Conversation with [Patrick J.] Hurley1
(November 8, 1944)
We welcome General [Patrick J.] Hurley to Yan’an and are grateful for the zeal
with which he has aided the united Chinese War of Resistance. It is difficult to
deal with circumstances in China. Colonel [David D.] Barrett,2 who has spent
many years in China and some time in Yan’an, understands this very clearly.
Many of our other American friends are also aware of this. China has abundant
manpower and material resources; what we need is unity. But we must have
democracy to achieve unity. That is, we need to unite the strength of our whole
country to fight the Japanese on the basis of democracy. Currently, the war
against the Fascists in the rest of the world is going very well; it is only on the
front lines in China that the fight is not going so well. This is because China lacks
democracy. We greatly welcome General Hurley’s coming here to lend the
Chinese people a hand and to promote Chinese democratic unity. This is
especially true now, when the Japanese bandits are penetrating southwestern
China and the Americans need Chinese coordination with their attack on the
Philippines. Yet the front line for which the Guomindang is responsible loses
battles every day. The Chinese people and their Allied friends are very much
concerned, and we hope that with General Hurley’s forceful assistance, the
Chinese situation can take a turn for the better. We hope to turn from the present
direction of shattered unity, depleted military strength, broken democracy, and
bad relations with the Allies to the direction of strengthening unity, greater
military strength and democracy, and enjoying good relations with the Allies. If
we can attain this through General Hurley’s help, all the Chinese people will be
grateful.
This morning, General Hurley expressed a desire for a free, open, and candid
conversation. I will now follow the method you proposed to say a bit.

Until now, the Guomindang has been a major political party with a vast army.
This army fought rather well during the first two years of the War of Resistance,
and it can still be considered to be fighting the Japanese. The Guomindang
authorities still have not fundamentally destroyed national unity. This is one
good aspect of the party and the government led by Mr. Chiang Kaishek.
Therefore, we have always been willing to cooperate with Mr. Chiang to fight the
Japanese. We have never abandoned this. We should, however, look at another
aspect, which is the difficulties, shortcomings, and serious crises facing China. If
we do not consider this aspect, we will be unable to solve problems. The present
policies of the Chinese government (they remain the same at present, but we
hope they will change) are detrimental to the unity of the people of all China and
prevent the people of all China from rising up to fight the Japanese.
China is now divided into three regions: the areas occupied by the enemy, the
liberated areas under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party members and
those with no party affiliation, and the areas directly under the control of the
Guomindang.
The Guomindang authorities do not concern themselves with the first type of
areas, the areas occupied by the enemy. The Guomindang authorities also do not
concern themselves with organizing an underground army to coordinate fighting
with Allied landings in these areas.
With regard to the second region, the liberated areas, the Guomindang
authorities do everything they can to prevent, restrict, shrink, and annihilate
them. But the liberated area nevertheless grows larger with every passing day.
Why do you think the liberated area has expanded in this way? It is the result of
eight years of arduous struggle by the broad masses. They must fight the
Japanese in the front, while at the same time the Guomindang is destroying them
from the rear. They are in the extremely difficult position of being attacked from
two sides. As to how the Guomindang works to encircle, attack, and send spies to
the liberated area to cause havoc, one can say that they have thought up a million
ways; it is difficult to fully recount them here.
In the third region, the areas directly ruled by the Guomindang, there exist
grave crises, of which the military crisis is the most profound. Since April of this
year, the Guomindang army has shrunk from between 2 million and 3 million
troops to 1.95 million troops in the face of attacks by the Japanese bandits. Most

of the soldiers cannot fight; they simply collapse at the first encounter. In the
great rear echelon, the people cannot support themselves and bandits run amuck.
The people’s trust in the government has never been as low as it is today. People
from all walks of life, including university professors, students, members of lesser
political parties, and even Guomindang members, are dissatisfied and resentful of
these authorities.
The above is a summary of China’s three regions. We hope that our Allied
friends can understand the true situation.
The Japanese bandits have now penetrated southwestern China, and the U.S.
Army urgently needs China to cooperate in its attack on the Philippines. How
can we quickly solve this problem in order to unite all the strength of China,
cooperate with the Allies to quickly defeat Japan, and establish a free and
democratic China? This morning, General Hurley said that the United States
would supplement our strength and help us to solve this problem. We Chinese
people are very happy about this.
General Hurley has raised a few points about how to resolve our difficulties,
which we hope can be the basis for reaching an agreement. We feel that there are
still a few problems, which, although they have not been written into a treaty,
deserve to be raised and discussed.
The majority of Chinese people, including those of us in the Chinese
Communist Party, primarily hope that the policies and organization of the
National Government will be changed rapidly. This is the starting point for the
resolution of the problems. Without these changes, we may still come to some
agreement, but such an agreement would have no foundation. Therefore, it is
necessary to reorganize the current National Government, establishing a coalition
government that includes all anti-Japanese parties and factions and those who
belong to no party or faction. At the same time, established policies of the
government that are not suitable for uniting the people of all China to fight the
Japanese must be changed and be replaced by those that are suitable for uniting
the people of all China to fight the Japanese.
This reform is necessary, first, to ease the serious military, political, financial,
economic, and other crises in the areas directly under Guomindang rule.
Although the liberated areas face extreme difficulties, there is no crisis. If the
present National Government is not reorganized, there will be no way to firm up

