Talks with Colonel David D. Barrett
December 1944

[Excerpt]
On the afternoon of December 8, during my meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, I did my utmost.

My talks with these two Communist leaders were an experience I shall never forget. Immediately after leaving the Chairman’s residence, while the content of our discussions was still fresh in my memory, I carefully recorded them in detail. Once my report was completed, I submitted it to General Wedemeyer, as I was under his command and had no authority to communicate directly with Ambassador Hurley. The full text of my report is included in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, China*, page 727. It is reproduced in full below:

(Yan’an) December 10, 1944
Subject: Talks with Chairman Mao Zedong

The main point of the three proposals put forward by the Generalissimo to us is that the Communist forces must submit to the "reorganization" by the National Military Council.
This means placing our army entirely under the Generalissimo’s control, with the result that he could reduce our forces to any number at will. Thereafter, we would be at his mercy.

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This is nothing less than the terms of a total surrender, offering us in return only one seat on the National Military Council; yet this council seat is utterly meaningless. Generals Feng Yuxiang and Li Jishen, both prominent military figures in their time, were also members of the Military Council, but they had no influence whatsoever over its decisions. In fact, the entire Military Council has not convened for a long time.

General Hurley said that if we accepted this seat on the National Military Council, we would gain access to all military reports, thereby learning of the government’s measures, and we would also be in a position to influence government decisions. We respectfully beg to differ with General Hurley’s opinion. We told him plainly that even with a Communist participating in the National Military Council, his understanding of its work would be no greater than that of an outsider, nor would he have any more say in it than an outsider; we are well aware of the situation we are describing.

General Hurley also said that accepting the representative seat on the National Military Council would allow us to "get one foot inside the door," serving as a starting point to expand the importance of our position and thereby strengthen our influence, to the extent that we would eventually control the entire government. We consider this a fundamentally mistaken notion. However, we were unable to convince General Hurley that it was mistaken. All we could say was that if one’s hands are tied behind one’s back, "getting one foot inside the door" is utterly meaningless.

General Hurley, General Wedemeyer, and General McClure told General Zhou Enlai that the United States hoped to cooperate with us militarily, but before we could provide such cooperation—which we are very willing to offer—we must first accept the Generalissimo’s conditions.
However, the United States has not provided us with any absolute guarantee of our safety under these conditions. We feel we cannot properly ask the United States for any such guarantee. To be frank, under these conditions, we cannot trust that the United States could guarantee our safety, no matter how sincerely she might desire to do so. We cannot trust the Generalissimo to have good faith. Anyone who has studied the history of relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China without prejudice would reasonably conclude that we cannot place any trust in him.

We find the American attitude somewhat perplexing. When General Hurley came to Yan’an, he inquired about our conditions for cooperating with the Kuomintang. We then put forward five proposals, the core of which was the establishment of a coalition government. General Hurley also agreed that those conditions were clearly fair, and, in fact, most of the five proposals were made at his suggestion. Yet the Generalissimo rejected them.
Now the United States is so earnestly demanding that we accept counterproposals requiring us to sacrifice our freedom. This is difficult for us to understand.

We have also been told that sacrificing ourselves to save the situation would be a noble act. But we fail to see how placing ourselves at the mercy of Chiang Kai-shek could help rescue the current crisis. General Hurley further said that if we made concessions, we would win the world’s praise. But if we let the Generalissimo tie our hands, the world’s praise will do us no good.

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General Wedemeyer said that if we reached an agreement with the Generalissimo, he could give us weapons and send American officers to help train our troops and work alongside us. We wholeheartedly welcome such assistance, but we cannot be expected to pay the price of requiring the Generalissimo’s approval to receive it. We believe the United States should fully recognize the following fact: if we give up our sole means of self-defense—our army—we will have to submit to whatever restrictions the Generalissimo can and will impose upon us; and if it comes to that, we will simply have no means left to cooperate with you.

There is no doubt that, under the present circumstances, we are willing to participate in the government. But the conditions actually offered to us provide no opportunity to do so.

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We repeat: if one’s hands are tied behind one’s back, getting one foot inside the door is useless.

It seems unfair to us that we are asked to make such enormous sacrifices, while the Generalissimo, who bears great responsibility for the current crisis, is not required to make any sacrifice. Recognizing the legality of our party entails no sacrifice on his part; nor can we regard giving us a seat on the ineffectual National Military Council as a sacrifice.

No matter how sincerely General Wedemeyer may desire to aid us, if we accept the Generalissimo’s conditions, he will be unable to do so. We wish to cooperate with the United States in the fight against Japan, we wish to extend our helping hand in the present critical situation, and we need all the assistance the United States can give us. But the entire effort is being obstructed by the Generalissimo. We have put forward a reasonable solution, under which our acceptance of American aid would not be an issue. Yet our conditions were flatly rejected by the Generalissimo, who then attempted to shift the blame onto us.

