Comrades: Today’s report meeting has been initiated by the Fifth and Sixth Departments of the Central Party School.
Comrades from the Fifth and Sixth Departments, as well as many other comrades, have been in Yan’an for a long time, and I have not come to speak even once.
Today, this meeting is held specifically for the comrades of the Fifth and Sixth Departments, and in addition, many other comrades are also participating.
The topics to be discussed today were assigned to me by the comrades: one is the question of the current situation, one is the question of mountain-stronghold mentality, and one is the question of examining cadres.
In addition, I would also like to speak on some other issues.

**I. The Question of the Current Situation**
Everyone is concerned about the current situation, and this is very good.
What is meant by the current situation includes the world situation and the situation in our China.
What is the main issue in the world today? It is whether the several great powers can unite to the very end to eliminate fascism.
What is the main issue in China? It is whether China can unite to eliminate Japanese imperialism.
Regarding the current situation, some newspapers, especially those of the enemy side, frequently spread rumors, saying that the three great powers—Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—cannot unite, that their unity will break apart, that there are disputes, contradictions, and struggles among them.
Are there disputes among them? There are disputes.
There were disputes before, and now there are still many problems unresolved, which are being discussed in meetings, and there will be more in the future.
But among all the problems, many can be resolved with mutual agreement and settled amicably; of course, there are also some problems that involve some debate and will take a long time to resolve.
The fascists hope that the three great powers will not unite.
There are also some people (and we have such people in China too) who are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist; they have long hoped that Britain and the United States would one day go to war with the Soviet Union.
Such people are not few, and within Britain and the United States, there are also many who are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, opposing the Communist Parties and revolutions in their own places, and also opposing Communist Parties and revolutions elsewhere.
So, what exactly is the situation among the three great powers? It can be said that friction exists, but unity holds the primary and dominant position.
Since these great powers concluded treaties to jointly oppose fascism, most problems have been resolvable, and now they are meeting again by the Black Sea [2]; we estimate that the problems can be resolved.
They can unite, and we estimate that they can unite not only during the war but also after the war, and can maintain peace for a very long time.
What is the reason? The reason is that there is a common enemy, and to defeat this enemy requires the participation of the people of all countries.
The Soviet Union is the big thumb, the main force.
Look at the fight against fascism in Europe: Britain and the United States have only contributed eighty divisions, while the Soviet Union has contributed over two hundred divisions.
The Soviet Union has exerted tremendous strength; without the Soviet Union, victory would be impossible.
Without Britain and the United States, could there be victory? Of course, victory would also be impossible, but without the Soviet Union, it would be even more impossible.
Therefore, the Soviet Union is a very great force, a decisive force, and indispensable.
The people of Britain and the United States are also different from before; they have now awakened.
Now, people over forty have all experienced the First World War.
The government of our country at that time—the Beiyang Government—participated in the war.
What was the level of consciousness of the people of the whole world at that time? It was far lower than it is now; the consciousness of the people of Britain and the United States, the consciousness of the European people, and the consciousness of the Chinese people were all like this.
That world war was an imperialist war, a reactionary war.
The Russian Bolshevik Party led by Lenin opposed that war, while the workers’ parties of some countries under the leadership of the Second International supported their own national bourgeois governments in participating in that war. From this, one can see what the level of consciousness of the proletariat was at that time; it should be said that the level of consciousness was very low.
If the proletariat was like this, needless to say, other working people or intellectuals were even more so.
What was the situation in our China at that time? Many people did not know what imperialism was, did not know what the Communist Party was, and had not even heard the name of Marx.
In 1917, the victory of the Russian October Socialist Revolution divided world history into two eras, and Marxism spread throughout the world.
The October Revolution broke out on the first day, and the Chinese people knew about it on the second day.
Comrades, the actual impact of revolutionary action spreads much faster than theoretical propaganda articles; of course, without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary action.
The October Revolution did not fall from the sky; it was the result of seventy years of the Marxist movement.
After the end of the First World War, in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party was born, and it has now grown to over a million members.
From 1921 to this year, twenty-four years have passed. In these twenty-four years, China has undergone changes, and the changes have been very rapid.
The changes in these twenty-four years have surpassed those in China’s history over two thousand four hundred years, even surpassing three thousand or four thousand years.
Now, the consciousness of the Chinese people has risen; I think this is very good.
In recent years, fascism has been invading everywhere, killing people everywhere; the consciousness of the European people has also risen, and the consciousness of the American people and the British people has also risen.
Now, one month is worth many years in history.
After a few more months, for example, when Berlin is taken and German fascism is overthrown, the impact on the whole world will be even greater.
We must see this point.
Because of this reason, the people of Britain and the United States have awakened, the European people have awakened, and we, the Chinese people in the East, have also awakened.
Because the people unanimously demand the overthrow of fascism, the result is that the governments of various countries have been compelled to adopt the policy of overthrowing fascism.
Those reactionaries—found in Britain, the United States, and China—oppose alliance with the Soviet Union, but the broad masses of the people do not approve, so they have no way out.
For example, in the American elections, the isolationists suffered losses because the isolationist elements opposed cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the American workers opposed them, so they fell.
Similarly, the awakening of our Chinese people has made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang to succeed in its anti-Soviet and anti-Communist schemes.
For instance, in the three months of July, August, and September the year before last, the Kuomintang propagated the dissolution of the Communist Party, saying that since the Comintern had been dissolved, why shouldn’t you dissolve? They also said that communism did not suit China’s national conditions, and so on.
What was the attitude of the common people? Not a single person applauded. The masses in Yan’an held rallies and sent circular telegrams to denounce it; *Liberation Daily* published articles exposing the Kuomintang’s acts of undermining unity. This was how the third anti-Communist upsurge was beaten down and quelled.
This is to say that everyone supports the unity of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the three countries will unite.
Why will they unite? Because the people of the whole world have awakened, because this unity can now guarantee the defeat of fascism and, in the future, guarantee the progress of the world.
In what year will the war against Japan end? This is a question of concern to everyone.
Now that the United States has occupied the Philippines, will it land on the Chinese coast? Will Japan collapse in a few months? It seems it will not collapse in a few months, because Japanese fascism still has something in its hands now; it will not fight hard battles with the Americans but will keep its capital to fight slowly. This is precisely its tactic.
Japan has occupied large tracts of Chinese territory; we must rely on ourselves to drive it out, rely on the comrades of our Party School, after graduation, to go to the various base areas in North China, Central China, and South China to persist in work and drive it out.
We now have insufficient millet, insufficient rifles, insufficient machine guns, our army is still not large enough, and our base areas are still not extensive enough. We must increase our millet and rice, increase our rifles and machine guns, increase our army, and expand the liberated areas.
Comrades, you must all understand one principle: in this world, if you do not move a thing, it will not move.
For example, this table: if I do not move it, it will not go away; this teapot: if I do not pick it up, it will not rise.
The Japanese are the same; only when we “invite” him to leave will he leave.
Now our army has developed, our liberated areas have expanded very rapidly, and the production movement has also developed in all base areas, but it is still not enough, especially the work in the cities is insufficient.
It is precisely because our strength is still small that the Japanese will not leave, so we must prepare our strength.
Can the Kuomintang and the Communist Party unite? Can they unite as one to fight Japan? We demand unity every day.
The Kuomintang now also talks about unity verbally, because they cannot avoid talking about it, but in their hearts, they hate us to the death.
My words are well-founded, not spoken recklessly.
Chiang Kai-shek personally said: “If the Communist Party is not dissolved, my eyes will still be open when I die.”
If the eyes do not close after death, an ancient saying calls this “dying with eyes unclosed.”
Now Comrade Zhou Enlai has gone to Chongqing again to negotiate with them once more.
It seems the Kuomintang is not prepared to genuinely solve the problems. They say that if problems are to be solved, it must be according to their methods. They will not handle a single matter we raise; they only want us to join their government, to send one or two people to Chongqing to eat rice.
We say, Mr. Chairman, please handle a few matters: First, abolish one-party dictatorship.
He says this matter is difficult to handle.
Second, establish a coalition government.
He says that also won’t do.
Third, recognize the legal status of all political parties.
He says this can be done.
We say this depends on what kind of legality; under the secret service system, legality means legality according to the secret service system.
Fourth, we say your secret service organs are all no good and must be abolished.
He says that won’t do; the secret service organs are very good.
Fifth, we say some things must be abolished, namely those decrees and laws that oppress the people’s freedom must be abolished.
This he also refuses to do.
Sixth, we want him to release political prisoners.
We say, release Zhang Xueliang [3]! Release Yang Hucheng [4]! Release Ye Ting [5]! Release the hundreds and thousands of Communist Party members! Yet he has one principle, which is: not a single one will be released.
There is another point: we say, withdraw the troops encircling the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Encircling our Border Region makes the common people unhappy. Since you lack troops to fight Japan, send the troops you use to attack us in North China and Central China to fight Japan! He also refuses.
The last point: we say, do you approve of our liberated areas or not? We demand that you recognize all anti-Japanese armed forces and democratically elected governments.
This point also cannot be negotiated well; it was discussed last year.
He says the anti-Japanese armed forces led by the Communist Party should be disbanded by four-fifths, that is to say, leaving four divisions, and all the rest must be disbanded.
We raised eight points, and he will not handle a single one.
We say, first handle two or three points, or first handle three or four points! He says not a single one will be handled.
This is how the negotiations stand.
In short, comrades, to drive out the Japanese aggressors, we must rely on the comrades present here, on our comrades working in the Northwest, North China, Central China, and South China, on the Chinese people to produce more millet and rice, to produce more rifles and machine guns, to expand the army, to expand the liberated areas, to organize guerrilla units in the Japanese-occupied areas, and to develop the democratic movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.
Doing these things is reliable; other matters, such as the unity of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are only conditions.
That is all for the question of the current situation.

