April 27, 1945 With spring plowing upon us, we were delighted to receive news from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region: a plan for this year’s self-sufficiency in military production had been announced. The April 22 issue of our newspaper published the details. The plan stipulates the following: (1) Each soldier is to receive four qian of oil and salt, five qian of meat, one jin of vegetables, three jin of firewood per day, plus six jin of meat for major festivals (to supplement any shortfall in official rations); (2) allowances; (3) miscellaneous public expenses; (4) funds for books and newspapers; (5) expenses for mules and horses; (6) one towel and a pair of cloth socks per person; (7) living allowances for the wounded and sick. These seven items constitute the tasks assigned to the troops for achieving self-sufficiency through production. However, it was also specified that, due to varying local conditions, some units would only be responsible for certain of these items. For example, in the 11th and 13th Subregions as well as the Central Hebei Area, the authorities would continue to provide funds for miscellaneous expenses, while in the Jehol–Rehe–Liaoning Area, troops were instructed to improve their living standards through production. The planners themselves highlighted three key features of this plan: First, the primary focus of the production effort lies in ensuring self-sufficiency in food rations and personal daily necessities, thereby raising the troops’ standard of living. Second, since self-sufficiency depends on productive output, both units and individuals will be encouraged to practice economy and restraint in spending. Third, “This year, no quotas are set for submission to higher command; instead, each unit is tasked with resolving its own difficulties and establishing a revolutionary ‘household management’ system. This approach will foster a spirit of self-reliance within the army and dispel last year’s tendency to depend on superiors and to seek ways to evade or underperform on assigned duties.” Overall, this plan is highly commendable, with its core principle being precisely that third feature. Given the current extreme material hardships and the dispersed nature of our operations, it is imperative not to place the entire burden of supplying provisions on the higher-level leadership, thereby paralyzing the initiative of the rank and file, especially when such demands cannot realistically be met. Rather, we should declare: Comrades, let us all pitch in and overcome these difficulties! As long as superior commands skillfully set achievable objectives and empower subordinate units to rely on their own efforts, the problem can be effectively solved—and even more thoroughly so. Should the upper echelons persist in assuming responsibilities they are fundamentally unable to shoulder, refusing to delegate authority downward and failing to mobilize the broad masses to take charge of their own welfare, then despite every exertion, the result will be mutual impasse: neither superiors nor subordinates will be able to resolve the underlying issues, particularly under present circumstances. Years of experience have amply demonstrated this point.

The principle of “unified leadership, decentralized management” has proven to be the correct framework for organizing all economic activities in our liberated areas under current conditions. Our armed forces now number over nine hundred thousand. To defeat the Japanese aggressors, we must further expand to several more groups of nine hundred thousand. Yet we lack any external assistance. Even if aid were to become available in the future, the means of subsistence would still have to be secured by our own efforts—there is absolutely no room for wishful thinking in this regard. Moreover, in the near term, we will need to concentrate sufficient combat formations, withdrawing them from their currently dispersed operational zones to converge on specific targets for offensive action. Such large-scale, concentrated operations will not only fail to achieve self-sufficiency but will also require substantial logistical support from rear areas. Only the remaining local units and regional detachments—whose numbers will remain considerable—will be able to continue fighting while simultaneously engaging in production. In light of this, is there any doubt that, at this juncture and without compromising combat readiness or training, every unit of our army ought to master the skills necessary to fulfill part of its self-sufficiency obligations?

