Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Directive on the Training and Consolidation of Troops[1]

(July 1, 1944)

1. Our entire army currently numbers 470,000. This is sufficient for persevering in and expanding base areas before the counteroffensive, but it is not sufficient for seizing large cities and key lines of communication during the counteroffensive, ultimately driving the Japanese aggressors out of China, and dealing with possible sudden domestic incidents instigated by the Kuomintang. To undertake the task of ultimately driving the enemy out of the large cities and key lines of communication and to cope with possible sudden incidents, nothing less than a military force one to several times the present size will be adequate. The enemy is now mounting large-scale offensives on the frontal battlefronts, and there have been certain temporary changes in the enemy situation facing some base areas; the good news of the opening of the Second Front in Europe can also boost the morale of the War of Resistance and deflate the arrogance of the enemy and puppets. These conditions all make it possible and necessary for us to expand our base areas and military strength behind enemy lines. However, first, our manpower, material resources, and financial capacity are still strictly limited at present; second, it is possible that the enemy will pull back troops from the frontal front to conduct "mopping-up" operations and transfer troops from Manchuria into the interior; third, our army has been engaged in dispersed guerrilla warfare for many years, with very little training, and is not yet consolidated. Therefore, large-scale expansion is currently neither possible nor appropriate. We should seize the present moment, and while dealing with enemy and puppet "mopping-up" and "nibbling" operations, developing guerrilla warfare deep into the enemy's rear areas, expanding our forces as much as possible, enlarging and consolidating base areas, and vigorously winning over the puppet troops, puppet police, and the broad masses in large cities and along key lines of communication, we must, within one year, intensify the training and consolidation of the existing troops. On the present material foundation and in the intervals between fighting and production, we must greatly elevate our army's military training and political work to prepare the conditions for future large-scale expansion. The central task at present is generally one of elevation, consolidation, and preparing the conditions for future large-scale expansion.

If we fail to accomplish this task, our future large-scale expansion and our task of driving the enemy out of the large cities will be impeded.

2. Therefore, we propose to you that within one year, under conditions that do not impede combat and production, each bureau and each committee should formulate an overall plan, to be implemented by the military regions and military sub-districts, utilizing every possible interval to train and consolidate the troops in rotation. Where conditions are particularly favorable, training and consolidation may be carried out by concentrating several regiments or one regiment as a unit in batches; where such conditions do not exist, training and consolidation may be carried out by concentrating battalions or companies as units in batches. The overall aim is that within one year, the entire Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army shall undergo one effective large-scale training and consolidation.

3. The content of the training and consolidation shall encompass both military and political aspects. Military training and consolidation means troop training, and it also involves summarizing the experience of leading troops, employing troops, and sustaining troops (leading troops means management, employing troops means commanding operations, sustaining troops means production and supply). The content of troop training shall focus primarily on technical skills, supplemented by tactics. The method of troop training shall involve launching a mass movement, with all officers, soldiers, support personnel, and non-military personnel who can participate all taking part; identifying skilled individuals (training heroes) from among the soldiers to educate the masses of soldiers, with officers who are less skilled than soldiers first learning from the training heroes, and then educating the soldiers. Regularly summarize experience, elect model learners, and convene conferences of training heroes and model learners at the sub-district or regimental level. Break with the old stereotyped methods of troop training. The large-scale winter training conducted in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region last year adopted this method and achieved tremendous results. The Military Commission has issued separate directives on this experience.

4. During the one-year period of training and consolidation, political work must undergo a universal, thorough, and planned transformation. In accordance with the Gutian Resolution and Comrade Tan Zheng's report, the goal of transforming political work shall be achieved through the methods of reviewing shortcomings and errors, giving full play to fine achievements, promoting the experience of model companies, and commending combat heroes, labor heroes, model workers, and model learners. Political work must guarantee the completion of the entire task of training and consolidation.

5. You are requested to submit the task of the one-year large-scale training and consolidation to the relevant military organs and political work organs for study, and to provide opinions to the Central Military Commission. Take July of this year as the preparation period, begin in August, carry out the training and consolidation in stages, and complete the task within one year. However, the main forces must seize the winter period for training

and consolidation (four months from November this year to February next year). In August, September, and October, armed work teams, guerrilla units, and a small portion of the main forces must be trained to prepare to take over the training and consolidation duties of the main forces. Furthermore, under the principle of reducing the people's burden by 10 to 20 percent, some new recruits must also be supplemented to fill out the companies and prepare to cope with new changes next year.


