October 12, 1942

[This editorial was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Liberation
Daily.]


The Battle of Stalingrad has been compared by the British and American press
to the Battle of Verdun, and the "Red Verdun" is now famous all over the
world. This comparison is not altogether appropriate. The Battle of Stalingrad
is different in nature from the Battle of Verdun in World War I. But they
have this in common-- now, as then, many people are misled by the German
offensive into thinking that Germany can still win the war. In 1916 the German
forces launched several attacks on the French fortress of Verdun, two years
before World War I ended in the winter of 1918. The commander-in-chief at
Verdun was the German Crown Prince and the forces thrown into the battle
were the cream of the German army. The battle was of decisive significance.
After the ferocious German assaults failed, the entire
German-Austrian-Turkish-Bulgarian bloc had no future, and from then on its
difficulties mounted, it was deserted by its followers, it disintegrated,
and finally collapsed. But at the time, the Anglo-American-French bloc did
not grasp this situation, believing that the German army was still very powerful,
and they were unaware of their own approaching victory. Historically, all
reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct a last desperate
struggle against the revolutionary forces, and some revolutionaries are apt
to be deluded for a time by this phenomenon of outward strength but inner
weakness, failing to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing
extinction while they themselves are approaching victory. The rise of the
forces of fascism and the war of aggression they have been conducting for
some years are precisely the expression of such a last desperate struggle;
and in this present war the attack on Stalingrad is the expression of the
last desperate struggle of fascism itself. At this turning point in history,
too, many people in the world anti-fascist front have been deluded by the
ferocious appearance of fascism and have failed to discern its essence. For
forty-eight days there raged an unprecedentedly bitter battle, unparalleled
in the history of mankind--from August 23, when the entire German force crossed
the bend of the River Don and began the all-out attack on Stalingrad, through
September 15, when some German units broke into the industrial district in
the northwestern section of the city, and right up to October 9, when the
Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Red Army had breached the German
line of encirclement in that district. Ultimately this battle was won by
the Soviet forces. During those forty-eight days, the news of each setback
or triumph from that city gripped the hearts of countless millions of people,
now bringing them anxiety, now stirring them to elation. This battle is not
only the turning point of the Soviet-German war, or even of the present
anti-fascist world war, it is the turning point in the history of all mankind.
Throughout these forty-eight days, the people of the world watched Stalingrad
with even greater concern than they watched Moscow last October.

Until his victory on the western front, Hitler seems to have been cautious.
When he attacked Poland, when he attacked Norway, when he attacked Holland,
Belgium, and France, and when he attacked the Balkans, he concentrated all
his strength on one objective at a time, not daring to disperse his attention.
After his victory on the western front, he became dizzy with success and
attempted to defeat the Soviet Union in three months. He launched an offensive
against this huge and powerful socialist country along the whole front stretching
from Murmansk in the north to the Crimea in the south, and in so doing dispersed
his forces. The failure of his Moscow campaign last October marked the end
of the first stage of the Soviet-German war, and Hitler's first strategic
plan failed. The Red Army halted the German offensive last year and launched
a counteroffensive on all fronts in the winter, which constituted the second
stage of the Soviet-German war, with Hitler turning to retreat and the defensive.
In this period, after dismissing Brauchitsch, his commander-in-chief, and
taking over the command himself, he decided to abandon the plan for an all-out
offensive, combed Europe for all available forces and prepared a final offensive
which, though limited to the southern front, would, he imagined, strike at
the vitals of the Soviet Union. Because it was in the nature of a final offensive
on which the fate of fascism hung, Hitler concentrated the greatest possible
forces and even moved in part of his aircraft and tanks from the North African
battle front. With the German attack on Kerch and Sevastopol in May this
year, the war entered its third stage. Massing an army of over 1,500,000,
which was supported by the bulk of his air and tank forces, Hitler launched
an offensive of unprecedented fury on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. He endeavoured
to capture these two objectives at great speed for the twofold purpose of
cutting the Volga and seizing Baku, intending subsequently to drive against
Moscow to the north and break through to the Persian Gulf in the south; at
the same time he directed the Japanese fascists to mass their troops in Manchuria
in preparation for an attack on Siberia after the fall of Stalingrad. Hitler
vainly hoped to weaken the Soviet Union to such an extent that he would be
able to release the main forces of the German army from the Soviet theatre
of war for dealing with an Anglo-American attack on the western front, and
for seizing the resources of the Near East and effecting a junction with
the Japanese; at the same time this would allow the main forces of the Japanese
to be released from the north and, with their rear secure, to move west against
China and south against Britain and the United States. That was how Hitler
reckoned on winning victory for the fascist camp. But how did things turn
out in this stage? Hitler came up against the Soviet tactics which sealed
his fate. The Soviet Union adopted the policy of first luring the enemy in
deep and then putting up a stubborn resistance. In five months of fighting
the German army has failed either to penetrate to the Caucasian oil-fields
or to seize Stalingrad, so that Hitler has been forced to halt his troops
before high mountains and outside an impregnable city, unable to advance
and unable to retreat, suffering immense losses and getting into an impasse.
October is already here and winter is approaching; soon the third stage of
the war will end and the fourth stage will begin. Not one of Hitler's strategic
plans of attack against the Soviet Union has succeeded. In this period, bearing
in mind his failure in the summer of last year when his forces were divided,
Hitler concentrated his strength on the southern front. But as he still wanted
to achieve the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga in the east and seizing
the Caucasus in the south at a single stroke, he again divided his forces.
He did not recognize that his strength did not match his ambitions, and he
is now doomed--"when the carrying pole is not secured at both ends, the loads
slip off". As for the Soviet Union, the more she fights the stronger she
grows. Stalin's brilliant strategic direction has completely gained the
initiative and is everywhere drawing Hitler towards destruction. The fourth
stage of the war, beginning this winter, will mark the approach of Hitler's
doom.

