On the Political Work in the Armed Forces—Report on Political Work Submitted by the Political Department of the Rear Corps at the Senior Cadres’ Conference of the Northwest Bureau in 1944^April 1944
Editor’s Note: The report "On the Political Work in the Armed Forces," submitted by the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army Rear Corps at the Senior Cadres’ Conference of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in 1944, was drafted under the personal direction of Chairman Mao with the participation of Comrade Zhou Enlai and others, and the greater part was written by Chairman Mao himself. This is another important historical document on the political work of our People’s Liberation Army following the resolution of the Gutian Conference, possessing profound historical significance and major practical significance. To commemorate the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the full text is hereby published openly for study by the entire Party and the entire army.

I. A Summary of the Experience of the Troops in the Border Region Over the Past Year
It has now been over a year since the Senior Cadres’ Conference and the Military and Political Cadres’ Conference convened by the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in the winter of 1942. The year 1943 was a year of great progress for the troops in the Border Region. In the course of this year, we resolved a major issue of principle within the Border Region troops—the issue of the warlordist deviation and the doctrinaire deviation—and established a unified leadership system, headed by the Northwest Bureau and encompassing the Party, government, army, and people of the Border Region, that is completely integrated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. We also fostered a leadership style of maintaining close ties with the masses and seeking truth from facts.

As early as the Senior Cadres’ Conference the year before last, comrades of our Party Central Committee and the Northwest Bureau pointed out: The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are the people’s armies, armies with a fine revolutionary tradition, and among the best troops in the entire country in the anti-Japanese national war. The Eighth Route Army units in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region have basically fulfilled the tasks assigned to them by the Party and higher authorities and have carried out the line of the Party and higher authorities. At the same time, however, it was pointed out that, for various reasons, certain deviations had arisen in our troops, the most important of which were the so-called warlordist deviation and doctrinaire deviation. The degree of these shortcomings varied, but the task at hand was to unite in correcting these deviations, promoting fine work styles, and changing undesirable work styles, so as to better enhance the combat effectiveness of the troops, better carry out the political tasks assigned by the Party and higher authorities, better conduct operations, production, and mass work, and thereby achieve the goals of uniting ourselves, defeating the enemy, and overthrowing Japanese imperialism. Over the past year, we have carried out this directive and have basically fulfilled the tasks it assigned.

As a result of the year’s work, there has been marked progress in the relations between the army and the Party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, between officers and soldiers, between higher and lower ranks of cadres, between military work and political work, and in the friendly relations among various army units—all areas where the warlordist deviation and the doctrinaire deviation had once manifested themselves. In the relations between the army and the Party (by which we mean that our army must be placed completely, absolutely, and unconditionally under the political guidance of the Communist Party and its leading organs, and must not assert independence), we have not only established unified leadership within the Border Region centered on the Northwest Bureau and within each subregion centered on the local Party committee, while maintaining their respective higher-and-lower-level relationships, but, more importantly, we have also achieved consistency in policy thinking and in steps of action. In the relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people, through the movements to support the government and cherish the people and to support the army, and especially since November 1943, the army has resolutely practiced self-criticism and launched a frankness movement, bringing to light all undesirable phenomena in the relations between the army and the Party, between the army and the government, and between the army and the people, thereby thoroughly transforming the thinking of cadres and soldiers.

Where relations with the civilian population were poor, steps were taken to improve them by returning borrowed articles, compensating for losses, and, in disputes where the fault lay with the army, offering apologies and making amends to the people. The army also engaged in a large-scale self-supporting production campaign, improving its provisions and lightening the burdens on the people; the army further used large amounts of labor power to assist the people in production. In this way, the relations between our army and the government and between the army and the people were greatly improved. In the internal relations of the army, whether between officers and soldiers, between higher and lower ranks, between military work and political work, or in the friendly relations among various army units, wherever shortcomings existed, there has been great improvement. At the frankness meetings of military personnel in the companies, all undesirable phenomena, grievances, and dissatisfaction in officer-soldier relations, company life, and personal thinking were brought into the open, stimulating their enthusiasm and creativity, fostering an atmosphere of intimacy and friendship, correcting various undesirable phenomena, assuaging grievances, and uniting the army internally. Although certain shortcomings still remain in all these respects and it cannot be said that they have been completely overcome, the situation is clearly vastly different from what it was a year ago. In sum, the warlordist deviation and the doctrinaire deviation, which existed to some degree in the troops and were chiefly characterized by detachment from the masses, have been severely criticized and have been basically overcome.

