Han Jun Reveals the Truth about the Western Shanxi Incident[1]

(August 13, 1944)

[Yan'an, August 13, Xinhua News Agency] The *Xijing Daily* in Xi'an carried a statement by Yan Xishan during his conversation with a delegation of Chinese and foreign journalists, in which he claimed that when he was preparing for the winter offensive in 1939, Han Jun, the leader of the Second Column of the New Army, led his troops in mutiny. In order to help our countrymen understand the truth about this incident, which saddened our friends and gladdened our foes, our correspondent specially interviewed Comrade Han Jun, who personally experienced those hardships and dangers. Comrade Han Jun first told our correspondent that the cruel and vicious truth about the Western Shanxi Incident had been endured and concealed in the past, in the hope that Yan Xishan would awaken to his errors, and had never been made public. This time, Yan Xishan has confounded right and wrong and openly misrepresented the truth to the Chinese and foreign public, making it truly impossible to remain silent any longer. Comrade Han Jun then recounted the course of the incident in detail as follows:

Yan Xishan Bears Hostility Toward the People

After the fall of Taiyuan, Yan Xishan began to waver and prepared to capitulate and compromise. After Wang Jingwei defected to the enemy, Yan Xishan convened a meeting of senior cadres to explore the possibility of peace. He said: "Resistance and peace are political issues; one cannot say that advocating resistance is right and advocating peace is wrong." At that time, Comrade Bo Yibo said: "The enemy has invaded our country, and to seek national independence, we can only resist to the end. Peaceful compromise means surrender, it means being a traitor." Yan remained silent. Yan Xishan voiced such arguments more than

[1] This is an interview by Xinhua News Agency. The original revised manuscripts of the introduction and the first section, "Yan Xishan Bears Hostility Toward the People," have been lost. The subtitle of the second section was revised by Mao Zedong; the original title was "Anti-Communist Troops and Japanese Invaders Jointly Attack the Dare-to-Die Corps." The text printed in Song typeface in the article was added and rewritten by Mao Zedong.

once, and each time they were exposed and opposed by the Sacrifice League and the New Army. But Yan Xishan's preparations for surrender never ceased. The Sacrifice League and the New Army maintained that to win the war of resistance, it was necessary to practice democracy and mobilize the masses. Yan Xishan opposed practicing democracy and abolished popularly elected county magistrates, district heads, village heads, and public opinion organs at all county levels. He said: "Political power is a knife handle; if we hold it, we can rule the people; if it falls into the people's hands, it will endanger us. Therefore, democracy cannot be practiced." He also opposed the establishment of peasant anti-Japanese national salvation associations, self-defense forces, and the like (which, however, form the foundation of China's strength in the war of resistance). He said: "The peasantry is a tiger; if mobilized, it will cause trouble (for fear they will resist to the end and refuse to obey orders); if not mobilized, it leaves a vacuum (for fear the Communist Party will come and mobilize them). Now the question is not whether to mobilize or not, but how to grasp the electric whip (the electric whip is a whip used to control the tiger)." His opposition to democracy and to mobilizing the masses was entirely for the sake of capitulation and compromise. He also said: "Survival is everything; resistance is merely a means." At the time of the July 7th Incident, for the sake of survival, he needed to resist for a few days. Later, feeling that the war of resistance would be protracted and difficult, he wanted to surrender, also for the sake of survival. Concepts of justice, principle, nation, and state had no place in his dictionary. While making these preparations, he outwardly pretended to be resisting, but secretly he had long been collaborating with the enemy and opposing the Communists, having held the Liucun Conference and the Anping Conference with the enemy. Envoys communicating with the enemy traveled incessantly on the road between Xingji and Taiyuan. The responsible comrades of the Dare-to-Die Corps repeatedly stated: "We have come to cooperate with you to resist to the end, not to capitulate and compromise. We will oppose anyone who wants to capitulate and compromise." Because of this, Yan Xishan regarded the New Army as the greatest obstacle to his capitulation and compromise. Unable to subdue the Dare-to-Die Corps through persuasion or other methods, he resorted to his "cunning schemes," attempting to "shift" the New Army into "rebel troops" "imperceptibly" and carry out "punitive expeditions." This is the true content of the Western Shanxi Incident.

