Problems Concerning the Study of
Lines, the Style of Work, and the
Current Political Situation1
(March 5, 1944)
I. About the Study of Lines
1. Inner-Party problems and problems external to our Party.
Last year, during the Party’s study of lines, several comrades suspected that the
2. The problem of legitimate or illegitimate.
Our aim since the rectification has consistently been to cure the illness and
save the patient. When we were ferreting out historical problems inside our
Party, some suspected that we were not really following this orientation. Our
current policy still is to clarify our thinking thoroughly, but to draw
organizational conclusions carefully and appropriately.
In the course of our Party’s past history, in addition to the struggle against the
revolutionary passion and a realistic spirit. The proletariat should use the
methods of remolding and redeeming by persuasion to lead the peasants and the
petty bourgeoisie to socialism. We should not adopt an impetuous policy of
annihilation toward the petty bourgeoisie.
The most basic character of Chinese society is that the petty bourgeoisie
constitutes the majority of the population. Our Party should deal with this
problem carefully. The petty-bourgeois thought reflected within our Party, and
the mistakes from this kind of thought, are social phenomena, not individual
problems. This is a necessary phenomenon under certain historical circumstances.
The Chinese Communist Party made the mistake of Right opportunism during
the period of the Great Revolution, and the mistake of “Left” opportunism during the Civil War. Similar circumstances have occurred in other parts of the world in
the past. For example, the mistake of “Leftist” Blanquism was made during the
period of the Paris Commune, and the mistake of Right opportunism was made
during the period of the Second International. This pattern is caused by the fact
that the policy of the bourgeoisie toward the proletariat may be reflected in the
Party of the proletariat. For example, when the Chinese bourgeois Chiang
Kaishek adopted the policy of allying with the Chinese Communist Party during
the period of the War of Resistance, our Party easily made Rightist errors. During
to clarify our thinking or learn from experience.
We are not permitted to draw conclusions at the Seventh Congress about
problems during the War of Resistance. The Seventh Congress will only draw
conclusions on the historical segment from the Fourth Plenum to the Zunyi
Conference.13 This conclusion should focus on learning from experience, and
should look toward the future. Rather than focusing on punishment, we should
only give a political verdict so as to reach the goal of curing the illness to save the
patient.
4. Do not negate everything.
Do not negate everything in the historical period from the Fourth Plenum to
Comrade Luo Fu. We had a common goal, which was to defeat Chiang Kaishek.
We disagreed on how to defeat Chiang Kaishek; this was a disagreement about
strategy. On the problem of land reform, we did not disagree on the decision of
the Sixth Congress to confiscate the land belonging to the landlord class and to
distribute it to peasants who had no land or who were short of land. The
controversy centered on what to do after the confiscation. Bo [Gu], Luo [Fu], and
others advocated that we should give bad land to the rich peasants, and none at
all to the landlords, but I did not agree. It would be a deviation to negate
everything in the past. We should analyze the problems and not just negate
5. The appraisal of the Sixth Congress.15
In this discussion, a few comrades try to negate the Sixth Congress. Some
people say that the line of the Sixth Congress was basically wrong.
6. Are there or are there not still factions in our Party?
I believe that after going through several splits, there are none. After the split
at the Zunyi Conference, the split in the early days of the War of Resistance, and
the recent split, these factions no longer exist. Only such an estimate is in
accordance with the facts and is beneficial to the unification of the whole Party.
At present, the more serious problem is the mountain-stronghold mentality.
The main reasons for its existence are: (1) the vast numbers of the petty
bourgeoisie; (2) revolutionary base areas in the countryside that have been cut off
from one another for a long time; and (3) the lack of ideological education. Such things seriously hinder our internal cooperation, especially in the relationships
among Party, government, army, and the people. Those old cadres who took part
in the Long March tend to emphasize the power that comes from the army, and
this is reasonable. If the Red Army had not advanced northward at that time, we
would not have such power as we have today and would only be able to carry
out guerrilla war. Responsible local comrades should explain this point to local
cadres. Responsible comrades from the south should also explain clearly to those
cadres who came from outside that without a foundation consisting of local
cadres, Party organs, and the masses in their locality, work cannot be done well.
The whole of the Red Army on its northward advance consisted of only 25,000
people when it arrived in northern Shaanxi. Now, we have almost one million
Party members, of whom only a minority are old members. Except for Comrade
Wang Zhen,18 the regional Party committee under Yan’an consists mainly of
local cadres. There are more northern cadres in the Northwestern Bureau and
other regions, such as North China and Central China. Therefore, those cadres
coming from outside should understand this point and pay attention to this
problem. First, we should acknowledge the achievements of the cadres of the Red
Army. In the beginning, local cadres treated the Eighth Route Army as though it
consisted of “gods.” After that, they thought that it was not worth a penny. Now
we should have a negation of the negation. That is, they are not “gods,” or we can
say that they are “gods” who have some defects. Second, cadres from outside
should talk more with local cadres, they should understand local history, and
they should cooperate with local cadres. They should be conscious of this aspect.
Now, the foundation consists of local cadres, and veteran cadres should
consciously understand this point. Currently, the mountain-stronghold mentality
is the most important and concrete problem within our Party. Historical problems
have already ceased to be important.
II. The Problem of Work Style
Recently, some leaders have made progress in their work style. Such progress is
gained by rectifying the Three Styles, investigating cadres, and studying lines.

