Opinions on the Issuance of a New Administrative Program by the Jin-Cha-Ji Sub-Bureau

(January 11, 1943)

Jin-Cha-Ji Sub-Bureau:

(A) The administrative program issued in the 29th year [of the Republic of China, i.e., 1940] has had a significant influence among the masses and remains applicable to this day. At present, not only should a new program that does not differ much from the old one not be issued, but the provisions of the old program should also not be amended, lest the prestige of the old program among the masses be affected. At this session of the Senate, a declaration may be issued. This declaration should be initiated by Communist Party members in the Senate, inviting non-Party individuals to co-sign it, submit it to the Senate for approval, and then publish it. The declaration should endorse the administrative program of the 29th year while elaborating on matters not covered in that program.

(B) There are some inappropriate points in the draft of the new program you proposed, as noted below:

1. The current characteristic of the situation in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region is that the vast majority of the region is increasingly becoming guerrilla zones, the base areas are shrinking daily, and the circumstances are growing more difficult, with severe hardships still ahead. Therefore, in addition to explaining the favorable aspects of the situation, this point should be supplemented. Moreover, our policies should be formulated differently for the basic base areas and the areas that have already become guerrilla zones.

2. Emphasis should be placed on adjusting the relations among various classes in the Border Region to consolidate unity among the Party, government, military, and civilians, as well as among all strata.

3. Emphasis should be placed on earnestly implementing the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" to endure the darkness before dawn, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counteroffensive. The military and civilians, both public and private, must actively and cooperatively develop production and trade to open up financial resources and improve the people's livelihood.

4. In the vast guerrilla zones such as central and eastern Hebei, it is difficult not only to handle traitors according to legal procedures, establish a strict legal system, or achieve strict unification and standardization of fiscal taxation, but also, when necessary, to adopt a dual-faced policy in dealing with enemy and puppet regimes, organizations, and various installations. Therefore, while efforts should be made to disintegrate, divide, win over, strike at, or opportunistically resist them, it is difficult to uniformly destroy or resolutely oppose them. These circumstances should also be taken into account in the program.

5. Under conditions of increasingly difficult circumstances and expanding guerrilla zones, we should seize the initiative to actively streamline and strengthen guerrilla units, enhance the organization and training of the militia, and have the government and main forces supply the militia with weapons and ammunition as much as possible. Only in this way can we extensively develop mass guerrilla warfare to cooperate with the main forces and guerrilla units in combating the enemy's nibbling policy and mopping-up operations, thereby achieving the goal of reducing enemy-occupied areas and expanding or preserving our own. There is no need to raise the issue of implementing a voluntary compulsory military service system, as it is actually very difficult to implement today and could instead be exploited by the enemy to deceive the masses.

6. Under the current conditions of struggle in the Border Region, it is necessary not only to educate the people to respect, cherish, and assist the military but also to educate the troops to cherish, respect, and help the common people, so that the military and civilians are united in heart and mind to face the national crisis together. This point is of great significance in the extremely difficult circumstances ahead.

7. Some overly ambitious and impractical measures should not be proposed, such as allowing the implementation of a salary system after the war or reducing the people's burdens, as these are uncertain in the future.

8. Regarding the issues of arrest, detention, interrogation, and punishment in the protection of human rights, under the current circumstances of struggle behind enemy lines, in addition to what is stipulated in Article 6, an exception should be added for situations authorized by the government under special circumstances such as during enemy mopping-up operations and in guerrilla zones.

(C) When drafting the Senate declaration, please pay attention to the points noted above.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

January 11

Restricted to the Communist Party

Currently, the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region is transforming

Difficulties will

The Border Region should be

Greatly

Assist the military and civilians

3. Our Party in the past

Will propose

Established in the 29th year

Included in the new program

Cultivate as

5. In central Hebei

Handle

(C) When you draft the revolution and convene the meeting, pay attention to the points noted above. Secretariat of the Central Committee, [date]

Mao Zedong's manuscript of "Opinions on the Issuance of a New Administrative Program by the Jin-Cha-Ji Sub-Bureau," drafted for the Secretariat of the Central Committee.