Under these circumstances of reform and progress, the morale of the troops has undergone a great change. The passive moods and undesirable conduct that existed to some extent in the troops in the past have now generally disappeared and have been replaced by a new spirit. The troops are now filled with combat enthusiasm, production enthusiasm, and study enthusiasm; they are troops brimming with vitality. This enthusiasm and vitality began to surge in the spring of last year and have continued to the present. From last year’s land reclamation, weeding, and autumn harvest, they subsequently moved directly into consolidation and training, passing through combat mobilization in July. Its characteristics are: intensity, universality, and persistence. The troops are now full of enterprising spirit. In production, in supporting the government and cherishing the people, and in the winter consolidation and training, many stirring deeds have emerged; batches of labor heroes and model learners have appeared; many model squads, platoons, and model companies have emerged. The organization and discipline of the troops have been strengthened. After streamlining and reorganization, the phenomenon of too many officers and too few soldiers, of top-heaviness, has been changed, and certain instances of disconnection between officers and soldiers have been overcome.

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Violations of discipline have also greatly decreased. In this great movement, the leadership style in certain links has undergone a major transformation, and both the warlordist style and the doctrinaire style have been criticized. The styles now greatly promoted are the style of maintaining close ties with the masses and the style of seeking truth from facts. Therefore, we say that last year was a year of great progress in the leadership style of our troops. It was because of this progress that we were able to achieve the truly great results of last year—the results in carrying out the rectification of the three styles within our troops, the results in better troops and simpler administration, the results in supporting the government and cherishing the people, the results in the production campaign, the results in guarding against enemy agents, and the results in the winter consolidation and training. Without progress in the leadership style, such great results would have been impossible.

The characteristic of the troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is that they are rear-area garrison troops. They guard several hundred li of river defenses, but because of the heroic fighting of the front-line troops, the enemy has not yet dared to cross the river and attack. These are all differences from the front-line troops. But in all other respects, they are largely the same. Particularly in the matter of leadership style, the progress of the troops in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region can serve as a model for all units of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

How did we achieve this progress? The process of this progress in leadership style proceeded from the relations between the army and the Party to the relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people, from the overall leadership relations of the army to the relations between officers and soldiers, between higher and lower ranks, between military work and political work, and the friendly relations among various army units. Taking the relations between officers and soldiers and between higher and lower ranks as an example, it proceeded from senior cadres to ordinary cadres, from cadres to soldiers, and from Party members to non-Party members. If last year’s progress had not been a series of advances on all fronts, but had been done in a piecemeal fashion, treating the head when the head aches and treating the foot when the foot hurts; if last year’s progress had not first grasped the overall leadership relations of the army—that is, grasped the senior leading cadres, enabling them to straighten out their own thinking, change their own work style, and unconditionally submit to the Party’s guidance, as a prerequisite for motivating ordinary cadres and influencing the masses of soldiers—but had instead sought solutions only from the lower levels and the soldiers; if our comrades indeed had shortcomings in leadership, and in the review...

