truth, that is, “a real man needs three
friends to help him” and “though the lotus flower is beautiful, it must be
supported by green leaves.” Everyone needs help from other people, mutual
criticism, and self-criticism. Only thus can one make progress; only thus can
problems be solved. The present situation of the whole Party, the situation of this
congress, our experience in the past three periods, the good and bad things in the
eight years of the War of Resistance, and the experience in rectification all prove
this truth.
There will be fewer problems in terms of falling behind and making mistakes
again. Can we say this? Yes, we can, which is more of a guarantee. But is there
an absolute and complete guarantee? We cannot say that. The possibility of
falling behind, as well as the possibility of making mistakes again, still exists.
Those comrades who made mistakes in the past may make mistakes again if they
are not sufficiently prudent; those comrades who have never made mistakes are
more likely to make mistakes if they are not sufficiently prudent. Because when
you push a cart forward, there may be a difference in experience between those
who have stumbled and those who have not. Those who have never stumbled
while pushing a cart should be more cautious and prudent. It may be just when you boast “I have never stumbled” that you stumble, and the cart falls over—you
never know. Those who have stumbled in the past are often relatively more
cautious. Their eyes look everywhere. In addition, those who stand by also
frequently remind them: “You must be more careful, for you fell over once
before!” Besides, they have more helpers. No matter when, there are always three
types: those who are relatively more progressive, those in the middle, and those
who are relatively more backward. I cannot guarantee now that this congress will
never elect the wrong person. Right now he looks good, but in the future he may
prove to be no good. Such a possibility does exist. This time we are going to elect
several dozen people. It is possible that some of them will fall behind when they
are only halfway through the journey because their feet hurt. Those who have
never stumbled and fallen may stumble this time, and those who have stumbled
may stumble again. Don’t such things happen in this world? Just like those
ordinary people who push carts, it is by no means the case that they will never
push carts again simply because they fell over once. If they do not do it well, they
may fall over several times. Therefore, it is impossible to guarantee that not a
single one of the several dozen will ever fall behind. We are going to choose
several dozen Central Committee members to push the carts and carry the millet.
Some push, some pull, and it is quite likely that some of the millet might drop,
but it is fine so long as tomorrow morning’s breakfast is guaranteed. Of course,
we must be very careful; otherwise, if all the grain is lost, we will have nothing to
eat tomorrow. At the same time, we do not have to be afraid. Since we produce a
lot of millet, it does not really matter much if we lose one or two ounces, or even
two or three. If one or two drivers are disqualified, we may elect other people at
the Eighth Congress, or we may hold an election at a national conference
between the two congresses.
Third, the issue of unfairness. We should give consideration to all sides. There
are two different groups of veterans: Those who made line mistakes in the past,
and those who did not. We should give consideration to both of them. We should
give consideration to the revolutionary forces in every group of those newly
recruited, that is, the so-called factions. This kind of consideration, as I said
before, should go only as far as possible. It is certainly better to have as much
knowledge as possible, but even if they have a bit less knowledge, we may still
want to elect them when necessary. Then a problem will occur, since we have to give consideration to both the veterans as well as to the newly recruited.
Moreover, it is not necessary that one has to know every kind of knowledge, and
we cannot elect several thousand or tens of thousands of Central Committee
members. This will lead to one consequence in the election: some comrades who
are better in terms of capability and knowledge and who have contributed a great
deal to the Party may not be elected. Isn’t this unfair? If we look at it from one
point of view, it is unfair; nevertheless, it is fair if we look at it from a larger
point of view and from the point of view of the overall situation. Because though
there is a difference between those who made mistakes but corrected them and
those who have never made any mistakes, if we refuse to elect them and only
elect those who have never made any mistakes, we are liable to encounter other
shortcomings. Therefore, we must definitely elect them. Of course, this is only
my suggestion. Because we have to give consideration to every aspect, it will
result in a situation that some comrades will not be elected, though they should
be according to their capability and knowledge. Such things will happen; we have
to be prepared for it. If we do not make this issue clear here, some comrades may
say: those who made mistakes are elected, but those who have never made any
mistakes are not. Those people who know less than I do are elected; though I am
pretty good, I am not elected. We all have to be prepared spiritually for this sort
of thing. Once this congress is over, if some comrades still do not understand this
election principle, we should explain it to them very carefully, explain it to them
in terms of history, and make it clear by using historical experience.
II. The Number of People to Be Elected
Today we are going to pass the election law. The very first article of the election
law provides that we should hand out two candidate lists, the first being the list
for the preliminary election, and the second the list for the formal election. After
the election law is passed, everybody has to start thinking. The candidates will be
discussed in each of the small groups. The Presidium will propose a list for the
preliminary selection tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
As for the number of people, the Presidium has been thinking about it for a long time, but it still has not come up with a fixed number. I will make such a
proposal in terms of the number, around seventy people. As I said before, we
should give consideration to every aspect, give consideration to the newly
promoted, to the more learned, to the less learned, and to those who represent the
different revolutionary forces from different places. How big should this number
be? It should be around seventy. On the issue of the number of people, three
proposals have been discussed. One is around a hundred, one is around seventy,
and one is around thirty. That is, there are three proposals, large, medium, and
small. Of the three proposals, in my opinion, we should reject the two ends and
keep the middle, that is, around seventy. The Presidium thinks this is the best
proposal. It will not be able to reflect the present state and development of our
Party if it is too small. Our Party has more than a million members today, and it
will continue to grow. For instance, we may be able to expand to 2 million Party
members in one year. The new Central Committee should be bigger than the old
one. Is it appropriate to expand it to around seventy people? I think it is, and we
should adopt such a principle. We should adopt a more cautious principle. We
should not elect too many, nor should we elect too few. Thirty or forty people are
too few; one hundred people are too many; seventy is very good. On behalf of the
Presidium, I put forward these suggestions. Of course, it is up to you who will
make the final decision.
Comrades, in this election you have to guarantee that the line of this congress
will be carried out and that this is crucial to the Party and you have to consider
whether this will be beneficial to the Party and the people. It should be absolutely
beneficial to the Party and completely for the Party’s interests. I would like to
make a special suggestion: We have to pay attention to those who are not present
at this congress and to those comrades whom we do not know. If their names
appear on the candidate lists, we must pay attention to them. Naturally, we do
not know everybody at this congress. The chairman of each delegation should
introduce them. In this way, we will be able to elect a relatively better (of course,
only relatively) leading organ in this election to be the instrument to command
the Chinese Revolution. We are Marxists, so we believe in instrumentalism. What
is a government? What is a state? Marx and Engels believed that a state was an
instrument that one class uses to oppress another class; it is a machine, a tool.
What is our government? It is a tool used to oppress the counterrevolutionaries.