the morale of the army in the great rear echelon or to ease the crises in the areas
ruled by the Guomindang. The Guomindang always complains about insufficient
Allied assistance in arms and ammunition, but if the government is not
reorganized, and the old policies are not changed, all the tanks, planes, and other
new weapons in the world will not help. Every unit under Guomindang control is
extremely corrupt. The primary reason for reorganizing the government is to ease
the crises in the area under Guomindang rule. If the Guomindang believes it
holds power firmly and refuses to change, what can anyone do? Nonetheless, it
will then have no way to remedy its own crises.
With regard to the “democratic order of government,” I feel that perhaps the
National Government needs, first, to be reorganized into a coalition government
and change its policies. Mr. Chiang, however, has repeatedly expressed his desire
to delay dealing with this issue until a year after the end of the war. When people
have raised the issues of reorganizing the government and establishing a coalition
government to him, he has slapped them down. If this situation continues, it will
only prolong and widen the crisis, causing the National Government to face the
danger of collapse. This danger is felt not only by we Chinese Communist
members but also by our foreign friends, such as numerous foreign reporters.
Therefore, the origin of the crisis in areas ruled by the Guomindang lies in the
Guomindang’s erroneous policies and corrupt apparatus, not in the existence of
the Chinese Communist Party.
Now, let us take a look at how we Chinese Communist Party members work.
In the enemy-occupied areas, we have organized underground armies and have
prepared to coordinate with the fighting by the Allied forces.
In the liberated areas, we have carried out work openly, organized the people,
practiced democracy, and persevered in the War of Resistance. We have never
impeded the Guomindang, but the Guomindang has impeded our democratic
anti-Japanese activities. Of the Guomindang army, which is 1.95 million strong,
775,000 have been used to encircle us, a part of which is used to attack us. Even
under these circumstances, we still use all of our strength to fight against the
Japanese.
In the Guomindang area, when an authority sees a Chinese Communist Party
member, it either arrests or executes this person. Since 1939, our Party there has
been forced to go underground. Only in Chongqing can a small number of

Chinese Communist Party members still work openly in the Eighth Route Army
office and the New China Daily. In Xi’an as well, only a few Communists can
operate openly. In all the other places in the great rear echelon, our Party has
been forced to work underground. In spite of this, we have not caused workers’,
shopkeepers’, or students’ strikes. We still support the National Government in its
fight against the Japanese.
Therefore, I venture to say once more that the origin of the crisis in the
Guomindang-controlled areas lies in the Guomindang’s erroneous policies and
corrupt organization, not in the existence of the Chinese Communist Party.
In contrast, our 630,000 soldiers and 90 million people behind enemy lines have
held fast to the “oxtail” of the Japanese bandits, thus protecting the great rear
echelon. Without this force to hold on to the “oxtail” of the Japanese bandits, the
Guomindang would have fallen to the Japanese long ago. In June of this year, the
Guomindang authority announced a scheme in which 80 percent of our army, as
well as the democratically elected governments of the liberated areas, would all
be eliminated. If this scheme is implemented, there will be no one left holding the
Japanese bandits’ “oxtail.” This will only end up harming the Guomindang itself.
Of the main points raised by General Hurley this morning, one is about the
reorganization of our army. It states that after reorganization, our officers and
soldiers will receive salaries and subsidies equivalent to those received by the
Guomindang army. I fear that Mr. Chiang himself wrote most of this item. I
think that the army that should be reorganized is the one that has lost its combat
ability, disobeys orders, is mired in corruption, and scatters at the first sign of a
fight. For example, the armies of Tang Enbo and Hu Zongnan need to be
reorganized, not the courageous and skilled Eighth Route and New Fourth
armies. The U.S. Army Observation Group is now visiting the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, northwestern Shanxi, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei [Border
Region], and other anti-Japanese base areas. We have several dozen base areas
behind enemy lines, seventeen of which are large. We are willing for you to
organize an inspection team of a few hundred people to go to each base area and
draw your own conclusions as to which army really needs reorganizing. The
public opinion of the Chinese people is that whichever army is corrupt should be
reorganized. As for salaries and remuneration, soldiers in the Guomindang army
are plagued by both cold and hunger to the point that they can hardly walk. The

soldiers’ monthly salary is only 50 yuan, which is only enough to buy a pack of
cigarettes. Our army has enough to eat and warm clothes to wear; when they
march, they are quite energetic. Now they want us to receive the same salary as
the Guomindang army. Wouldn’t our army also lack enough to eat and to wear?
Wouldn’t we also lack the strength to march? How would this work?
Our opinion is basically as stated. We in Yan’an deeply thank General Hurley
for his enthusiasm to help China, which led him to take great pains to go on this
long journey. As for the actual situation in China’s three regions, we felt the need
to tell you.
On the basis of not destroying the strength to resist in the liberated areas and
not blocking democracy, we are willing to come to terms with Mr. Chiang
Kaishek, even if fewer problems are resolved and solutions take longer to find.
We do not demand that all problems be solved in an instant. Nonetheless, we
cannot accept destroying the strength to resist in the liberated areas and
impeding democracy.
I am very willing to meet with Mr. Chiang Kaishek. There have been
difficulties in the past, so we did not have that opportunity. Today, we have the
help of General Hurley, so at a suitable time I am willing to meet with Mr.
Chiang.
Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 220–25, where it is reproduced from the
transcript of the conversation preserved in the Central Archives.
1. Patrick J. Hurley (1883–1963) was a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. In September 1944 he went to
China to “mediate” relations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party as a personal
representative of President Franklin Roosevelt.
2. David D. Barrett (1892–1977) was a colonel in the U.S. Army. He was at this time a military attaché in
the U.S. embassy in China and the head of the U.S. Army Observation Group.