I. Summary of One Year's Experience in the Border Region Armed Forces (Omitted)

II. On Enhancing Achievements in Political Work and Rectifying Its Shortcomings

Ever since the Communist Party of China participated in and led China's national democratic revolution, and since it participated in and led the revolutionary armed forces fighting for this national democratic revolution, it has established and developed revolutionary political work within the armed forces. The basic principle of this political work is to educate the armed forces with the program of the national democratic revolution, to imbue them with the spirit of the people's revolution, to foster unity within the revolutionary armed forces, to align the revolutionary armed forces with the revolutionary people and the revolutionary government, to ensure the revolutionary armed forces fully submit to the political leadership of the revolutionary party, to enhance the fighting capacity of the armed forces, and to carry out efforts to disintegrate enemy forces and assist friendly forces, thereby achieving the unity of oneself, the defeat of the enemy, and the liberation of the nation and the people. This is the fundamental distinction between our armed forces and other armed forces. When we say that the revolutionary political work led by the Communist Party is the lifeline of the revolutionary armed forces, this is precisely what we mean. When such revolutionary political work is combined with revolutionary military work, it constitutes the entirety of the work of the revolutionary armed forces. During the Northern Expedition, the political work guided by Communists in the National Revolutionary Army was conducted in this manner. During the periods of the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan, the political work guided by our Party in the former Red Army and the current Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army has been carried out even more in this way. The military and political work performed by Communists in the revolutionary armed forces during these three periods has all yielded results. For the first time in Chinese history, an armed force that wholeheartedly supports the interests of the people emerged. If our armed forces did not have the leadership of the Communist Party, if they did not have the revolutionary military work and revolutionary political work led by the Communist Party, this would be unimaginable. Without the leadership of the Communist Party, there could be no military and political work that wholeheartedly supports the interests of the people, and without an armed force possessing such military and political work, it could not be an armed force that wholeheartedly supports the people's interests. The fundamental reason why the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have been able to persist so valiantly, struggle arduously, make repeated efforts, and remain indomitable in the War of Resistance Against Japan lies precisely here. This revolutionary political work has not only been carried out by political workers in our armed forces; many military workers and other personnel have also participated in it. Similarly, many political workers have also taken part in military work. This was the case during the civil war period and remains so during the War of Resistance.

Speaking of the civil war period, our armed forces were in a phase of creation in the early stage, a phase of development in the middle stage, and encountered some setbacks but also achieved certain results in the later stage. Particularly in the early and middle stages of the civil war, in the political work of combating the enemy, and in the political work of coordinating relations between the armed forces and the Party, between the armed forces and the government, between officers and soldiers, between the armed forces and the people, between superiors and subordinates, between military work and political work, and fostering friendly relations among various units of the armed forces—in short, in the work of uniting oneself and defeating the enemy—there were many innovations, to the extent that they still form part of the fine traditions of our armed forces today.

Speaking of the period of the War of Resistance, the early stage was dynamic and vibrant, with great achievements. During this period, under the leadership of the Party, the entire Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army developed anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, expanded the anti-Japanese armed forces, rallied the broad masses of the people around themselves, recovered vast stretches of lost territory, established numerous anti-Japanese democratic base areas, resisted a large number of national enemies, and were thus able to assist the Kuomintang forces holding the front lines in halting the enemy's strategic offensive, safeguarding the Chinese nation from being defeated by Japanese imperialism. All of this was done very well and very correctly. In the middle stage of the War of Resistance, especially in recent years, the entire armed forces have continued to implement the Party's line and many of its policies, enabling them to resist 58% of the Japanese invading forces in China and 90% of the puppet troops, to smash the enemy and puppet forces' countless and brutal repeated "mopping-up" campaigns, to effectively counter their so-called "Three Alls Policy" of killing all, looting all, and burning all, to recapture much of the Chinese territory retaken by the enemy, to endure unprecedented hardships without government support, lacking weapons, ammunition, medicine, food, and clothing, and yet to persist on the most important and powerful anti-Japanese front on the Chinese mainland for the Chinese nation and the Allied nations. All of this has also been done very well and very correctly.

In summary, whether during the civil war period or the War of Resistance period, the achievements of the entire armed forces have been great, and the achievements of the political work in the armed forces have also been great. Those engaged in political work in the armed forces, like those engaged in military work and logistical work, are fully deserving of credit and have made glorious contributions to the Chinese people.

However, our political work (here we speak only of political work) has had and continues to have shortcomings. We should adopt an attitude of self-criticism, examine these shortcomings, and overcome them, with the aim of defeating the enemy and overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

For example, when we mention the traditions in political work, some comrades often harbor a vague notion, seeming to believe that everything in our political work tradition is good. Consequently, they inevitably regard certain undesirable elements and certain things that are unsuited to the current circumstances of our armed forces as unalterable truths, upholding them as so-called fine traditions. Meanwhile, many truly valuable experiences and genuinely fine traditions accumulated in the history of political work are neglected or dismissed.

Our political work during the later period of the civil war exhibited such conditions. On the positive side, the political work of this period implemented policies opposing the enemies of the people and achieved many results, primarily manifested in the struggle against the enemy, such as encouraging officers and soldiers to fight heroically and winning over prisoners of war. It also achieved results in uniting the internal forces of the armed forces and uniting the people, such as recruiting people into the armed forces and making the armed forces more orderly. The many effective political education and cultural education efforts within the armed forces, as well as the many good initiatives in work among the populace (these achievements were mainly evident in the Central Soviet Area and the armed forces in several other regions; in certain other armed forces, due to the absolutely erroneous political leadership and leadership in political work by some individual comrades, not only were such achievements absent, but existing achievements were actually destroyed). However, on the negative side, several incorrect styles of work emerged, namely, a dogmatic style in political work (this dogmatic style also existed in military work, especially in military education, but we will not elaborate on it here). The most typical manifestation of this dogmatism in our work is a fondness for empty talk, detachment from reality; an emphasis on form over content; and rallying a minority while alienating the majority. The reason why some comrades, to varying degrees, fall into such errors lies in their subjectivist and dogmatic methodology. The expression of this methodology is that, on many occasions, they act solely on subjective conjectures, ignoring the realities of the Chinese revolution and the actual conditions of the armed forces at the time, mechanically transplanting foreign experiences, inappropriately emphasizing the regularization of the armed forces at that time, and severing our armed forces' history of struggle. These comrades like to emphasize verbally and formally the so-called leading role of the proletariat, yet in practice, they slacken in the ideological remolding and education of people from peasant and petty-bourgeois backgrounds with proletarian ideology (i.e., Marxism-Leninism). They fail to genuinely value or stress the basic ideas that our armed forces should earnestly advocate and truly practice, such as genuine unity between the armed forces and the Party, between the armed forces and the government, between the armed forces and the people, between officers and soldiers, between superiors and subordinates, between military work and political work, and among various units of the armed forces. Instead of seriously and earnestly making these ideas the basic content and fundamental direction of political work, they treat these basic contents and directions as matters of little importance while valuing and emphasizing formally many things that should not be valued or emphasized.

If this style of work develops further, the inevitable result will be a situation where the task of winning over the masses is somewhat neglected. The three major tasks of the armed forces, the Three Rules of Discipline, and the Eight Points of Attention have their formulations changed or are deemed unnecessary. The work of fostering unity within the armed forces is also somewhat relaxed. Efforts to cultivate close relations between the Party, the government, the armed forces, and the people are no longer vigorously pursued. The armed forces show disrespect toward the Party and the government; incidents of the armed forces beating and scolding civilians and infringing upon their interests, as well as incidents of officers beating and scolding soldiers within the armed forces, persist without effective redress. Friendly relations among various units of the armed forces also weaken; mountain-stronghold mentality and departmentalism grow stealthily and intensify. Due to the growth of mountain-stronghold mentality and departmentalism, one part of the armed forces may fail to consider another part; main-force units may disregard local forces and the militia; model units may neglect backward units. Consequently, among a number of comrades in the main-force units (including comrades in military, political, and logistical work), a sense of arrogance develops, marked by self-righteousness, superciliousness, a fondness for recounting achievements and an aversion to discussing shortcomings, a love for hearing flattery and a dislike for criticism, fear of others' criticism, and fear of engaging in self-criticism. In some cases, this even evolves into the deplorable phenomenon of asserting independence from the leadership organs of the Party and higher authorities. Some of these conditions changed during the War of Resistance period, some first developed and then changed during this period, and some remain unchanged to this day.

In inner-Party life, during the later period of the civil war, a policy of excessive struggle was widely adopted, lacking the spirit of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient. Inner-Party life within the armed forces also experienced this abnormality, leading to many comrades who should not have been attacked being wrongly subjected to criticism. This situation changed during the War of Resistance period, but its remnants have not been eliminated, and there have been several instances of mistakenly attacking comrades who should not have been attacked.

Regarding the relationship between military work and political work, although it was fundamentally united, there were some instances of discord. In the later period of the civil war, the political commissar system was inappropriately emphasized, the status and authority of political work were inappropriately stressed, and in practice, an undue emphasis was placed on the so-called differences in Party spirit between military workers and political workers. The lack of advocacy for a spirit of cooperation between military workers and political workers was one of the sources of this discord. However, this discord cannot be entirely blamed on the political workers; at times, military workers also bear responsibility.

In the early stage of the War of Resistance, there was a temporary accommodation of the Kuomintang, leading to the abolition of the political commissar system and a lowering of the status of political work. This was erroneous. Later, this was corrected, the political commissar system was restored, and the status of political work was elevated, which was entirely correct. Political work in any unit of the revolutionary armed forces should have its appropriate status and should be appropriately emphasized; otherwise, the work of that unit will suffer. In units where political work is relatively weak, such emphasis is especially necessary.

Excessive emphasis on the status of political work is incorrect, but a lack of necessary emphasis and a lack of necessary status are also incorrect.

The direction of the entire armed forces is the direction of political work. Therefore, the tasks of political work can only be defined based on the basic tasks of our armed forces (struggling against imperialism and feudalism; struggling for war, production, and mass work, etc.) and the current specific tasks (such as countering mopping-up operations, countering encroachment, production campaigns, consolidation campaigns, preventing espionage, rectifying the three styles, unifying leadership, better troops and simpler administration, supporting the army and cherishing the people, improving relations between the armed forces and the Party, between the armed forces and the government, between the armed forces and the people, between officers and soldiers, between superiors and subordinates, and among various units of the armed forces, etc., with specific arrangements made according to current needs). There cannot be so-called independent tasks of political work beyond the basic tasks of our armed forces and the current specific tasks. Political work is about educating the armed forces with revolutionary spirit, ensuring the completion of these tasks ideologically, politically, and organizationally. If one emphasizes the independence and particularity of political work in this regard, separating the tasks of political work from the overall tasks of the armed forces, that would be incorrect and would become the reason for inconsistency between the objectives of political work and military work, causing political work to become detached from reality and appear hollow. Any organizational form, mode of work, or method of work arises from circumstances and tasks, is subordinate to specific circumstances and tasks, and should change according to changes in circumstances and tasks. The organizational forms, modes of work, and methods of political work are no exception. Thus, if we discuss the organizational forms, modes of work, and methods of political work in isolation from the specific tasks of the armed forces, separating these forms, modes, and methods from the specific tasks of the entire armed forces and treating them as absolute, it will inevitably turn into dogmatism and formalism. On this issue, some comrades in the past lacked a clear understanding. If such conditions still exist today, they should be rectified.

It should be pointed out that all the above-mentioned shortcomings, whether during the civil war period or the War of Resistance Against Japan, were not equally present in every unit. Their severity and extent varied, just as the fine achievements and fine traditions of various units also had their own characteristics and differed from one another. Our army has always been a revolutionary army, and its shortcomings are like occasional ailments in a healthy person, which can soon be cured.

It should also be pointed out that these shortcomings cannot all be attributed to dogmatism. The particular environment of the Chinese revolution (the vast presence of the petty bourgeoisie and the rural base areas long divided by the enemy) constituted the objective cause. The existence of dogmatic ideas and their not having been eliminated, together with the inadequacy of our educational work, were the subjective causes. Since the rectification of the three styles and the implementation of various reforms in 1942, these shortcomings have gradually diminished, and in some units where the rectification was thorough, they have become even fewer.

It should also be pointed out that the dogmatism in the army was closely related to the dogmatism in the Party leadership during the latter period of the civil war. If it had not been for the dogmatism of the Party leadership at that time, the army, on its own, would not have developed serious dogmatism to such an extent.

It should also be pointed out that when we examine the shortcomings and mistakes in our work, we should not focus on the responsibility of certain individual comrades but on summing up historical experience as a guide for future work. We should also bear in mind that our army work and the work of summing up army political work are both advancing, and the thinking and understanding of our comrades engaged in military work, political work, and logistics work are also advancing. Some comrades who have made mistakes have either already made progress, are in the process of doing so, or will make progress once the mistakes are pointed out. In accordance with the Central Committee’s policy of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient, we should unit all comrades engaged in military, political, and logistics work, regardless of their differences, to work together.

