The various policies our Party has put forward during the War of Resistance have all been effective and have proved correct.

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Currently, there are ten essential policies, and they must be implemented in an interconnected manner.

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I. Struggle Against the Enemy.

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region must prepare to struggle against the provocations of Hu Zongnan, the Kuomintang diehards, and Chiang Kai-shek—that is, military preparations must be made to further consolidate the army politically and enhance it militarily.

This winter, we must launch a large-scale training campaign, with all officers and soldiers intensively shifting into a major training movement, training each person to be able to fight two enemies.

The Border Region now has 50,000 troops—if they are all well trained, how could they not be able to fight?

Bear in mind that when the three front armies of the Red Army joined forces, there were only 25,000 men, and when the Red Army was reorganized, there were only 45,000. Now that the Border Region has 50,000 troops, and well-trained ones at that, can we not handle affairs smoothly?

In the large-scale training, we must earnestly implement the methods of leaders taking responsibility and personally engaging in action, combining the leading core with the broad masses of soldiers, and integrating general calls with specific guidance.

After the Senior Cadres’ Conference, this will be the responsibility of the regiment commanders and political commissars of each brigade.

We must learn from the approach of a company commander in the Sixth Brigade who cared for his soldiers by inspecting their dormitories and sentry posts at midnight, and learn from the spirit of Regiment Commander Chen Zongyao, who carried rice and opened up wasteland alongside his soldiers.

No matter what shortcomings our comrades may have, as long as they are willing to correct them and possess the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, they can handle affairs smoothly.

All those who can become one with the masses are Marxists-Leninists and can become leaders of the masses; we must vigorously promote this style of work within the army.

Over a past period, it was not good that some comrades in the armed forces adopted a domineering and arrogant attitude toward the Party, the government, and the people.

It is correct to use a domineering approach toward the enemy—toward the enemy we must be ruthless—but it is wrong to use a domineering approach toward the people, the Party, and the government. Toward the people and the masses, we must apply the way of benevolence.

We must have two attitudes: a domineering one toward the enemy and a benevolent one toward the people.

This point must be remembered very firmly.

During the Lunar New Year this year, we shall again launch a movement to support the government and cherish the people, and once more promulgate a convention. It shall begin with the armed forces, then extend to the Party and government, with both sides engaging in self-criticism.

We must spread and pass down the practice of the army becoming one with the people. This is the fundamental difference between a proletarian army and a bourgeois army.

We support the people, fight the enemy for the people, apply the way of benevolence toward the people, adopt an attitude of self-criticism, and oppose warlordist tendencies.

Our weapon is criticism and self-criticism. Among cadres, between officers and soldiers, and between the army and the people, if we bring problems out into the open and conduct criticism and self-criticism, we can eliminate what is wrong and achieve genuine unity.

II. Better Troops and Simpler Administration.

This is an important measure and is already being implemented.

III. Unified Leadership.

Implementing unified, centralized leadership is very important; we must establish a leadership core [2].

Wherever this policy has not yet been sufficiently carried out, it should be properly addressed immediately.

IV. Support the Government and Cherish the People.

Conduct this once a year to examine the year’s shortcomings and mistakes, make self-criticism before the people, and promulgate a convention annually.

The Central Committee is preparing to issue a unified convention of ten articles each on supporting the government and cherishing the people and on supporting the army, to be implemented in all regions.

The core of all issues is the problem of the common people. The armed people (the army) and the unarmed people must become one; this can only be achieved through policies. As long as the army supports the government and cherishes the people, the government and the people will care for the army.

Our army and its cadres have “stormed through prefectures and passed through counties,” have endured the 25,000-li Long March, and are widely experienced and knowledgeable.

Our army is the organizer and propagandist of the Chinese people and is the most politically conscious.

The Party within the army is the most advanced; it should help establish local Party and government organs, cherish them, and cherish the people.

As long as the army’s attitude toward the people is good, the people’s attitude cannot be bad.

In the past, some leading comrades of the Left-behind Corps kept saying that the people of the Border Region were not good and did not care for the army.

