Directive on the Principle of Self-Defence to Be Adopted
in Dealing with the Kuomintang Die-Hard Troops[1]
(March 27, 1944)

Li and Xiao, and inform Teng and Deng:

(1) More than three enemy divisions in north China are concentrating towards the northern bank of the Yellow River, and a portion of the enemy forces along the Yangtze are concentrating towards Xinyang, giving the appearance of attempting to force open the Beiping-Hankou Railway. A group of British and American journalists may come to Yan’an in the next few days. Therefore, in the struggle against the die-hards, it is all the more necessary to strictly uphold the principle of self-defence; we must not lose sight of the larger picture for petty gains or provoke conflicts ourselves. The telegram of the 18th day of the 3rd month has presumably arrived; carry it out conscientiously.

(2) When Li Xianzhou left Shandong, he gave the local die-hard troops a conspiratorial policy of resolute anti-communism to confuse the enemy. If we wish to break this conspiracy, we must exploit and widen the various contradictions between the enemy and the die-hards, between the puppet troops and the die-hards, and among the die-hard troops themselves, study them concretely, and flexibly carry out the policy of striking and pulling alternately. Under the principle of self-defence, striking with reason and advantage can create more conditions for pulling, can ease friction, and can achieve the goal of winning over and neutralizing the majority while isolating a minority of die-hard elements. Striking indiscriminately without reason or advantage not only eliminates the conditions for pulling, but on the contrary impels the die-hard side to unite and compromise with Japan to contain us.

(3) After the recent heavy blow dealt to Zhao Baoyuan, Zhao and Wang may compromise. We should take the initiative to pull Wang and isolate Zhao. Prisoners from Zhao’s troops should also be treated leniently; leading officers should separately approach them, using small group discussion methods to patiently answer all questions they have that are suspicious of us, to elicit their own difficulties and sufferings, to help resolve them as much as possible, to elicit their understanding of Zhao’s conspiracy of collaborating with the enemy and opposing the Communists, to inform them of the rent and interest reduction, democracy, and the Eighth Route Army’s system in the base areas, to solicit their criticism of us, to welcome those who wish to stay, and to send off with good wishes those who do not, changing the past working style of exaggerating oneself and attacking others. And openly inform Zhao that if he can cease opposing the Communists and unite to resist Japan in actual deeds, we will permit the return of the captured personnel and weapons.

Mao, Zhu, Peng