**II. The Question of Mountain-Stronghold Mentality**
Everyone is now discussing the question of mountain-stronghold mentality; this is a problem that exists in fact.
Our Party is formed by the combination of many parts.
What is called a mountain stronghold is a product of Chinese society, a product of the Chinese revolution.
In this Chinese society, the people are oppressed by imperialism and feudal forces, and because they are oppressed, they must make revolution.
China is also an agricultural country, and transportation is very inconvenient.
During the civil war period, the Party and the revolutionary ranks were cut apart by the enemy, divided into White Areas and Soviet Areas.
The White Areas consisted of this province and that province; the Soviet Areas consisted of this Soviet Area and that Soviet Area. This lasted for a very long time, as long as ten years.
During the War of Resistance, it was also like this, lasting a very long time, as long as eight years, with this base area and that base area.
Our China is a producer of tofu; following the method of cutting tofu, many squares were marked out. These were not marked out by ourselves but by the enemy for us.
A Party school like our present one was never run during the civil war period.
Now, from the Northwest, North China, Central China, South China, and the Northeast, there are probably people from all parts of the country studying here.
However, our base areas are still cut apart by the enemy and are not linked into a single whole.
When a revolutionary party and revolutionary army in one place rise up to fight the enemy, it naturally forms various groups, various mountain strongholds.
Therefore, I say that mountain-stronghold mentality is a product of Chinese society, a product of the special circumstances of the Chinese revolution, and we should recognize this thing.
To eliminate this thing, we need to run Party schools to analyze it and explain it clearly.
However, only in the future, when the whole country has been victorious, when there are big cities, when transportation is convenient everywhere, when newspapers can be sold throughout the country, when telecommunications can reach all places, and when holding meetings is also very convenient—only then will mountain-stronghold mentality be thoroughly eliminated.
Now, not only is our Party School discussing mountain-stronghold mentality, but all organs in Yan’an are also discussing this issue.

