Conversation with John S. Service[1]

(August 23, 1944)

After a brief general conversation, Mao Zedong said he wished to discuss the issue of relations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party. The following are the key points of his remarks.

The relationship between the KMT and the Communist Party of China is the crux of China's problems. The first phase, from 1922 to 1927, saw cooperation between the two parties. This made the success of the Northern Expedition and the KMT's rise to power possible. However, once the KMT gained political power, it monopolized it, turned against us, and attempted to eliminate us. The result was the second phase, a decade of civil war from 1927 to 1937. Forced by the imminent urgency of the Japanese invasion, the third phase brought renewed cooperation. But this cooperation has been unstable and has persisted until today.

The KMT did not join the third phase of cooperation cheerfully or willingly; it has never accepted the cooperation with sincere intent. Five factors compelled the KMT to accept this cooperation:

1. The Japanese attack.
2. Pressure from foreign public opinion.
3. The restraint shown by the Communists during the Xi’an Incident.
4. The will of the Chinese people to resist Japan.
5. Weaknesses within the KMT, which prevented it from defeating us.

When the war ends (or even as the war draws to a close), these forces will change. With Japan's defeat, the most powerful and active factor among those mentioned above will also be removed.

The Communist Party is stronger than before, so it can be said that our influence in striving for unity and opposing civil war has also grown. But as long as the KMT leadership remains as it is now, the Communist Party’s increasing strength will only make the KMT more determined to destroy the Party. However, such an approach can only go so far; if the Communist Party is very strong, the KMT will not dare to attack us. Yet the KMT leaders are so obsessed with power that they will always look for an opportunity to act.

For a long time, the Chinese people have not dared to speak out and have suffered political oppression; this was caused by the KMT. The liberals, students, intellectuals, politicians, the press, minority parties, local groups, and modern industrialists (who are disillusioned with the KMT’s bureaucratic approach to industrialization and see no future for themselves)—these people are numerous. Yet they are unorganized, disunited, and powerless. Chiang Kai-shek uses force and secret police against them.

The KMT is an amorphous body without distinct characteristics or a program. The liberal group within it lacks strong leaders, a common goal to strive for, and a positive program. Under current conditions, even if they had these, they would have no way to reach the people. The dominant leaders in the KMT, though split into mutually distrustful cliques, are all anti-Communist and anti-democratic. They band together for selfish purposes in order to hold on to their power in perpetuity.

Taking only these factors into account, if the nation continues to drift under its current leadership, a civil war instigated by the KMT seems inevitable.

We Communists are deeply conscious of civil war from our bitter experience. We know it would mean years of destruction and chaos for China. China's unification, its stabilizing influence in the Far East, and its economic development would all be delayed. Not only would the Chinese people be affected, but all countries with interests in the Far East would also suffer. China would become a major international issue. This is also of great importance to the United States.

One thing is very clear: we Communists fear civil war, we detest it, and we will not strike the first blow. Under the present circumstances, even though we know that if the KMT lacked foreign assistance we would ultimately win, we still make every effort to avoid it. For the Communist Party belongs to the people, and the interests of the people are our interests. The people will not long endure arbitrary fascism, which is evident now in Chongqing and Xi’an and whose threat was further foreshadowed in books like Chiang Kai-shek’s *China’s Destiny*. If the people want to fight, the Communists will definitely fight alongside them.

Therefore, the hope of preventing civil war in China depends to a large extent (much more than before) on foreign influence. Among these, the most important is the United States. With its power growing daily in China and the Far East, the United States can play a decisive role. Given its present position, the KMT must pay heed to America.

So U.S. policy in China is not just a matter of concern to Americans themselves; it is equally a matter of the greatest concern to the democratic Chinese people. The Chinese people are generally concerned about three issues.

First, is it possible that the United States will return to isolationism and thus lose interest in China? Will the American people truly close their eyes to foreign problems and let China "face the consequences of its own actions"? We Communists believe that if Roosevelt is re-elected, this issue probably will not arise.

This question and others regarding the United States were addressed directly to me. I therefore state in the clearest terms that I hold no official authority, and my answers are purely personal and entirely unofficial opinions.

Regarding the above points, I mentioned the long-term and special interests of the United States in China; in fact, we do not face a problem of domestic reconstruction caused by wartime destruction. Quite the contrary, our enormously developing economy and our increasingly broad international vision will compel us to look beyond our borders for trade and investment. Thus, we shall not become isolationists or indifferent toward China; whether Republicans or Democrats are in control of the state, I do not believe they will fundamentally affect our policy toward China.