The United States believes that Chiang Kai-shek must be retained in power at all costs. We do not oppose this policy. So long as he fights Japan,

We would then be completely happy to endorse his continued leadership. However, we also have no intention of giving up the seat that should rightfully be assigned to us on the National Military Council.

—If one looks at Chiang Kai-shek’s past, America’s desire to continue propping up his rotten framework—Chiang Kai-shek—is America’s own right. But we believe that, although America can do whatever she wishes, Chiang Kai-shek is doomed to fail. Does General Hurley think that in implementing his proposals Chiang Kai-shek will give wholehearted and full cooperation? Of course he cannot. General Stilwell already knows the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek can be relied upon in military operations. Just watch America continue to support Chiang Kai-shek, until he throws away Kunming, Guiyang, Chongqing, Xi’an, Chengdu, and so on. Only then perhaps will she realize that supporting him is utterly useless.

—We are not like Chiang Kai-shek. We do not need the support of other countries to survive. We can stand upright and act freely, like all free people.

[Although this Generalissimo has many shortcomings and weaknesses, we believe he has not yet made peace with the Japanese. We are deeply grateful for this. But then again, only a son of a bitch would refuse to fight Japan.]

—Based on the [Five-Point Proposal], we believe that, with America’s help, we can still make a certain contribution to remedying the current situation. We are willing to shed our last drop of blood in the fight against Japan. We believe General Wedemeyer knows what help we can provide, if we are permitted to do so. But we cannot fight with our hands tied. We are fully willing to submit to the command of the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek, provided we have a certain voice in that government. However, a single seat on the National Military Council will not give us a voice.

—If America parts ways with us, we will certainly feel very regretful, but this will not affect our friendly sentiments toward you. We will, at any time, now or in the future, accept your aid with a grateful heart. We will, without any conditions attached, cooperate with the command of American generals, unite as one, and do our duty. This is the sentiment we hold toward you. If you land on the coast of China,

we have already welcomed the U.S. Army Observer Group, and we have made our utmost efforts to cooperate with them. If this group remains in Yan’an, we will be pleased; if it withdraws, we will feel regret. If after withdrawing they wish to return, we will again welcome them. If America does not give us a single rifle or a single bullet, we will still continue to fight the Japanese, and we will still be friends of America.

[We have already fought the Japanese for seven years without any outside aid, and no matter what happens, we will continue to fight. If America does not aid us, there are still Britain and the Soviet Union who can aid us. (Colonel Barrett interjected: I stated that, in my personal opinion, they could not expect Britain to give them much aid; they made no reply to this. I did not express my opinion on the Soviet Union’s situation.)]

[Colonel Barrett said that we did not make it sufficiently clear to General Hurley that the [Five-Point Proposal] was our final answer. The Colonel also said he believed General Hurley regarded those five points as our [bargaining position]. But those five points are our final terms, in which we have already made all the concessions we are willing to make. We made a concession when we agreed to accept the Generalissimo as leader; we made a concession when we agreed to place our troops under the command of a unified National Military Council; we also made a concession on the distribution of American aid supplies—we only demanded a fair share, not to receive nothing at all; beyond this we have asked for nothing else. We cannot make any further concessions.

We fully understand that General Hurley cannot guarantee that the Generalissimo will accept the [Five-Point Proposal]. We know he only said the following: that the terms were fair, and that he would do his utmost to persuade the Generalissimo to accept them. But after Chiang Kai-shek rejected these fair terms, we did not expect General Hurley to come back to Yan’an to pressure us into agreeing to counterproposals that require sacrifices from us.

—If America cannot understand our assessment of the predicament we would face once we accept Chiang Kai-shek’s absolute control, then everything we have said today has been in vain. When General Zhou Enlai was in Chongqing, he made every effort to explain this point to General Hurley. If General Hurley still does not understand now, I fear he will never understand. General Zhou going to Chongqing again to rehash these issues with him would also be of no use.

[Since Chiang Kai-shek has already refused to agree to form a coalition government, and we are resolutely determined to make no further concessions, we have therefore also resolved to take a decisive step. We are proposing to the National Political Council branches in the regions under our control the organization of [Joint Committees] representing each of these regions. We will seek recognition of this body from the National Government, though we do not expect it will be granted. The establishment of this committee will be a preliminary step toward organizing another government.]

[When General Zhou was in Chongqing, he did not inform General Hurley of the plan to organize such a Joint Committee. This measure was considered over a long period, but he did not learn that it had been definitively decided upon until after his return to Yan’an.]

[Colonel Barrett said that the position we are now taking closes the door to negotiations. Yes, we have closed the door, but we have left the window wide open. The [Five-Point Proposal] is the window. We would be happy to join a coalition government today, tomorrow, or even the day after tomorrow. But by the day after the day after tomorrow, once Chongqing, Kunming, Guiyang, Chengdu, and Xi’an have all been lost, we will no longer join on the terms we proposed earlier.]