For example, not only is the work of our unit done within the unit but also much
of it extends outside it. In the past, many units of our Central Committee had no
relationship with the local people. They had no “citizenship.” Some cadres also
believed that they were fine timber put to petty use, and consequently they did
not concentrate on their present work. Now the situation has changed somewhat.
For example, the Women’s Committee has expressed a desire to interact more
with the local masses. Those people who used to believe that they were fine
timber put to petty use have also changed their thinking somewhat. Previously,
there were some cadres who did not use their minds and were unable to analyze
concrete problems. Instead, they only knew how to shout at the top of their
voices and write big articles. The brain’s sole function is to think. It is a big
drawback not to use the brain. Recently, the situation has changed somewhat.
There has been some progress, especially in recent days. But the problems of
work style are still severe as far as the whole Party is concerned. There are still
quite a few people who separate themselves from the masses and do not think
through problems in certain sectors.
Recently, we have been close to the masses in aspects of literature and art work
and propaganda work. There have been some analytical articles in the
newspapers. And newspapers have had some relationship with the masses. The
work of the Party School and certain units has made some progress. Citizenship
education is also being reformed.
The work of organizational departments had some formalism in the past. But
there has been much progress after carrying out the mass line. The work of
eliminating traitors has been changed. Its former method was for it to be done
only by a few workers having specific duties. Now we have aroused the broad
masses to take part in it and we have achieved new successes.
As for the workers movement, in the past we generally merely published some
documents on the commemoration to mark the day. Now committees of workers
have gone deep into the factories to conduct some surveys and research. They
will achieve some success because they have really taken part in the workers
movement in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
In the army, in the past the relationship between the troops and the people was
Now we pay attention to calculating the numbers, seeking truth from facts,
and linking with the masses in all aspects of work. We have achieved greater
successes, especially in aspects such as rectification, cadre investigation, and
production. That is mainly because we carried out methods such as leading
cadres being responsible and doing the work by themselves, leaders cooperating
with the masses, and general calls being integrated with specific guidance. We
should make every comrade understand that if the work style is not changed, not
only will each individual not achieve success but also, from a broader
perspective, our revolution will lose its future. All of us should have confidence
that those comrades who used to have a bad work style and who made mistakes
in the past can change. All of them have a bright future.
What good work methods are there? I think they are the kind of good work
methods that we have recently seen in the labor heroes’ rallies, labor heroes’ and
model workers’ rallies, and labor heroes and combat heroes’ rallies. During the
period of the Civil War, some methods separated us from the masses and were
coercive; they were not good. Some new content in recent heroes’ and models’
rallies really belongs to the masses and is compatible with specific situations.
Labor heroes and model workers are models from the masses. We can make
leading cadres, labor heroes, and model workers link together by holding these
kinds of meetings. In the past, leading cadres separated themselves from the
masses. They did not integrate activists in order to unify leading cadres and the
masses. The standard of the model workers should be discussed among the
masses. Now we should first carry out selection in several units. By doing this,
we can make the leaders link with the masses. Some leading cadres in our units
are not as good as the masses. Of course, there are also some good leading cadres.
For example, common people called Assistant Director Ma “Clear Sky” when he
carried out a joint case investigation.20 We will hold labor hero rallies again in
the border region this year. The labor heroes from all regions, combat heroes, and
model workers in all aspects will attend. This is a good method created by the
masses. It is a good kind of competitive method. It can improve the cadres, link
them with the masses, and move our work forward. We should nurture and
educate model workers. We should not make them arrogant or cause them to fall
behind. We should select labor heroes or model workers in military companies
and in all big or small units. This kind of method is a “challenge” to the leading cadres at all levels. It gives the cadres the chance to learn something. For
example, in military education we will select people who can throw hand
grenades or can charge bayonets to teach others. This will force our cadres to go
beyond their units. Those cadres should first abandon their haughty manner and
break their individualistic heroism. They should forget that they are “leaders,”
forget that they are members of the Central Committee, and go among the
masses to learn. There was a person in our army who farmed 30 or 40 mu of land
this year (he farmed only 18 mu last year). He could produce 6 dan of grain: 4
dan of it belonged to the public, 2 dan belonged to him. Every person in
Yangjialing on average could produce 1 dan and 5 dou. We now carry out the
Red institution of sharing bonuses both with the public and with the private. This
is a new principle, created by the masses themselves.
In a word, we should put aside our haughty manners and open our minds to
think through more problems in order to construct a good work style.
III. The Recent Political Situation and Our General
Policy
Our general policy is to make the Guomindang unable either to capitulate or to
fight a civil war. We are not willing to fight a civil war. We carried out a political
offensive in the second half of last year. As a result, we forced the Eleventh
Plenum of the Guomindang to issue a declaration that it will use political
methods to solve the problem of the Chinese Communist Party. It is possible that
there will be no civil war this year. This year is very important. We will hold the
Seventh Congress. We will be engaged in production. We will continue our
rectification and anti-spy campaigns. All these things should be finished this
year. Now we are still in a difficult position. We still have a lot of difficulties, for
example, economic difficulties, the work of rectification within the Party, and the
anti-spy struggle that has still not been completed. We need a year of peaceful
circumstances to finish this work. If we compare this year with last year, the
situation is rather different: (1) There are the successes of the Moscow
Conference and the Tehran Conference21 this year. The Soviet Union and the

