Directive to Various Areas Concerning
Opposing the Erroneous Idea of Too
Many Spies1
(February 26, 1944)
Deng [Xiaoping] and Teng [Daiyuan]2 to transmit to Central China, Shandong,
and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei:
Your telegrams of February 16 and February 19, as well as Li Da’s and Xuefeng’s
of February 15, have all been received. Your cadre investigation work has already
entered into the Confession movement [tanbai yundong] and has made some
accomplishments. This is very good. In order to make present and future work
progress more smoothly and correctly, we must understand that the anti-spy
struggle is a covert and pointed struggle. Because the enemy is hidden, before
spies are discovered the general tendency in the Party is apathy and inattention
to what seems familiar. And because the struggle is pointed, after spies are
discovered, especially during the Confession movement, the tendency in the
Party can easily shift to “too many spies” and “mistaking grasses and trees for
soldiers.” This sort of first Right and then Left is the general rule for anti-traitor
deviations. Moreover, the move from Right to Left can be extremely quick.
Because of this, when undertaking the anti-traitor struggle leading organs must
correct Rightist deviations in areas where the anti-traitor struggle has not yet
begun and protect against Leftist deviations in areas where the anti-traitor
struggle has already begun, especially in areas where the Confession movement
is under way—and this must be done on the basis of the Center’s directive on the
nine guiding principles for cadre investigations,3 as well as careful study of the

January 24 telegram4 on analysis of the six elements of confession—while paying
attention to the following issues:
1. Use the Confession movement in a flexible manner. Don’t mechanically
apply the experience of Yan’an’s various organs. Since the rectification and cadre
screening began, the Confession movement has already adopted two forms. In
areas in which rectification and cadre screening have been pursued in separate
stages, the confession of errors inside the Party and the confession of espionage
activities have been carried out separately. However, when the Confession
movement is carried out during rectification, then the confession of ideological
problems principally follows the model of inner-Party struggle and when the
Confession movement is carried out during cadre screening, then confession of
espionage problems principally follows the model of anti-traitor struggle; various
units in Yan’an for the most part adopted this distinction. In addition, in areas
where rectification and cadre screening are carried out together, the confession of
inner-Party errors and the confession of espionage issues are likewise
interconnected. A few military units in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and
most of the Central China Bureau adopted this composite model. This model is
for the most part inner-Party rectification. Its content is not limited to confession
of espionage issues; it permits and welcomes confessions of inner-Party errors.
Even if a spy has been discovered, if there are no reliable materials, then for the
time being do not pursue the matter further. This will help us to investigate and
collect material evidence, to interpret leniency policies, to enlighten the self-awareness of those who confess, not just to create an atmosphere of antagonism
but to make it easier for those with problems to draw close to the Party. For
departments in the Northern Bureau that frequently endure the battle conditions
of the mopping-up campaign behind enemy lines, it will serve no good purpose to
turn so many people into our enemies. Therefore, we ask you to consider
carefully whether this form of the Confession movement is more suitable to your
circumstances.
2. Correctly assess the strength of the enemy. Those of you in battle conditions
behind enemy lines should not underestimate the importance of enemy scouts
and Nationalist spies in wrecking us. Therefore, you must resolutely and
correctly carry out the anti-traitor struggle, while at the same time you
absolutely must not exaggerate the strength of the enemy. And you absolutely must not regard every student, intellectual, soldier, man of culture, technician,
and so forth, who have come from enemy or Guomindang areas, nor all halfhearted people who have committed errors nor even those who have confessed
and criminals as spies to be taken into custody. It is not permissible to view all
Leftist revolutionary groups organized by the Party in enemy or Nationalist areas
as Red Flag policy spy organizations. The experience in Yan’an has already
demonstrated that spies amount to only about 10 percent of those who have
confessed and new intellectuals are for the most part all good. You must pay
attention to these experiences. Thus, of eight hundred rectification cadres, some
30 percent had problems, and it was necessary to investigate them carefully but
not to view them all as spies. According to our general judgment, there are
certainly spies among them, but they will not exceed 10 percent of those who
have already confessed.
3. During the Confession movement continually educate cadres on how to
carry out investigations, hunt out genuine evidence, and avoid easily believing
statements made under interrogation. Make sure cadres understand that without
proper investigation and lacking genuine evidence, it is extremely difficult to
determine whether a person is right or wrong, or how serious the matter is. Thus,
on the matter before us concerning XX, XX, XX, and others,5 do not rely solely
on oral testimony to confirm the problem. You must collect reliable evidence
from various sides (including oral testimonies) and on the basis of concrete
evidence determine whether or not they are spies.
4. Uphold the principle of “not one killed and only a few apprehended” (not to
exceed 5 percent of the suspects). Do not simply arrest those who have not
confessed at confession rallies. In places where the Confession movement has
already been mobilized, you must deeply and widely teach the cadres and the
masses of the dangers of giving credence to forced confessions, discuss in detail
the directives of the Central Committee, make them understand the great danger
and the immense harm of giving credence to forced confessions. Not only can
these comrades be wrong, but they necessarily serve the secret plots of the spies
to malign us. When interviewing those who have confessed, do not subjectively
track people suspected of having connections with them or arbitrarily associate
them with any organizations. This way inevitably leads to the realm of forced
confessions. There were a few units and schools in Yan’an and Suide that sought out numerous organized systems, from such groups as the Fuxing [Renaissance]
Society, the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps, and the Guomindang local
Party committees. But in fact, they were all false. Physical torture and disguised
physical torture are strictly prohibited in interrogations. Experience has shown
that wherever there is anti-traitor struggle these phenomena are inevitable. There
is a county in Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] that has twenty-four types of
physical torture, and even in Yan’an there are a few units and schools where
phenomena such as binding, beating, dragging, and hanging have occurred. Thus,
you must tirelessly promote education on this, establish firm regulations and
propagandize firm discipline, and moreover from time to time carry out
inspections, constantly opposing the error of giving credence to forced
confessions. You must personally grasp this tightly and call upon various
important cadres also to grasp this tightly, thereby implementing a system in
which leaders take responsibility because a little carelessness can produce
disorder.
5. By raising these points, we do not mean to say that you have already
exhibited these erroneous tendencies but, rather, on the basis of the experience of
various areas, to inform you and to draw your attention to them. As for the
problem of XX, now it is most important to collect reliable evidence. If we just
arrest those people for whom we lack evidence, it will be very difficult to get
them to clarify the issues. Thus, at present, when it is possible to keep a strict
watch over them and there is no chance that they can escape, postpone taking
them into custody.
Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng