The 1942 autumn harvest has arrived. All base areas must instruct Party and government bodies at all levels to inspect the implementation of the rent reduction policy. Wherever rent reduction has not been earnestly implemented, it must be implemented this year without exception. Where it has been implemented but not thoroughly, it must be thoroughly implemented this year. Party organizations should immediately issue directives based on the Central Committee's land policy and local conditions, and personally inspect several villages, select models, and promote them elsewhere. At the same time, publish editorials and model stories about rent reduction in the newspapers. Rent reduction is a mass struggle of the peasants; the Party's directives and the government's decrees are to lead and assist this mass struggle, not to bestow favors upon the masses. Bestowing rent reduction as a favor without mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses is incorrect, and its results will not be solid. Peasant associations should be established or reformed in the struggle for rent reduction. The government should stand on the position of enforcing rent reduction decrees and mediating the interests of landlords and tenants. Now that the base areas have shrunk, the task for our Party to meticulously, earnestly, and thoroughly win over the masses in the base areas, and to share life and death with the masses, has a more urgent significance than in the past six years. If we can inspect the degree of implementation of the rent reduction policy this autumn and carry out thorough rent reduction, we will be able to arouse the enthusiasm of the peasant masses, strengthen the struggle against the enemy next year, and promote next year's production movement. (2) The majority of cadres in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines have not yet learned to mobilize the Party, government, army, and the masses of the people (all public and private, military and civilian, men and women, old and young, with absolutely no exceptions) to carry out large-scale production. The Party, government, and army must, in this autumn and winter, prepare for a large-scale production movement for the entire base area next year to overcome difficulties through their own efforts (for the time being, do not raise the slogan of "ample food and clothing" except in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region), including public and private agriculture, industry, handicrafts, transportation, animal husbandry, and commerce, with agriculture as the main body. Implement household-based planning, labor mutual aid (called "labor-exchange teams" in northern Shaanxi, and "plowing teams" or "mutual-aid societies" in the past in the Jiangxi Soviet), the Zhao Zhankui movement (industrial labor heroes), the Huang Lide movement (heroes of vegetable growing in organizations and schools), reward labor heroes, hold production competitions, and develop cooperatives that serve the masses. County and district Party and government personnel, on matters of finance and economy, should devote ninety percent of their energy to helping the peasants increase production, and then use ten percent of their energy to collect taxes from the peasants. If painstaking effort is used on the former, the latter will be easy. All organizations, schools, and army units must, under wartime conditions, vigorously engage in growing vegetables, raising pigs, gathering firewood, making charcoal, and producing handicrafts, and partially grow grain. In addition to all large and small units developing collective production, all individuals (except in the army) should be encouraged to engage in a small amount of agricultural and handicraft production as personal sideline production, with the income belonging to the individual. All localities should hold seven- to ten-day training classes for growing vegetables, training classes for raising pigs, and training classes for cooks to improve meals. In all Party, government, and army organizations, practice frugality, oppose waste, and prohibit corruption. All leading personnel in Party, government, and army organizations and schools at all levels must learn the entire set of skills for leading mass production; those who do not pay attention to studying production are not good leaders. All military personnel and civilians should regard those who do not pay attention to developing production and are content to eat what they have as not good models, and regard being a good public servant in the production movement as one of the conditions for being a good soldier. Among all rural Party members who are not divorced from production, those who do not pay attention to developing the economy and one-sidedly hold the conservative and purely financial viewpoint of balancing expenditures are wrong. The viewpoint of not paying attention to organizing the vast labor power of the Party, government, army, and the masses of the people to launch a mass production movement, but one-sidedly paying attention only to a few government personnel busy with collecting grain, collecting taxes, and getting money and food, is wrong. The viewpoint (the Kuomintang viewpoint) of not knowing how to use all efforts to help the masses develop production, but only knowing how to demand grain and funds from the masses, is wrong. The viewpoint of not paying attention to comprehensively launching a mass production movement, but only paying attention one-sidedly to having a few economic organizations