When faced with these shortcomings, they become timid and hesitant, worry about personal gains and losses, and refuse to expose their own mistakes; then such great progress would become impossible, or at least would not achieve such great and rapid results. The experience of the past year proves that wherever this spirit and method are followed, achievements are great and progress is rapid. Conversely, achievements are meager and progress is slow. The experience of the past year proves that the work of ideological remolding of cadres is extremely important and also extremely arduous. The progress in cadre thinking is the pivot of all work progress; only after there is progress in cadre thinking can work progress be truly reliable progress, and if one seeks work progress apart from ideological progress, it will inevitably be only superficial and formal. On a certain material foundation, ideology commands everything, ideology changes everything—this truth has been fully confirmed by the experience of the past year. If we want to change from certain erroneous leadership styles to correct leadership styles, to enable units where warlordist deviations and doctrinaire deviations are most typically manifested to advance by leaps and bounds after changing such styles, to transform backward elements into activists, to change an atmosphere of liberalism into an atmosphere of principled stand, to change poor officer-soldier relations and army-civilian relations into good officer-soldier relations and army-civilian relations, and so on—all these require progress in people’s thinking before progress in action can be achieved. It can almost be said that the process of ideological progress is the process of work progress, and the process of progress in the mood of the masses. The more thoroughly ideological remolding is carried out there, the more thorough will be the progress in work, in the mood of the masses, and in work style there. Based on the experience of the past year, we have come to understand that in remolding the thinking of those who have made mistakes, there should be steps: generally speaking, the first step should be to expose the mistakes; the second step, to reflect on the mistakes; and the third step, to correct the mistakes. Without the first two steps, it is impossible to realize the final step. In all units where shortcomings exist, among the three steps, the first is of primary importance. Without this step, or if this step is not carried out thoroughly—that is, if the essence of the mistakes is not exposed, and serious criticism is not conducted against things that are clearly wrong—it will be impossible to alert the cadres, and it will be impossible to mobilize the enthusiasm of cadres for examining and criticizing mistakes. And for those who have made mistakes, without exposing the mistakes, it is impossible to gauge their attitude toward their own mistakes, and impossible to make them engage in self-reflection; even if they do reflect, it will mostly be superficial, perfunctory, and without resolve, and thus it will be impossible for them to correct their mistakes. Last year, the troops in various parts of the Border Region reviewed the mistakes there, examined the officer-soldier relations and army-civilian relations there, held frankness meetings, and waged struggles against warlordist deviations and the indifferent attitude toward such deviations, namely the so-called liberalist attitude. What was not done well the first time was done a second time, a third time, and finally it was done well. Those that have still not been done well are cases where the exposure of mistakes was not thorough or not properly conducted. But here, the so-called exposure of mistakes has a guiding principle and specific targets, and is not rash or arbitrary accusation. Our principle is to educate cadres, to remold cadres, to educate soldiers, to remold soldiers, not to injure or revile cadres, not to injure or revile soldiers. As long as comrades who have made mistakes boldly expose their own mistakes, sincerely reflect on their mistakes, and are determined to correct their mistakes, we will not adopt excessive methods of struggle, nor methods of punishment and attack. Throughout the entire rectification movement, we have implemented this principle; except for a very few truly bad elements, no disciplinary measures have been taken against any comrades with shortcomings. Those who cannot change for the time being undergo gradual remolding in rectification classes and cadre teams. By doing so, we have achieved results, and the majority of those with shortcomings have been transformed. Many have been transformed very well. Cadres who lacked an amiable attitude, lacked an attitude of diligently and earnestly educating soldiers, lacked an attitude of inquiring about soldiers’ well-being and showing concern for them, lacked an attitude of caring about the hardships of the people, and lacked an attitude of honesty and devotion to public duty have now changed and learned well. When cadres learn well, soldiers also learn well. Loafers among the soldiers have become good men, those who wanted to desert no longer desert, the discontented have become satisfied, those who broke discipline now observe discipline, and the lazy have become industrious. In short, both officers and soldiers have taken on a completely new appearance. Here, I will cite a typical example from a unit in the Border Region to illustrate the correctness of this Party principle. The following is a work report from a unit: “The ideological transformation can be illustrated by the increase in activists and the decrease in backward elements within the unit. At the time of reorganization last March, there were only 77 Party member activists and 31 non-Party activists. By November last year, Party member activists had increased to 161, and non-Party activists to 95. At the time of reorganization, there were 55 backward Party members and 81 backward non-Party members. By November last year, backward Party members had decreased to 8, and backward non-Party members to 15. This shows that the change is very great. The phenomena of cadres engaging in embezzlement and waste, conducting private business, caring only for their own enjoyment, and not concerning themselves with the soldiers’ lives have been overcome. For example, in 1941, the method of simple punishment was adopted at that time, and more than ten cadres who committed errors such as embezzlement and waste were dismissed, including two battalion commanders, two political instructors, two company commanders, two political guides, one medical team captain, and one mass movement officer. But in 1942, the same undesirable phenomena not only did not decrease but actually increased. If the method of simple punishment had still been adopted, more people would have had to be dismissed, and things certainly would not have improved. But in 1943, following the instructions of higher authorities, we abolished the method of simple punishment and adopted the method of ideological remolding, and not a single person was dismissed. Through rectification and reflection, through frankness meetings, and through the production campaign and training campaign, those who had previously made mistakes were all transformed in this great movement. They are the same people, but throughout the entire year, not a single person was found to have committed a serious mistake again.” The unit mentioned above was the one with the worst work and discipline among the troops in the Border Region; it was an extremely bad typical case. But because mistakes were exposed, mass self-criticism was launched, the leadership style was changed, correct and positive tasks were put forward, and the principle of curing the sickness to save the patient was grasped, it was quickly transformed. As for the majority of units with a good or relatively good work foundation, once they are seriously rectified according to the correct principle, their progress is even more remarkable.

