China has the possibility of becoming an independent, free, democratic, unified, and prosperous nation at this time—a possibility unprecedented in the past century, since the May Fourth Movement, or since the founding of the Party.

We should seize this opportunity to put forward an appropriate program, mobilize the entire nation to strive for its realization—that is, to unite the whole Party and the entire people to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new China.

Much of this program existed before; now we are synthesizing and elaborating upon it.

To achieve the goal of building a new China, our principle is to boldly mobilize the masses.

This has been our consistent line since the War of Resistance began, whereas the other line is to constrain the masses.

Chiang Kai-shek is one who constrains the masses; he spoke of so-called spiritual conquest at the Liuzhou Conference. [2]

We are sincere and earnest toward our comrades and the people, with no such thing as spiritual conquest; toward the enemy, it is conquest by force.

This report of mine does not say much about the anti-Japanese part, and some comrades have raised objections to this—because their thinking is not yet quite clear.

*On New Democracy* says even less about anti-Japanese matters.

As early as 1937, I proposed that only democracy could save China. At the time, some comrades disagreed; they did not realize that the question of resisting Japan had already been settled—the issue then was how to resist Japan.

I mentioned that some comrades’ thinking has not yet been fully clarified this time, but there is a difference from the erroneous tendencies during the period from the December 1937 Conference [3] to the Sixth Plenary Session [4]. Those tendencies advocated reliance on the Kuomintang and rejected democracy, people’s livelihood, and the Three People’s Principles.

Adhering to the Three People’s Principles is a matter of principle and must be upheld firmly.

The comrades’ opinions are very good; I have adopted more than ninety percent of them.

Is our proposal to boldly mobilize the masses a “leftist” deviation?

I pondered for half a year over how to phrase our statements regarding the Kuomintang.

Should we adopt a gentlemanly tone, like that used when receiving journalists?

At that time, our reputation was very good, yet Stein and Forman [5] were very dissatisfied with my remarks. That tone had a major flaw: it could not thoroughly clarify issues or expose Chiang Kai-shek.

Or should we adopt an attitude like that of the Soviet Union?

That is also inappropriate, because we are not legitimate—unlike the Soviet Union—and Chiang Kai-shek is no Roosevelt or Churchill. [6]

Then, should we sound like the *Liberation Daily*?

That would not be good either. *Liberation Daily* can speak that way, but not every day, and it is unsuitable for our leading figures to speak in such a manner.

In this report, I have criticized him to the extent of nine parts—the criticism is sharp, but I have left some leeway and hope, though it accounts for less than one part.

This is necessary; failing to leave this leeway would lead to mistakes.

I did not say much about the Kuomintang’s achievements in the War of Resistance. In a scientific sense, one should say the Kuomintang is semi-fascist, but I refrained from saying so to avoid boosting their prestige.

My descriptions of them vary according to circumstances; the basic spirit is that our independence has grown stronger, while still leaving some leeway for Chiang Kai-shek.

Toward all those we wish to unite with, we adopt a united attitude, yet we also show slight distinctions and offer slight criticism.

This point is also very important; it would not be good to make no distinctions.

Regarding the bourgeoisie, I said it is mostly tied to the land.

I also criticized certain elements in the democratic movement in the Great Rear Area for their lack of resolve, referring to figures like Sun Ke. [7]

Some people panicked again after seeing Chiang Kai-shek’s March 1st speech and our forceful rebuttal; then, upon hearing that Hurley [8] replied in his telegram that no final conclusions should be drawn, they became elated again.

The middle faction is vacillating; China’s political forces are hard at both ends and soft in the middle.

If there were a Peasants’ Party in China, we would also have to distinguish ourselves from it.

This is something we Communists must clearly understand—only through distinction can we lead.

The Kuomintang reactionaries are also vacillating—they are double-dealers.

They resist Japan on the one hand, and surrender on the other; they unite with the Communists on the one hand, and oppose them on the other; they ally with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and oppose it on the other.

We have exposed all of Chiang Kai-shek’s deceptions, and there is foreign pressure as well.

Hurley’s visit to Yan’an and the stationing of the U.S. Army Observer Group [9] in Yan’an had a great impact, and even the Kuomintang’s secret service agencies were affected.

People like Atkinson and Gao Guizi [10] all say the world is ours; in cultural circles, signatures were gathered from people like Xie Bingxin and Gu Jiegang. [11]

This report does not say such things explicitly, but it carries that spirit—we must prepare to welcome victory.

This report will displease Chiang Kai-shek the most; the middle faction will be both pleased and displeased.

The middle faction has a future. When Chiang Kai-shek becomes untenable, foreigners will support them; their growth is not harmful to us at present.

But they are vacillating; if Chiang Kai-shek makes concessions, they will support him.