But we must ask: What has our army’s attitude toward the people been?

What things have we done for the people?

We must first examine ourselves and reproach ourselves. As the saying goes, “Partial listening leads to ignorance; listening to all sides leads to enlightenment.” It is this method that we must put into practice.

V. Develop Production.

I would like to speak particularly on the issue of organizing the labor force.

As for temporarily organized labor, in Yan’an County it accounts for 70 percent, and next year there will be further development and improvement.

The vast majority of counties in the Border Region should emulate Yan’an County and organize the labor force into forms of collective labor. Among these, temporarily organized labor should constitute the majority, while regularly organized labor should, based on the conditions in each county, be raised from one-tenth to two- or three-tenths, reaching approximately 100,000 people.

In addition, there are semi-able-bodied laborers, who also form a labor army.

What shackled the development of the Border Region’s productive forces was the former feudal exploitative relations. In half of the region, these feudal exploitative relations were completely destroyed through the Agrarian Revolution, while in the other half they were dealt a blow through the reduction of rent and interest.

That was the Agrarian Revolution—the first revolution.

However, if we do not carry out a second reform of the relations of production, that is, the mode of production—shifting from individual labor to collective labor—the productive forces cannot develop further.

By developing mutual-aid labor organizations based on the individual economy, namely the peasants’ agricultural production cooperatives, production can be greatly increased, doubling or more than doubling.

If all the labor power in the Border Region were organized into collective mutual-aid labor organizations, the harvest from the region’s 14 million mu of arable land would more than double.

This method can be extended to the whole country in the future and will merit a special chapter in China’s economic history.

In such a reform, the tools of production have not changed at all, but the relations of production among people have changed.

The two transformations—from agrarian reform to the development of mutual-aid labor organizations—constitute a revolution in the production system.

Army units, government offices, and schools must vigorously promote cooperatives and advocate cooperative modes of production. For example, a company can be regarded as a form of cooperative.

Based on the experience of Yangjialing, the transport team was transformed into a cooperative, adopting a system of shareholding and profit-sharing on a 20-80 basis: the public side contributed eight large carts, 22 pack mules, and all equipment as 80 shares, while the 22 transport team members contributed as 20 shares; the public side paid transport fees by weight.

The result was that monthly transport capacity rose from only 190,000 jin to over 389,000 jin—an increase of 100 percent. Moreover, tools were conserved, the draft animals were better cared for, and a large amount of public funds was saved.

This method has been widely applied among the organs and schools directly under the Central Committee and the Military Commission and has yielded great results.

The transport battalion of the Central Administration Bureau, with 100 animals and 20 large carts, transported 1.2 million jin per month before forming a cooperative; after reorganization into a cooperative, its monthly transport capacity rose to 1.85 million jin—an increase of 50 percent.

Therefore, I ask everyone to consider whether this cooperative method can be widely applied in factories and farms.

The issue of cooperatives is fundamentally a question of the mass viewpoint; we must think of the masses.

Whether or not one has the mass viewpoint is the fundamental difference between us and the Kuomintang. The mass viewpoint is the starting point and the ultimate goal of Communists in making revolution.

“From the masses, to the masses”; to think about problems starting from the masses makes everything easier to handle.

Leading comrades in the army must think on behalf of the soldiers; leading comrades in government offices and schools must think on behalf of the communal kitchens and the support staff; all Communists must think on behalf of the people.

VI. Rectify the Three Styles.

The Border Region has made achievements in this regard and must continue the work.

VII. Examine Cadres.

The struggle against espionage must continue to be waged.

VIII. Class Education.

Class education is education on current affairs. It was carried out on a large scale for three months this time and must continue, to deflate the arrogance of others and boost our own morale.

IX. Reduction of Rent and Interest.

In many base areas it has not been thoroughly implemented; in some places in the Border Region it has also not been done well, and it must continue.

Even if Kuomintang-Communist relations break down, we will still carry out reduction of rent and interest and will not implement the Agrarian Revolution.