But we should make our comrades deeply understand that if we fail to proceed from the actualities of the Chinese revolution and the specific tasks of the Chinese revolutionary army, and if we commit the mistake of subjectivism and dogmatism, we will be unable to educate the army with a high revolutionary spirit, unable to consolidate the relations between the army and the Party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, and between officers and men, and unable to overcome the abnormal relations between higher and lower ranks in the army, between political work and military work, between different army units, and between the army and the local authorities. Nor will we be able to overcome the harmful tendencies of warlordism, departmentalism, and mountain-stronghold mentality. Conversely, if we truly understand the methodology of Marxism-Leninism, if we are good at proceeding from the actualities of the Chinese revolution and the specific tasks of the Chinese army, good at investigation and study, and good at maintaining close ties with the masses, then we can accomplish the entire task of political work (as well as military and logistics work) and achieve the aim of uniting ourselves and defeating the enemy. The experience of the Chinese revolution—the experience of the Northern Expedition, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan—all testifies to this conclusion.

The experience of protracted revolutionary struggles proves that the task of our army is not just a purely military task of fighting the enemy. This was already clearly stipulated in the Gutian Resolution of the Fourth Army. Owing to the special circumstances of our army, during the civil war we set three major tasks for the army: fighting, raising funds, and conducting mass work. Naturally, fighting was given first place, and in time of war everything else was subordinated to it. But to abandon the other two tasks would not have suited our circumstances. In the early and middle periods of the civil war, our army carried out these three major tasks arduously but gloriously. That is to say, before the establishment of base areas, it assisted local Party and government organizations in establishing them, and after they were established, it helped them consolidate these base areas. These tasks remained unchanged during the War of Resistance Against Japan. As everyone knows, if the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had not assisted the local people and the local Party and government organizations in northern and central China in setting up anti-Japanese democratic base areas, how could such a powerful national enemy—with 58 per cent of all the Japanese troops invading China and 90 per cent of all the puppet troops falling on the shoulders of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies—and such a long and arduous war have been sustained? However, in the period of the War of Resistance, the method of raising funds was changed; we set the army the task of engaging in production so as to improve its living conditions and lighten the burden on the people in the base areas. Thus, the three major tasks of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies today are warfare, production, and mass work. To reduce these three tasks to one single task of fighting would be inappropriate to our special circumstances.

In order to unite ourselves and defeat the enemy and fulfil the three major tasks of the army, we must revive the spirit of the Three Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, as instituted in the past. Relations between the army and the Party, between the army and the government, between officers and men, between the army and the people, between higher and lower ranks, between military and political work, and among the various army units must be improved in every way and placed on a firm foundation. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all other units must unconditionally accept the political leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its representative bodies, so that the army will not go astray and will attain the goal of uniting the people and the army of the whole country to defeat Japanese imperialism.

Within the revolutionary army, the guiding principle must be unity, co-operation, and mutual assistance, not division into separate groups each going its own way, not mutual contempt or obstruction. In a revolutionary army, under the unified leadership of the Party, comrades engaged in military, political, and logistics work, while stressing that they should specialize in their respective duties and that any neglect of them would constitute a wrong tendency, should also be encouraged to engage in political work and participate in it; and comrades engaged in political work should study military and logistics work and be ready, when needed, to join in military and logistics work or even to change their present posts to do military or logistics work. And as for the relations between military and political work, co-operation should be stressed. True, these are different kinds of work, each with its own specific content, and that is precisely why they are distinguished. But they all serve the single aim of uniting ourselves and defeating the enemy, and their successful execution requires harmonious co-operation. Therefore, whatever helps to consolidate such co-operation should be commended, and whatever hinders it should be criticized and condemned.

Under the general policy of uniting ourselves and defeating the enemy, controversies inside the revolutionary army should only be principled debates about ideological trends and policy orientations, only debates aimed at overcoming incorrect principles with correct ones; and they should take place only insofar as they help consolidate the Party's leadership, strengthen relations between officers and men, between the army and the people, and other relations, and thereby enhance the army’s combat effectiveness and achieve the aim of uniting ourselves to defeat the enemy. Any debate at all should be conducted entirely under the unified leadership of the Party. Any debate or antagonism that to any degree departs from this standpoint is unprincipled and should not be allowed to exist.

