(1) The vast majority of cadres from the former Fourth Front Army came from worker and peasant backgrounds and had risen through the ranks from the grassroots level. During the domestic war, they demonstrated unwavering dedication and loyalty to the revolution and to the Party. After overcoming the Guo Tao line, they unanimously supported the CPC Central Committee. In the War of National Resistance, they again displayed courage and devotion. Only a very small number defected to the enemy, but this is not surprising, as a few cadres from the First and Second Front Armies also went over to the enemy side.

(2) During the period when the Guo Tao line was in power, the cadres of the former Fourth Front Army complied with and implemented that line. However, it is important to distinguish between mere followers of the Guo Tao line and those who actively carried it out. Only a handful played an active role in advancing the Guo Tao line. Most, owing to their limited cultural and political literacy, succumbed to the Guo Tao line’s policy of deceiving the masses and its repressive tactics, as well as to the centralized command structure of the army, and thus obeyed and executed it. The five years of the War of Resistance have thoroughly tested these cadres, revealing their fundamental honesty and firmness, thereby confirming that the Central Committee’s conclusion in 1937, when opposing the Guo Tao line, was entirely correct. It should be noted that comrades such as Xu Xiangqian and Li Xiannian are not included among the few who actively assisted the Guo Tao line. They did not play such a role during that period. Even for those few comrades who went beyond the level of mere assistance, the Central Committee’s policy has been to win them over through education and ideological transformation rather than to abandon them, and this approach has indeed yielded positive results.

(3) Cadres from the former Fourth Front Army should be treated no differently from other cadres in terms of trust and assignment of duties. There should be no discrimination against them simply because they once followed the Guo Tao line. Assignments should be made on the basis of each individual’s moral integrity (loyalty to the Party), competence (work ability), and standing (seniority and prestige). Where existing assignments are unsuitable, efforts should be made to adjust them, with particular emphasis on helping these cadres improve their cultural, political, and military levels.

(4) Cadres from the former Fourth Front Army who achieve good results in their work should be commended. If they make mistakes—any cadre may err—the nature and extent of the mistake should be clearly pointed out, and assistance provided to correct it. Neither concealing nor exaggerating errors is appropriate. A relationship characterized by mutual sincerity and frankness must be cultivated; any attitude of estrangement, severance, or discrimination is unacceptable. Furthermore, it is crucial to avoid hastily labeling a mistake made by a cadre from the former Fourth Front Army as “an error stemming from the Guo Tao line” or “a remnant of the Guo Tao line,” as such labels are factually incorrect and extremely detrimental to the unity of the cadre corps. In effect, they only serve to assist the enemy in sowing discord within our ranks.

(5) Cadres of the former Fourth Front Army should continue to place their trust in the sound personnel policies of the Central Committee and the Military Commission, act boldly without hesitation, and freely express their views on work matters in an open and straightforward manner to the local military and Party leadership whenever necessary. Most importantly, they should intensify their studies in culture, military affairs, and politics, thereby deepening their understanding of the Party and enhancing their professional capabilities.

(6) The ten-year civil war and the five-year War of Resistance have both demonstrated that, with only a few exceptions regardless of their origins, our military and other cadres stand united. As the War of Resistance grows increasingly difficult, the Japanese aggressors and domestic counter-revolutionary elements are employing every possible means to sow division among our Party cadres. Under these circumstances, we must remain even more united and eliminate all barriers arising from past historical ties or regional loyalties.

(7) Upon receipt of this directive, all levels of cadres throughout the country are required to convene full meetings to report on and discuss it.