organize a few people to engage in production, is wrong. The viewpoint that it is not glorious or moral for a Communist Party member to engage in household production (rural Party members) or personal sideline production (Party members in organizations and schools) to support family life or improve their own life for the benefit of the revolutionary cause, is wrong. The viewpoint of, under the conditions of having base areas, not advocating developing production to struggle for the improvement of material life, but one-sidedly advocating arduous struggle, is wrong. The viewpoint of not regarding cooperatives as economic groups that serve the people, but regarding them as a means for a few staff members to make money and profits, or as government-run public stores, is wrong. The viewpoint that Wu Manyou's production methods (labor mutual aid, more plowing, more hoeing, more herding) cannot be promoted in all areas, is wrong. The viewpoint of, in the production movement, not implementing the system of heads taking responsibility, taking action themselves, combining the leadership backbone with the broad masses, combining general calls with individual guidance, conducting investigation and study, distinguishing between the urgent and the less urgent, striving to have men and women, old and young, and vagrants all participate in production, training cadres, and educating the masses, but only knowing how to push the production tasks onto the head of the construction department, the supply chief, or the head of the general affairs office, is wrong. The central link in developing production is organizing labor power. It is both possible and absolutely necessary, even under the current wartime conditions, for every base area to organize the labor power of tens ofthousands of Party, government, and army personnel and hundreds of thousands of people (in the forms of household-based planning, labor-exchange teams, transport teams, mutual-aid societies, cooperatives, etc., organizing all full and partial labor power on a voluntary basis) to engage in production. Communist Party members must learn the entire set of principles and methods for organizing labor power. The thorough implementation of rent reduction throughout the country this year will be a stimulus for the large-scale development of production next year. And next year, the great production movement in which the entire Party, government, army, and people, men and women, old and young, will all participate to increase grain and daily necessities and prepare to fight against famine, will be the material foundation for continuing to hold on to the anti-Japanese base areas. Otherwise, we will encounter insurmountable difficulties. (3) In order to forge the Party, government, and army into one, so as to facilitate the development of next year's struggle against the enemy and the production movement, the Party committees and military-political leading organs of all base areas should prepare to hold a large-scale mass movement to "support the government and cherish the people" and "support the army" universally and without exception during the first lunar month of next year. On the army side, they should re-announce the "support the government and cherish the people" pact, hold their own review meetings, and convene get-together meetings with residents (with local Party and government participation). In cases where the interests of the masses have been harmed, compensation and apologies must be made. On the civilian side, under the leadership of the local Party, government, and mass organizations, they should re-announce the "support the army" pact and carry out a fervent campaign to comfort the army. In the "support the government and cherish the people" and "support the army" movement, thoroughly inspect the shortcomings and mistakes of the army side and the Party and government side in 1943, and resolutely correct them in 1944. Hereafter, this should be held universally every first lunar month to support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting in the War of Resistance. The "support the government and cherish the people" pact and the "support the army" pact should be read again and again. The shortcomings and mistakes that have occurred in various base areas, such as the army bullying the Party, government, and people, and the Party, government, and people not showing enough concern for the army, should be subjected to open, mass self-criticism (each side criticizing itself, not criticizing the other side) and be thoroughly corrected. (4) This directive mainly explains the importance of rent reduction this year, production next year, and holding the "support the government and cherish the people" movement next spring. Other policies have been instructed on repeatedly and will not be reiterated here. But it should be known that among the various policies implemented by our Party in the various base areas, there are ten that are most crucial at present. These ten policies are: first, the struggle against the enemy; second, better troops and simpler administration; third, unified leadership; fourth, support the government and cherish the people; fifth, develop production; sixth, rectify the three styles; seventh, screen cadres; eighth, education on current affairs; ninth, the "three-thirds system"; tenth, rent and interest reduction. These ten major policies are interconnected and indivisible. This autumn and winter, all Central Bureaus, Central Sub-bureaus, Regional Party