We advocate that meetings be held in all organizations, with those who have struggled in various base areas and those from various army units, to review history and conduct self-criticism with analysis. What is the purpose? The purpose is to eliminate mountain-strongholds, to dissolve them, and to turn the whole Party into a single integrated whole.

And when various parts review history, it must be done under one precondition, namely, that the guiding ideology must be correct. Only then will the review be beneficial, beneficial and not harmful.

What is a correct guiding ideology? I put forward a few points for everyone to discuss.

First, proceed from unity, from uniting the whole Party, from uniting one million Party members, from the interests of 450 million people.

When we discuss this issue or any other issue, this is our point of departure, or we may call it our stand.

Are there any other points of departure, any other stands? There are none.

For the interests of the whole Party and the people of the whole country—this is our point of departure, this is our stand.

Second, there must be analysis.

Analysis requires criticism, criticizing oneself and also criticizing others.

When we analyze a thing, we first break it down into two aspects, finding out what is correct and what is incorrect, what should be developed and what should be discarded—this is criticism.

To analyze one’s own work and one’s own history is self-criticism; to analyze others is to criticize others.

When being criticized, one will always feel somewhat uncomfortable and pained; this is normal.

Now the Central Committee has a resolution, advocating that everyone speak up. No matter when, whenever you see shortcomings or flaws in the work, speak up.

There will certainly be some flaws in our work; we must analyze them. What has been done correctly must be acknowledged as correct, and what has been done incorrectly must be corrected. That is what I spoke of here last time: uphold the truth, correct mistakes.

What is correct is truth.

What we call truth is that which has been proven in our struggle and practice to conform to objective reality, which suits the demands of the people and enables us to win victory in struggle.

What has already been proven by objective facts to be truth must be acknowledged and must be upheld. If anyone opposes such truth, we must explain and criticize.

Once truth is recognized, it must be upheld. What will happen if it is not upheld? That would be disastrous.

To smash truth is to smash the Chinese people, to smash the Chinese proletariat, to smash the Communist Party, and the revolution will fail.

So whether it is a great truth or a small truth, a whole truth or a partial truth, all truths must be upheld.

There is another thing called error, which is what does not suit the people’s struggle, words spoken in struggle that are incorrect, deeds done that stumble and fall, resolutions written that are wholly or partially incorrect.

Erroneous things should be discarded, things the people do not need should be discarded; there is no reason to keep them.

What proves unworkable in actual practice, words spoken wrongly, deeds done wrongly, resolutions written wrongly—these must be corrected.

If a resolution has ten articles, nine are correct and one is wrong, then the wrong one must be revised. This is called correcting mistakes.

Should we adopt this attitude of upholding truth and correcting mistakes? Yes.

Should a Communist Party member do so? Yes.

Should we do so when studying in the Party School? Yes.

This is called fairness.

Upholding truth is fairness, and correcting mistakes is also fairness.

This is the dialectics of upholding truth and correcting mistakes.

The most basic principle of dialectics is called the unity of contradictions. A unified thing can be divided into two aspects, for example, right and wrong. Not acknowledging this principle is not acknowledging dialectics.

If someone thinks he cannot be analyzed, then he has no mental preparation for self-criticism.

Many comrades, because they lack this preparation, have no initiative whatsoever and are often passive.

We must promote initiative, constantly examining the things we do, the words we say, the resolutions we write, analyzing the work we have done—what is correct, what is erroneous. What is correct must be upheld, what is erroneous must be corrected.

Only with such mental preparation can we handle affairs well.

Our Party School advocates this principle.

Comrades leaving the Party School should all adopt a consistent attitude: uphold truth, correct mistakes, and propagate this everywhere, to those around you, before and behind, left and right; wherever you go, propagate it to the people there.

In this way, things will be easy to handle.

Of course, there are still many shortcomings and mistakes that one cannot see oneself; then one must be prepared to ask others to speak.

Shortcomings and mistakes—if they exist, they exist; if they do not, they do not. If they exist, speak of them; if they do not, do not speak. If what is said is correct, that is very good, truth has been spoken; if what is said is not correct, it does not matter—blame not the speaker.

Comrades! We have struggled for twenty-four years, and the revolution has not yet won victory. This is because our country is too large.

The country being too large gives rise to the protracted nature of the revolution.

The country is too large, the enemies are too many. The revolution did not succeed in three attempts: the Northern Expedition did not succeed, the Civil War did not succeed, and the War of Resistance Against Japan has not yet succeeded.

Now we have reached a time when victory is possible.

We have the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and over one million Party members—these are the conditions for victory.

Objectively speaking (international and domestic conditions), victory is possible, but subjective conditions are also needed.

What are the subjective conditions? They are whether we want victory and whether we are mentally prepared. This is very important.

How did the Great Revolution period fail? The objective cause was the great strength of imperialism; the subjective cause was our lack of mental preparation, confused thinking, and erroneous policies, and so it failed.

The Civil War period was much the same. Neither the work in the White Areas nor the work in the Soviet Areas achieved victory. The objective conditions were that the forces of imperialism were too great and the forces of the Kuomintang were too great. But the first point is that our Party was still very immature politically and insufficiently prepared mentally.

These two periods left behind a treasure, and this treasure is people.

Very few people remain from the first period; perhaps there are still one or two thousand—this needs investigation. Though few in number, they are a heap of treasure. First, it is not gold; second, it is not silver; it is more precious than gold and silver.

There are more people from the second period. How many? There are still about twenty thousand Party members preserved from that time.

Including the first period, the second period has twenty thousand or a little more than twenty thousand people. This group of people is very precious.

Now we have over one million Party members. Where did they come from? They grew out of the soil, and the seeds were those twenty thousand and more people.

In the first two periods, we did correct things and also did incorrect things, called stumbling and falling.

We have reviewed the history of the Civil War period, and some comrades have also reviewed the Great Revolution period and the War of Resistance period. This is a very good thing.

The purpose of the review is to draw lessons from experience, not to place responsibility on individual comrades, because placing it on those comrades yields no good result. What good is there in putting a comrade into a mill and grinding him to powder? Can it solve problems? It cannot solve problems.

Through many years of practice, the Chinese Communist Party has learned to analyze the things it has done, and to proceed from uniting the whole Party.

Proceeding from uniting the whole Party is first; conducting analysis and criticism is second; then comes unity again.

Unity, criticism, unity—this is our method, this is dialectics.

If things are not handled well, where does the cause lie? The cause lies in not acting according to dialectics.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping [6] said: How should things be done? Act according to dialectics. I agree with his words.

When you hold meetings in various parts to review history, whether the Great Revolution period, the Civil War period, the War of Resistance period, this part or that part, the first point of departure is unity.

If we speak of unity, then let’s just have unprincipled harmony. At a meeting, shout “Unity!” once, shout “Unity!” again—wouldn’t that be the end of it? Acting according to dialectics means it is not yet finished; we must analyze, must criticize, must clarify problems, distinguish right from wrong, weighty from trivial.

To speak of unity, we must add analysis, and precise analysis at that—looking at this side, looking at that side, looking repeatedly, until our thinking matures.

We have much experience proving that mistakes are often made because we looked at one side but not the other, listened only to the words of one side and not to the words of the other.

Why do people have two ears? Wouldn’t one be fine? This is worth studying. I think the advantage of having two ears is this: one ear listens to this side, the other ear listens to that side.

Unity plus analysis—analyze all kinds of contradictory opinions, opinions that do not fit, each person’s opinion: either they are entirely correct, with just a phrase or two not good; or part is correct and part incorrect; or they are entirely incorrect.

Distinguish right from wrong, and then settle on one point, which is unity.

When we speak of unity, we proceed from uniting the whole Party, not from uniting one mountain-stronghold, not from uniting a small group of people.

If we are not prudent, and the first step is taken incorrectly, not for the sake of unity, and the second step of analysis and criticism is also not quite proper, then the place where we settle will inevitably be disunity.

There have been quite a few such instances in our Party’s history.

Understanding this history is very beneficial. It has educated us, made us conscious, and gradually reduced and eliminated our blindness.

We now have this set of correct methods, which is closely related to our preparation for victory in China.

If we use such methods to study and research, will we achieve victory? We will achieve victory.

In the work of the whole Party these past few years, there has been a rectification movement, which is precisely to prepare mentally for victory. Soon our Party will convene the Seventh Congress, also to prepare mentally for victory, to prepare the Chinese Communist Party for nationwide victory.

Objectively, the possibility of victory exists; we must now intensify the preparation of subjective conditions.

On the question of mountain-stronghold mentality, comrades must also pay attention to one point: after you graduate and go to any place, you must take all circumstances into account.

When Comrade Wang Zhen [7] led his troops south, I said to him: The first point is to see the brightness; the second point is to see the difficulties.

To see the brightness and also to see the difficulties—this is dialectics, the unity of contradictions.

Brightness and also difficulties—isn’t this slapping one’s own face? If you speak of brightness, just speak of brightness; why also speak of difficulties? There have been times in our Party’s history when only brightness was spoken of, and darkness could not be mentioned. This is not dialectics, not acting according to Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s opinion.

When we speak of brightness, we must at the same time speak of difficulties.

In 1937 and 1938, students entering the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University overcame countless obstacles, surging toward Yan’an like a tide, flowing in torrents, continuously and endlessly.

I was not very busy then, and gave them short lectures every three days and long lectures every five days. Most of what I said has been forgotten, but one point I still remember.

I said: Comrades, coming from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Yunnan, Guizhou, Suiyuan [8], Xinjiang, “having traveled a thousand li from afar, might you not also have something to benefit our country?” The matter of the War of Resistance is for the sake of the country.

I said that on Qingliang Mountain a banner has been planted, called New Democracy. China wants independence, wants democracy, wants to solve the people’s livelihood issues. Are these correct? Very correct.

Is there hope? There is great hope.

Should it be called brightness? It should be called brightness, ten-tenths brightness, not nine-tenths brightness.

But when you ran to Yan’an, you fantasized very nicely, viewing Yan’an as heaven. Thinking this way is wrong.

Yan’an is not heaven, nor is it hell; it is the human world, beneath the sky and above the earth.

I did not speak a single word wrong. The correct method is to view Yan’an as a part of Chinese society. This place has many shortcomings. I listed seven or eight of them to them, and said you must install these in your minds.