On March 1st, Chiang Kai-shek delivered a speech, and Luo Longji [12] wrote an article welcoming the “return of power to the people.” On the 2nd, we broadcast a commentary by a *Xinhua News Agency* correspondent on Chiang’s speech, and on the 10th, the Democratic League issued a statement opposing the Kuomintang’s monopolization of the National Assembly.

Thus, they can heed us, but they require our firm leadership.

On the question of leadership, I touched upon it in the report: besides the peasantry and petty-bourgeois intellectuals, it also includes other democratic elements.

In foreign relations, our main alliance is with the Soviet Union; toward Britain, the United States, and other anti-fascist countries, alliance is the main approach, but there are also implicit warnings, expressing the hope that they will respect the opinions of the Chinese people.

Did I talk too much about Sun Yat-sen?

Not too much.

We must be adept at citing him—this does no harm, only good. Lenin also wanted us to elaborate on his ideas. [13]

In his will, the two basic strategies are to arouse the masses and to unite with those nations of the world that treat us as equals. He spoke best about democracy—that it should be shared by all common people.

The Communist Party of the United States now takes Washington and Lincoln [14] as its banners; we have Sun Yat-sen, and we have a connection—we once cooperated with him.

During the civil war period, it cannot be blamed on us that we did not speak of him, because at that time we had been knocked to the ground; without setting aside Sun Yat-sen, we could not have stood up—just as the May Fourth Movement toppled the Confucian shop.

Now it is different.

Among some within the Party, there is a lack of respect for Sun Yat-sen; they should be persuaded.

In the report, I deleted the section on communism once but then restored it; it would not be good to leave it unsaid.

As for the Party’s name, many outside the Party advocate that we change it, but changing it would certainly be bad—it would ruin our image. So the report simply emphasizes the infinite splendor of communism.

The peasants like communism; communism is democracy.

After mentioning communism once, the report still emphasizes the democratic revolution, pointing out that only through democracy can we reach socialism—this is the unalterable truth of Marxism.

This distinguishes us from populism, which has widespread influence in China and within our Party.

What differs in this report from *On New Democracy* is that it affirms the need for the broad development of capitalism and makes opposition to autocracy the primary task.

It also touches upon opposition to old democracy—slogans like the nationalization of the army are theirs—but it does not stress opposition to old democracy, because Chiang Kai-shek represents not old democracy but autocracy.

The broad development of capitalism under a New Democratic regime is harmless and beneficial, and the report also explains that there are three types of economic sectors.

State capitalism existed in the Soviet Union for several years as well; after the October Revolution, Lenin wanted a development of state capitalism but failed to achieve it, and the kulaks existed even longer.

The distinction between the general program and the specific program was not pointed out before. In fact, the general program remained unchanged during the Great Revolution, the civil war, and the War of Resistance, and it can be used for many years to come.

The democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants is the essence of New Democracy.

The specific program varies at different stages.

A coalition government is a specific program—it is the concrete form of a united front government.

This slogan was long in coming, which shows how hard it is to find a slogan, a form.

This slogan arose from three factors: the Kuomintang’s great military collapse, the establishment of coalition governments in some European countries, and the Kuomintang’s claim that we talk about democracy without substance.

When this slogan was raised, comrades in Chongqing embraced it as if they had found a treasure, and the people supported it so widely—I did not anticipate that.

If everyone agrees with these basic views in the report, it will be distributed to all delegates after revision, and various amendments can still be proposed at the congress.

2

Just now, several comrades raised the issue of whether the spirit of the congress includes settling old scores.

Of course, “not settling old scores” is not a slogan; summing up experience can also be called settling accounts, but our accounting should not imply the intention of overthrowing anyone.

Comrades attending the Seventh Plenary Session should use sound reasons and a proper attitude to persuade the delegates to the Seventh Congress to have this awareness: it is better to entrust past historical issues to the Seventh Plenary Session for resolution, so that they can concentrate their efforts on the tasks of resisting Japan and building the nation.

Past historical errors were primarily a social phenomenon. Because the Party was politically immature, comrades who made mistakes did so unconsciously, believing they were right in trying to overthrow everything both inside and outside the Party.

Now everyone has awakened, and the main ideas are all in agreement.

Comrade Wang Ming [15] recently wrote to me, also endorsing the two points of opposing the Kuomintang reactionaries and uniting the whole Party—this is very good.

If we discuss historical issues at the congress, it will inevitably drag on for two or three weeks, diverting attention from the central topic, and the outcome will still not surpass the current draft resolution.

If we go further into military history, North China history, various mountain strongholds, and so on, it will become even more tangled and impossible to clarify.

The draft resolution does not speak in absolutes, does not mention personal character, does not mention illegality, and does not mention factionalism. Leaving these unsaid at most becomes a shortcoming, but saying them incorrectly would become an error.

The Zunyi Conference [16] and the Sixth Plenary Session both adopted this approach.

There is one point in the political report concerning military affairs that still needs clarification: the issue of jointly building a people’s army.

