Telegram from the Military Commission to Deng Xiaoping, Teng Daiyuan, and Others on Preparing to Deal with Severe Enemy Mopping-Up Operations Before the Decisive Battle[1]

(October 14, 1944)

Comrades Deng and Teng, and for the information of Shandong, Pingyuan, and Wutai:

Your telegram of the shen-gan day has been received. In North China there are six major railways running vertically and horizontally, three military and commercial ports at Lianyun, Qingdao, and Tanggu, a network of highways, the great Hebei-Shandong plain (advantageous for large-scale military operations), the Northeast as a rear base, and the Japanese homeland as a screen. With convenient transportation and ease of coordination between air and sea forces and the army, and under the condition that the Soviet Union does not send troops into Manchuria, it is the most ideal battlefield for the Japanese army to fight a decisive battle on the mainland. In South China, because Japan is inferior in both naval and air power, transportation is difficult, and inland communication relies solely on the Guangdong-Hankou Railway, which has been destroyed. When the Allied forces land in Guangdong and Fujian in the future, the Japanese army may adopt mobile defense and resist at every step to delay for time. North China may become the main decisive battle battlefield. However, what gives the enemy the greatest headache is the many militia and guerrilla forces of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. These anti-Japanese forces not only directly endanger Japanese military operations but are also the best assistants for the British and American landing in North China. Therefore, before the decisive battle begins, there may still be a period of the most severe mopping-up and destruction in North China. We should be prepared for this. But at present, the Japanese bandits are busy preparing for the U.S. landing on the Philippine Islands, cutting off the South Seas, and striving to quickly open up the Annan-Guangxi communication line. The enemy forces in North China are weakening, and the puppet troops are wavering. Where conditions permit, we should take advantage of this weakness to eliminate as much as possible the puppet troops, diehard troops, and small enemy strongholds that have infiltrated our base areas, and expand the base areas. However, generally and temporarily, we should not attack key communication lines and relatively large cities (except for sabotaging key communication lines and raiding relatively large cities during enemy mopping-up operations). We should reinforce

[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Deng Xiaoping and Teng Daiyuan, with information sent to Shandong, Pingyuan, and Wutai, on preparing to deal with severe enemy mopping-up operations before the decisive battle.

the existing small regiments, strengthen the guerrilla units, reinforce the militia organization, and take advantage of the winter cold to earnestly conduct military training. In newly developed areas and areas where the reduction of rent and interest has not been deeply carried out, continue to deepen the struggle for rent and interest reduction. In areas where rent and interest reduction has been deeply carried out, pay attention to various types of production, improve the livelihood of the army and the people, and consolidate army-people unity and social unity. In the Taihang and Beiyue mountainous areas, strive to increase the production of bullets, artillery shells, hand grenades, landmines, smokeless propellant powder, and explosives, and store them in concealment for use when severe conditions make production impossible in the future. Work on both the upper and lower levels of the puppet troops must be intensified. Accomplishing these tasks well means foreseeing difficulties, overcoming difficulties, and creating the conditions for victory. The above opinions are for your consideration and implementation.

Military Commission
Mao, Zhu

You-han