What is a counterrevolutionary government? It is a tool to oppress the revolution.
In sum, they are all tools; this is the view of Marxists. The Party is the tool of
class struggle, and so is the government. The Party’s Central Committee as well
as the Party’s leading organs are all the Party’s tools, and they are all the tools of
class struggle. Our Party is the leader of the class; the Central Committee is the
leader of the whole Party; we will treat them all as tools. Today I want to
elaborate on this point. In the past many of our comrades did not understand this
issue. They thought that they themselves were heroes, that they came out to
make a revolution, and they felt very proud of themselves. It is all right to feel
proud of oneself, but it should be a pride in serving as a tool. We are weapons
used by class. If we want our class to be victorious, we must elect the vanguard.
The masses select their leading tools, the leaders, from practice. It is absolutely
wrong if those who are elected think they are extraordinary and if they adopt the
attitude of “I am somebody now!” rather than being conscious that they are only
tools. That is wrong. If our Party wants to help the people to succeed, it has to
become a tool and do so consciously. Every member of the Central Committee,
and every leading organ should have such an understanding. This is the historical
view of materialism, this is what it says in the song “The Internationale.”
Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi read it several times here: “Not god, not Caesar, not a
hero; we rely completely on ourselves to save ourselves.” If one wants to save
himself, he will have to elect a Party and select a tool.
In sum, the Presidium of this congress hopes that you comrades and each and
every one of the representatives will adopt such an electoral line. The Presidium
believes that such a hope reflects the opinion of the great majority of the
representatives, reflects the correct opinion of the great majority of the entire
Party. Such an electoral line, if approved by you comrades, will be carried out.
Comrades, please think it over.

---

Notes

Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 356–75, where it is reproduced from a
transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This is a report that Mao Zedong delivered at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party.
2. The Third Plenum refers to the enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, held in Shanghai, September 24–28, 1930. At this plenum, Li Lisan’s “Leftist” line
was criticized and partially corrected.
3. On the Fourth Plenum, see above, note 11 to the text of October 14, 1943.
4. On the Fifth Plenum, see above, note 11 to the text of October 14, 1943.
5. On the Sixth Plenum, see above, note 4 to the text of May 21, 1944.
6. As a result of the scattered nature of the Communist base areas, primary loyalty was often given to the
base area leaders rather than to the Center, an attitude which the Rectification Campaign had been designed
to correct.
7. On Chen Duxiu, see above, note to the text of March 30, 1942.
8. On Li Lisan, see above, text of March 30, 1942.
9. On the Zunyi Conference, see above, note 13 to the text of March 5, 1944.
10. Referring to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Li Lisan, and Guan Xiangying.
11. On Zhang Guotao, see above, note 7 to the text of March 5, 1944.
12. Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was an Italian patriot, philosopher, Freemason, and politician. His efforts
helped bring about the modern Italian state.
13. In this passage, Mao uses the term “mountaintopism,” or “mountain stronghold mentality”
shantouzhuyi) to signify not the fact of seeking safety in the mountains, as many Communists found it
necessary to do at this time (which produced factions, or shantou), but the conviction of some of these people
hat their mountain strongholds were the only bastions of pure and genuine communism. In the passage that
ollows, we have translated this term sometimes literally, and sometimes as “factionalists,” which Mao often
uses here as a synonym because these isolated groups tended to regard themselves as set apart.
14. Fu Zhong (1900–1995) was deputy head of the General Political Department of the Military
Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
15. Zhuge Liang was the brilliant strategist in the novel The Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
16. See Analects, 7:10, where Confucius describes the sort of person he would want if he should ever lead a
arge army.