X. The “Three-Thirds System” [6].

By persistently carrying through the above ten major policies, we will be able to cope with the Japanese imperialist aggression and with the possible rupture of Kuomintang-Communist relations.

At present, the most important tasks for all base areas are four: first, struggle against the enemy—that is, fighting the enemy and recovering lost territory; second, developing production—that is, securing food; third, rectifying the three styles—that is, correcting unhealthy tendencies; fourth, examining cadres—that is, the struggle against espionage.

If these four tasks are done well, the Party can be consolidated. For now, it is only fairly consolidated, not yet fully so.

Struggling against the enemy and recovering lost territory is a very vital issue.

If we do not push back, though we have two feet, we will have no place to stand.

In six years of war, behind enemy lines the enemy has squeezed us as if from the bottom of a teapot up to its waist and then to its rim. Now we absolutely must squeeze our way back down from the teapot’s rim.

If Chiang Kai-shek tries to squeeze us and squeeze the Border Region, we are prepared to squeeze him back, no matter what.

Regarding production and securing food, all cadres in the Party must learn this skill; it can be learned in just half a year.

Such creative efforts by the masses have solved a major problem for the revolution.

The army can pay its own expenses; we have ways to support an army of thousands upon thousands.

Every brigade should establish a rear base.

Didn’t the KMT used to say we had “fled back to our old lair”? In the past, we had no “lair.”

Here in northern Shaanxi, relying on the Qiao Mountain range, we can indeed build a deep and sound “lair” — one the enemy cannot penetrate, with agriculture, industry, and commerce inside, with cattle, sheep, chickens, and dogs, with women and children, and with production teams.

This must be carefully planned; we must, like Commander-in-Chief Zhu De said, properly build up a revolutionary household.

Since the War of Resistance began, the Kuomintang has used its secret-agent policy to try to undermine us from within. Our anti-espionage struggle has foiled this KMT scheme.

To carry out the three tasks of struggling against the enemy, developing production, and examining cadres, we must launch criticism and self-criticism—that is the method of rectifying the three styles.

Last year’s Senior Cadres’ Conference [10] clearly distinguished between two lines and overcame the erroneous thinking existing among cadres. But we must also distinguish between two kinds of attitudes toward our work.

We must study the methods of Marxism-Leninism. Some comrades think they have a great deal of Marxism-Leninism, but in practice, when they come into contact with actual work, one could say they have not caught even a whiff of Marxism-Leninism.

The basic method of Marxism-Leninism is the method of analysis. One must speak honestly in order to correct mistakes and seek progress.

If one is self-righteous, refrains from analyzing the work as a whole, talks only about achievements, and is afraid to speak of shortcomings and mistakes, it is impossible to advance the work.

Work is an integrated whole; if we analyze it, point out its achievements and shortcomings, and carry out criticism and self-criticism, that is the analytical method.

We must also draw conclusions about our work—that is, we must synthesize.

Without analysis, there can be no synthesis. Synthesis is the result of analysis, and analysis is the means of synthesis. One must dissect a thing before being able to summarize.

Some comrades who are guilty of subjectivism do not understand the method of analysis.

Last year's conference of senior cadres, the military and political cadres' conference, the conference of junior cadres of the 120th Division, and so forth all applied criticism and self-criticism, carried out correct analysis, dissected what was uniform to study its various aspects, and only then reached correct conclusions.

Another example is financial and economic issues—without conducting analytical work, such problems cannot be resolved.

Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin all undertook the work of meticulous possession of materials and meticulous analysis. How much more so should we?

In our work, we must maintain a humble attitude, recognize our own deficiencies, and avoid becoming puffed up with pride. We should not assume that being a leading official makes us extraordinary; we must be conscious of our shortcomings.

We need to exchange views with others and sincerely listen to their opinions.

We must constantly bear in mind that we have shortcomings, errors, and inadequacies; only in this way can we make progress.

Language, writing, and thought reflect objective reality, but for the laws of objective reality to be reflected as laws in the form of ideas requires hundreds or thousands of repetitions before they can become relatively accurate.

We must combat subjectivism and oppose arrogant self-importance.