Otherwise, after three or five months, when you graduate, you will heave a long sigh and say: “Had I known Yan’an was like this, I would never have come!” Sure enough, later someone wrote an article called “Wild Lilies” [9], and so on and so forth. Those people probably did not hear me say these words, or did not take them to heart.

Later, the Forum on Literature and Art was held, and this question was thoroughly clarified.

Then, how should we view Yan’an, how should we view our revolutionary base areas? According to the method of dialectics, proceed from the whole.

What place is the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region? The Border Region is one of the base areas of the Chinese people’s revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party.

The second is northwestern Shanxi, the third is Mount Wutai, the fourth is the Taihang Mountains, the fifth... Mount Tai in the east, Mount Heng in the south, and also Central China and South China—all have base areas of the Chinese revolution, base areas of the Chinese people’s anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle.

Is such a definition correct? Of course it is correct.

Under such a definition, what attitude should we adopt toward any base area of the Chinese people’s anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle led by the Chinese Communist Party? First of all, long live! Is it just one “long live”? Beyond “long live,” we must also mentally prepare for the fact that any base area still has its shortcomings.

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region will still have shortcomings ten years from now; even when the revolution has won victory throughout the whole country, there will still be shortcomings here.

More than twenty years have passed since the Soviet October Socialist Revolution. Three Five-Year Plans have been completed, the Red Army is quite powerful, and even Hitler was terrified of it during wartime. Yet, they still produced figures of the Gorlov [10] type.

Therefore, we must be mentally prepared.

When you set out for various places, you must shout "Long live!" wherever you go. "Nine thousand years" won’t do, because those places are base areas where the Chinese people, led by the Chinese Communist Party, oppose imperialism and feudalism, and where heroic and arduous undertakings are being carried out.

But at the same time, you must be mentally prepared for shortcomings there, for bureaucracy, for many people crowded into a small room, for not having that much millet or rice.

Furthermore, people there won’t know you are a regimental commander or a brigade commander; they will only see that you have two eyes and one nose. No one will say, "Please take a seat, Comrade Regimental Commander." There won’t be much respect, no welcome meetings; you may be left to sit on a cold bench, or if you have minor shortcomings, people will start talking.

In this way, something called resentment can easily arise in your hearts.

So, comrades, you must all be mentally prepared for all kinds of unsatisfactory things—how many blockade lines there are, enemy attacks, no welcome meetings, or if there is a welcome meeting, the applause is insufficient, just a few scattered claps.

Should we speak only such discouraging words? No.

The first point I made was words of encouragement; I did not speak only discouraging words.

But if we speak only words of encouragement, only about brightness, brightness, brightness, while in reality there are shortcomings and difficulties, that won’t do either.

Therefore, we must tell comrades: Don’t just talk about ample food and clothing and new-style weapons; don’t casually write promissory notes.

To comrades, to soldiers, to the people, we must speak honest words—what is right is right, what is wrong is wrong.

Every place has shortcomings and difficulties; we must estimate in advance the shortcomings there, the difficulties there.

When you go to a place, don’t go criticizing people right away. Adopt an attitude of learning. Settle down there, become familiar with the work, let the people there get to know you, and only then speak about any shortcomings. In this way, people will be able to take it in, they will approve, and they will also make corrections.

We must adopt such an attitude, an attitude of modesty.

Now, when various departments hold meetings, the leading cadres must consult frequently, guidance must be appropriate, and work style must be good.

This point is very important.

If guidance is appropriate, the movement can be victorious, and meetings can be conducted well; if guidance is inappropriate, meetings will not go well.

III. The Question of Examining Cadres
I spoke about this here once last time. Many comrades did not hear it, so I will speak about it again.

The year before last and last year, we carried out the work of examining cadres. This work has been conducted before in the history of our Party, but never as conscientiously as in the last two years following the Rectification Movement.

In this work, we have achieved very great successes and also committed many errors. These are two lessons.

The first lesson: The achievements are great. This is of major significance for our Party and for preparing the Chinese people for victory.

Our policy has two aspects, namely, adopting a serious attitude and a cautious attitude.

Why do we say that on organizational questions our Party differs from bourgeois parties and also from petty-bourgeois parties? Because the seriousness and discipline such as the Communist Party possesses are not found in the parties of any other class.

The proletariat is an oppressed class, a class without power in its hands. To liberate itself from an oppressed position, from a position of powerlessness, and to gain power, it absolutely must have strict discipline; it must uphold centralization and unity, unity of thought, unity of action, and preserve the purity of the Party.

Such a Party is a model party unprecedented since the emergence of political parties.

Before the Rectification Movement, comrades all know, our Party was not pure ideologically; there were non-proletarian ideas, mainly petty-bourgeois ideas, and they were quite strong.

How is it now? There has been great progress.

Have they been completely eliminated? Not yet; work still needs to be done. That is why Party schools must still be run.

The purpose of running Party schools or other cadre schools is to make our Party pure ideologically, to make it Marxist-Leninist; and also to make it pure organizationally. Our examination of cadres is precisely aimed at making our Party pure organizationally.

This kind of serious attitude is absolutely indispensable. But it is easy to talk about; when it comes to adopting a specific attitude, this point is often forgotten, as if a lack of seriousness doesn’t matter much.

People from an agricultural society reflect in their thinking the lax and scattered state of agricultural society; liberalism is a reflection of small-scale production.

Comrades, in seven or eight years our Party grew from tens of thousands to over a million people. Ideologically it was impure, organizationally it was impure; some bad elements sneaked in, impure elements sneaked in.

What is to be done? Organizationally, we should be pure; we should get things clear.

How were the movements of these two years? I say they have rendered great service. We have learned how to conduct rectification, examine cadres, and screen Party members. There have been great achievements in this regard.

Some people fail to see this point; they only see that we made mistakes, citing dozens or hundreds of cases. But I know there are thousands of cases. Counting the number of cases cannot negate the nature of our movement.

The nature of this movement was fundamentally correct. It was beneficial to the unity and consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party and beneficial to the victory of the Chinese people.

We have brought many problems to light. This is one lesson. With this lesson, when we go out in the future, each person can undertake the work of building the Party, sorting out our Party organizations to make them pure, and sorting out the thinking of our comrades to make it pure.

Among the over one million Party members, more than nine hundred thousand joined after the outbreak of the War of Resistance.

This raises a question: Do we want victory? Do we want victory throughout the country? If we do, then we must have a Party that is disciplined, ideologically pure, organizationally pure, and conforms to unified standards.

The first point in the conclusion of the *History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks)* says there must be a Party. What kind of Party? Not a Social Democratic party, but a Communist Party with a revolutionary work style.

We must see the achievements. This lesson is of great use to our entire Party.

The second lesson is that we made mistakes. Counting by the number of cases, there are many.

The Party School made many mistakes. Who is responsible? I am responsible, because I am the head of the Party School.

The whole of Yan’an made many mistakes. Who is responsible? I am responsible, because I was the one issuing orders.

If mistakes were made elsewhere, who is responsible? I am also responsible, because I was the one issuing orders there too.

But, comrades, we must analyze the nature of these mistakes themselves: one aspect is the harm, the other is the benefit. The harm is that mistakes were made; the benefit also lies in the fact that mistakes were made.

In the examination of cadres, some people were clarified as comrades, or as special agents, traitors, capitulationists, or members of other political parties. Clarifying these people is very good.

We must be amiable toward these people and unite with them. Whether they spoke out voluntarily or were compelled to, as long as they speak out, we welcome them and help them correct their mistakes.

My words count; the promissory notes I issue must be honored.

One promissory note—"not a single one to be killed"—has this note been honored? It has indeed been honored! If we had verbally promised "not a single one to be killed," but then killed two, wouldn’t we be slapping our own faces? Indeed, we did not kill a single one.

We must distinguish clearly between right and wrong, and between major and minor issues.

What is right is right. If they are special agents, traitors, capitulationists, or members of other parties, what should be done? Unite with them to resist Japan.

If they are now willing to resist Japan, and having taken the wrong path in the past, they no longer take it, then let it be.

We proclaimed this principle mainly to help those comrades who took the wrong path.

Because the Party had many shortcomings in the past, people were afraid and dared not speak out, so they didn’t. Now that they have spoken out, it is very good.

For those who were wrongly labeled, where wrong was taken for right, what should be done? What is wrong is wrong. Remove the label and offer an apology.

The Party School also made mistakes regarding some comrades. If any such comrades are present here, I offer an apology.

Then, what attitude should those who were wrongly labeled adopt? When we put the label on them, they should have been angry! They thought, "I am not a special agent or traitor, why put this label on me?" Labeling people recklessly—is this right? This is not right.

Now that I have taken the label off you and offered an apology, what attitude should you adopt? You should return the courtesy! Now I salute you; if you don’t return the salute, I cannot put my hand down.

Comrade, in the past we treated you as a special agent or traitor, not as a comrade. We made a mistake.

Originally, this flame of anger should have been directed at the enemy, not at comrades. But the result was that it was directed at comrades. This is called making a mistake.

However, the initial motive and purpose were directed at the enemy. The direction of the entire movement was toward the enemy, not toward comrades. Therefore, all wrongly placed labels must be removed.

All you comrades who were wrongly labeled, you have reason on your side, you have the truth; we were in the wrong. So on this point, you should set your minds at ease.

Comrades, in the history of our Party, have there been instances where wrongly placed labels were removed? Yes, there have.

But the attitude we adopted last year was rarely seen in the past. In the past, when mistakes were made, the labels were removed and then people were ignored.

So I say, in the work of examining cadres, admitting mistakes to those who were wrongly dealt with and offering an apology—this is our progress, a progress of our entire Party.

The words we speak to the people, the resolutions we make, the various policies we formulate—all are like this. Whenever mistakes are made, we must correct the errors, offer an apology, and honestly apologize.

We must have such an attitude. What is this attitude called? The attitude of self-criticism.

Stalin wrote a book called *Foundations of Leninism*, which states that Leninist methodology has four points, one of which is self-criticism.

The issue of "mountain-stronghold mentality" I spoke about earlier, after all is said and done, is about this method of self-criticism.

Unity—criticism—unity; the second step is criticism and self-criticism.

If the Chinese revolution is to be victorious, we must adopt this attitude.

Making mistakes has two aspects: First, making mistakes is bad. Second, after making mistakes, they can turn into experience. For example, when we examine cadres again in the future, both sides will have gained experience.

Comrades who wrongly labeled others, because they have made this mistake, will be more cautious than before when labeling others in the future.

Comrades who were wrongly labeled will also be cautious when labeling others in the future, because they have suffered from it.

When we go to Beiping, Shanghai, and Nanjing in the future to examine cadres and do counter-espionage work, we will do much better.

So, I say there are two lessons: one is achievements, the other is shortcomings. Both are useful. Achievements should be carried forward, and mistakes should be corrected.

We adopt a serious attitude and a cautious attitude; this is a struggle on two fronts.