United States are cooperating very well and are very enthusiastic now. It seems
that there are some contradictions between the Soviet Union and England. One
faction thinks England has no independent diplomacy, for example, as regards
the problem of Poland and the problem of Yugoslavia. But both England and the
United States declared that this will not affect the opening of the second front.
Although there are some disagreements in international relationships, they will
not affect the basis of the Tehran Conference. (2) Japan has decided that it will
not attack the Soviet Union. This kind of international situation affects China. It
reduces the possibilities of a civil war. Our policy is to follow the defensive and to
“gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.” (3) Recently, the
Guomindang changed its plan for attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border
Region. Four main divisions have left the area around the border region. (4) Our
situation has also changed. Our troops carried out winter training. Our
production has achieved some success. The relationship between the troops and
the people has improved. Last year, we carried out current affairs education (i.e.,
class education) and unified our Party. Our ordnance production has developed.
We are now able to make steel. We have trained our troops in self-defense. Our
forces have increased by two brigades. Under the four international or national
conditions mentioned above, the possibility of avoiding a civil war has increased.
Recently, the Guomindang asked Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Lin Boqu22
to go to Chongqing to negotiate. We answered that Venerable Lin could go first.
They said “Welcome.” Our policy is to avoid civil war and to concentrate on the
War of Resistance. We should pay more attention to associating with Gao
Shuangcheng23 in the north and to improving the relationship with the associated
staff officers. Foreign reporters will soon come to Yan’an. We should be prepared
to show them around. We should adopt the policy of establishing a good
relationship with the Guomindang, that is, to carrying out “Confucius plays
mahjong——peace is precious.”24
Dialectics has been the rule in this process. When we carried out the political
offensive toward the Guomindang last year, we primarily emphasized the aspect
of criticizing the Guomindang. Now we should mainly relax our relationship
with the Guomindang. The two aspects should not be emphasized and formulated
at the same time. Otherwise, it will be merely formal logic.
The Guomindang’s prerequisite for negotiation with us is based on the hao telegram25 that we should reduce our armies proportionally. We proposed that
our army could be reorganized into four armies, twelve divisions. Our principles
are the Three People’s Principles and the Four Promises.26 Our Seventh Congress
should also grasp the Three People’s Principles and the Four Promises and
emphasize avoiding civil war, concentrating forces in the anti-Japanese war and
emphasizing peace after the war. We can only reopen the door to negotiation if
we now base it on the hao telegram (though not completely). Our first step will
be first to dispatch Venerable Lin to open the door to negotiations. But concrete
negotiations will be held in the second half of this year.
On the question of constitutional government, our policy is to take part in the
constitutional movement. On the “March 12” commemoration of Sun Yatsen’s
death, both Enlai and Venerable Lin will give speeches. They will emphasize local
self-government, civil rights, and the lifting of the ban on other parties.