The IV-8 was very fast. From this it can be seen that the successful accomplishment of work and the maintenance of discipline are built upon the foundation of correct leadership and the consciousness of the masses. Without the condition of correct leadership, as Lenin said, "Any attempt to enforce discipline will inevitably degenerate into empty talk and absurdity." Once the condition of correct leadership is secured, emphasis must be placed on the consciousness of the masses, a point fully borne out by last year's experience. In the past, many leading bodies, when faced with negative phenomena among cadres and the masses, failed to examine their leadership, failed to start by transforming their leadership, failed to grasp ideological issues, failed to start by remolding thinking, and, moreover, toward those who had erred, failed to proceed from a standpoint of cherishing them to prompt their introspection and self-awareness, resorting instead only to simplistic punitive methods. All this was truly incorrect. Therefore, only by proceeding from a standpoint of cherishing people, from exposing specific errors to urging those who have erred (including cadres and soldiers) to reflect on their own mistakes, and by diligently and wholeheartedly encouraging them to voluntarily correct their own errors—such a line is the entirely correct line. Here, the weapons of criticism and self-criticism both have their roles and neither should be neglected. However, criticism is meant to inspire self-criticism; in a certain sense, it uses the means of criticism to achieve the end of self-criticism. During a past period, in the rectification movement within the troops aimed at remolding thinking, the target of struggle was focused on overcoming warlordist deviations and the liberalist attitude toward such deviations. The so-called exposure of errors was precisely the exposure of these, and matters beyond these targets were only linked to them (where linkage was possible and necessary) without being emphasized. One should not attempt to correct all undesirable things at once but should concentrate efforts on criticizing the most critical point, and the rest will then be readily resolved. Under a given target of struggle, with regard to linking it to specific individuals, only typical cases should be selected, and egalitarianism should not be adopted. Such a method of typical criticism and typical education is the most powerful and most educationally meaningful correct method; the egalitarian method of criticism and education is the most powerless and least educationally meaningful erroneous method.