Yan's Troops and Japanese Troops Jointly Attack the Dare-to-Die Corps

Even considering the Western Shanxi Incident itself, it was Yan Xishan who first broke faith and launched the civil war. Yan Xishan had long harbored the intention of eliminating the New Army. By October 1939, he authorized Wang Jingguo, Chen Changjie, and others to prepare for an attack on the New Army. He also summoned anti-Communist generals one by one and told them that the influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army was growing daily, and with the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-Die Corps cooperating with them, his Jin-Sui Army would have no place to stand. Now their only option was to eliminate the New Army and the Sacrifice League, and adopt the method of Sino-Japanese collaboration proposed by Japan to achieve the goal of survival. One reactionary officer (Liu Wuming) asked how to proceed. Wang and Chen replied that they would first reorganize the Fourth Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps into the "Chinese Anti-Japanese Loyal and Brave Vanguard Army," then concentrate six armies in western Shanxi, in coordination with the Japanese invaders, to eliminate the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps, and subsequently, in coordination with the Japanese troops, eliminate the First and Third Columns. Sure enough, not long after, Yan Xishan appointed Chen Changjie as Commander-in-Chief of the "Bandit-Suppression" Army. On November 29, 1939 (nine days before the Western Shanxi Incident), Chen issued a secret order: to attack the New Army in three routes. The Southern Route Column consisted of the 61st Army, the 83rd Army, and the 73rd Division of the Security Army, etc., with Chen himself serving as commander, attacking Yiquan and Huangtu in Xi County (where the headquarters of the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps was located); the Northern Route Column, commanded by Liang Peihuang, led the 19th Army and part of the 33rd Army, attacking Shuitou, Shikou, and Damaijiao on the border of Xi County and Xiaoyi (where the Western Shanxi Detachment of the Eighth Route Army was located at the time); the Right Route Column, consisting of the New 1st Brigade, etc., commanded by Cui Daoxiu, attacked the Quanziping area of Xi County. At the same time, the enemy also concentrated over 5,000 troops garrisoned between Linfen and Pingyao in the Hanxinling area. Consequently, on December 1, 1939, Yan Xishan ordered the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps to launch a large-scale sabotage operation on the Tongpu Railway by December 5, implementing the so-called "Winter Offensive." Just as we were mobilizing our troops to carry out the sabotage order, Yan's troops and the Japanese troops simultaneously began their attack on us. Our Second Column found itself encircled and caught in a pincer attack by both Japanese and Yan's forces. The situation was extremely perilous, with the danger of total annihilation. If we did not act in self-defense, we would perish. We had no choice but to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat on one front, while being forced to defend ourselves against the old army on the other. After bitter fighting lasting over ten days, we finally broke through the encirclement by the Japanese invaders and the old army and moved into northwestern Shanxi. This is the so-called "mutiny of the Dare-to-Die Corps." Henceforth, the Dare-to-Die Corps was branded a "rebel army."

Who Exactly Are the Rebel Troops?

Who exactly are the rebel troops? Who colluded with the enemy invaders, opposed the people, sabotaged the war of resistance, and betrayed the nation? Was it the New Army, or was it Yan Xishan? The New Army has never opposed the people, regarding them as fierce tigers; nor has it participated in the traitorous and treasonous Linfen Conference or Anping Conference; nor has it dispatched Zhao Chengshou, Liang Yanwu, Wang Qianyuan, or anyone else to Taiyuan, Beiping, or Nanjing to pay homage to the enemy and the traitor Wang Jingwei; nor has it concluded any "on-the-spot agreement" with the enemy. It is precisely Yan Xishan himself who has done all these things. The issue is perfectly clear. Even Yan Xishan himself knows that the Dare-to-Die Corps is not a rebel army. Before 1939, he repeatedly praised the Dare-to-Die Corps, calling them revolutionary youth, saying all their methods were revolutionary, and lamenting that his old army was all muddle-headed, backward, and unprogressive, unable to measure up to the Dare-to-Die Corps—this need not even be mentioned. Even after the Western Shanxi Incident, he once said within a small circle of his "loyal comrades": "The Dare-to-Die Corps is revolutionary. They are the most resolute in resisting Japan," and "Bo Yibo is not a military man, but the troops they have trained can fight the enemy. This is because their methods are revolutionary and progressive." Why then does he still call the Dare-to-Die Corps a rebel army? The drinker's heart is not in the cup; his purpose is to use this as a pretext to cover up his own disgraceful acts of collaborating with the enemy, opposing the people, and opposing the Communists, and his true form as a traitor or quasi-traitor. It is not a matter of "Han Jun's mutiny" or a "conflict between the New Army and the old army," but a struggle between capitulation and resistance against capitulation, a struggle between splitting and unity, and between progress and retrogression. Facts speak louder than words; even if Yan Xishan had a hundred mouths, he could hardly quibble his way out.

This matter can be attested to not only by Bo Yibo, Han Jun, and other Communists and non-Communists working in the Dare-to-Die Corps and the Sacrifice League through our personal experience, but also by Mr. Xu Fanting, a senior member of the Kuomintang (he was the commander of the 1st Provisional Division appointed by Yan, and later the Commander-in-Chief of the New Army), who can also bear witness through his personal experience. More importantly, the common people throughout Shanxi Province can recount Yan's crimes to others as if enumerating their family treasures.

A manuscript of a news release exposing Yan Xishan's collaboration with the enemy and opposition to the Communists during the War of Resistance Against Japan, drafted by Bo Yibo and revised by Mao Zedong.