---

Notes

Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 92–103, where it is reproduced from the
transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.
public version of these points was delivered by Mao in Yan’an on April 12, 1944 (see text below) and is
included in his Selected Works.
see above, note to the first text of September 15, 1942; he was at this time editor-in-chief of Jiefang ribao and
the New China News Agency.
established in September 1931.
Central Committee.
7, 1931 in Shanghai, at which Wang Ming, with the support of the Comintern, assumed leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party.
and was one of the major leaders of the Party in its early history. During the Long March, he came into
sharp conflict with Mao Zedong and took a different path (see Vol. V, passim). When he and the remnants of
his army finally sought refuge in Yan’an in 1936, he was appointed to major offices in the Party and in the
Border Region Government, but he enjoyed no real power. In April 1938, when he was sent to participate in
a ceremony in Xi’an honoring the Yellow Emperor, he took advantage of the occasion to travel directly to
Hankou to place himself under the protection of the Guomindang.
Scientific by Engels, Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution and Left-wing
Communism: An Infantile Disorder by Lenin, and Short Course on the History of the Soviet Communist Party
Bolsheviks) by Stalin.
of the Guomindang general Xu Kexiang on May 21, 1927 (a “day of the horse” according to the traditional
Chinese calendar). For Mao’s own contemporary account, see the document dated June 13, 1927, in Vol. II, pp.
14–17.
Long March. This conference marked the return of Mao to a central leadership position. The historical
resolution mentioned here was passed at the time of the Seventh Congress; see below, the text of April 20,
1945.
because it was too dangerous to meet in China after Chiang Kaishek’s crackdown on the Communists
beginning in April 1927.
1928)” is translated in Saich, ed., Rise to Power, pp. 341–58.
October 1930.
commander and commissar of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, he was
Secretary of the Yan’an Regional Party Committee.
Committee from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943.
Region Government. “Clear Sky” (qing tian) is a popular phrase referring to an upright official.
Foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. The conference mainly addressed issues
of shortening the war and peace after the war. Regarding the Tehran Conference (held at the end of
November 1943), see above, note to the text of December 16, 1943.
Central Committee in addition to being chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.
mahjong. However, the same character is most often read he, which means “peace.” Thus, in one character
Mao is suggesting a sort of victorious peace, as the same phrase can be read as both “peace is precious” and
victory is precious.”

--- Notes

# Problems Concerning the Study of Lines, the Style of Work, and the Current Political Situation
# Date: 1944-03-05
# Source: en:MRP
# Translated from: zh/1944/1944-03_guan_yu_lu_xian_xue_xi_gong_zuo_zuo_feng_he_shi_ju_wen_ti.txt


mistakes of Comrade Wang Ming and Comrade Bo Gu2 were external to our
Party. We have now determined that they are inner-Party problems.

In the past, some comrades considered the Provisional Central Committee3 and
the Fifth Plenum4 illegitimate. Now we have seen Luo Fu5 saying in his selfexamination notes that the Communist International [Comintern] sent telegrams
approving both the Provisional Central Committee and the Fifth Plenum. On this
basis, we should say that they were legitimate, although the election formalities
were imperfect. The Provisional Central Committee should have reported the
relevant circumstances after moving to the central soviet region, and it is not
good that they did not do so. Once we have resolved the problems mentioned
above, it will be easy for us to examine whether the Fourth Plenum6 was or was
not marked by a mistake in the political line. The Fourth Plenum was recognized
by the Comintern and the Central Committee. Thus its form was legitimate, but
its political content was not good.
Dealing with these issues will help us to distinguish right from wrong in politics and to achieve unity within the Party.

erroneous line of Zhang Guotao,7 two great struggles took place: that against
Chen Duxiu’s8 erroneous line, and that against Li Lisan’s9 erroneous line. At that
time, we did not thoroughly discuss the ideas involved, and yet we drew very
serious conclusions. Therefore, we did not achieve the aim of curing the illness to
save the patient. The overturned cart ahead did not warn the carts behind. This
time, we must clarify our thinking. Currently, the Central Committee requires
that we read five theoretical books10 dealing with the experience of world
revolution. In the past, we did not seriously carry out the work of studying
theory and history, and we only punished those who made mistakes. We did not
clearly realize that the mistake of the [Li] Lisan line was not a problem of an
individual but, rather, represented petty-bourgeois thought. Revolutionary
impetuosity is an inherent characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in a society
where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the majority. It is not an individual and
arbitrary phenomenon but a social phenomenon. The social existence of the
proletariat is also a necessity, and proletarian thought is the union of a