A serious attitude is against Right deviation; lack of seriousness is Right deviation, liberalism. A cautious attitude is against "Left" deviation; lack of caution leads to disasters.

I have finished the main issues I wanted to address.

Last time I was here, I spoke about the various revolutionary groups, about the First Front Army, the Second Front Army, and the Fourth Front Army, and within each Front Army there were various components. My account was not complete; I missed mentioning the Fifteenth Army Corps.

After my report, a comrade wrote to me, saying that the Fifteenth Army Corps had made great sacrifices in the past and should have been mentioned.

Today, I want to supplement by discussing issues not mentioned that day.

The first issue: the question of the South and the North.

I had noticed this issue long ago but forgot to mention it that day.

The comrades now working in the three regions of the Northwest, North China, and Central China can be roughly divided into two parts: one part consists of southerners who came from outside, and the other part consists of local people.

Why should this issue be raised? It is to make our comrades pay attention to it.

The nature of this issue is the relationship between outside cadres and local cadres, and the relationship between military cadres and local cadres.

During the War of Resistance, there have been many instances of trouble and friction between outside cadres and local cadres, and between military cadres and local cadres. This is a widespread phenomenon.

I think outside comrades must first have an understanding; they must recognize the contributions and strong points of the local comrades in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in various parts of North and Central China.

I did not clarify this point well in the past, nor did I analyze it well. I don’t blame those comrades.

Only after the Rectification Movement did I address this issue, synthesizing many experiences.

The comrades from the South, now in the Northwest, North China, and Central China, number fewer than twenty thousand still alive. They have rendered great service. The comrades from the North, the local comrades, should thank them. The people of the Northwest, the people of North and Central China, should thank those old Bolsheviks from the South.

The Chinese revolution developed in the South for a long time and only shifted to the North during the War of Resistance.

The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the 1911 Revolution, the Northern Expedition, and the Agrarian Revolution all mainly took place in the South. The South is very glorious.

But, comrades, these revolutions all failed. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom failed, the 1911 Revolution failed, the Northern Expedition failed, the Agrarian Revolution failed—all failed.

There is both glory and difficulty; again, we speak of two aspects.

There are old Bolsheviks in the South, and there are also old Bolsheviks in the North, and not a few at that. They exist in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and there is a large group in North China. Comrade Chen Yi [11] says they also exist in Central China.

Old Bolsheviks from the south, do not think that "this is the only shop, there is no other branch."

We must recognize that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has its shortcomings, described as "vast territory, sparse population, and backward economy." However, only the northern Shaanxi base area was preserved, while all other base areas were lost.

The role of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is immensely significant. I say it is a pivot of the Chinese revolution, the point of transition and continuity in the Chinese revolution.

After the Long March ended, the beginning started from this place, and the turn also occurred from this place.

During the Long March of ten thousand li, our feet became sore, and we ran to this place to rest for a while, calling it a foothold.

We do not intend to stay here forever. This place is a foothold and, at the same time, a starting point.

In a couple of days, you will leave, and in the future, the Central Committee will also leave.

Since the War of Resistance began, our forces, except for the New Fourth Army, have all set out from here. Recently, Wang Zhen set out from here, Dai Jiying [12] also set out from here, and the northern forces all set out from here.

In the north, in North China, there are also Party members who have been revolutionaries for many years, such as Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo [13], and of course many others. They struggled against the enemy for many years in prison cells.

The local Party in the north and North China also launched some uprisings, although they failed.

Many comrades have experienced three periods: the Northern Expedition War, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan.

According to Comrade Chen Yi, such comrades have also been found locally in Central China, especially in northern Jiangsu and southern Jiangsu.

Why is this issue being raised? It is so that our comrades should see this point, and comrades from outside should recognize this point.

Not only is the south glorious, and I myself am glorious, but North China is also glorious, and Central China is also glorious. Not only is the First Front Army glorious, but the Second Front Army is glorious, the Fourth Front Army is glorious, and the Northern Shaanxi Red Army is also glorious.

Every part within each section is glorious. Is there one part that is superior and another that is inferior? I see neither superior nor inferior—all are glorious.

The south and the north are neither superior nor inferior—both are glorious.

Over 900,000 people joined the Party during the War of Resistance period. This should attract the attention and regard of the tens of thousands of cadres from outside. At the same time, these 900,000 people should be grateful to these tens of thousands, because they taught us this set of experiences regarding warfare.

The second issue concerns the Party in the Great Rear Area.

The Party in the Great Rear Area has about 100,000 members, under the responsible leadership of Comrades Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu [14], and many other comrades present here.

During the cadre examination the year before last, some comrades felt that the Party organizations in those places were not very reliable, and that there were many instances of the "Red Flag Policy" [15].

Based on the results of last year's screening, the facts have proven that there should be two points: First, we must adopt a serious attitude, because under the rule of the Kuomintang, bad elements infiltrated to sabotage us. Some bad elements infiltrated, and some impure individuals infiltrated. We should acknowledge this point today.

Second, we must not exaggerate. We must remember not to think that the problem is overwhelmingly large.

How many are there exactly? It is still impossible to calculate now. We will only be able to clarify this after nationwide victory in the future. But an estimate can be made: the majority of the 100,000 should be considered good, not spies.

Why say this? Because a large number there are peasant comrades. Even in places where the Kuomintang has carried out sabotage, it pays little attention to them. We have also adopted a policy of dispersal, scattering them everywhere like loose sand. Thus, they have been able to remain concealed and avoid being sabotaged or suffer less sabotage.

Furthermore, we must also take into account the bureaucratism of the Kuomintang. Do not regard the Kuomintang as mysteriously omnipotent.

