Conversation with John S. Service[1]

(March 13, 1945)

The peoples of China and the United States share a close bond of mutual sympathy, mutual understanding, and common interests. Both are fundamentally democratic and respectful of all individuals; both are essentially peace-loving, non-aggressive, and non-imperialistic.

China's greatest post-war need is economic development. Yet China lacks the necessary capitalist foundation to accomplish this task on its own. China's standard of living is so low that the funds needed cannot be raised by further lowering it.

Economically, China and the United States can complement each other's strengths and weaknesses, and there will be no competition between them. China does not have the essential conditions to build large-scale heavy industry, nor does it wish to compete with the United States in high-grade specialty products. The United States, for its heavy industry and such products, needs export markets and also seeks outlets for investment.

China must establish light industry to meet the needs of its own market and to raise the living standards of its people. In time, China can supply such products to other countries in the Far East. The raw materials and agricultural products that China possesses can serve as compensation for foreign trade and foreign investment.

[1] John S. Service (1909–1999) was born in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, China. From 1938 to 1941, he worked at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. Subsequently, he served as Third Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing. In July 1944, as a State Department political officer and political advisor to the Commander of U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, he joined the U.S. Army Observer Group in Yan'an, where he remained until April 1945. During this period, he held numerous formal and informal discussions with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others, dispatching over 30 reports and cables to the State Department over half a year that reflected the views of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party on major domestic and international issues at the time.

The United States is not only the most suitable country to assist China's economic development but also the only country fully capable of cooperating.

For the reasons above, there should not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement, or misunderstanding between the peoples of China and the United States.

But in reality, the Chinese people are rural people, peasants. Of China's 450 million people, at least 360 million are peasants. Intellectuals, senior officials, merchants, and capitalists make up only a thin layer on top. The peasantry is China.

A country as vast and backward as China cannot be quickly transformed. For a long time to come, China will necessarily remain predominantly agricultural.

Therefore, China's peasant question is the fundamental question of China's future. Unless China takes solving the land question as its foundation, it cannot successfully industrialize, because the peasants must provide a true market for the products of industrialization.

Take Japan as an example. Because it sought industrialization on the basis of a feudal society, it had no choice but to pursue imperialism and external aggression. It did not start by resolving its own land question.

Wallace[1] and some other American statesmen and writers—such as Brooks Atkinson, who recently published the article "The Chinese Peasant" in *The New York Times*—demonstrate a clear awareness of this fundamental fact about China.

The basic demand of China's peasants is to be freed from feudal tenancy relations and no longer to depend on landlords and capitalists for loans and the purchase of their products. This requires land reform and also democracy. The peasants must be independent and self-reliant, with the right to safeguard their own interests.

On the whole, neither the peasants nor the entire Chinese people are ready to realize socialism, nor will they be ready for a fairly long time to come. They still need to go through a prolonged stage of democratic management of private enterprise. To talk of immediately realizing socialism is "counter-revolutionary," because it is unrealistic; attempting to put it into practice would mean courting self-destruction.

The Kuomintang has no connection whatsoever with the vast peasant masses among China's population. It is a party composed of military men and landlord cliques, which rules through a conservative and utterly uninspired bureaucracy. The Kuomintang has done nothing in the past, and will do nothing in the future, about fundamentally improving the lot of the peasants, carrying out genuine land reform, and eliminating the feudal remnants that still exist to this day. It cannot do so because doing so would infringe upon the power base of the Kuomintang's main backers.

Because the Kuomintang fears genuine democracy, it has had to become fascist. Thus, it has turned into a bizarre amalgam of feudalism and fascism. This is the context and the defining characteristic from which the Kuomintang cannot extricate itself.

Unwilling to resolve the land question in order to raise the peasants' standard of living as the basis for industrialization, the Kuomintang has instead turned to rigidly prescribed principles of state control and domination of industrial development. As a result, it has been unable to build a solid foundation for its domestic political authority or for cooperation and friendly relations abroad with Russia and other neighboring countries. It throws all its strength into developing "national defense industry" and indulges in the dangerous game of power politics.

It is to be expected that future domestic and international conflicts lie embedded in these policies. If it persists in them, these expectations will surely become reality. Under these policies, the Kuomintang cannot solve China's basic domestic problems, cannot lead the country toward full democratization, and cannot become a stabilizing force in the Far East. And without an internal revolution within the Kuomintang, without an entirely new leadership group, these policies cannot be changed.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party is a party that represents the interests of China's peasants. The program it has formulated aims to achieve a democratic solution to the peasant question—reducing rent and interest rates, implementing progressive taxation, supporting production, promoting cooperatives, and fundamentally enforcing democratic politics.

Conversation with John S. Service

On this foundation, as people of all strata build the necessary free capitalist enterprises on a basis of unity rather than conflict, the Chinese Communist Party will become the driving force that brings democracy and sound industrialization to China. These are the only feasible guarantees for realizing peace and stability.

Just as the peasantry cannot be ignored in considering China's future, so too the Chinese Communist Party cannot be ignored. The Kuomintang wishes to ignore it, but its guns and cannons cannot bring it victory. In short, the vast majority of soldiers, like the Chinese people, are peasants. Because we are for the people and come from the people, we speak on behalf of the Chinese people. The people recognize this from our experience.