In our army we should advocate simultaneously the policy of respecting cadres of worker and peasant origin and respecting cadres of intellectual origin, respecting veteran cadres and respecting new cadres, and we should bring about a good integration of these cadres. People should be made to understand the strong points of worker and peasant cadres. Our army has a large number of worker and peasant cadres, who have historically formed a key part of the leading core of the army. This is precisely one of our army’s strong points and characteristics (the same is true in Party, government, and militia work). The overwhelming majority of them are loyal, steadfast, and especially capable of bearing hardships and fighting heroically. The thinking that belittles worker and peasant cadres is incorrect. But at the same time, people should be made to understand the strong points of revolutionary intellectuals. If large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals had not joined our army, it would have been impossible to unite ourselves and defeat the enemy. The overwhelming majority of them are also loyal and steadfast, and their shortcomings can be overcome through training and tempering (especially through practical work). The thinking that belittles intellectuals is likewise incorrect (the same is true in Party work, government work, mass work, and cultural and educational work). Both worker and peasant cadres and intellectual cadres have their own shortcomings; neither should be arrogant, but each should learn from the strong points of the other and overcome their own shortcomings.

The veteran cadres in the army are the main backbone of the army; without them we could not have so strong an army. Therefore, we should respect veteran cadres, and the view that belittles them is mistaken. But at the same time we should respect new cadres, for they are the fresh blood of our army; without them, our army could not develop and grow. The view that belittles new cadres is also mistaken. New and veteran cadres should respect and help each other and, in particular, the veteran cadres should show, at all times and in all places, an attitude of welcome and respect for new cadres, so as to facilitate the absorption of new cadres from all quarters into our anti-Japanese army and to strengthen our anti-Japanese forces.

Cadres transferred from local work to the army—new and old, of worker and peasant origin and of intellectual origin—are a major source for expanding army cadres. We should adopt an attitude of respect, welcome, and earnest cooperation with them. It is only natural that they may be unaccustomed and unskilled in their work when they first come, and we should be good at helping them.

In our army, incorrect views do exist on questions concerning the relations between worker and peasant cadres on the one hand and intellectual cadres on the other, between veteran and new cadres, and between the original army cadres and the cadres newly arrived from local work, and the sectarian views on these questions should be corrected.

In the political education of the army, we must both distinguish and unify the cultivation of a deep hatred for the enemy with the winning over of enemy captives. Without the former, we cannot boost the morale of an army that presses forward without regard for any obstacle and fights to the death to destroy the enemy. Without the latter, we cannot disintegrate the enemy troops. We should make our commanders and fighters understand that in battle we must concentrate all our force to crush the enemy and compel them to surrender; if they refuse to surrender, we must resolutely annihilate them or take them captive. This is the revolutionary spirit of an army that presses forward without regard for any obstacle and fights to the death to destroy the enemy; this revolutionary spirit is an extremely precious historical tradition of our army and should be vigorously promoted and developed. However, once the battle is over, our policy towards captives is different. Here we should adopt the attitude of persuasion, winning them over through ideological education, material treatment, and political attitude, turning our pre-battle and in-battle propaganda towards the enemy into reality, so as to disintegrate the enemy ranks. To use an old Chinese saying, the former attitude may be called “the way of dominance” (revolutionary dominance), and the latter “the way of kingship” (revolutionary kingship). To apply the former attitude to the latter situation is wrong. To distinguish between these two attitudes and at the same time to develop both—this is precisely our historical tradition, and we should carry it forward even more vigorously in the future.

If we use “the way of dominance” against the enemy, then against our comrades, soldiers, people, and friends we use “the way of kingship.” Towards the former it is a matter of striking down and destroying; towards the latter, it is a matter of respecting and persuading. To fail to distinguish between the two, or to apply the attitude appropriate towards the enemy ever so slightly in error towards comrades, soldiers, the people, or friends, would be to commit a most serious mistake. To draw a strict distinction between these two attitudes is precisely our historical tradition, and it should also be carried forward even more vigorously in the future.

In our army, the relative proportion of military education to political education should be determined according to the specific conditions of the unit. According to specific needs, emphasis may be put on one or the other at a given period. For example, when political education is particularly lacking in a unit, it is absolutely necessary to devote more time and effort to stressing it. But generally speaking, in allocating the time between the two, military training should take a larger share, political and cultural education a smaller share. The time for military training must not be taken up by many unnecessary and tedious meetings and reports; many political education tasks and political work meetings should be conducted in the odd moments available. This allocation of time must never be misinterpreted as diminishing the importance of political work. On the contrary, we hold that political work is the lifeline of our army; without it, an army would not be a true revolutionary army. We must make people understand that earnest political work is of great significance and that any view which belittles political work is wrong. However, in some units today, political education, cultural education, and other political work activities take up too much time, reducing the time for military training, and this should be corrected.