Second, does the U.S. government genuinely care about democracy and the future of democracy in the world? For example, does it consider democracy important in China, a country with a quarter of the world’s population? Does it want the Chinese government to truly represent the Chinese people? Is it concerned that the current Chinese government, which it recognizes but whose legal status has not been confirmed by any lawful process, cannot truly represent the Chinese people? Chiang Kai-shek was elected chairman by only ninety members of a single party, the KMT, and they themselves cannot even claim with certainty that they represent the limited membership of that party! Even Hitler boasted that his regime was democratic, saying he was elected by the people, and he had a Reichstag! Does the United States grasp the obvious fact that the KMT has now lost the trust and support of the Chinese populace? Yet the important question is not merely whether the U.S. government grasps this fact, but whether it is willing to help improve the situation by trying to assist China in achieving democracy.

I mentioned many official U.S. statements that address China's unification and our general desire for the development of democracy in all nations. I said that at least a portion of significant American public opinion, its clear tendency, has been evident in recent commentary in the American press.

It is obvious that the KMT must reform itself and reorganize its government. On the existing basis, it cannot be expected to conduct the war effectively. Even if America wins the war for it, chaos will inevitably follow.

The government must broaden its foundation and include all important groups of the people. We do not demand a full and direct representative democracy, which is impractical. Moreover, under KMT initiation and control, it would be a useless sham. However, what can be done immediately and what should be done is to convene a provisional (or transitional) national congress, inviting all groups to send representatives. These representatives must not be selected and appointed by the KMT as in the past; they must be genuine representatives—the most qualified leaders. They should include the Communist Party, all minority parties, intellectual groups, the press, students, professional bodies, central organs of cooperative societies, workers, and other mass organizations.

A practical compromise on the allocation of representative quotas would be for the KMT to take half and all other groups together to take the other half. Given the actual party relationships, with prior consensus, the Generalissimo could be recognized as provisional chairman.

This provisional congress must be vested with full authority to reorganize the government and enact new laws, which would remain effective until a constitution is adopted. The government should be directly responsible to the congress, with a role and powers similar to those of the British House of Commons.

The provisional congress should at the same time take full responsibility for preparations for a fully democratic system and constitutional institutions. It should supervise elections and the convening of a national assembly, then transfer its power and declare itself dissolved.

Is the U.S. government willing to exert its influence to compel the KMT to implement such a proposal? Is the U.S. government willing to put forward such a proposal and actively support it?

Mao Zedong suggested that, given the importance of the matter, it would be worthwhile for me to travel to Chongqing to submit it to the ambassador. I said I would report it in full to the ambassador. I also mentioned that I had earlier heard the gist of this proposal from other quarters in Chongqing.

Later, during a conversation with Zhou Enlai on August 26, I learned that the Communist Party’s Political Bureau was considering submitting this proposal to the KMT. Perhaps they put it forward because, during recent negotiations, the KMT refused to discuss the Communists' demands concerning democracy on the grounds that they were "too abstract."

Third, what is the attitude and policy of the U.S. government toward the Communist Party of China? Does it recognize the Communist Party as an active, fighting force in resisting Japan? Does it recognize the Communist Party as an influential force in China’s democratic politics? Is there any possibility that the United States will support the Communist Party of China? If civil war breaks out in China, what will be the United States’ attitude toward both the KMT and the Communist Party? What is the United States doing to ensure that the KMT does not use its new U.S.-made weapons to fight a civil war?

These questions, particularly the points raised in the second and third issues, set the scope of our further discussions. I responded to several of the key points for further detailed talks and discussion.

Regarding the question of "supporting" the Communist Party, I pointed out that since the Communist Party itself openly supports the Central Government and Chiang Kai-shek, this issue is puzzling and, in any case, premature.

Because the foreign threat of Japanese aggression endangered the country, we Communists in 1936–1937 accepted the KMT’s terms for establishing a united front. First of all, since we are all Chinese, for the purpose of fighting Japan, a ten-year civil war—fruitless and mutually destructive—was halted. Although we did not start the civil war, we took the lead in stopping it. Besides, foreign countries recognized the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, but they did not support us. However, the united front was not entirely one-sided. The KMT also promised political reforms, yet they were never carried out.