It is to be expected that Chiang Kai-shek will resort to any means to undermine reconciliation, because through reconciliation he and the clique that supports him will inevitably be forced to weaken their power and abandon their dictatorial rule. But the path he is now choosing leads directly to civil war and the eventual self-destruction of the Kuomintang.

Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to recognize any genuine coalition government, as well as his announcement of plans to convene a National Assembly in November 1945, all reveal his growing desperation. Such an assembly would be entirely a tool of the Kuomintang. No matter which non-Kuomintang representatives are invited to attend, it would be meaningless—mere window dressing. The delegates to this assembly were all selected and organized by the Kuomintang in 1936. At that time (1936), relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party were in a period of open civil war; it was a most fraudulent travesty of universal suffrage. Those delegates cannot represent the people who have fought the Japanese over the past seven years and taken control of their own destiny in the Liberated Areas, nor can they even represent the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

To have this gang of puppets elect Chiang Kai-shek as president and make his government the legitimate democratic government of China would be a farce. No one can imagine or expect that such a government would accomplish anything. Yet the immediate danger lies in the fact that this National Assembly will be used by Chiang Kai-shek as a means to demand that the Chinese Communist Party recognize his authority and surrender its own armed forces. It goes without saying that before the enemy has been driven from Chinese soil, the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the enemy-occupied areas will never accept these

unreasonable demands. At that point, they will be branded as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek, and the curtain will rise on open civil war.

China's liberals and China's most important friend, the United States, must clearly recognize the inherent danger in Chiang Kai-shek's latest tactic (the decision to immediately establish a "constitutional government" on the basis of Kuomintang one-party rule). This is the reason we are currently waging a vigorous propaganda campaign against Chiang Kai-shek. This struggle matters greatly, and we are compelled to exert every effort to speak out loudly.

China's liberals, whether inside or outside the Kuomintang, are numerous and growing. They include the democratic parties and the Kuomintang's factional groups, minor parties, most intellectuals, and many modern capitalists.

But they cannot overthrow the Kuomintang organization or alter its current reactionary leadership, nor can they control the new "constitutional government" being devised by Chiang Kai-shek's clique. Without the exertion of American influence, winning genuine unity and democracy will require a long and arduous struggle.

A coalition government is the only hope for a peaceful transition to a constitutional government; it would accommodate and represent all political forces nationwide on a democratic basis. The establishment of such a coalition government brooks no delay, for it is the only way at present to unify all forces throughout the country and effectively carry on the war of resistance against Japan.

Why is Chiang Kai-shek determined to push forward with "constitutionalism" now, before the country has recovered lost territories from the Japanese and before the people of the Liberated Areas have had a chance to express their will? Because he knows the people will not agree. In Europe, it has been stipulated for occupied countries that the form of government can only be determined after national liberation, when the people can decide on their own political leaders. This policy is fair and reasonable, and we recommend its adoption to the leaders of the Allied countries. Why should China be an exception? Shanghai is larger than Athens; China's enemy-occupied areas are equivalent to a country much larger than Greece!

The United States is unaware of the influence it wields over China and its capacity to shape China's course of events. Chiang Kai-shek relies on American aid. Without American support, he might have collapsed long ago or been compelled to alter his policies for the sake of national unity and popular support. America

does not interfere in China's internal affairs? Nothing of the sort! You are here, as China's largest ally, and the very fact of your involvement matters enormously.

America's intentions have been good. When Ambassador Hurley[1] came to Yan'an and signed the five-point basic agreement, we expressed our appreciation. He would not have signed if he had not understood that President Roosevelt shared the same thinking.

We do not understand why American policy, after making a good start, now seems to waver. Undoubtedly, Chiang Kai-shek's motives and tricks are all too apparent. His proposals for a "war cabinet" and a "party conference" resolve no fundamental differences, for they have no power and are in every respect inferior to a coalition government. Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to "reorganize the Communist armies" and "place them under American command" are attempts to drive a wedge between us and the Americans, to cause misunderstanding. Like the British in Europe, we would gladly accept American command—but this must apply to all Chinese armed forces.

Chiang Kai-shek has constantly tried to shift the blame for the failure of negotiations onto the Chinese Communist Party. To secure foreign consumer goods, he has staged an extremely cunning propaganda swindle: promising to realize "democracy" at once by convening a bogus National Assembly this year. We do not believe the Americans will be easily duped.

Convening the National Assembly is Chiang Kai-shek's last trump card. It is most important that the United States recognizes this, for it will close the door to peace. Once the National Assembly is convened, the die will be cast, and reconciliation will become impossible. If compelled, we will fight, because we fight not only for the democratic rights of the 100 million people in the Liberated Areas, but for the democratic rights of the entire Chinese people.

When half our motherland is divided or occupied by the enemy, when the Kuomintang

[1] Hurley (1883–1963), served as U.S. Ambassador to China from November 1944 to November 1945.

When all political parties outside the ruling party are deemed illegal, a national assembly cannot be convened. What the situation demands is the formation of a coalition government, as only a coalition government can save the current state of affairs. We hope that the United States can use its influence to help make this happen. If this cannot be achieved, all efforts made by the United States will come to nothing.