Committees, and Prefectural Party Committees must make a summary of the ten major policies for this year (it is not necessary to hold very large and long meetings, just review the ten policies one by one). At the same time, the idea of the interconnectedness of the ten major policies must be widely publicized within the Party, so that the entire Party, and especially the cadres, recognize that only by implementing these ten interconnected policies in their entirety, not partially (such as saying that a certain place does not need to implement "support the government and cherish the people" or Wu Manyou's production methods), and earnestly, not carelessly, can the goal of overcoming difficulties and welcoming the bright future be achieved. But as long as all comrades in the Party earnestly implement the ten major policies, we will certainly be able to create many favorable conditions and achieve the goal of overcoming difficulties and welcoming the bright future. We are fully confident of overcoming difficulties, our future is infinitely bright, we will surely defeat Japanese imperialism and build a free and equal new China!

Jiefang Ribao, January 1, 1943. Reference Materials on the History of the Communist Party of China, Volume 4.

From September 6th to 13th, the Kuomintang convened the Eleventh Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee, and from September 18th to 27th, the Kuomintang government convened the Third Session of the Second People's Political Council. All materials from the two meetings have now been collected, and we can make a general assessment. The international situation has reached the eve of a great change, and now all sides have sensed this change. The European Axis powers have sensed this change; Hitler has adopted a policy of last-ditch struggle. This change has been mainly brought about by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is taking advantage of this change; the Red Army, with the momentum of a tidal wave, has fought its way to the Dnieper River. With another winter offensive, if it does not reach the new border, it will reach the old border. Britain and the United States are also taking advantage of this change. Roosevelt is waiting for Hitler to be on the verge of collapse to fight his way into France. Churchill regards the Italian front, where only a dozen or so divisions are currently fighting, as merely a third front. In short, the European problem is on the eve of a final solution, and its main force is the Soviet Union. The pivot of the world problem is in Europe; the solution of the European problem will decide the fate of the two major world camps, the fascist and the anti-fascist. The Japanese imperialists already feel they have nowhere to turn; their policy can only be to concentrate all their forces to prepare for a final struggle. Towards China, it is "mopping-up" against the Communist Party and inducement to surrender against the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang people have also sensed this change. Faced with this situation, they are on the one hand joyful, and on the other hand fearful. They are joyful because they think that with the solution in Europe, Britain and the United States can free their hands to fight Japan for them, and they can move back to Nanjing without effort. They are fearful that with the collapse of the three fascist countries, the world will become a great era of liberation unprecedented in human history, and the Kuomintang's comprador-feudal fascist dictatorial rule will become a tiny, isolated island in the vast ocean of world freedom and democracy. They fear that their fascist "one party, one doctrine, one leader" will be drowned. Originally, the Kuomintang's idea was to let the Soviet Union fight Hitler alone, and to provoke the Japanese bandits to attack the Soviet Union, to fight the socialist country to death or to ruin it; to tell Britain and the United States not to bother with a second or third front in Europe, but to move all their forces to the East to first defeat Japan, then defeat the Communist Party of China, and then talk about other things. The Kuomintang people at first clamored for the "Asia first, Europe second theory," and later clamored for the "Europe and Asia equal share theory," all for this ulterior motive. In the last days of the Quebec Conference in August this year, Roosevelt called in China's Foreign Minister T.V. Soong and spoke a few words. The Kuomintang people again clamored: "Roosevelt and Churchill's line of sight has shifted to the East, the Europe first, Asia second plan has changed," and "the Quebec Conference is a conference of the three powers: Britain, America, and China," and even engaged in a bout of "self-praise and self-congratulation." But this was the last joy of the Kuomintang people. After this, their mood changed somewhat. "Asia first, Europe second" or "Europe and Asia equal share" were henceforth consigned to the museum of history; they may have to come up with another idea. The Kuomintang's Eleventh Plenary Session and the Kuomintang-controlled People's Political Council may be the starting point for this other idea. The Kuomintang's Eleventh Plenary Session slandered the Communist Party for "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state," while at the same time declaring a "political solution" and "preparations for implementing constitutional government." The Third Session of the Second People's Political Council, under the manipulation of a majority of