We judge a comrade by one standard: whether he possesses a humble attitude.

In Marxist-Leninist methodology, criticism and self-criticism is one principle, and opposition to the theory of spontaneity is another.

Before last year's conference of senior cadres, the theory of spontaneity was very prevalent. For instance, in the case of extreme financial and economic difficulties, instead of devising solutions, various doctrines and work were simply allowed to drift along on their own.

There was also a great deal of liberalism in politics and organization—no criticism was made, no struggle was waged, and no rigorous supervision was exercised over work.

We Communists must not have liberalism; we must strive for the best, combat passive tendencies, criticize mistakes, seek unity through struggle, integrate with the people, overcome difficulties, and transform the world. This is Marxism-Leninism.

The principle of seeking unity through struggle must be applied to four categories.

The first is the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie.

Through struggle, we must raise the bourgeoisie to the level of endorsing the anti-Japanese program; the proletariat can lead the bourgeoisie.

We must act according to reality, not according to books, whereas Wang Ming [11] opposed the proletariat leading the bourgeoisie, saying that Lenin never spoke of this.

The second is the proletariat versus the peasantry.

This is a category entirely different from the first.

The peasantry are small producers, petty bourgeoisie, and our most reliable allies. We must adopt a comradely attitude toward the peasants, seek unity through struggle, and raise the peasants to the level of accepting the Communist Party's program.

The third is within the ranks of the proletariat itself.

We must seek unity through struggle, oppose all backward ideas that split the proletariat, and combat Menshevik thinking within the proletarian ranks.

The fourth is within the Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat.

We must develop criticism and self-criticism, oppose all opportunist ideas, and seek unity through struggle.

There are three fundamental methods of Marxism-Leninism: first, linking theory with practice; second, opposing the theory of spontaneity; and third, criticism and self-criticism.

Criticism is of two types. One is correct criticism, the result of which is unity within the Party; the other is incorrect criticism, like the criticism at the Fourth Plenum [12] and the Fifth Plenum [13], the result of which was division within the Party.

We must promote correct criticism and oppose incorrect criticism—this is rectification.

We must continue to eliminate unhealthy tendencies, and I believe everyone will certainly be able to unite and work as one, and will surely do the job well.

Based on a transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes

[1] This is part of Mao Zedong's speech at the senior cadres' conference of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[2] "One state with three rulers" is a metaphor for the lack of unified authority, leaving people at a loss as to whom to follow. It comes from the "Fifth Year of Duke Xi" in the *Zuo Commentary*: "[Shi] withdrew and recited a verse: 'The fox fur is all matted; one state has three rulers—whom should I follow?'" The three rulers refer to Duke Xian of Jin and his sons Chong'er and Yiwu during the Spring and Autumn period. Mao Zedong cited this allusion here to stress that the Party, government, and military in the anti-Japanese base areas at the time should have unified leadership, should not have policies issued from multiple sources, and should coordinate and cooperate in their work.

[3] "Till three, spare one" means cultivating land for three years and saving up one year's worth of grain. The "Royal Regulations" chapter of the *Book of Rites* states: "After three years of cultivation, there must be a year's supply of food; after nine years of cultivation, there must be three years' supply of food." During the War of Resistance against Japan, the large-scale production campaign led by the Chinese Communist Party put forward the slogan "Till three, spare one," calling on peasants to engage actively in production, practice strict economy, and ensure each household had four months' surplus grain annually.

[4] "Labor-exchange teams" and "labor-hiring teams" were both mutual-aid agricultural labor organizations based on the individual economy in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. "Labor exchange" meant swapping labor, a method by which peasants mutually adjusted labor power, including swapping human labor for human labor, animal labor for animal labor, human labor for animal labor, and so on. Peasants in a labor-exchange team would take turns using their own labor or animal power to cultivate each team member's household land; at settlement time, those who contributed extra human or animal labor were compensated in wages by those who contributed less. "Labor-hiring teams" were generally formed by peasants with insufficient land. Besides mutual labor exchange within the team, members of labor-hiring teams mainly worked collectively as hired hands for households needing labor.