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3. During the talks, I raised several points of my personal opinion, attempting to influence the uncompromising stance of these two Communist leaders. A summary of my opinions and their responses is as follows:

(1) Opinion: The decision to form a joint committee leading to the establishment of a separate government will give Chiang Kai-shek an excellent opportunity to claim that his long-standing assertion that the Communist Party is a band of rebels has been irrefutably confirmed.

Answer: He has been calling us rebels for so long that we have grown accustomed to it. Let him say whatever he pleases.

(2) Opinion: You will give the Generalissimo an opportunity to say that you are colluding with the Japanese.

Answer: He has long slandered us in this way many times. Our continued resistance against Japan will prove that there is absolutely no truth to it.

(3) Opinion: The news that negotiations have failed and that you will break with the National Government will delight the Japanese.

Answer: No matter what we do, Japan always distorts the facts to achieve her aims. We must act as we must; what does it matter if they are delighted?

(4) Opinion: If you break with the Kuomintang, not only Chiang Kai-shek but also the majority of American public opinion may consider you rebels.

Answer: Time will prove to the American people the justice of our cause.

(5) Opinion: Your failure to join the government during this crisis may provoke a very unfavorable reaction in the United States.

Answer: When the truth becomes fully clear—and the truth will eventually come to light—the American people will commend our actions.

(6) Opinion: If the Japanese are driven out of Kunming and Guiyang by Kuomintang and American forces, you will appear very isolated.

Answer: If that is indeed the case, we would cheer more joyfully than anyone else.

(7) Opinion: If the Generalissimo suffers defeat and you offer him no assistance in his hour of need, the United States may withdraw all her forces from China.

Answer: The United States cannot possibly disregard China.

By the end of the heated talks recorded above, Chairman Mao had considerably calmed down, but he still added one parting shot; in a rather composed but quite emphatic tone, he said: "Colonel, you probably recall that on November 10, just before General Hurley was about to depart from Yan’an, he and I signed the terms that we had drafted and revised with certain modifications at his suggestion; in those terms we expressed our willingness to form a coalition government with the Kuomintang. It was he who suggested that we sign them to show that we considered these terms fair after deliberation. We believe that the time will eventually come when we should publish this document, along with the signatures, to the Chinese and foreign press, although we are most reluctant to do so." I did not record this parting shot by Mao in the report of the talks I submitted to General Wedemeyer, but I mentioned it orally when I read the report to him and the Ambassador on the day I returned to Chongqing from Yan’an.

As recorded above, when I expressed the opinion that Chairman Mao’s conditions for resolving issues with the National Government might suggest he wanted the Generalissimo to step down, he flew into a sudden rage; at that moment I felt compelled to remind Mao that I was not Chiang Kai-shek, but merely a colonel in the U.S. Army. When Ambassador Hurley heard that Mao had hinted at the possibility of releasing the signed text of the Communist terms to the press, I feared for a moment that he might burst a blood vessel in his fury. "Damn it!" he bellowed, using an expression that was rarely heard then but has since become more common, "He’s pulled a fast one on me!" At this point, I had to steel myself and remind the General that I was not Mao Zedong.

As for Chairman Mao having "pulled a fast one on me," it seems to me that if anyone ever did something with full knowledge and a complete understanding of the grave implications of his actions, that person was General Hurley. It was he who, that morning in Yan’an, suggested that he and the Chairman sign those terms proposed by the Communists.

There is one final word regarding my talks with Mao in Yan’an on December 8, 1944. As I was leaving, he saw me to the door in the purely Chinese manner. When we parted, he said: "Colonel, you are truly calling for peace in China, are you not?" The truth is that I was calling for peace. — Talks with Barrett, 215

oO Figures - Issue 1983.8, Barrett (translated by Zeng Yue), *The Tough Negotiator*

--- Notes

1. On December 8, 1944, I held a lengthy meeting with Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Zhou Enlai, Vice Chairman.
During the talks, I spoke first. I said I had learned that General Zhou Enlai had no intention of returning to Chongqing. Chairman Mao replied that there was nothing for General Zhou to do there.
We then engaged in a full and frank discussion on the ongoing negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The key points of the remarks by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Zhou are summarized as follows:


2. Throughout the talks, Chairman Mao’s attitude was extremely tough and difficult to deal with. Yet he was not discourteous toward me, although he flew into a rage several times. He repeatedly exclaimed: [We cannot make any more concessions!] [That bastard Chiang Kai-shek!] [If Chiang Kai-shek were here, I would slap him in the face!] When I remarked that I thought the Generalissimo viewed the [Five-Point Proposal] as a means to force him out of power, Chairman Mao became particularly indignant. He stood up in anger and said, [He should have stepped down long ago!] General Zhou Enlai remained unhurried and composed, calmly supporting and supplementing Chairman Mao’s words with cool remarks. At the conclusion of this meeting, I was left with the following impression: my conversation with these two intelligent, ruthless, and resolute leaders was futile; they are absolutely convinced of the strength of their position.