YENAN AUTHORITIES COMMENT ON TALKS BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNIST
PARTY, EXPLAINING THE NECESSITY TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH
COMMAND TO AVERT THE CURRENT CRISIS

September 1944

[Text] It has been 4 1/2 months since Comrade Lin Po-chu [2651 0130 3255]
opened negotiations with government representatives Chang Chih-chung [1728
3112 0022] and Wang Shih-chieh [3769 0013 2638] in Sian. During this long
period of time, although the CCP Central Committee and its representatives
are very tolerant, patient and compromising, there have been no results
whatsoever because of the government side's obstinacy in its wrong policy,
lack of sincerity and playing politics. There has been no solution to any
concrete problem, even the most trivial ones. The proceedings of the negotiations have been reported to the National Assembly, which resolved to
organize an inspection group to visit Yenan. So the 4 1/2 months of
Kuomintang-CCP negotiations have come to an end. Therefore, we may make
a general comment on these negotiations. When Comrade Lin Po-chu went
to Chungking, the Japanese bandits' attack on the Chinese mainland was
just starting. In view of the Kuomintang's wrong policies, which had
placed the country in danger over the years--such as its negative and
bystander's attitude toward the war and its reliance on the Allies to fight
the Japanese in military affairs, its tyranny and dictatorship in politics,
its monopoly in economic affairs, and its oppressive control in cultural
affairs--the CCP Central Committee foresaw that China's war of resistance
would encounter serious military setbacks and political and economic crises
before the new Japanese offensive. To avoid the crisis, the CCP Central
Committee sent Comrade Lin Po-chu to Chungking. The CCP standpoint and
principles in these negotiations had already been stated in a Letter of
Opinion submitted to the National Government on 5 June. The letter began:
"The CCP believes that overcoming the present difficulties, defeating the
Japanese attack, and earnestly preparing for a counteroffensive can be
achieved only by carrying out democracy and strengthening unity. For this
purpose, the CCP hopes the government will resolve a number of urgent
problems." From this Letter of Opinion one can perceive the CCP's calm
and clear understanding of the situation, its great sense of responsibility
toward the country and the nation, and its impartial and sincere attitude.
The Kuomintang government, on the contrary, saw no gravity in the current
situation, entertained an unwarranted optimistic viewpoint, and showed no

IN REPLY TO CHANG CHIH-CHUNG

inclination to blame itself for bringing the country and the nation to such
a critical situation. During the negotiations the government side was
arrogant and assertive in an attempt to put the interest of one party or one
faction above that of the nation and to compel others to obey. Once we look
at the government's proposal of 6 June we will know everything. The proposal
did not mention a single word about the war of resistance (this deserves
our utmost attention). Not a single word touched upon the current difficult
and dangerous situation. There was no hint of any intention on the part
of the government to start anew or to abandon the policy that endangered the
country. This proposal wanted to "abolish by a definite date" four-fifths
of the armed forces which rendered outstanding meritorious services behind
enemy lines and engaged five-sixths of the enemy and puppet troops. That is
to say, this proposal would permit these armed forces to be reorganized into
10 divisions with each division consisting of about 10,000 men, the same
number of men for each Kuomintang division. The total number is 100,000 men.
The other 370,000 regular troops must be "abolished," and "abolished" quickly.
Is this not the tone of the Japanese? What the Japanese bandits fail to
eliminate by all designs and cruel war will be accomplished by the gentlemen
of the Kuomintang government through a piece of paper. If these troops
were really abolished, wouldn't they be awarded by Emperor Hirohito with
the highest order of decoration? This proposal also wanted the democratic
regimes which are elected by the people in China's liberated areas through
democratic methods, closely related by blood and flesh to the people behind
enemy lines, sharing happiness and hardships with the people, and resolutely
providing leadership in the war of resistance, to be abolished and "to be
taken over without exception by officials of the respective local provincial
governments." But where are these so-called "provincial governments?" No-
body knows what corner of the world they have fled to. What relationship
do they really have with the people and the hard and outstanding struggle
of the people. If one day we find where they are, these high officials
of the provincial governments should be given fair treatment; that is,
"dismissal pending investigation and punishment."
In addition, there are
many traitors who are hiding in these so-called provincial governments.
Were Pang Ping-hsun [7894 3521 8133] and Shih Yu-san [4258 0645 0005],
the two thieves who sold out their country, not those provincial governors?
As to provincial government commissioners, a countless number of them
either surrendered to the enemy or rebelled against their own country,
In summary, this proposal is favorable only to the Japanese aggressors,
reflecting the will of those who pursue their private interest and forget
the interest of their country and nation. This so-called proposal is the
crystallization of the despicable will of a small group of fascist elements
in the Kuomintang who pursue only the private interest of their own faction
without any sense of righteousness for their nation. This proposal cannot
and should not be accepted by any real patriot, because accepting this kind
of proposal is tantamount to giving aid to the Japanese aggressors.

