Letter Drafted on Behalf of Lin Boqu
Replying to Wang Shijie and Zhang
Zhizhong1
(September 27, 1944)
Venerable Mr. [Wang] Xueting and Mr. [Zhang] Wenbai:2
You two gentlemen’s letter of September 10, the reports of both sides on the
progress of negotiations at this session of the Political Council,3 and Chairman
Chiang [Kaishek]’s remarks on this issue during the session have all been
reported to the Central Committee of our Party. The following points constitute
our reply to you two gentlemen. Please also transmit it to Chairman Chiang of
the National Government and to the Central Committee of your party.
1. We express our satisfaction with the opinion expressed by Chairman Chiang
at the Political Council to continue to use political methods to resolve problems.
Because a few powerful public figures in our country have not relaxed their
preparations for civil war, the threat of civil war remains. Furthermore, the closer
it gets to the time for a counterattack, the more serious this threat grows. Their
plan calls for combining the counterattack on the enemy with opposition to the
Communist Party in order to attain their goal of “killing two birds with one
stone.” However, Chairman Chiang’s declaration at this session is enough for us
and our countrymen to relax a bit for now. To the Yan’an inspection delegation
organized by the Political Council, we express our welcome. Regarding you two
gentlemen’s trip to Yan’an, we still look forward to the honor of your visit. As for
you gentlemen’s question of whether we can send a responsible representative to
Chongqing, it depends on the results of the Yan’an negotiations. However, we can confirm that as long as the National Government and the Guomindang do
not refuse to continue negotiations and will guarantee our freedom of travel (as
of today, there is no such freedom), although no one will come forth to negotiate
immediately, someone will do so in the near future. Although Comrades Zhou
Enlai and Dong Biwu have been in Chongqing for many years, Division
Commander Lin Biao also came here the year before last, and [I, Lin] Zuhan4
have been here for five months this time, and none of us has obtained any result
from the negotiations. However, so long as there is a thread of hope, we will
always send someone to negotiate.
2. Because of the current urgency of the War of Resistance and the fact that the
general domestic conditions are still not on a track in accordance with the
demands of the War of Resistance, severe crises exist everywhere on military,
economic, cultural, and political issues, and there are extremely large gaps
between the people and the government, between the people and the military,
between officers and soldiers, among officers themselves, and among armies.
Everyone in the country suffers feelings of unending anxiety. Torment,
bitterness, and hatred grow stronger each day. Everyone feels as if there is no
way out. Under such circumstances, the heart of the army has been shaken and
the heart of the people severed, so that we cannot stop the enemy’s attack and
help the Allied countries with their counterattack. The fundamental reason for
this series of grave crises is that there is absolutely no democracy under the oneparty dictatorship. Because of this, we cannot earn the trust of the people, cannot
mobilize and unite the powers of resistance of the whole country, cannot
strengthen the hearts of the army and the people, and cannot bring political,
military, economic, and cultural arrangements into accord with the needs of the
War of Resistance, democracy, and unity. At present, the only possible solution is
to demand that the National Government and the Guomindang immediately end
their one-party dictatorship and call an urgent assembly, including
representatives of all anti-Japanese political parties, all anti-Japanese armed
forces, all regional governments, and all popular mass organizations, to establish
a multiparty coalition government. This new government should proclaim and
implement new policies to thoroughly reform all military, political, economic,
and cultural affairs. Only such a new government, rather than a so-called new
government that manages only to entertain people but does not alter the essence of the one-party dictatorship or change its policies, will be able to renew the eyes
and ears of China’s people, implement Mr. Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary Three
People’s Principles, safeguard the people’s full rights to freedom and democracy,
give military orders and democratic political orders to energize the War of
Resistance, and thus gain the trust of the people. Only such a new government
will be able to mobilize all Chinese people, strengthen our forces of resistance,
stop the enemy’s attack, and implement our counterattack. Only then can we
have a national congress and a government truly elected by the people. With
such a new government, the unification of our country perhaps will be realized. If
the one-party dictatorship continues, there will be no way to gain the trust of the
people. Every sort of crisis will only grow worse, and the people will not be
mobilized. There will be no way to win the War of Resistance and to overcome
the dangerous phenomenon of the alienation of the people’s hearts and wills, and
the country will not be unified. This suggestion of ours actually represents the
demands of the people, as well as those of many members of your own party. [I,
Lin] Zuhan have already put forth this suggestion at this session of the Political
Council and would like to mention it here once again. You gentlemen’s
discussions and letters regarding implementing democracy in the past were full
of perfunctory words, without any sense of sincerity. Your letter of September 10
was no different. If no decision is made on this issue, even if our two parties can
solve a few secondary problems through negotiations, we absolutely will not be
able thoroughly to solve the important issues concerning the country and the
people.