In my view, military self-sufficiency, though seemingly regressive in form—after all, no civilized nation today maintains or could possibly maintain a system whereby its armed forces produce their own food and supplies—is, in essence, a progressive measure of profound historical significance. From a formal standpoint, it may appear to contradict conventional military norms: indeed, no modern army anywhere possesses—or should possess—a mechanism for complete self-sufficiency in sustenance. Yet, under our particular circumstances—national poverty, national fragmentation (both dire consequences wrought by the Kuomintang’s ruling clique), and protracted, decentralized people’s guerrilla warfare—it represents genuine progress. Consider the contrast: the Kuomintang’s troops are pale and emaciated, whereas those in the liberated areas are robust and vigorous. Reflect on our own experience: how arduous life was before we achieved self-sufficiency, and how much more comfortable it has become once we did. Now, imagine two units standing before us—say, two companies—each faced with a choice between two approaches: either having all their needs fully supplied by higher command, or receiving only partial or minimal support and being expected to meet the remainder through self-production. Which option would yield better results? Which would they prefer? After a year of piloting self-sufficiency, they would undoubtedly conclude that the latter approach is superior and embrace it, while deeming the former inadequate and rejecting it. This is because the latter enables every member of our armed forces to improve their living standards, whereas the former, given the prevailing material shortages, can never truly satisfy their needs no matter how much is provided from above. Precisely by adopting this “backward” yet practical approach—achieving self-sufficiency—we have enabled our troops to surmount severe shortages of essential supplies, enhance their well-being, grow stronger and healthier, thereby alleviating the burdens borne by our fellow citizens who likewise endure hardship. In doing so, we have won popular support, fortified our capacity for prolonged warfare, expanded our ranks, and consequently enlarged the liberated territories while shrinking the occupied ones, ultimately bringing us closer to the goal of eradicating the invaders and liberating all of China. Is such historic significance not worthy of celebration?

Beyond improving living standards and easing the strain on the populace, military self-sufficiency has also yielded numerous ancillary benefits. First, it has strengthened relations between officers and enlisted men: working side by side in production fosters a brotherly camaraderie. Second, it has reinforced a sense of labor discipline. Our current system is neither purely voluntary recruitment nor conscription; rather, it falls somewhere in between—an “mobilization” model. While preferable to full-scale conscription, it lacks the rigorous selection process characteristic of volunteer armies. Under our present conditions, however, we are still constrained to employ mobilization, as conscription remains unfeasible. Prolonged service tends to weaken soldiers’ commitment to hard work, giving rise to various undesirable behaviors and habits within the ranks. Self-sufficiency, by contrast, revives that work ethic and helps reform such tendencies. Third, it has enhanced discipline: observing labor discipline during production not only fails to undermine combat discipline or military conduct but actually reinforces both. Fourth, it has improved civil-military relations. When troops engage with local communities, they often find common ground and build trust. Through joint efforts in production, bonds of cooperation and mutual respect are forged, laying the foundation for harmonious coexistence.

Furthermore, the movement toward self-sufficiency has brought about other positive outcomes: it has elevated the ideological and political maturity of party members, enabling them to better grasp and guide future developments within the framework of Marxist principles. The first step in this process was the production campaign. Over the eight years of the War of Resistance, we initially managed to secure adequate food and clothing, but gradually fell into increasing hardship—severe shortages of grain, cooking oil, salt, uniforms, and funds. These difficulties arose in tandem with the Nationalist government’s three major anti-people offensives—the so-called “anti-communist campaigns”—launched between 1940 and 1941 in response to the enemy’s large-scale offensives. Without addressing these pressing challenges and resolving the deep-seated contradictions—specifically, the clash within the Party between proletarian and non-proletarian ideologies (including petty-bourgeois and even landlord-class elements, though predominantly petty-bourgeois)—between Marxist and non-Marxist thought, could we possibly have advanced smoothly? Clearly not.

However, by undertaking the Rectification Movement, which sought to rectify this very contradiction, our Party achieved an unprecedented degree of unity—though not absolute—in ideology, politics, and organization, advancing steadily yet decisively. As we enter the final phase of the War of Resistance, our Party will undoubtedly continue to evolve, and indeed should do so—but only by firmly anchoring itself in Marxist principles can it better navigate the path ahead.

The Rectification Movement and the production drive together represent two pivotal campaigns of immense historical importance. There can be no doubt about their significance. We should therefore strive to widely promote these two initiatives as the foundation for all other combat endeavors. If we succeed in this, then the ultimate defeat of Japanese imperialism and the complete liberation of the Chinese people will be within reach. As we stand at the threshold of the spring plowing season, I urge all leading comrades, staff members, and the general public throughout the liberated areas to seize this opportune moment, master the techniques of self-sufficiency, and surpass last year’s achievements. Those regions that have yet to begin implementing self-sufficiency measures should redouble their efforts this year. Liberation Daily (Editorial) April 27, 1945 All-Army Self-Sufficiency in Production: This Year Should Be One of Universal Implementation || A Further Discussion on the Historical Significance of Rectification and Production Er Ren San