Comparing Hitler's position in the first and third stages of the war, we
can see that he is on the threshold of final defeat. Both at Stalingrad and
in the Caucasus the Red Army has now in fact stopped the German offensive;
Hitler is now nearing exhaustion, having failed in his attacks on Stalingrad
and the Caucasus. The forces which he managed to assemble throughout the
winter, from last December to May of this year, have already been used up.
In less than a month winter will set in on the Soviet-German front, and Hitler
will have to turn hastily to the defensive. The whole belt west and south
of the Don is his most vulnerable area, and the Red Army will go over to
the counter-offensive there. This winter, goaded on by the fear of his impending
doom, Hitler will once again reorganize his forces. To meet the dangers on
both the eastern and western fronts, he may perhaps be able to scrape together
the remnants of his forces, equip them and form them into a few new divisions
and, in addition, he will turn for help to his three fascist partners, Italy,
Rumania and Hungary, and extort some more cannon-fodder from them. However,
he will have to face the enormous losses of a winter campaign in the east
and be ready to deal with the second front in the west, while Italy, Rumania
and Hungary, becoming pessimistic as they see that it is all up with Hitler,
will increasingly fall away from him. In short, after October 9 there is
only one road open to Hitler, the road to extinction.

The Red Army's defence of Stalingrad in these forty-eight days has a certain
similarity to the defence of Moscow last year. That is to say, Hitler's plan
for this year has been foiled just as was his plan for last year. The difference,
however, is that, although the Soviet people followed up their defence of
Moscow with a winter counter-offensive, they had yet to face the summer offensive
of the German army this year, partly because Germany and her European accomplices
still had some fight left in them and partly because Britain and the United
States delayed the opening of the second front. But now, following the battle
for the defence of Stalingrad, the situation will be totally different from
that of last year. On the one hand, the Soviet Union will launch a second
winter counteroffensive on a vast scale, Britain and the United States will
no longer be able to delay the opening of the second front (though the exact
date cannot yet be foretold), and the people of Europe will be ready to rise
up in response. On the other hand, Germany and her European accomplices no
longer have the strength to mount large-scale offensives, and Hitler will
have no alternative but to change his whole line of policy to the strategic
defensive. Once Hitler is compelled to go over to the strategic defensive,
the fate of fascism is as good as sealed. From its birth, a fascist state
like Hitler's builds its political and military life on taking the offensive,
and once its offensive stops its very life stops too. The Battle of Stalingrad
will stop the offensive of fascism and is therefore a decisive battle. It
is decisive for the whole world war.

There are three powerful foes confronting Hitler, the Soviet Union, Britain
and the United States, and the people in the German-occupied territories.
On the eastern front stands the Red Army, firm as a rock, whose
counter-offensives will continue through the whole of the second winter and
beyond; it is this force which will decide the outcome of the whole war and
the destiny of mankind. On the western front, even if Britain and the United
States continue their policy of looking on and stalling, the second front
will eventually be opened, when the time comes to belabour the slain tiger.
Then there is the internal front against Hitler, the great uprising of the
people which is brewing in Germany, in France and in other parts of Europe;
they will respond with a third front the moment the Soviet Union launches
an all-out counter-offensive and the guns roar on the second front. Thus,
an attack from three fronts will converge on Hitler--such is the great historical
process that will follow the Battle of Stalingrad.

Napoleon's political life ended at Waterloo, but the decisive turning point
was his defeat at Moscow. Hitler today is treading Napoleon's road, and it
is the Battle of Stalingrad that has sealed his doom.

These developments will have a direct impact on the Far East. The coming
year will not be propitious for Japanese fascism either. As time goes on
its headaches will grow, until it descends into its grave.

All those who take a pessimistic view of the world situation should change
their point of view.