In the proportion of political education to cultural education in the military, political education should take first place, with cultural education coming second, so as to enhance the troops' political morale, political awareness, and political quality. However, the cultural level of the revolutionary army must be raised, and we must not mistakenly believe that politics alone suffices without culture. We can and should use various intervals of opportunity to carry out literacy campaigns and other cultural activities. In the case of the garrison troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, there are greater possibilities for cultural education, and more effort should be devoted to it.

Our army is a people's army, one that wholeheartedly upholds the interests of the people, with workers and peasants as its basic components. Yet we absolutely do not reject those from landlord, rich peasant, or capitalist class backgrounds who sincerely wish to devote themselves to the War of Resistance Against Japan and sincerely obey the leadership of the Communist Party, allowing them to join our army. These individuals may have shortcomings, even serious ones, and those shortcomings are wrong, but they can be corrected. We should not exclude or discriminate against them; instead, we should welcome them, trust and respect them, struggle alongside them, and gradually help them overcome their shortcomings in the course of that struggle.

Regarding loafers (hooligans) in the army, we should adopt the same policy of reform and persuasion as we do for loafers in civilian areas. Allowing loafers' habits to persist is wrong, and simply excluding or purging loafers is also wrong. The vast majority of loafers can be transformed into good people through education, provided our policies and methods do not err.

In the work of reforming backward elements, we must primarily employ patient methods of persuasion and strictly prohibit the use of purely punitive measures. The problem of deserters cannot be solved by punitive measures alone; we must use educational and persuasive methods, and the execution of deserters must be absolutely forbidden. In this regard, heartfelt conversations conducted by commanding officers from a standpoint of care and concern are most effective. Such conversations must be integrated with self-examination and self-education among the masses to yield greater results. Simple punitive measures, or even methods like beating and scolding, are merely approaches that alienate the masses and are completely ineffective. Beating, scolding, and corporal punishment must be abolished in the army, and the resolutions of the Gutian Conference of December 1929 must be resolutely implemented. We must ensure that diligent, sincere, and well-intentioned educational and persuasive work, grounded in the standpoints of care and concern and of curing diseases to save lives, replaces abusive language and corporal punishment (beatings) and replaces purely punitive methods. Moreover, necessary punishment methods beyond abusive language and corporal punishment—that is, legitimate punitive measures that are absolutely necessary according to the actual situation—must also be reduced to a bare minimum. Punitive methods shall never be lightly employed except when absolutely necessary.

Regarding secret societies and bandits, we should also adopt a policy of gradually and systematically persuading and reforming them; a policy of simple exclusion and suppression is inappropriate. Only when we have exhausted all efforts to win them over and certain secret societies or bandits still firmly side with the enemy and oppose us may we resort to some form of striking measure. However, after such strikes, we must follow up with further efforts to win them over.

During the War of Resistance, various political tasks—such as political work in the struggle against the enemy and puppet forces, political work to win over enemy and puppet prisoners, political work by armed work teams, political work to rally the broad masses to join the army, political work to organize militia and guerrilla units, political work to unite the broad masses with the army, political work to organize militia and guerrilla units, political work to unite the broad intelligentsia with the army, political work to unite the landlord and capitalist classes to fight alongside us in the war, political work to unite ethnic minorities, and other work that has achieved results—should all be continued and carried forward as long as they hold positive significance.

If ideological deviations arise in our units regarding the above issues, they must be corrected.

Additionally, within the political work of our army (and also in military work), there are several other defects that, though mentioned earlier, were not emphasized clearly and need to be clarified here. These defects do not exist to the same extent or with equal severity in every unit; the troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region have already undergone considerable reform over the past year. Yet these defects are so conspicuous and so striking that we must bring them up for analysis, in hopes of awakening comrades' attention and thoroughly overcoming them.

What are these defects? The first defect is formalism. It often happens that when some comrades draft work plans, their plans are formulaic essays applicable anywhere and at any time. They know only the set of old formulas they are accustomed to and fail to understand that changes must be made according to changing circumstances. This is a type of formalism.