6. In order to prepare for expanding our army by one to several times when conditions mature in the future, the training of large numbers of cadres should attract the great attention of Party committees at all levels and military and political work organs at all levels. At present, whether in the main forces, the guerrilla units, or the militia and self-defense forces, the technical and tactical proficiency of our cadres, and their ability to train, lead, employ, and sustain troops, are generally very inadequate, and in some cases very low; their political understanding and political work generally have shortcomings, and in some cases are very poor. If they are not promptly trained and consolidated, this will inevitably impede the execution of major tasks in the future. But at the same time, whether in our main forces and guerrilla units, or in the militia and self-defense forces, there are contained vast numbers of brave, intelligent cadres and soldiers with great potential for development. Our cadres and the entire army have tremendous achievements, and the inadequacy of the cadres' level and certain backwardness can be overcome. During the one-year period of training and consolidation, each bureau, each committee, and each military region and military sub-district should have a practical plan for training cadres, to be implemented respectively at the military region, military sub-district, and county levels.

At the military region level, there should be branch schools of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, providing rotational training for military and political cadres at and above the company commander and company political instructor level, and training cadres from local Party, government, and mass work who are preparing to transfer to the army for work at or above the company level. Furthermore, ordinary secondary schools and above should also add military education courses. At the military sub-district level, training teams should be established for the purpose of training two categories of cadres: squad leaders and platoon leaders in the army, and platoon leaders in the militia and self-defense forces. The former should include rotational training for platoon leaders and squad leaders from the main forces and guerrilla units, and training for cadres from local Party, government, and mass work who are preparing to transfer to the army for work as squad leaders and platoon leaders, with the duration to be determined by each locality. The latter should last one to two months, after which they are sent back to their local areas for work. At the county level, training teams for squad leader-level cadres of the militia and self-defense forces should be established, with rotational training lasting one month before returning to their home townships, thereby creating cadres for the broad masses' armed forces. Each locality should create its own diverse training methods, utilizing the intervals between combat and production to conduct them.

7. You are requested to submit the task of the one-year large-scale training and consolidation to the relevant military organs and political work organs for study, formulate plans, and begin implementation. In order to transform this plan for one-year large-scale training and consolidation into a movement enthusiastically participated in by the masses and to achieve practical results, it is necessary to explain the importance of this task and the methods for its practice thoroughly at a meeting of senior Party, government, and military cadres encompassing the entire base area. After the meeting, following the example of the Senior Cadres' Conference in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region last winter, all senior cadres, regardless of civil or military status, must participate without exception, undergoing drill for five to seven days (those in very poor physical condition may observe from the sidelines), thereby creating the determination and upsurge for the large-scale training and consolidation. It must also be noted that although the time is set for one year, the main focus should be on seizing the four months from November this winter to February next spring as the central pivotal period for training and consolidation. In the three months of August, September, and October this autumn, a portion of the armed work teams, a portion of the guerrilla units, and a portion of the main forces must be trained well, preparing them to take over from other units in the winter for concentrated training and consolidation in stages. The plan for the rotational training of the militia and self-defense forces in stages is to be determined by you.

8. Furthermore, under the principles of developing military, Party, and government public production, reducing the people's burden by 10 to 20 percent (using the 1943 burden as the standard), paying close attention to protecting able-bodied men, and conserving the people's strength, a certain number of new recruits should be absorbed as appropriate according to the needs of each locality, to replenish the attrition in the companies and maintain the total strength of the army in each strategic area. If, at the end of the one-year training and consolidation period, our army can maintain a total strength of 470,000 to 500,000 and has also undergone one large-scale training and consolidation, that will be considered a very great success. Furthermore, the policy of training and consolidation and improving the quality of the troops put forward in this directive must not be misinterpreted as relaxing the streamlining of the upper and middle-level structures, nor should it be misinterpreted as intending to change the current dispersed guerrilla character of the troops. It must be understood that the policy of streamlining and the policy of dispersed guerrilla warfare remain absolutely necessary in the current period.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

July 1

--- Notes

[1] This is an inner-Party directive drafted and revised by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.