Kuomintang members, passed a resolution on the Communist issue that was largely the same as that of the Eleventh Plenary Session. In addition, the Eleventh Plenary Session also "elected" Chiang Kai-shek as the Chairman of the Kuomintang government, strengthening the dictatorial apparatus. What idea might the Kuomintang people come up with after the Eleventh Plenary Session? Nothing more than three: (1) surrender to Japan; (2) drag on in the old way; (3) change political policy. The defeatists and capitulationists within the Kuomintang, in response to Japan's demand to "fight the Communist Party, pull in the Kuomintang," have all along advocated surrender. They surround Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, constantly attempting to instigate an anti-communist civil war. Once a civil war starts, resistance will naturally be impossible, and there will be only one road: surrender. The Kuomintang has concentrated four to five hundred thousand troops in the Northwest, and is still secretly concentrating troops from other fronts to the Northwest. It is said that the generals are very bold, saying: "Taking Yan'an is not a problem." This is what they said after hearing Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's speech on the Communist Party issue at the Eleventh Plenary Session: "This is a political problem and should be solved by political means," and after the plenary session passed a resolution largely identical to what Chiang said. Last year, the Kuomintang's Tenth Plenary Session also passed a similar resolution, but before the ink was dry, the generals were ordered to prepare a military campaign to annihilate the Border Region. The ink of the Eleventh Plenary Session's resolution has just been spilled on white paper, and the generals' bold words and troop movements are heard again. "Taking Yan'an is not a problem," what does this mean? It means deciding to surrender to Japan. Not all Kuomintang members who approve of "attacking Yan'an" are subjectively determined capitulationists. Some of them may think this way: we are anti-communist on the one hand, but we still want to resist Japan on the other. Many Whampoa military men may think this way. But we Communists must ask these gentlemen a few questions: Have you forgotten the experience of the ten-year civil war? Once a civil war starts, will those determined capitulationists allow you to resist Japan again? Will the Japanese, like Wang Jingwei, allow you to resist Japan again? How capable are you yourselves, to be able to fight on two fronts, internally and externally? You are now said to have three million troops, but in reality, morale is extremely low. Some compare it to a basket of eggs, which will collapse with a single touch. This was the case in the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, the Battle of Taihang Mountain, the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, the Battle of Western Hubei, and the Battle of Dabie Mountain. The reason for this is that you have implemented two fatal policies: "active anti-communism" and "passive resistance to Japan." With a national enemy deep in our territory, the more you practice active anti-communism and passive resistance, the more your morale will decline. If you are like this against a foreign enemy, can you suddenly become fierce against the Communist Party and the people? You cannot. As long as you start a civil war, you can only fight the civil war with all your heart and mind. Any "resistance on one front" will surely be thrown to the nine heavens, and the result will inevitably be to sign an unconditional surrender treaty with Japan. There can only be one policy: "surrender." All those in the Kuomintang who are unwilling to truly surrender, as long as you actively launch or participate in a civil war, you will inevitably become capitulationists. If you listen to the instigation of the capitulationist faction and take the resolution of the Eleventh Plenary Session and the resolution of the People's Political Council as tools to mobilize public opinion and prepare to launch an anti-communist civil war, the result will inevitably lead to this situation. This is called, although you yourself are originally unwilling to surrender, by listening to the instigation of the capitulationist faction and taking wrong steps, you end up having to follow the capitulationist faction in surrendering. This is the first possible direction for the Kuomintang after the Eleventh Plenary Session, and this crisis exists in an extremely serious manner. In the eyes of the capitulationist faction, "political solution" and "preparations for implementing constitutional government" are precisely the best smokescreens for preparing for civil war, which is to say, preparing for surrender. All Communists, patriotic Kuomintang members, all anti-Japanese parties and groups, and all anti-Japanese compatriots must keep their eyes wide open and pay attention to this extremely serious situation, and not be confused by the smokescreen of the capitulationist faction. It must be known that it is precisely after the Eleventh Plenary Session that the crisis of civil war is unprecedented. The resolution of the Eleventh Plenary Session and the resolution of the People's Political Council can develop in another direction, which is "drag on for now, fight later." This direction has some difference from the direction of the capitulationist faction; it is the direction of those who still want to resist Japan but are absolutely unwilling