In our political education (and to some extent in military education as well), what we teach does not always align with what the soldiers need. For instance, some comrades especially like to discuss international and domestic grand situations in front of the soldiers but are unwilling to discuss the grand situations of the local area, their own army, their own company, and their own platoon. They ignore these concrete matters, which they themselves understand best and which the soldier masses most need and welcome, preferring instead to deliver large quantities of abstract concepts to the soldiers. Again, some comrades often like to teach soldiers in vain to observe discipline, to serve as models, to be brave and resolute, but are unwilling to recount real, vivid, and moving exemplary figures and heroic deeds to them. They act as if such things hold no value for teaching and only vast concepts are priceless treasures. Under such circumstances, the content of education is dogmatic, and so too are the teaching methods, study methods, and testing methods. The instructors, regardless of whether the learners understand, simply keep teaching in order to "fulfill the plan." The learners, in turn, can only treat listening to lectures as a burden, as a chore, going through the motions without ever knowing to connect it to themselves or engage in self-reflection. During tests, only the scores of questions and answers are calculated, without examining actual conduct. This situation exists in many units. In these units, this applies not only to the education of soldiers but also to the education of Party members; not only to political education but also to cultural education. The formalistic style of emphasizing form over content has become a serious defect in our propaganda and education work. As for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, this situation improved greatly in 1943, yet it has not been thoroughly resolved in the thinking of cadres.

The work of some of our Party branches also suffers from the defect of formalism. When some comrades inspect branch work or discuss it, and when a branch secretary lays out his tasks, the very first item announced is meetings and reports, called "establishing a meeting system" and "establishing a reporting system." Those who implement meetings and reports well are deemed "models," and those who do not are not, as if meetings and reports were the center, everything. As a result, branches are busy holding meetings, and Party members are busy attending them, with the result that everyone comes to detest meetings. Why is this so? Because such meetings are devoid of content and dull and insipid. The soldiers detest these reports because they mostly involve finding fault with the soldiers in a negative way, reflecting so-called "grumbling," thus arousing dissatisfaction among the masses. Such so-called meetings and reports only cause the branch committee to become detached from the Party members and the Party members to become detached from the masses. Branch work like this has no way of being done well; this too is a type of formalism.

If political work is not carried out with different content and different forms according to the specific function of each unit (infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, medical corps, transport corps, etc.) and the characteristics of each mission (combat, training, production, mass work, etc.), but instead the same sort of political work is done for everything, then that is a very severe type of formalism. This kind of formalism exists in some units and is the reason why political work in those units lacks vitality.

The systems for writing reports and filling out forms in some units have similar problems. For example, higher-level organs stipulate numerous report items and form formats, rigidly demanding that lower levels (especially battalions and companies) compile and fill them out. Under such demands, the lower levels can only exhaust themselves to write them up and fill them in. Yet the content of these materials is mostly stereotyped and of little practical use, merely wasting effort. After receiving such materials, higher authorities often pile them up without analysis or sorting, so they turn into waste paper and become useless. This too is a type of formalism.

Many of the organizational forms in our army do not meet actual needs. For instance, some political work organs are divided into numerous departments and sections, gathering many people in the offices, with the result that the more personnel there are, the less work gets done; much of the busyness involves trivial formal tasks, while genuine leadership work is done even less. Similarly, things like work networks in companies, ten-man groups, youth corps, and political fighters have become outwardly pleasing but actually useless formalities.

In sum, all work forms and organizational forms that do not meet actual needs and exist merely for show belong to this category. This is the first defect.

The second defect is egalitarianism. Here we refer to the fact that when some comrades draft work plans, they do not know how to grasp the central task; when inspecting work, they do not know how to find typical examples; and when solving problems, they do not know where to begin at a crucial juncture. As a result, many of their plans often try to cover everything, leaving nothing out. Even routine tasks that have long become daily habits are included in so-called plans, lumping together trivial matters with key issues. Such a confused and unfocused so-called "work plan" completely loses the meaning of a work plan. Comrades in some units do not understand that over a certain period, there should be only one central task required by the situation at hand, with several other indispensable tasks subordinate to it. Instead, they simultaneously launch many tasks, hoping to achieve results in all of them. The outcome, however, is that not a single task is carried out thoroughly, and satisfactory results are achieved in none. When inspecting work, some of our comrades may visit every company and examine every item of political work. But what is the result? They still fail to discover problems or analyze them, turning the effort into empty words. All this constitutes very serious egalitarianism. The egalitarian method of work stems from the desire to do everything well, but in the end, nothing is done well. This egalitarian method, like formalism, is subjectivist in nature, because it proceeds from subjective assumptions rather than the actual needs of the work.

