Strive to Establish Peace with the
Guomindang After Victory in the War
of Resistance
(January 25, 1943)
Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:1
I have read your telegram of December 18 only recently. My response is as
follows:
1. After Germany, Italy, and Japan are defeated, both the domestic and the
international situations will undergo fundamental changes. The situation will
benefit the people, not the dictators. But Chiang [Kaishek] has made a
contribution to the War of Resistance, and at the same time the people detest civil
war. Therefore we should strive to establish peace with the Guomindang after the
War of Resistance and focus our efforts on democracy and the people’s
livelihood. The July 7 Declaration of last year2 was based on this point. We are
striving to obtain the legalization of the border region and the New Fourth Army,
and we have promised the Guomindang that after the end of the War of
Resistance we will concentrate our troops that are now south of the Yellow River
by moving them to the north. For the past two years, Liberation Daily and the
New China News Agency have followed the orientation of national peace, doing
everything possible to avoid provoking the Guomindang. Last September, Chiang
invited me to meet with him; I sent Lin Biao,3 who has not yet returned. I am
prepared to go and see Chiang when the time is right in the hope that the
negotiations will succeed. All of this is the point of departure. In addition to its
current function, even the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration

serves this purpose. Since we are not preparing to fight a civil war, we don’t need
so many troops. Fewer troops may also serve to reduce the Guomindang’s
psychology of fear and to help achieve peace, while awaiting the enlightenment
of the people of the entire nation. If others want to fight, we are prepared and
unafraid.
2. The essence of democratic power is to improve the economic life of the
people and to raise their political consciousness, both of which will contribute to
the War of Resistance. The conditions for improving the standards of living are:
first, to reduce the burden on the peasants imposed by the landlords, that is, to
carry out rent and interest reductions; second, to reduce the burden on the
peasants by the government, that is, to carry out the policy of Crack Troops and
Simple Administration, and to develop a state-owned economic sector; third,
conscientiously to help the peasants develop agricultural and sideline production
and increase their grain and sideline income. Every base area can do much work
on these issues. The core work for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is
the two issues of the economy and education; the core work of each base area
behind enemy lines is the three issues of war, the economy, and education.
3. In terms of the object of education, there is cadre education and citizen
education, and so on. The present emphasis should be placed on cadre education
instead of citizen education (this is not to say that we do not want citizen
education). In terms of its content, there is ideological education, political
education, military education, cultural education, and so on. For cadres,
especially at the present time, we should emphasize ideological education. The
means of doing this is rectification study and cadre investigation. These are the
basic policies for Party building. In Yan’an, the study began in April of last year;
it has lasted for eight months and will be completed by the end of March of this
year. The results will be tremendous. Cadre investigation has already begun (with
some achievements); it will take this entire year to complete. Party, political,
military, and civil cadres in areas other than Yan’an in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are still in the midst of rectification study and cadre
investigation. I hope that you will take note that various base areas behind enemy
lines have yet to become deeply engaged in rectification study and have not yet
conscientiously undertaken cadre investigation. The most important task of
rectification is to rectify high-level cadres (those who are most stubborn in

ideological defects are among these cadres) and to clarify their thought. Each
base area has 100 to 200 such people (including all central bureau and branch
bureau committee members). Next in importance are the middle-level cadres, of
which each base area has from several hundred to several thousand. Only then is
it the turn for the low-level cadres. Some base areas have reversed this order.
Only in the upsurge of serious and deep rectification study and the exercise of
self-criticism will cadre investigation be thorough. In the past, both in Yan’an and
in other places, cadre investigation was mostly a formality. If we can, within the
next two years (before our victory in the War of Resistance), clarify the thought
of the high- and middle-level cadres through rectification and cadre
investigation, and preserve the backbone of the Party and the military, then we
may consider ourselves victorious. Preserving and educating the backbone are the
two important tasks for this year and the next; high-level responsible persons
must grasp this guiding principle. For these two tasks, we must carry out these
critical struggles, both internally and externally.
Mao Zedong
Notes
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from a manuscript
copy.

--- Notes

1. Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was at this time the acting secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central
Committee and the vice commander of the Eighth Route Army.

2. Referring to the “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the War of Resistance,” published July 7, 1942.

3. Lin Biao (1907–1971) was at this time the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
He left for Chongqing as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the negotiations in
September 1942 and returned to Yan’an in July 1943.