We must clarify matters within our own ranks. Generally speaking, there are these two points: First, acknowledge that there are problems in the local Party organizations; second, acknowledge that the majority of comrades are good, without problems, and pure, while a minority are impure and have problems.

Such an assessment should be made.

It should be said that comrades working in the south have achievements. Generally speaking, during the War of Resistance period, they have achievements.

In terms of strategy, having base areas alone is not enough. There must be three aspects—the Liberated Areas, the Enemy-Occupied Areas, and the Great Rear Area—a trinity, none of which can be dispensed with.

Finally, regarding the issue of work in the White Areas.

I had not thought of this issue before. The other day, Comrade Chen Yi informed me that such an issue existed. He raised it very correctly.

In the past, we criticized the leadership line for work in the White Areas during the Civil War period as having problems, and at certain times, it should be said there were errors, which consequently caused great losses to the work in the White Areas.

In the past, it was said that the losses were 100 percent. Now it appears they did not reach that extent; some remained, though the majority was lost.

The leadership line was erroneous and should be criticized.

The purpose of criticism is to work well in the future and not to repeat such mistakes. It does not mean that all comrades and cadres working in the White Areas had no merit.

This is just like the loss of the southern base areas, which does not mean that the Red Army soldiers and cadres, local comrades and cadres, had no merit, or that they did not struggle arduously and sacrifice heroically.

Among the comrades working in the White Areas, there are those who did not go to prison and are still alive, those who did not go to prison and sacrificed themselves, those who went to prison and are still alive, and those who went to prison and sacrificed themselves. These groups of people waged heroic struggles for the Party and the proletariat. They risked their lives in the struggle, and it was because of this that they went to prison. A few who narrowly escaped did not go to prison. The achievements of their struggle should be recognized.

These three issues, which were not discussed last time, are supplemented today. These are the issues I wanted to address. That is all.

Based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes
[1] This is a report by Mao Zedong at the Central Party School.
[2] Refers to the Crimea Conference, also known as the Yalta Conference. From February 4 to 11, 1945, the heads of state of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom held a meeting in Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula of the Soviet Union to coordinate military plans for the final defeat of Germany, discuss postwar arrangements in Europe and issues related to the war against Japan, secretly sign the "Agreement of the Three Powers Regarding Japan" (i.e., the Yalta Agreement), and issue the "Communiqué of the Crimea Conference of the Three Powers."
[3] Zhang Xueliang, see p. 144, note [16] of this volume.
[4] Yang Hucheng (1893–1949), a native of Pucheng, Shaanxi. Formerly served as Commander-in-Chief of the 17th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army and Director of the Xi'an Pacification Office. On December 12, 1936, together with Zhang Xueliang, he launched the Xi'an Incident. In June of the following year, he was forced to "go abroad for inspection." After returning to China in November, he was imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek for a long period and was killed in Chongqing in 1949.
[5] Ye Ting, appointed Commander of the New Fourth Army in October 1937. Detained in January 1941 during the Southern Anhui Incident launched by Chiang Kai-shek.
[6] Deng Xiaoping, then serving as Acting Secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Political Commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
[7] In early November 1944, Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao led the Southward Detachment of the Eighth Route Army from Yan'an, with Wang Zhen serving as Commander.
[8] Suiyuan, i.e., Suiyuan Province, abolished in 1954, with its former jurisdiction incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
[9] "Wild Lilies," see p. 121, note [4] of this volume.
[10] Gorlov is a front-line commander-in-chief during the Soviet Great Patriotic War, portrayed by Soviet playwright Korneichuk in the play "The Front." He is divorced from reality, unwilling to learn new knowledge, and fond of flaunting his seniority.
[11] Chen Yi, then serving as Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army, was in Yan'an at this time preparing to attend the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
[12] Dai Jiying, born in 1907, a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei. In October 1944, he was appointed Political Commissar of the Henan Military Region of the Eighth Route Army. Together with Commander Wang Shusheng, he led two regiments and a large number of cadres from northern Shaanxi into Henan to establish the Henan People's Anti-Japanese Army.
[13] Peng Zhen, joined the Communist Party of China in 1923. In 1929, he served as Secretary of the Workers' Movement Committee of the Shunzhi Provincial Committee of the CPC. Arrested in June of the same year, he was released from prison in 1935. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as Secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice President of the Central Party School, and Acting Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee. Bo Yibo, joined the Communist Party of China in 1925. Formerly served as Minister of the Organization Department of the Taiyuan Prefectural Committee of the CPC. Arrested in 1929, he was released from prison in 1936. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as Political Commissar of the First Column of the Shanxi Youth Anti-Enemy Dare-to-Die Corps, Secretary of the Taiyue District Party Committee, and Deputy Secretary of the Taihang Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[14] Dong Biwu, then serving as Deputy Secretary of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, concurrently Minister of its Propaganda Department and United Front Work Department.
[15] During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the spy agencies of the Kuomintang operated and organized some newspapers, bookstores, and cultural groups that pretended to be progressive, and even organized fake Communist Parties to lure and arrest progressive youth and Communist Party members, forcing them to recant, then having them join or remain within Communist Party organizations to act as internal agents. At the same time, they dispatched skilled spies to infiltrate Communist Party organs under a "leftist" guise, lying in wait to carry out sabotage. This anti-communist strategy of the Kuomintang was called the "Red Flag Policy." During the rectification and cadre examination period in Yan'an, there were instances where the enemy situation in this regard was overestimated, leading to an expansion of the counter-"Red Flag Policy" campaign.