Authoritative Person in Yan’an
Comments on the Negotiations
Between the Guomindang and the
Communist Party
The Remedy for the Present Crisis Requires the
Reorganization of the Government and the Supreme
Command
(September 19, 1944)
(New China News Agency, September 19) The authoritative person here gave the
following comments on the course of the negotiations between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party and the sending of an inspection delegation to Yan’an
by the National Political Council:
It is already four and a half months since Comrade Lin Boqu began negotiations
with the representatives of the government, Mr. Zhang Zhizhong and Mr. Wang
Shijie,1 in Xi’an. During this long period, though the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee and its representatives have been extremely tolerant and
patient and compromised out of consideration for the general interest, because
the government, for its part, is incorrigibly obstinate in its erroneous policies,
lacks sincerity in the negotiations, and resorts to crafty maneuvers, the
negotiations have had no result at all. Every specific issue, even the most trivial
one, has not been resolved. Now the progress of the talks has been reported to the
Political Council,2 and the Political Council has decided to organize an inspection
delegation to come to Yan’an. The negotiations between the Guomindang and the

Communist Party, which lasted for four and a half months, have been brought to
a temporary end. Hence we can comment briefly on the past talks. The last ten
days of April, when Comrade Lin Boqu was leaving for Chongqing, was precisely
the time when the Japanese bandits began their offensive on the Chinese
mainland. Considering the Guomindang’s erroneous policies that have harmed
the nation in the past—in military matters, looking on passively and relying on
the Allied countries to defeat Japan; in politics, authoritarian dictatorship; in the
economy, monopoly; in culture, oppression and muzzling of public opinion—the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee foresaw that in the face of a new
offensive by the Japanese invaders the resistance camp in China would suffer
serious military loses and major crises in politics, the economy, and all the other
fields. In order to avoid this dangerous situation, the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee sent Comrade Lin Boqu to Chongqing. The stand and general
policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the negotiations were explicitly
expressed in the suggestions put forward to the Guomindang government on
June 5. This document began with the following words: “In order to overcome the
current difficulties, defeat the offensive of the Japanese bandits, and prepare
carefully for the counteroffensive, the Chinese Communist side believes that we
have only one way, that is, to carry out democracy and enhance unity. For this
purpose, the Chinese Communist Party hopes that the government side will solve
a few urgent problems.” The calm and clear understanding of the situation by the
Chinese Communist Party, its great sense of responsibility for, and unselfish and
loyal attitude toward, the country and the people could be seen clearly in this
proposal. As for the Guomindang government, its position is quite different. It
turns a blind eye to the present critical situation and is careless and optimistic
about it. It does not seem to blame itself for leading the country and the people
into these perils. Throughout the negotiations, it adopted an arrogant and
dogmatic attitude, attempted to put the private interests of the Guomindang and
its faction alone above the national interests, and to force the others to accept
this. This is apparent if we look at the brief proposed by the government on
June 5.3 The brief does not contain a single word about the War of
Resistance (this is very much worth noting), does not include a single word
about the present difficult and dangerous situation, and does not express
any intention of changing and giving up the erroneous policies that have

done great harm to the country. This brief wants to abolish more than fourfifths of the armed forces that are resisting five-sixths of the invading and
puppet troops and that have made extraordinary contributions in the War of
Resistance behind enemy lines “within a limited period.” That is, this brief
permits us to organize ten divisions, each division, as in the Guomindang
military system, with about 10,000 men. The total number is not to exceed
100,000 and the remaining 370,000 regular troops must all “be abolished.”
Moreover, they must “be abolished” very quickly. We must ask, isn’t this the
tune of the Japanese? If what the Japanese bandits have been trying by
every possible cruel means of war to “abolish” but have not been able to do
so is really “abolished” now in accordance with the brief of the Guomindang,
aren’t they going to be awarded a top decoration by the Japanese emperor?
This brief also wants to “put all the democratic regimes,” which are
democratically elected by the Chinese people in the liberated areas, which
are linked as closely as flesh and blood with the people behind the enemy
lines, which share joys and sorrows with the people, and which resolutely
lead the War of Resistance “all and without exception under the charge of
envoys sent by the individual provincial governments in which they are
located.” But where the devil are these “provincial governments?” Nobody
knows to what corner of the earth they have fled. What connections do they
have with the unrivaled arduous struggles of the people? If one day these
gentlemen in the so-called provincial governments can be located, they
should be given fair treatment, that is, “discharge them from their posts and
prosecute them.” What is worse, are there not also many traitors hidden in
these so-called provincial governments? Weren’t traitors like Pang Bingxun
and Shi Yousan4 formerly chairmen of these kinds of provincial
governments? As for the members of these provincial governments who
have defected to the enemy and betrayed the nation, they are even more
innumerable. In sum, this brief only favors the Japanese invaders and is only
the expression of the will of those who think of their own private interests
instead of those of the country and the nation. To put it more bluntly, the
so-called brief is nothing but the summary of the mean-spirited will of a
small clique of Guomindang Fascist elements who think only of the interests
of their party, but know nothing of the righteous cause of the nation. It