Our support of Chiang Kai-shek does not mean we support autocracy; we support him in fighting Japan. Previously, we could not raise the question of recognition; from a legal standpoint, it is still premature. At present, we only ask that U.S. policy persuade the KMT to reform itself. This is the first phase. This is probably an indispensable step; if this matter is accomplished successfully, there will be no danger of civil war.

But suppose the KMT is unwilling to reform. Then U.S. policy must have a second phase, at which point the question of U.S. policy toward the Communist Party will have to be raised. We would not risk a conflict with the United States.

We could, for now, leave aside the question of U.S. arms supplies, which could be used by the KMT in a future civil war. But can we expect history to repeat itself? In the early years of the Republic, the powers recognized only Beijing. It was only after a long period that the Guangdong government could claim to represent the Chinese people. Nanjing was not recognized until it had completed the Northern Expedition and achieved success. Now the internal situation in China is changing, and the direction is not yet clear, but some similar circumstances may arise. Will the United States continue to recognize and support a government that is inefficient, lacks popular support, and is quite similar to the old Beijing government?

I raised the point that it is impossible, diplomatically, to withdraw recognition from a government that has not committed a directly unfriendly act, and it is even more awkward to support an opposition party behind the back of a recognized government. Finally, the whole difficulty of the issue lies in the interference in another country's internal affairs.

The United States has interfered in every country to which its troops and supplies have been transported. This interference is not necessarily intentional, nor is it necessarily direct. However, as long as the presence of American influence exists, interference remains an objective reality. If the United States insists on providing those weapons to all anti-Japanese armies, including the Communists, then it is not interference. If the United States gives weapons only to the Kuomintang, it is in fact interference, because it enables the Kuomintang to continue opposing the will of the Chinese people. "Interference," (Mao Zedong pointed out, noting that he had objections to this term because it had lost its original meaning under the following circumstances.) to promote the true interests of the Chinese people is not interference; it would be welcomed by the broad masses of the Chinese people, because they need democracy, and only the Kuomintang opposes it.

We do not demand the cessation of all aid to the Kuomintang army; such an outcome would be detrimental to the war, the Kuomintang would collapse, and the difficulties of the American landing in China would increase.

In a subsequent conversation, Zhou Enlai elaborated on the above points, expanding on the following topics: 1. Providing American weapons exclusively to the Kuomintang inevitably means civil war; 2. We must not overlook the possibility that Japan wants to "surrender" to Chiang Kai-shek to end the war. This is a trick against the other Allies; in reality, it is a compromise, and the fundamental reason for this compromise is that Japan hopes to maintain a weak Kuomintang in China, rather than a strong, unified, and democratic government; 3. In China, the only way to ensure a decisive victory in the war and avoid civil war is to provide weapons to both the Kuomintang and the Communist parties.

I raised the question of how American influence could be effectively brought into play and expressed doubt about whether Chiang Kai-shek could be "controlled." Mao Zedong vehemently opposed my view.

Chiang Kai-shek is in a position where he must heed the United States. Look at what has happened in Henan, what is currently happening in Hunan, and observe every sign shown in Guangxi! Perhaps the next step will be Yunnan. Look at the economic situation! Chiang Kai-shek is at his wit's end.

Chiang Kai-shek is stubborn, but fundamentally he is a scoundrel. To deal with him, one must understand this fact. We have had to learn this from experience. The only way to handle him is to be relentless. Do not yield to his threats and intimidation; do not let him think you are afraid, or he will resort to blackmail and extortion. The past American approach to dealing with Chiang Kai-shek has been very clumsy, allowing him to succeed through blackmail. For example: he has claimed that he can no longer sustain the war of resistance, that he has no choice but to negotiate peace, and his strategy was aimed at securing a 500 million loan. Now Kong Xiangxi is dispatched to the United States, also demanding cloth supplies. Cloth! Are we at war with Japan? Is cloth more important than bullets? Here in our border region, we have no cotton, and the Kuomintang blockade prevents us from obtaining any cotton from other parts of China where it is available. But we made an effort, and we quickly became self-sufficient. For the Kuomintang, solving the cloth issue would be a hundred times easier. If their government had its own economic policy, they could have solved it themselves long ago.

You can only befriend Chiang Kai-shek based on your own demands; he must be placed under constant, vigorous, and consistent pressure. Never relax your objectives; keep prodding at him frequently.