Last year, in our practical work within the troops, we promoted the ideas of unified leadership, supporting the government and cherishing the people, self-sufficiency through production, improving military skills, and guarding against hostile elements. In the education and practice of these ideas, not only were warlordist deviations subjected to criticism, but dogmatist deviations were also simultaneously criticized. Our military and political cadres, in carrying out their work, were already able to avoid being shackled by dogmatist styles of work, discarding those undesirable practices of divorcing themselves from reality and indulging in empty talk, valuing form over content, and uniting with the few while alienating the many. They came to understand the need to proceed from an analysis of specific circumstances in handling matters and grasped the method of selecting and seizing upon typical cases; they understood the need to pay attention not only to the form of events but especially to their content; they understood the need to take care not only of the few but especially of the many. In conducting education, they understood the need to adopt methods of inspiration, guidance, review, and introspection; they understood the need to publicize the working style of Zhang Zhiguo and the working style of Men Shande; they understood the need to organize the Zhang Zhiguo Movement and the Men Shande Movement. In this way, our educational work was liberated from the shackles of dogmatism, formalism, egalitarianism, and isolationism, and from abstract concepts divorced from reality. The experience of last year made us understand that the common result of warlordist deviations and dogmatist deviations in leadership style is the alienation from the masses, with dogmatism particularly manifesting in detachment from concrete practice and satisfaction with abstract shouting and formal uniformity. Conversely, the reason why last year's work achieved great successes was also that, while overcoming warlordist deviations, we fundamentally overcame dogmatist methods of leadership and adopted the correct methods of leadership pointed out by our Party Central Committee. The main characteristics of this method of leadership are: "Responsibility borne by the leading cadres, doing things oneself, integration of the leading core with the broad masses, and combination of general calls with specific guidance." In every movement and every task, the principal cadres at all levels forming the leading core were first made to understand, and then the mass line was adopted, going through the masses to carry out ideological mobilization and public opinion mobilization, so that ordinary cadres and the broad masses also understood, and only then was action taken. In the process of mobilization, overall plans (general calls) were formulated for each brigade and regiment based on their respective conditions, and then, based on these brigade and regimental plans and the conditions of each unit, more specific plans were drawn up for squads, platoons, companies, and battalions, down to plans for each individual (specific guidance). In the process of implementation, these plans were examined and revised in light of practical experience, lowering those that were too high and raising those that were too low (specific guidance). In the process of mobilization, political work comrades and military work comrades, under the unified leadership of the Party and the unified guidance of the most authoritative leading cadres in each unit, worked in coordination and unity, thus avoiding the malady of each acting on their own. Many major tasks last year adopted the method of revolutionary emulation. However, when the mood of the masses had not yet felt the need to carry out emulation, emulation should not be launched. When this mood for emulation had brewed among the masses to a point of general maturity, emulation should immediately be called for, and all efforts should be made to organize it. The sign of such maturity is that not only are the activists fully prepared mentally, but the intermediate elements (who often constitute the majority) and the backward elements have also reached a considerable degree of preparation; otherwise, emulation will become a matter of a few standing out, with only a few doing it rather than the many taking it up. At the beginning of the production movement last year, some units chose an inappropriate moment to launch emulation, starting too early, seeing only the mood of a few activists without taking into account the mood of the intermediate and backward elements, and as a result, the call for such emulation fell flat. Later, by taking the intermediate and backward elements into account and reorganizing the emulation, success was achieved. In the production movement and the training movement, wherever not only the intermediate elements but also the backward elements were taken into account, the enthusiasm for emulation grew ever higher, the scale of emulation grew ever larger, and it was sustained to the very end, becoming entirely the masses' own undertaking without needing urging from the leadership. We must understand that in terms of the level of consciousness among various people, there is a gap between the intermediate elements and the activists, and a gap between the backward elements and the intermediate elements. The task of leadership lies in uniting with the activists, attracting the intermediate elements, and encouraging the backward elements. And the entire purpose of our uniting with the activists is precisely to attract the intermediate elements and encourage the backward elements to advance together. Departing from this purpose, the activists lose their role, and our work of organizing activists becomes superfluous.