[5] "Partnership farming," also called "joint farming cultivation," was a form of labor exchange. Typically, participants in partnership farming were two peasant households with roughly similar production conditions—in terms of human labor, animal power, land, etc.—and tied by kinship or familial relations. They would pool all their human labor, animal power, tools, and land to cultivate together, dividing the harvest equally. In some cases, "partnership farming" meant jointly reclaiming wasteland and dividing the harvest equally. In other cases, it meant jointly renting land from landlords, cultivating it together, and dividing the harvest equally after paying the rent.

[6] "Three-thirds system," see note [8] on page 25 of this volume.

[7] Nie Rongzhen was then Secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region of the Eighth Route Army.

[8] Zhou Yang was then Director of the Central Cultural Work Committee of the Communist Party of China and President of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature. Chen Boda was then Deputy Director of the Central Political Research Office of the Communist Party of China. Fan Wenlan was then working in the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

[9] Wang Zhen (1908–1992), a native of Liuyang, Hunan, was then Brigade Commander and Political Commissar of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[10] Refers to the senior cadres' conference convened by the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943.

[11] Wang Ming, i.e., Chen Shaoyu (1904–1974), a native of Jinzhai, Anhui. From the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1931, he served as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau and was a principal representative of the third "Left" deviationist line. In November 1931, he went to Moscow as the CCP's representative to the Comintern. He returned to China in November 1937 and subsequently served as Secretary of the Yangtze River Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. In the early period of the War of Resistance against Japan, he advanced many proposals of a Right capitulationist nature. He had more faith in the Kuomintang than in the Communist Party, dared not fully mobilize the masses or develop the people's armed forces, dared not expand the liberated areas in Japanese-occupied territory, advocated "everything through the united front," and proposed handing the leadership of the War of Resistance to the Kuomintang. Because the correct line represented by Mao Zedong had already become dominant in the entire Party, these errors by Wang Ming only held sway for a brief period in certain localities.

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If some leading comrades harbor resentment in their hearts, they should turn toward the center and oppose the situation of “one country with three masters.” Let everyone speak out, conduct analysis, and carry out criticism and self-criticism, thereby achieving unity and unification.


In agricultural production, we must achieve “plowing three years to yield a year’s surplus” [3], to prepare for war and for natural disasters.


This year, the Border Region has seen a revolution: out of 350,000 able-bodied laborers across the region, over 30,000—roughly one-tenth of the total—are regularly organized in collective labor groups such as work-exchange teams and hired-labor teams [4].


Our farms, run on a sharecropping basis [5], are in fact cooperative in nature; of course, methods other than sharecropping, such as direct cultivation, can also be adopted.


It must be earnestly implemented. Even if Kuomintang-Communist relations break down, the ten major policies will not change, and the “Three-Thirds System” policy will not change either.


According to what Comrade Nie Rongzhen [7] reported on his return, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area has recovered some territory, and southeastern Shanxi has recovered territory with a population of 1.4 million.


In the past, this was the business of the heads of general affairs, the finance departments, and the construction departments. Now, the chiefs of all army units, the leading comrades of all government offices, and the heads of all schools must learn it; even literati and scholars such as Zhou Yang, Chen Boda, and Fan Wenlan [8] have all learned it.


As for production by army units, when Comrade Wang Zhen [9] drew up his plan in February this year, he set a target of each person opening up six mu of wasteland. Many people opposed it at the time, but as things actually developed, the average per person reached 18 mu of wasteland opened.


[12] The Fourth Plenum refers to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. With the support of the Comintern and its representative Mif, Wang Ming and others gained leading positions in the CPC Central Committee through this meeting, ushering in a period of "Left" adventurist domination within the Party that lasted over four years.


[13] The Fifth Plenum refers to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in mid-January 1934 in Ruijin, Jiangxi. This meeting erroneously concluded that a "direct revolutionary situation" already existed in China and that the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" "was precisely the struggle to win complete victory for the revolution," pushing the "Left" errors to their peak.