to give up anti-communism and dictatorship. It is possible for these people to take this direction, because they see that the great international change is inevitable, see that Japanese imperialism will inevitably be defeated, see that civil war means surrender, see that the people at home support resistance and oppose civil war, see that the Kuomintang is divorced from the masses and has lost the people's support, putting itself in an unprecedentedly isolated position, and see the seriousness of this crisis. They see that the United States and the Soviet Union are unanimously opposed to the Chinese government launching a civil war. Therefore, they are forced to postpone the civil war conspiracy, and use the empty words of "political solution" and "preparations for implementing constitutional government" as a pretext and tool to drag things on. The usual method of these people is to be good at "deceiving" and "dragging." These people's desire to "take Yan'an" and "annihilate the Communist Party" is something they never forget even in their dreams. On this point, they are completely at one with the capitulationist faction. It is just that they still want to fly the banner of resisting Japan, are not yet willing to lose the Kuomintang's international status, and sometimes are also concerned about criticism from international and domestic public opinion. Therefore, they may drag on for a while, using "political solution" and "preparations for implementing constitutional government" as a cover to drag on, waiting for future favorable conditions. They have no sincere intention of a genuine "political solution" or "implementing constitutional government," at least at present they have absolutely no such sincerity. Around the time of the Kuomintang's Tenth Plenary Session last year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party sent Comrade Lin Biao to Chongqing to meet with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek. He waited in Chongqing for ten months, but Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang Central Committee were unwilling to discuss even a single concrete issue. In March of this year, Mr. Chiang published the book "China's Destiny," emphasizing opposition to liberalism and communism, shifting the responsibility for the ten-year civil war onto the Communist Party, and slandering the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army as "new-style warlords" and "new-style secession," implying that the Communist Party must be resolved within two years. On June 28th of this year, Mr. Chiang allowed Comrades Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and others to return to Yan'an, but at the same time he ordered the mobilization of river defense forces to advance towards the Border Region, and ordered all localities across the country, in the name of "people's organizations," to take advantage of the dissolution of the Third International to demand the dissolution of the Communist Party of China. Under such circumstances, we Communists had no choice but to appeal to the Kuomintang and the people of the whole country to stop the civil war, and had no choice but to expose the various dark conspiracies of the Kuomintang to sabotage the War of Resistance and endanger the state. We have endured to the utmost limit, as historical facts can prove. Since the fall of Wuhan, the small and large anti-communist battles in North China and Central China have not ceased. Two Nationalist army groups entered Soviet areas and Shandong to fight the Communist Party. The Pang Bingxun army group in the Taihang Mountains was ordered specifically to be anti-communist, and the Kuomintang troops in Anhui and Hubei were also ordered to be anti-communist. For a long time, we did not even publicize the facts of all these things. All Kuomintang newspapers and periodicals of all sizes were insulting the Communist Party at all times, and for a long time we did not reply with a single word. The Kuomintang secret service agencies arrested, insulted, and executed countless Communists and patriots. The Kuomintang unreasonably disbanded the New Fourth Army, an anti-Japanese unit of several hundred thousand men. This was the Southern Anhui Incident, a rebellion to annihilate the New Fourth Army. The New Fourth Army's troops in southern Anhui, more than nine thousand men, were annihilated. The commander, Ye Ting, was captured, and the deputy commander, Xiang Ying, was killed. We, apart from protesting to the Kuomintang and proposing conditions for a settlement, still endured for the sake of the country. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was, when the Communist Party representative Comrade Zhou Enlai met with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek at Lushan in June and July of 1937, established by order of Mr. Chiang, who appointed officials, as an administrative region directly under the Executive Yuan of the National Government. Mr. Chiang not only went back on his word, but also dispatched four to five hundred thousand troops to surround the Border Region, implementing a military and economic blockade, determined to put the people of the Border Region and the rear guard organs of the Eighth Route Army to death. As for cutting off supplies to the Eighth Route Army, calling the Communist Party the "traitorous party," calling the New Fourth Army the "rebel army," and calling the Eighth Route Army the "traitorous army," these facts are known to all. In short, the Kuomintang people who did