As to the attitude of the two parties during the negotiations, the Communist
side has always been earnest, sincere, and compromising, while the
Kuomintang side has been arrogant and playing dirty tricks. Let us talk

about the Letter of Opinion offered by the CCP Central Committee. The Central
Committee cabled Comrade Lin Po-chu on 21 May to make a 20-article proposal.
The proposal was delivered to Chang and Wang. After reading the proposal,
the two said: "The way this is written is not any different from exposing
the crimes of the Kuomintang." The proposal was rejected. After learning
of the rejection, the Central Committee reduced the proposal to 12 articles
and instructed its negotiator to propose the other 8 articles verbally during
the negotiations. On 5 June, Chang and Wang still refused to forward the
proposal to the government. After many days of argument, the proposal was
finally transmitted to the government. From this instance alone one can see
that the CCP Central Committee, to show respect for the opinions of the
other side, did not mind compromising by reducing the formal articles for
the sake of the success of the negotiations. On the contrary, the government
representatives fully showed their rascal-like faces, because transmittal
of the opposite side's opinion to the organization they represent is the
minimum duty and obligation of the representatives in any negotiations. To
agree on negotiating and at the same time refuse to transmit the opinion
of the opposite side is seldom seen in any negotiations. We don't know how
to describe this kind of attitude except by calling it "rascal-like" or
"scoundrel-like."

In addition, government representative Chang Chih-chung and Chiang Kai-shek
himself declared again and again in the National Assembly: "What the
Central Government demands is only unification of military command and
political command" (Chang). "The Central Government has stated repeatedly
that we want only unification of military command and unification of
political command" (Chiang). Concerning this point, we announce the following: We resolutely support the unification of political and military
command, but political command must represent the people's will, and
military command must be favorable to the war of resistance. If political
command leads the country toward fascist tyranny, and if military command
causes defeat in the war of resistance, then patriotic and democratic
fighters of China can never obey them, and such commands should never be
allowed to be unified. The Chinese people solemnly despise this kind of
counterrevolutionary, rotten tone of unification. The crucial point is
that the Kuomintang government's political and military commands are
exactly this kind of thing: political command is fascist command, and
military command is defeatist command. To use this kind of political
command and military command to unify the country will not only be like
"climbing a tree to look for fish." but also invite great disaster that
would spell death for the nation if unity were really achieved. Let us
not talk about remote things. Take the events that occurred during the
negotiations. For example, Chiang Ting-wen [5592 7844 2429],
Tang En-po, Hu Tsung-nan [5170 1350 0589] and Hsueh Yueh [5641 1471] are
so-called "loyally obedient" to the political and military commands of
the Kuomintang government. The result is that they are routed without a
fight, or routed as soon as they come into contact with the enemy. They
lost their troops and territory, played havoc among the ordinary people,
and made themselves a world laughingstock. On the contrary, the 8th Route
Army and the New 4th Army, accused by the Kuomintang of "destroying the

unity of military and political commands," win battles every day and recover
territories every day. Their actions are really beneficial to the unity of
the country and the nation. This kind of clear contrast proves that the
political command and military command of the Kuomintang government have no
value at all. Thus, if we want to talk about unity of military and political
command today, we must thoroughly change the nature of the military and
political command. In order to change the nature of the military command
and political command, we must thoroughly change the military, political,
economic and cultural policies of the Kuomintang government, thoroughly
reorganize the government and the command headquarters and chase out those
capitulationists, defeatists, dictators and fascist elements, let those who
can really represent the interest of the people control the political and
economic commands, and make it possible for them to represent all the
strength of the country and the will of the people. We must do this so
that we can avert the present crisis and win the war of resistance. We
must do this so that we can talk about unity of military command and political command. We must do this so that unity of military command and
political command can be beneficial to the country and the nation. Concerning the reorganization of the present corrupt, incompetent Kuomintang
oligarchical and dictatorial government, which has failed to devote its
full effort to the war of resistance, Comrade Lin Po-chu mentioned this
in his report to the National Assembly. It was really timely. Comrade
Lin Po-chu's rebuttal of the Kuomintang government's proposal, contained
in his letter to Wang Shih-chieh and Chang Chih-chung dated 30 August,
is entirely in conformity with the principles of the war of resistance,
unity and democracy. People in Yenan still hope that Chang and Wang will
come to Yenan for an inspection and continued negotiations. As to the
election of five assemblymen by the National Assembly for an inspection
trip to Yenan, it is a very good move. We wish to express our welcome.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO [Liberation Daily], 20 September 1944.

* "Reference Materials on China's New Democratic Revolution," April 1951.

* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution," Vol 4,
Chinese People's University, 1957.

* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party,"
Vol 4.