During the War of Resistance, there have been great changes within our army; some military commanders are not Communist Party members.

It is impossible for the army to be composed entirely of Communist Party members; even during the civil war period, Party members in the Red Army did not exceed one-third.

If some armies cooperate with us and later cease cooperation, we should then let them go, leaving some leeway and avoiding hurt feelings. Even if they become enemies again, it would be no worse than before the cooperation.

In external cooperation with other armies, Shandong has done very well; in many of our areas, there are still “leftist” tendencies that require patient persuasion.

There are three possibilities for a coalition government. The first is an undesirable possibility we do not hope for—that is, demanding we hand over our army to become officials.

Of course, we will not hand over the army, but if the government remains dictatorial, should we take up official posts?

We should not advocate doing so in our propaganda, but we should not refuse either; we must prepare for this possibility.

The drawback is serving as officials in a dictatorial government—though this can be explained to the masses (for the sake of making concessions, and we do not approve of this government). But there is also an advantage: we can carry out propaganda work.

The second possibility is also one headed by Chiang Kai-shek, democratic in form, recognizing the liberated areas, but in substance remaining Chiang’s dictatorial government.

The third possibility is one centered on us. When we have one and a half million troops and one hundred and fifty million people, and when Chiang Kai-shek’s power shrinks further and weakens to the point where no coalition is possible, we will have to do this. This is the basic trend and law of China’s political development, and the nation we want to build is just such a country.

This issue is not written into the report.

Also, the policy of the Seventh Congress is to resolve only those issues that have become mature. That is why the historical issue became mature only now and was deferred to the current Seventh Plenary Session for resolution. Historical issues in various localities need not be resolved urgently now, because they are not yet mature.

Published based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes

[1] This is Mao Zedong’s speech at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
[2] Refers to the military conference convened by Chiang Kai-shek in Liuzhou from February 23 to 25, 1940.
[3] The December Conference refers to the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Yan’an from December 9 to 14, 1937. At the meeting, Wang Ming delivered a report titled “How to Continue the National War of Resistance and Strive for Victory in the War of Resistance?”

...report, put forward the slogan "everything through the united front," and denied the principles adopted at the Luochuan Conference regarding the Party's independence and autonomy within the united front and the policy of waging guerrilla warfare.

Due to resistance from Mao Zedong and others, Wang Ming's erroneous views did not form a resolution and did not gain dominance within the entire Party.

[4] The Sixth Plenary Session, see note [4] on p. 143 of this volume.

[5] Stein, a journalist stationed in Chongqing for the Associated Press, the British *Manchester Guardian*, and the American *Christian Science Monitor*.

Forman (1898–1978), a journalist stationed in Chongqing for the United Press and the London *Times*.

In June 1944, they visited Yan'an as part of the Chinese and Foreign Journalists' Northwest Inspection Tour, and Mao Zedong held separate discussions with them.

[6] Roosevelt, then President of the United States.

Churchill (1874–1965), then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

[7] Sun Ke, then President of the Legislative Yuan of the Nationalist Government.

[8] Hurley, then United States Ambassador to China.

[9] The U.S. Army Observer Group, see note [7] on p. 226 of this volume.

[10] Atkinson (1894–?), a journalist stationed in Chongqing for *The New York Times*.

In 1944, he served as chairman of the Chongqing Foreign Correspondents' Club and visited Yan'an around September and October of the same year.

Gao Guizi (1891–1959), a native of Dingbian, Shaanxi, then commander of the 17th Army of the Nationalist forces.

[11] Xie Bingxin (1900–?), a native of Changle, Fujian, a writer.

Gu Jiegang (1893–1980), a native of Suzhou, Jiangsu, a historian.

They participated in signing the "Statement on the Current Situation" issued by the Chongqing cultural circles on February 22, 1945.

[12] Luo Longji (1898–1965), a native of Anfu, Jiangxi.

He then served as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the China Democratic League.

[13] Lenin pointed out in his article "Democracy and Narodism in China" that with the daily growth of the Chinese proletariat, "a Chinese Social Democratic Labour Party of one kind or another is bound to emerge, and this party, while criticizing the petty-bourgeois utopian and reactionary views of Sun Yat-sen, will certainly carefully distinguish, preserve and develop the revolutionary-democratic kernel of his political and land programmes."

(*Selected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 428)

[14] Washington (1732–1799), founder of the United States of America and its first President.

During the American Revolutionary War, he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army.

In 1787, he presided over the Philadelphia Convention, which drafted the federal Constitution.

He was elected President in 1789.

Lincoln (1809–1865), President of the United States from 1861 to 1865, advocated maintaining federal unity and abolishing slavery.

After the outbreak of the Civil War, he issued the Homestead Act and the Emancipation Proclamation, ensuring the war's victory.

[15] Wang Ming, see note [11] on p. 76 of this volume.

[16] The Zunyi Conference, see note [14] on p. 102 of this volume.