3. You two gentlemen’s letter of September 10 contained words complaining
that our “demands increase with time.” We have no choice but to refute and
correct them. Division Commander Lin Biao raised four points a year and a half
ago, but they were rejected by the government at that time. Division Commander
Lin worked hard but returned with nothing. During the negotiations that you
gentlemen had with [me, Lin] Zuhan in Xi’an this May, we agreed that each side
would submit a report to the Central Committee of its own party requesting
instructions, because both [I, Lin] Zuhan and you gentlemen had no authority to
make a final decision. As a result, only the twelve points that our Party’s Central
Committee formally raised and the eight points that our Party entrusted [me,
Lin] Zuhan to raise verbally on June 4 (which [I, Lin] Zuhan submitted to you gentlemen in person on June 5) were the opinion of our Party’s Central
Committee. In addition, it was established that the [results of the] talks in Xi’an
must be signed by both sides and be reported to both parties’ Central
Committees. However, after [I, Lin] Zuhan signed, you two gentlemen refused to
do so, so the agreement was actually invalid. But why did you gentlemen still cite
it afterward as proof? You two gentlemen’s way of doing things, to put it more
politely, is an unfriendly attitude. To put it more accurately, it is playing
unwarranted and useless tricks which can only affect the resolution of our
problems. As for the missing words “Central China, South China,” this was
obviously caused by damage to the text of the telegram. After finding the
mistake, we immediately added the words to the text. The people’s anti-Japanese
governments in the large liberated areas of Central and South China have existed
for many years now. Is there any sound reason that we cannot demand the
government’s recognition?
4. You two gentlemen’s letter of September 10, like the government’s “brief”
and you gentlemen’s previous letter, is not based upon what would benefit the
War of Resistance and, consequently, does not concern real issues and will end in
no results. In addition to the aforementioned important issue of implementing
democracy, which concerns the life and death of the country, this also holds true
for the two issues of demanding the Guomindang government’s recognition of
both the armies and governments in the broad liberated areas of China. We now
clearly inform you two gentlemen once more: We absolutely request that the
Guomindang government recognize all the armies and political powers in the
liberated areas behind enemy lines. Furthermore, our demands definitely will
“increase with time,” because the entire war on the battlefields behind enemy
lines marks a sharp contrast with the front-line battlefields: On the front lines we
are suffering continual losses and retreats, but behind enemy lines we are
winning continual victories. The Eighteenth Army Group, the New Fourth Army,
and the South China Anti-Japanese Column develop every day, and the
reclaimed territories, liberated people, and governments elected by the people
increase day by day. Can it be that the Guomindang and its government do not
like this? Can it be that Chairman Chiang also dislikes it? It can’t be so!
Regardless of whether the Guomindang government recognizes us, we will still
fight the evil Japanese bandits, and we will fight and drive them to the banks of the Yalu River and reclaim all our nation’s land. We request recognition only
because we demand unification; we demand that the Guomindang, the Chinese
Communist Party, and the entire country’s powers of resistance unite on a
foundation of democracy rather than on dictatorship, so that they are able to
coordinate with the Allied nations to overthrow the Japanese bandits as soon as
possible. [I, Lin] Zuhan think that it is inappropriate for you to maintain your
nonrecognition or minimal recognition. Why do you not want those military
forces that win victories, and only want those military forces that always lose?
Why do you not want the reclaimed territory of this country and instead revile
us, and you do not regret losing so vast a tract of land from Zhengzhou to Guilin
in a few months and accuse no one? Now I respectfully inform you two
gentlemen and request that my messages be transmitted to the Guomindang
government and Chairman Chiang. Please do not despise our Communist Party
in the future. We request that you recognize the victorious armies and the
reclaimed territory of our country because your hateful state of mind is
incompatible with the interests of the nation. Please forgive my frank words!
Lin Zuhan

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 213–17, where it is reproduced from the original
preserved in the Central Archives.
1. Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong were at this time the two representatives of the Guomindang in the
negotiations with the Communists.
2. These are the courtesy names (hao) for Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong.
3. The Political Council, see above, note to the text of September 19, 1944.
4. That is, Lin Boqu.