cannot and should not be accepted by every true patriot, because accepting
this brief is as good as assisting the Japanese invaders.
As far as the attitudes of both sides in the negotiations are concerned, the
Chinese Communist Party was always sincere and compromised out of
consideration for the general interest. The Guomindang government, however,
with ludicrous conceit, tried rascally tricks. For the moment, we will not discuss
these here, but will deal with the proposition put forward by the Chinese
Communist Party itself. On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee telegraphed Comrade Lin Boqu and put forward twenty suggestions.5
On the twenty-second, Lin sent them to Zhang and Wang. Zhang and Wang said
that “to put it in this way is no different from denouncing the crimes of the
Guomindang,” and they refused to accept them. After learning this, the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee reduced the list to twelve suggestions and
changed the remaining eight suggestions to oral demands. On June 5, Zhang and
Wang still refused to forward it to the government. After many days of
argument, they finally promised to forward it to the government. This incident
alone proves that the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, in order to
respect the opinions of the representatives of the other side, did not hesitate to
compromise out of consideration for the general interest and reduced the formal
items considerably. Nevertheless, the representatives of the government exposed
fully the image of a rascal, since it is the primary responsibility and duty of the
representatives in any negotiations to forward the opinions of the opposite side to
the institutions they represent. The negotiations are already under way, but the
representatives of one side refuse to forward the opinions of the opposite side.
This is really a rare case in any negotiations. We cannot think of any terms for
characterizing such an attitude other than the tricks of rascals or hooligans.
Apart from this, Mr. Zhang Zhizhong, the representative of the government,
and Mr. Chiang Kaishek himself remarked repeatedly at the Political Council:
“What the Central Government is seeking is the unification of the military and
political order” (Zhang). “Our central government has said more than once that
all we want is a unified military order and a unified political order” (Chiang).
Regarding this point, we should state clearly that we most resolutely support the
unification of military and political order. But this political order must be a
political order that represents the will of the people, and this military order must

be a military order advantageous to the War of Resistance. If, however, the
political order is a political order that will lead the country toward Fascist
tyranny, and the military order is a military order that will result in the failure of
the War of Resistance, they will never be obeyed by any patriots or democratic
fighters in China, nor will we allow this unification. The Chinese people
profoundly despise this worn-out counterrevolutionary theme of “unification.”
The heart of the matter is that the political and military order of the Guomindang
government at present is exactly this kind of stuff. Its political order is a Fascist
political order; its military order is that of defeatism. If we are going to unify
everything with this kind of political and military order, it is exactly like
climbing a tree to catch fish. Moreover, even if there is unification, it will lead to
the catastrophe of losing the nation. Let us not talk about things in the remote
past, and let us concentrate on the examples during the negotiations. Jiang
Dingwen, Tang Enbo, Hu Zongnan, and Xue Yue6 are all so-called loyal followers
of the political and military orders of the Guomindang. The result is they were
defeated without fighting or were routed at the first encounter and lost troops
and territory, plunging the people into an abyss of misery, and they have made a
laughingstock of themselves before the people of the world. In contrast, the
Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which are falsely accused by the
Guomindang of “sabotaging the unification of military and political order,” are
winning victories every day and regaining lost territory every day. This is the
unification that really helps the nation and the country. This sharp contrast
proves the utter uselessness of the “military and political order” of the
Guomindang. Therefore, in talking about the need for the unification of the
military and political orders today, we must thoroughly change the character of
the military and political orders. If we want to change the character of the
military and political orders, we must change completely the military, political,
economic, cultural, and other policies of the Guomindang government. We must
reorganize totally the government and the supreme command, kick out those
capitulators, defeatists, tyrants, and Fascist elements, and put those who can truly
represent the interests of the people in charge of the political and military orders
and make them represent the will of the various forces and people in the country.
Only in this way can we really remedy the present crisis and win victory in the
War of Resistance. Only in this way can we talk about the unification of the

military and political orders. Only in this way can the unification of the political
and military orders serve the nation and the people. As regards reorganizing the
present weak, corrupt, incapable, and oligarchical and dictatorial Guomindang
government, Comrade Lin Boqu has put forward this proposal in the report he
made at the Political Council, and it can be said that this was precisely the right
time. The criticism of the Guomindang government’s brief by Comrade Lin in his
letter to Mr. Wang Shijie and Mr. Zhang Zhizhong on August 30 is completely in
accordance with the principles of the War of Resistance, unity, and democracy.
The people in Yan’an still hope that Mr. Zhang and Mr. Wang will come to
Yan’an for inspection and negotiation. As regards the matter of the five members
who were chosen by the Political Council to come to Yan’an for inspection and
an exchange of opinions, this is a very good idea and we welcome it.
Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 117–21, where it is reproduced from the
September 20, 1944, issue of Jiefang ribao. A long section identified as Mao’s major addition to the report,
which appears in boldface, is reproduced in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 211–12; it is not clear what other
changes or additions he made to the report.
3. Referring to the “brief” of the Guomindang government with regard to solving the problem of the
Communist Party by political means; Mao also refers to a draft version of this “brief,” above in the text of
May 15, 1944.
on the resistance forces and signed an “Anti-Communist Pact” with the Japanese in 1940.

--- Notes

1. Zhang Zhizhong and Wang Shijie were the two representatives of the Guomindang in the negotiations
with the Communist Party.

2. The Political Council refers to the National Political Council, the highest consultative institution, which
was established by a resolution of the Provisional National People’s Congress of the Guomindang on March
31, 1938. All its members were designated by the Guomindang government, and the Guomindang members
constituted the majority. It was rescinded after the Third Plenum of the Fourth Congress of the Guomindang
in May 1947.

4. Pang Bingxun (1879–1963), chairman of the Henan Provincial Government for the Guomindang,
surrendered to the Japanese in 1943. Shi Yousan (1891–1940), a Guomindang general active in Hebei, turned


5. The content appears in an earlier text, a telegram to Dong Biwu to transmit to Lin Boqu; see above, the
text of May 15, 1944.

6. For the Guomindang generals, see above, notes to the texts of May 21, 1944, and June 14, 1944.