YENAN OBSERVER ON THE WAR SITUATION IN CHINA

21 September 1944

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 21 September--The Yenan observer made
the following comments concerning the war situation in China:

Recently the military situation on the two battlefronts in China sharply
revealed the true nature of what the Kuomintang authorities call "unity
of military command." On the battlefront entirely under the Kuomintang
command, seven cities along the Hunan-Kweichow Railway--Chi-yang, Ling-ling,
Tung-an, Hsin-ning, Tao-hsien, Tzu-yuan and Ch'uan-hsien--all fell to the
enemy in 12 days after the enemy in Hunan took Ch'ang-ning. Kweilin on the
Hunan-Kweichow Railway and Shao-yang on the flanks are in danger. Meanwhile,
the enemy in Kwangtung, in a two-pronged attack from the Hsi River and
Leichou Peninsula, captured six cities--Kao-ming, Sze-hui, Chao-ch'ing,
K'ai-p'ing, Hsin-hsing and Lien-chiang. The enemy troops advancing southward from Tao-hsien have reached Chiang-hua and Yung-ming in the southernmost part of Hunan. The enemy advancing northward from the Hsi River have
captured Huai-chi and Hsin-tu in Kwangsi. The distance between the two lines
of enemy advance is less than 120 miles. This kind of shameful defeat of
losing a city a day is the price of the so-called "obedience to military
command." Today, when the Allies are actively making naval preparations
to attack the Philippines and the China coast and are actively strengthening
the Yunnan-Burma overland transportation line and bombing Japanese-occupied
areas and Japan itself from the air, the corrupt and incompetent high
command in Chungking is creating dangers for itself and difficulties for the
Allied forces, yielding to the Japanese bandits important and strategically
advantageous territories, and giving them the opportunity to delay their
defeat. The seriousness of our defeat on the southwestern battlefront is
not the size of our losses nor the speed with which we lost our troops and
territory, but the consequence of our wrong strategy. The crisis in
Kwangsi may mean that the enemy may knock on the door of Kunming or even
of Chungking. The Allied air force, dreaded most by the Japanese bandits,
has lost its important bases because of the fast deterioration of the
situation in Hunan and Kwangsi, and it continues to feel that harm done by
the poor Kuomintang military command. If the worst happens, the Japanese

may be able to seize control of the entire east-west communication line
across China and cut China in two. The disadvantage created by this situation to our counteroffensive is immeasurable. In his two speeches in the
National Assembly, Chiang Kai-shek did not say a single word about how to
turn the tide of the current crisis or how to change the policy and personnel of the high command that created these crises. All of a sudden he
stressed in vain, again and again, the lack of so-called "unity of military
command" that hampered our victory in the war of resistance. One should
know that the so-called "unity of military command," just as National
Assemblymen Wang Yun-wu [3769 7189 0063] and Hu Lin [5170 7207] rightfully
said, "is not the problem." The problem is what kind of military command
should we have after the unification. If we must keep today's defeatist
military command as the unified command, then it seems to me that we will
not be satisfied unless all our armies follow the example of those units
engaged in the Honan campaign in the past and the present Hunan-Kwangsi
campaign, and then we will all perish. This kind of destructive psychology
leads to nothing but giving aid and comfort to the enemy, hindrance to
victory and defeat.

Let us take a look at the battlefronts behind the enemy, where the armies
are accused by the Kuomintang of being "disobedient to military command."
The situation there is entirely the opposite. The people's army on this
battlefront won significant victories one after another in August and
September. The 8th Route Army in Shantung took five cities from the second
half of August to the first half of September. These five cities are Li-ching,
Lo-ling and Ling-yi at the Yellow River estuary, Wen-teng at the top of the
Chiao-tung Peninsula, and Yi-shui in southeastern Shantung. The battle of
Yun-cheng in southwestern Shantung resulted in the liberation of more than
600 villages and towns. The countersweep campaign in coastal southeastern
Shantung annihilated one brigade of puppet troops under the command of
Ch'en San-k'an [7115 0005 0974]. This constitutes a sharp contrast to the
sad situation of losing a city a day on the forward battlefront. Also,
there have been many victories along the coast in various provinces. For
example, the 8th Route Army in Hopeh captured Kao-li-ying, 16 miles north
of Peiping; attacked and entered Ch'ing-yun-tien southeast of Peiping and
Ch'ang-hsin-tien southwest of Peiping; entered the cities of Changchow,
Hsiung-hsien and Shen-tze; and reached the city gates of I-hsien and
Hsu-shui. The New 4th Army, which has been active in a triangular area
bordered by Nanking, Shanghai and Ningpo, captured Lu-lang-ch'iao, 16 miles
southwest of Nanking, and Shih-chuang, Chang-huang-kang, and Hsin-sheng-kang
on the north bank of the Yangtze River; and attacked and entered Chang-hsing
on the southwest shore of T'ai-ho, Li-shui and Li-yang between Nanking and
Chang-hsing and the suburbs of Ningpo. The Tung-chiang Column in the
vicinity of Canton attacked and entered Lung-yen-tung in the suburbs of
Canton. The four victories at I-shui, Wen-teng, Yun-cheng and Chang-hsing
alone liberated 14,000 square li, or 1,500 square miles of land. As a
result of the continuous victories recently, the total population in
China's liberated areas has increased from 86 million to 90 million. If
the so-called military command is for the purpose of fighting the Japanese

ON THE TWO BATTLEFRONTS
and attaining victory, then the battlefronts behind the enemy are models in
executing the orders of the high command in the war of resistance. If we
have to accept the Kuomintang proposal by abolishing four-fifths of the
effective anti-Japanese force and returning to the enemy and their puppets
four-fifths of the recovered territory, liberated people, prisoners of war
and captured weapons before we can be described as "obedient to military
command," then these so-called military orders are nothing but orders against
the national interest and selling out the country issued by the running dogs
of His Majesty Emperor Hirohito. The Chinese people will arise to punish
these thieves who sell out their country and will never allow them to be
free or escape the reach of the law.

In looking at the recent situation on the two battlefronts one can see
clearly that the central problem for the forward battlefront is the convening
of an urgent conference on national affairs, to be attended by all political
parties, all factions, all circles, all army leaders, all people's organizations, and all local anti-Japanese forces, to abrogate the oligarchical rule
of the Kuomintang, to thoroughly reorganize the National Government and the
command headquarters, to chase out all thieves who sell out their country,
capitulationists, defeatists, dictators and fascist elements and turn them
over to the people for punishment, and to let those who represent the
interest of the war of resistance and the will of the people control the
military command so that we can stop the enemy advance and turn the tide of
the dangerous situation. As to the battlefront behind the enemy, the central
problem is to strengthen its armament. Judging from the fact that the
Communist Party is engaging five-sixths of the enemy and puppet troops and
is winning battles every day, while the Kuomintang is engaging only onesixth of the enemy and puppet troops and is losing battles every day, the
Chinese Communist Party should receive five-sixths or more of the materiel
assistance from the Allies, while the Kuomintang should receive at most
one-sixth. The materiel should not be distributed by the Kuomintang, because
it is not qualified to do this any more. If the government and the command
headquarters are not reorganized, then our Allies should even consider
whether they should give one-sixth of the materiel to the Kuomintang, because
it is responsible for losing territory and hindering the victory of our
Allies. If one weapon is handed over to the Kuomintang, it will eventually
wind up in the hands of the enemy.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 23 September 1944.

* "Reference Materials on China's New Democratic Revolution," April 1951.

* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution," Vol 4,
Chinese People's University, 1957.

* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party," Vol 4.