The third defect is emphasizing slogans while neglecting organization, substituting general slogans for concrete guidance—in other words, empty shouting. We have seen some comrades put forward inappropriate slogans without assessing the nature of the work there or taking into account the mood of the masses. What they call for is not what that unit actually needs. Even when the slogans are correct, we have also seen some comrades fail to take responsibility for the slogans they issue. After the first slogan is issued, a second one follows right away. There, much work revolves around slogans and remains forever stuck at the slogan stage; many tasks often have a beginning but no end. This whole attitude of trifling with work only damages prestige and yields no results whatsoever. In contrast, we should follow the principle of "leading cadres taking responsibility, doing things personally, combining the leading backbone with the broad masses, and combining general slogans with concrete guidance." Once a slogan is put forward, we should organize its implementation and, in the course of implementation, break through at one point to gain experience and guide the rest. Without concrete guidance, so-called general slogans amount to canceling them out ourselves.

The fourth shortcoming is the isolationism of some comrades. It is not that others isolate us, but that we isolate ourselves. These comrades, first of all, do not regard political work as mass work; they do not proceed from a mass perspective, do not adopt the mass line, and do not organize mass action. They would rather lock political work within a narrow circle, with only a few political workers engaged and busy while the broad masses remain idle. Many matters can and should be handled in coordination with comrades in military work, but we are unwilling to seek their cooperation and would rather let the work remain perpetually constrained. As for those who have mobilized the masses, there is also a similar situation: they fail to attend to the needs of the masses but instead go against those needs; they fail to examine the mood of the masses but instead ignore their feelings. Consequently, issues concerning the art of leading the masses, how to unite activists, consolidate the middle elements, and elevate the backward elements, issues concerning the connection between the Party and non-Party masses, and issues concerning the coordination of propaganda, agitation, and organizational work, are all regarded as unimportant or are entirely overlooked. Under such circumstances, our political work cannot but become generalized and simplistic. Under such circumstances, our political work turns into so-called "work" carried out in isolation by a few people divorced from the masses. Moreover, when solving problems, some comrades rely neither on their own abilities nor on diligently consulting and learning from their peers, subordinates, and the masses to gain knowledge and experience. Instead, they rely solely on their official positions and administrative means to solve problems, inevitably leading to bungled results and sometimes even leaving them with no recourse but to intimidate others with high-sounding labels. This method of work divorced from the masses is precisely the isolationist approach.

To summarize, the formalistic style, the equalitarian style, the empty-shouting style, and the isolationist style are essentially petty-bourgeois styles, styles rooted in subjectivism and dogmatism. These styles are not the style of Communists, nor the style of the revolutionary army. They cannot coexist with the Party's style and the revolutionary army's style. If such styles exist in political work, they will weaken its revolutionary nature. Even if the Party's line is correct and the direction of political work is correct, if these styles are not changed, they will still be unable to fulfill the tasks of political work. Our political work has had an excellent tradition, and the resolution of the Gutian Congress is a concrete expression of this tradition. In past work, wherever this tradition was inherited and carried forward, the work there fully demonstrated its revolutionary and creative character; conversely, it appeared rigid, lifeless, devoid of vitality and strength. Currently, in the troops of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and throughout the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, there is much lively creativity. In the course of the protracted War of Resistance, many combat heroes, labor heroes, and model workers have emerged. They have no formalism, no equalitarianism, no empty shouting, and no isolationism. They seek truth from facts and maintain close ties with the masses. We should learn from them, commend them, and launch a movement within every unit to emulate combat heroes, labor heroes, and model workers. The initiative and creativity among cadres and the masses are boundless. As long as we are adept at setting forth tasks, adept at inspiring them, and adept at encouraging them, they will flourish with vitality, carry forward their achievements, and correct their shortcomings. Even comrades who have made mistakes in past work will correct them in the course of this mass movement. Experience has proven to us that the integrity, enthusiasm, creativity, and initiative lying latent among cadres and the masses, once aroused, become an inexhaustible wellspring, transforming into a mighty river flowing thousands of miles. When that time comes, our past shortcomings will appear to be no more than a few sunspots on the solar disk. Our Party, our army, and our people are originally the sun, a sun that will illuminate the entire world.

III. Some Provisions on Organizational Forms and Work Systems (omitted)

(Note: This is a political work report written in 1944 under the personal direction of Comrade Mao Zedong and delivered by the Political Department of the Reserve Corps at the Senior Cadres' Meeting of the Northwest Bureau. [See "Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission on Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army," December 1960, Beijing.])

(Based on the printed edition compiled by the Revolutionary Education Institute of Nanjing and other revolutionary command organizations)