Therefore, in any mass movement, in our propaganda and agitation work, and in our organizational steps, the primary issue is to take into account the intermediate and backward elements. We must proceed from the level of the intermediate and even the backward elements, choose organizational forms and working methods that are acceptable to them, and adapt the pace of the entire movement to their progress. For example, in the production movement within our troops, organizing movements such as the Zhang Zhiguo Movement, the Hao Shucai Movement, the Hu Qingshan Movement, the Zhao Zhankui Movement (not the Zhao Zhankui of the workers' movement), the Wu Shenghua Movement, the Feng Zhenseng Movement, and the Feng Guoyu Movement was very good and very necessary. This is because these advanced fighters and junior lower-level cadres in the troops emerged from the production or training movements of their own units, are well known and personally witnessed by the masses of soldiers in their units, easily attract the intermediate elements and encourage the backward elements, are readily understood by them, and easily inspire their ambition to improve. For the masses comprehend issues through their own personal experience, not through slogans. If our agitation is detached from specific individuals and specific deeds, it will be impossible for the masses to understand and impossible to inspire their ambition to improve. However, when we encourage the intermediate and backward elements to emulate the advanced elements, we must not forget the characteristics of the intermediate and backward elements. For instance, in the forms of productive labor, we must base them on physical strength and adopt a considerable degree of voluntary principle, dividing the labor force into three grades—A, B, and C—and adopting different forms of labor with different content and intensity. This will be more welcomed by the broad masses than egalitarian and completely coercive forms of labor. If we do not make this distinction, we will become alienated from the masses. In the work of reforming backward elements, we should primarily adopt methods of patient persuasion and reformation, and prohibit the use of purely punitive methods. The problem of deserters cannot be solved by purely punitive methods either; methods of education and reformation must be adopted, and the execution of deserters must be absolutely prohibited. Here, cordial talks by the leading officers, proceeding from a standpoint of care and concern, are most effective. Such talks by the leading officers must be combined with self-examination and self-education among the masses to achieve even greater effectiveness. Purely punitive methods, even methods of beating and scolding, are merely methods that alienate the masses and are utterly ineffective. In the army, we must abolish abusive language and corporal punishment, resolutely implement the resolution of the Gutian Conference of the Fourth Red Army in 1929, and must replace abusive language and corporal punishment (beating people) and purely punitive methods with diligent, sincere, and well-intentioned educational and reformative work proceeding from a standpoint of care and concern and from the principle of curing the sickness to save the patient. Moreover, we must reduce to the minimum the necessary—that is, indispensable according to actual circumstances—legitimate disciplinary methods other than abusive language and corporal punishment, and never resort to disciplinary methods lightly except when absolutely necessary. The experience gained over the past year is extensive, and I have spoken here very incompletely. For example, the rectification of the three styles, the policy of better troops and simpler administration, supporting the government and cherishing the people, the production movement, the training movement, and the anti-espionage movement all have their own valuable experiences, which I have not recounted one by one here. What I have pointed out are only some common and principal experiences. Moreover, I am not saying that the warlordist deviation and the dogmatist deviation in our troops have been completely and finally overcome. No, that is not the case. The warlordist deviation existing in our troops has only been severely criticized, and the various undesirable tendencies it manifested in the relations between the army and the Party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, between officers and soldiers, between higher and lower ranks of cadres, between political work and military work, and in the friendly relations among various army units have been overcome, and these relations have been basically improved. This does not mean that these relations have been completely and finally improved. To achieve even more perfect improvement in these relations and to consolidate them, making them deeply rooted and unshakable, we must continue to do a great deal of work. As for the dogmatist style of work—fondness for empty talk, detachment from reality, emphasis on form and neglect of content, uniting with the few and alienating the many—it has also been criticized over the past year, but it has not yet been completely overcome. In particular, we have not yet examined this issue historically. Below, I intend to examine the historical issues of the entire army, focusing on the comparison and analysis of the dogmatist style of work and the style of seeking truth from facts in political work, and on the comparison and analysis of achievements and shortcomings in political work. As for the dogmatist deviation in military work, I will not touch upon it here for the time being.

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