America's current position is completely different from when the Pearl Harbor incident just occurred. There is no longer any need or reason to cultivate, nurture, or appease Chiang Kai-shek. The United States can tell Chiang Kai-shek what he should do for the sake of the war. The United States can only help Chiang Kai-shek under the condition that he complies with American demands. Another method for Americans to exert American influence is to talk more about American ideals. In China or in the United States, every American official, when speaking with any Chinese official, can talk about democracy. Visits like Wallace's provide excellent opportunities, and such opportunities should be increased. Do not miss the opportunity with Kong Xiangxi in the United States.

Every American soldier in China should become a living advertisement for democracy. He should talk about democracy to every Chinese he encounters. American officials should talk about democracy to Chinese officials. In short, the Chinese people respect the democratic ideals of you Americans.

I raised the point that using our military as a political propaganda force is not allowed, and we have no institutions, like the Communist Party's political department, that educate the army and guide such work.

Even if your American soldiers do not engage in active propaganda, their mere presence and contact with the Chinese will produce a positive influence. It is for this very reason that we welcome them in China. The Kuomintang, however, is different; it needs to isolate them and prevent them from learning the truth. How many American observers do you now have on the front lines? We are happy to let your people move around freely. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, worries about the influence of large numbers of Americans in China; they fear an American landing only slightly less than they fear Soviet intervention in the war.

On the other hand, having Americans present is also good. If Americans are widely distributed, they will exert a restraining influence on the Kuomintang, making it more difficult for the Kuomintang to cause trouble. Kunming is an example; that place has become a center of liberal thought and free student activities because, under the watchful eyes of so many Americans, the Kuomintang dare not arrest students and throw them into concentration camps. Compare this to Xi'an, where there are very few Americans and secret agents operate unchecked.

It is very good that American publications criticize the Kuomintang. The effects may not be immediately visible and may even often seem to produce temporary adverse reactions. But as long as it is fair and aboveboard (if it is fair and aboveboard, the Kuomintang will discern it), it will cause the Kuomintang to hesitate and reconsider, because the Kuomintang needs American support.

Finally, any contact you Americans have with us Communists is a good thing. We are naturally pleased that the observer group has come here, because it helps in fighting Japan. But there is no need to describe the primary significance of your coming here as exerting political pressure on the Kuomintang (at least as has been stated so far).

I noted his emphasis on an American landing in China, and I hinted that the war might be won by other methods, so a landing might not be absolutely necessary.

We believe that Americans must land in China. Of course, it depends on the strength of the Japanese and the development of the war. However, the main force of the Japanese is in the Yangtze River basin and North China — not to mention Manchuria.

If U.S. forces do not land in China, it would be extremely unfortunate for China. The Kuomintang would continue in power, but it is a corrupt and incompetent government.

If a landing is to take place, there must be cooperation between American forces and the armies of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Now, our forces have surrounded Hankou, Shanghai, Nanjing, and other major cities. We are in the inner ring, while the Kuomintang is farther back.

If such cooperation with both Kuomintang and Communist forces is necessary, the important thing is to allow us to operate within independent defense areas. The Kuomintang is too afraid to work alongside us; their sole concern is to destroy us. When we operate in independent defense areas, the U.S. military can see the differences between us and the Kuomintang: we have the support of the masses, and we can fight.

I asked whether, as they had suggested, if the Kuomintang is not constrained or induced to carry out reforms, open civil war is inevitable.

We can say that civil war is "inevitable, but not absolutely certain." Subjectively, the Kuomintang leadership is now determined to annihilate the Communist Party. They fear us, just as they fear the people. The reasons are the same. Objectively, there are many factors (the five factors mentioned at the beginning of the conversation) that restrict the Kuomintang. Among these factors, the most powerful one — the factor of Japan — will cease to exist. Another factor is foreign public opinion; this factor is powerful because it is foreign and independent of the Kuomintang. However, this factor is still unpredictable, because the Kuomintang still hopes that foreign powers may side with it.

The Kuomintang is already busy looking for pretexts for civil war. The more you understand about us and conditions in our areas, the less value those pretexts will have.

Therefore, the Kuomintang may also adopt indirect methods of attack; it is very difficult to define the scope of their provocations or to establish a line of defense.

However, if the Kuomintang tries to prevent the progress already made in our areas, if it attempts to strip the people of their new democratic rights, the people will resist and demand our aid.