these things treated the Communist Party as an enemy. In the eyes of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party is ten times, a hundred times more hateful than the Japanese. The Kuomintang concentrates its greatest hatred on the Communist Party. As for the Japanese, if there is any hatred left, it is only a very small part. This is consistent with the different attitudes of the Japanese towards the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Japanese fascism concentrates its greatest hatred on the Communist Party of China. Towards the Kuomintang, it is becoming more and more calm and composed day by day. Of the two slogans "oppose the Communists" and "annihilate the Party," only "oppose the Communists" remains today. All Japanese and Wang Jingwei newspapers and periodicals no longer mention slogans like "down with the Kuomintang" or "overthrow Chiang Kai-shek." The Japanese have deployed fifty-eight percent of their forces in China against the Communist Party, and only forty-two percent to watch the Kuomintang. Recently, many troops have been withdrawn from Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Hubei, reducing the surveillance forces to induce surrender. The Japanese dare not utter half a sentence of inducement to surrender to the Communist Party, but towards the Kuomintang they dare to go on at length, chattering incessantly, persuading it to submit. The Kuomintang only has a fierce air in front of the Communist Party and the people; in front of the Japanese, it cannot be fierce at all. Not only has it long since changed from resistance to observation in action, but even in words it dares not make one or two slightly sharp refutations of the Japanese inducements to surrender and various insulting remarks. The Japanese say: "The direction of the arguments in Chiang Kai-shek's 'China's Destiny' is not wrong." Have Mr. Chiang and his partymen ever offered any refutation to this extremely insulting but completely pertinent remark? No, and they dare not. The Japanese see that Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang only raise the so-called "military and government orders" and "discipline" against the Communist Party, but are unwilling and dare not raise the issue of military and government orders and discipline against the twenty Kuomintang Central Committee members who have gone over to the enemy and the fifty-eight Kuomintang generals who have gone over to the enemy. How can this not make the Japanese despise the Kuomintang! In front of the people of the whole country and the friendly nations of the world, one only sees Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang disbanding the New Fourth Army, attacking the Eighth Route Army, surrounding the Border Region, slandering them as a "traitorous party," "traitorous army," "new-style warlords," and "new-style secession," slandering them for "sabotaging the War of Resistance" and "endangering the state," and constantly raising the so-called "military and government orders" and "discipline." But against the twenty Kuomintang Central Committee members who have gone over to the enemy and the fifty-eight Kuomintang generals who have gone over to the enemy, they do not enforce any military or government orders, do not enforce any discipline. Even at this Eleventh Plenary Session and the People's Political Council, there are still only resolutions to deal with the Communist Party, and not a single resolution to deal with the Kuomintang's own large number of Central Committee members who have betrayed the country and gone over to the enemy and the large number of military generals who have betrayed the country and gone over to the enemy. How can the people of the whole country and the friendly nations of the world view the Kuomintang! The Eleventh Plenary Session indeed brought up the topics of "political solution" and "preparations for implementing constitutional government" again. Very well, we welcome these topics. But judging from the Kuomintang's consistent political line over the past few years, we believe this is just a pile of deceptive empty words, and in reality, it is for the purpose of preparing to fight a civil war and never giving up the dictatorial regime, to gain the necessary time. Can the development of the situation still have a third direction? It can. A part of the Kuomintang members, the people of the whole country, and we Communists all hope so. What is the third direction? That is to solve the Kuomintang-Communist relations in a fair and reasonable political way, sincerely implement a truly democratic and free constitutional government, abolish the fascist dictatorial politics of "one party, one doctrine, one leader," and convene a National Assembly genuinely elected by the people during the War of Resistance. We Communists have advocated this policy from beginning to end. A part of the Kuomintang people will also agree with this policy. Even for Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and his direct-line Kuomintang, we have for a long time always hoped that they would implement this policy. But based on the actual situation in recent years, and based on the current facts, Mr. Chiang and the majority of the Kuomintang people in power have not shown any facts to indicate that they are willing to implement this policy. To implement this policy requires many international and domestic conditions. The current international conditions (the eve of the total collapse of European fascism) are increasingly favorable