the Southern Anhui Incident,11 we tended to make “Leftist” errors. Some people
thought that it was another “Horse Day Incident”12 and advocated that we carry
out a country-wide insurrection, and so on. As soon as the bourgeoisie touches
us, we jump.
Some of the comrades who took part in the work of the Central Committee
after the Fourth Plenum did not take part in the Great Revolution, but they think
themselves very clever. That is also one of the reasons that they made mistakes.
We should emphasize the social causes of such mistakes, rather than the
problems of individuals, so that our organizational conclusions may be a bit more
magnanimous. This policy should be immediately propagandized and explained
in order to make comrades understand the necessity of carrying it out. Our Party
will benefit only if thought is clear and conclusions are magnanimous. We will
carry out this lenient policy because we are opposed to the erroneous orientation
adopted during the inner-Party struggle after the Fourth Plenum. Otherwise, we
will become students of the Fourth Plenum, and, in that case, we will be unable

the Zunyi Conference. At that time, I worked together with Comrade Bo Gu and


everything. When I wrote “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary
War,”14 I also said that we should preserve the good things. Only this is simply
seeking truth from facts.

I consider that the line of the Sixth Congress was basically correct.16 The Sixth
Congress pointed out the nature of the revolution, put forward ten political
principles, pointed out that the situation at that time was between two high tides,
opposed the theory of a quick victory, and pointed out that we should strive to
win over the masses. The basic spirit of the Sixth Congress included the mass
viewpoint. It is Li Lisan who did not want the masses. After war broke out
among Chiang [Kaishek], Feng [Yuxiang], and Yan [Xishan],17 Li Lisan then
came to believe that the revolutionary situation had reached a high tide and that
an insurrection should be carried out, even under conditions in which the masses
were not well prepared.

very bad. This attitude changed after the Senior Cadres Conference.19 It has made
great progress.
on October 19, 1940; see above, note to the text of March 16, 1943.
Guomindang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” dated
July 15, 1937 (in the name of Zhou Enlai), but not publicly released until September 22, 1937, by the
Guomindang’s Central News Agency. The text is available in the English version of the Selected Works of
Zhou Enlai, Vol.1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), pp. 93–95, and in Saich, ed., Rise to Power, pp. 771–
3, with the Four Promises on pp. 772–73, in short: upholding the Three People’s Principles, ceasing anti-Guomindang agitation, halting land reform, and changing the Red Army into a branch of the Guomindang
military structure.


--- Notes

3. Problems of clarifying thought and magnanimity in judgment.

1. This is a speech delivered by Mao Zedong at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee. The

2. On Wang Ming, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943. On Bo Gu, pseudonym of Qin Bangxian,

3. Referring to the Provisional Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,

4. Referring to the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in midJanuary 1934 in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. This plenum came to be seen as the summit of the “leftist” line.
5. Luo Fu, pseudonym of Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), was at this time a member of the Politburo of the

6. Referring to the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held on January

7. Zhang Guotao (1897–1979) participated in the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921

8. For that earlier discussion on Party history and on Chen Duxiu, see above, the text of March 30, 1942.
9. On Li Lisan, see above, the text of March 30, 1942.
10. The five books include Manifesto of the Communist Party by Marx and Engels, Socialism: Utopian and

11. On the Southern Anhui Incident, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943.
12. The reference is to the massacre of large numbers of peasants in Hunan by forces under the command

13. The Zunyi Conference was held from January 15 to 17, 1935, in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, during the

14. A textbook originally for internal use by the Eighth Route Army but openly published in Yan’an in
1941. It is dated December 1936 and is translated in Vol. V, pp. 465–538.
15. The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Moscow in June and July 1928

16. The “Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress [of the Chinese Communist Party] (July 9,

17. Referring to the large-scale war between Chiang Kaishek, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan from May to

18. On Wang Zhen, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943; at this time in addition to being the

19. Referring to the Senior Cadres Conference held in Yan’an by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central

20. Referring to Ma Xiwu (1889–1962), a Shaanxi local serving at that time in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border

21. The Moscow Conference was held in Moscow from October 19 to October 30, 1943, and attended by the

22. On Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942; at this time he was a member of the

23. Gao Shuangcheng (1882–1945) was at this time commander of the Guomindang Twenty-second Army.
24. Mao is making a pun; the character  in this sentence can be read hu and is called out when one wins at

25. The hao telegram refers to a telegram sent by Chiang Kaishek to the leaders of the Eighth Route Army

26. The Four Promises are the four items proposed by the Chinese Communist Party in “Announcement of