Another course of action for the Kuomintang is through puppet troops. The puppet troops will turn back to the Kuomintang — claiming they had always been "patriotic" — and then the Kuomintang will use puppet troops to occupy cities and places evacuated by the Japanese. They will incite puppet troops to attack us and create friction.

Zhou Enlai further elaborated on this Kuomintang policy, proposing that it is a possible component of a deceptive Japanese surrender to Chiang Kai-shek: that the Japanese, on the condition of exterminating the Communists, would hand over their weapons to puppet troops or the Kuomintang. This may seem somewhat far-fetched at first glance; the only explanation can be that the forces involved in this situation are so intricate and the resentments so intense that almost anything is possible.

Even to the Kuomintang, the facts are clear: China's political tide is inclined toward us. We uphold the manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress, a truly great and democratic document. Sun Yat-sen was not a Communist, and the manifesto remains valid; it will not become outdated soon. Even if the Kuomintang collapses, we will adhere to this manifesto, for its overall policy is good and applicable to China. Every single thing we do, every clause of our program, can be found in this document.

Of course, we do not pretend to be flawless. We also face the problems of bureaucratism and corruption. However, we confront them directly, and we are overcoming them. We welcome supervision and criticism from Americans, the Kuomintang, or anyone else. We frequently engage in self-criticism and revise our policies, moving toward greater effectiveness.

Our experience proves that the Chinese people understand democracy and need it; they do not require long periods of experience, education, or "political tutelage." Chinese peasants are not fools; they are intelligent and care about their rights and interests just like anyone else. You can see this difference in our regions — the people are vibrant, inquisitive, and very friendly. They have opportunities to express human emotions and energy; they have been liberated from heavy oppression.

I raised doubts about his emphasis on the importance of the United States while neglecting the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's participation in the Far Eastern war or China's post-war reconstruction will depend entirely on the circumstances of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people have suffered immense sacrifices in the war and will be preoccupied with their own reconstruction. We do not expect help from the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the Kuomintang, due to its pathological fear of communism, is also anti-Soviet. Therefore, cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Soviet Union is impossible. As for us seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union, that would only worsen China's situation, because China is already disunited enough! In any case, even if the Kuomintang needed Soviet help, it would be unlikely.

However, the Soviet Union would not object to American interest in China, provided that interest is constructive and democratic. In that case, there would be no conflict. The Soviet Union only needs a friendly and democratic China. Cooperation between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party would be beneficial and desirable for all parties concerned.

I jokingly said that the name "Communists" might make some American industrialists uneasy. Mao Zedong laughed and said they had considered changing the name, but if people understood them, they wouldn't be afraid.

The policies of the Chinese Communist Party are entirely free of bias. Our rent reduction has been lowered from the past rates of 80, 70, or 60 percent to the legal rate (according to an unimplemented Kuomintang law) of 37.5 percent. Even so, we only intend to accomplish this gradually, because we do not need to drive away the landlords. We have set a limit on interest rates at an annual 10 percent, considering that this is much lower than prevalent rates, so it is not absolute.

Even the most conservative American industrialist could not find anything objectionable in our program.

China must industrialize. In China, industrialization can only be achieved through free enterprise and with the assistance of foreign capital. The interests of China and the United States are identical and interconnected. We can complement each other economically and politically. We can, and must, cooperate.

The United States will find us easier to cooperate with than the Kuomintang. We are not afraid of the influence of democratic America—we welcome it. We neither entertain the naive notion of merely absorbing Western mechanical technology, nor are we interested in monopolistic bureaucratic capitalism. Such monopolistic bureaucratic capitalism stifles the nation’s economic development and merely enriches the bureaucrats. What concerns us is to adopt policies of construction and production that will enable the country to achieve the most rapid development possible. First, to raise the people’s standard of living (look at what we have already accomplished here with limited resources). Only then can we speak of the “defense industries,” as Chiang Kai-shek discussed in his China’s Destiny. We will care for the welfare of the Chinese people.

The United States need not worry that we will refuse to cooperate. We ought to cooperate. We must obtain assistance from the United States. That is why we Communists consider it extremely important to understand the thoughts and intentions of you Americans. We cannot rashly oppose you—cannot rashly enter into any conflict with you.

--- Notes

[1] John S. Service served as Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in China and advisor to General Stilwell’s headquarters during the War of Resistance. This text consists of talking points from a conversation with Mao Zedong, compiled by Service. The portions in Song typeface represent Mao’s remarks.