for China's War of Resistance, but the capitulationist faction is increasingly taking advantage of this stage to instigate civil war in order to induce surrender. Wang Jingwei said: "The most intimate brothers, Japan and China, are still brothers in the end. Chongqing will definitely walk the same road as us in the future, but we hope this day comes sooner rather than later." (Domei, October 1) How intimate and urgent! The current situation, at best, is to drag on for a while, and the adverse current of a surprise attack is very serious. The third direction does not yet have such conditions; it requires the efforts of patriotic elements of all parties and factions and the people of the whole country in all aspects to strive for it. Mr. Chiang Kai-shek declared at the Eleventh Plenary Session: "It should be declared that the Central Government has no other demands on the Communist Party, only that it abandon its armed secession and stop its past acts of attacking national troops and sabotaging the War of Resistance in various places, and that it fulfill the declaration of jointly facing the national crisis made in the 26th year of the Republic, and honor the four points mentioned in its pledge." What Mr. Chiang calls "acts of attacking national troops and sabotaging the War of Resistance" should be the Kuomintang's acts of attacking Communist Party troops since the fall of Wuhan. It is a pity that he has wrongly accused the Communist Party. The Kuomintang has launched three anti-communist high tides. The first was in the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940. At that time, Kuomintang troops attacked and occupied five cities garrisoned by the Eighth Route Army in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region: Chunhua, Xunyi, Zhengning, Ningxian, and Zhenyuan, and even used aircraft. In North China, they dispatched Zhu Huaibing to attack the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang region, and the Eighth Route Army only fought in self-defense. The second time was in January 1941. First, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi sent a telegram (October 19, 1940) to Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang, forcibly ordering all Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army units south of the Yellow River to move north of the Yellow River within one month. We agreed to move the troops in southern Anhui north, while other troops were in fact unable to move, but we still promised to move to the designated locations after the victory of the War of Resistance. Unexpectedly, just as the more than nine thousand troops in southern Anhui were moving as ordered on January 5th, Mr. Chiang had already issued the order to "wipe them out in one fell swoop." From the 6th to the 14th, all Kuomintang troops in southern Anhui indeed "wiped out in one fell swoop" this unit of the New Fourth Army. Mr. Chiang then issued an order on the 17th to disband the entire New Fourth Army and put Ye Ting on trial. Since then, in all anti-Japanese base areas in Central and North China where Kuomintang troops were present, all the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army units there were attacked by Kuomintang troops, while the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army only acted in self-defense. The third time is from March of this year to the present. In addition to continuing to attack the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army in Central and North China, Mr. Chiang published the anti-communist and anti-people "China's Destiny"; mobilized a large number of river defense troops to prepare for a surprise attack on the Border Region; instigated so-called "people's organizations" all over the country to demand the dissolution of the Communist Party; and mobilized the Kuomintang members who constituted the overwhelming majority in the People's Political Council to pass an anti-communist resolution, turning the People's Political Council, which should represent unity and resistance, into an anti-communist forum. Dong Biwu, a Communist member of the council, had no choice but to make a statement clarifying the facts, in order to prepare for the war of resistance. In short, these three anti-communist high tides were all launched by the Kuomintang in a planned and prepared manner. May I ask, what is this if not "acts of sabotaging the War of Resistance"? The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a declaration on jointly facing the national crisis on September 22, the 26th year of the Republic (1937). The declaration stated: "In order to remove the pretexts of the enemy's conspiracies, and to dispel the misunderstandings of all well-intentioned doubters, it is necessary for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to lay bare its sincerity for the cause of national liberation. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party once again solemnly declares to the whole nation: 1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles are what China needs today, and our Party is willing to strive for their complete realization. 2. To abolish the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the Kuomintang political power and the movement of sovietization, and the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of landlords. 3. To abolish the present Soviet government and implement democratic politics, so as to unify the political power of the whole country. 4. To abolish the name and designation of the Red Army