The Lessons of History
(October 14, 1942)
On October 4, when answering an American reporter’s question, “What are the
remaining resistance forces in the Soviet Union?” Stalin said: “I think the ability
of the Soviet Union to resist the German bandits is, if not larger, then no smaller
than that of Fascist Germany or of any other aggressive countries that seek world
hegemony.” The October 5 editorial of Pravda in Moscow said: “The resistance
fighting at Stalingrad has shattered Hitler’s great plan. That plan was to march
on to Moscow and Baku as soon as Stalingrad was taken.” These words were
vindicated on October 8 and 9. On October 8, a German military spokesman
announced: “There will be no more assaults on Stalingrad by artillery and
engineering forces.” One of the reasons is that, as the Soviet Intelligence Bureau
declared on October 9, “the Soviet army has already broken through the
encirclement of the industrial district in Stalingrad and is holding fast to new
positions.” The other reason is, as explained by Reuters on October 10: “Yesterday
the German army was forced to transfer part of its forces attacking Stalingrad to
the northwest district because this district is under constant attack from the
Soviet relief army.” All this means that the converging attacks from the city
proper and from the northern side by the Red Army have forced Hitler to
abandon the attack on this city and have in reality made him shift day by day to
a defensive position. Only one month ago, some people were busy discussing the
situation after the loss of the Caucasus, and they were all wrong in their
predictions about the strength of both the Soviet and the German armies. Hitler
did have a “great plan,” but this plan, exactly as Pravda said, was shattered by the
resistance fighting at Stalingrad.
The contradiction between Hitler’s actual strength and his ambitions is the
major cause of his failure. This contradiction is expressed in his policy of

avoiding the enemy’s main force and striking at its weak points. Leningrad and
Moscow were to be avoided; hence he gathered his strength in the south. In July
he fought desperately for Voronezh but failed to take it, and so he avoided it. He
fought desperately for Kletskaia but failed again, and he avoided it, too. Now his
attack concentrates on Stalingrad and the northern Caucasus. This time it cannot
be avoided, but it cannot be taken, and yet it must be avoided. However, this is
the last dodge, which means he has to give up the offensive and turn to the
defensive. This is the situation in which Hitler finds himself now. Today he has
not released a general declaration to stop the offensive and maybe he wants to
give it his last try, but as the game is as good as lost, failure is inevitable. Every
place that he avoided has become a starting point for Red Army attacks on him.
At present, the Red Army is attacking the German army right along the line from
Kletskaia to the northern corner of Stalingrad. In this way Hitler will be forced in
the end to give up all his strategic offensives.
The direct fight to protect Stalingrad began on August 23, when the German
army crossed the valley of the Don River, but the battle in the river valley was of
the greatest importance in protecting Stalingrad. All of July, the German army
fought from Kharkov to the Don. During this period, the Red Army was making
a strategic retreat and the Germans gained nothing. On July 30, Berlin announced
that the German army had crossed the Don along the 250-kilometer front
between Tsimlianskaia and Rostov-on-Don and the lower reaches of the Don.
Whether it was in the original plan or because German General Bock1 became
overconfident from his success in crossing the river, he ordered twenty divisions
from the entire field army to pursue vigorously the retreating Red Army. They
had already reached the basin of the Kuban River by the middle of August, but
unexpectedly the Germans met with stiff resistance from the Red Army. Even
today (October 14) the Germans only occupy a small oilfield in Maikop. There is
another larger oilfield called Groznii in the northern Caucasus. The AP news
agency said as early as August 13 that “the road to Groznii is very flat and
smooth, and the question of the moment is only if the German attack will leave
the Red Army enough time to destroy this oilfield completely.” Yet it is fully two
months since they said that, and for Hitler this oilfield is still within sight but
beyond reach. In terms of their desire to reach the Baku region and taste this
most delicious piece of swan meat, the Germans have made unrewarding efforts

to climb the Caucasus mountains. On August 23, the [official Nazi news agency,
the] Transocean News Service, claimed, “at about 10 o’clock in the morning on
August 21, German mountaineers raised the German battle standard atop the
5,630-meter-high Mount Elbrus,” expressing the ecstasy of the Fascist vampires.
However, we do not know whether this battle standard was given to the Red
Army or was dragged down the mountain by the Fascists themselves when they
fled, but in all it was an empty boast. It is said that Baku has now been cast aside
by Hitler (Reuters, October 9), but then, what were his mistakes? Perhaps the first
was to divide his forces in his advance on the Caucasus. On the one hand, the
Red Army firmly defended the Don River valley; on the other, it seduced Bock
into diverting one part of his troops to the Kuban River. In this way, the pressure
on Stalingrad was reduced.
The river valley battle began in July and August, with the Red Army fighting
extremely bravely and only giving up its position in the Kerch area on the east
bank of the Don River on August 23. Without this battle, had the Germans not
been stopped and greatly depleted for twenty-three days in the valley, it would
have been very difficult to protect Stalingrad directly.
From August 23, when the German army crossed the river, to September 15,
when it fought its way into the industrial district of Stalingrad, the Red Army
again wore away the Germans for another twenty-three days in a 50- to 60kilometer belt between the Don River and Stalingrad. Without these second
twenty-three days of depletion, it would have been difficult to defend Stalingrad.
From September 15, when the Germans fought into the industrial district, to
October 9, when Aleksandr Rodimtsev’s2 division of the Red Army broke through
the German front in this district, these twenty-four days were a period of fierce
street fighting. The Red Army shattered the German attack through street
fighting in the city and pressure from the north.
Ever since then, Hitler’s whole position has become passive. The contradiction
between his actual strength and his wild ambitions have finally been revealed,
and he will be crushed by this contradiction.
Referring to the Red Army in the speech he delivered at the sports palace in
Berlin on September 30, Hitler was only able to say, “That is an enemy that does
not know what pity is; they are not human beings but wild beasts,” indicating, it
seems, that he had once hoped the Red Army would have pity on him. The entire

war between the Soviet Union and Germany has already demonstrated: If only
we do not have pity on the Fascists, that is, if we have more courage, then the
Fascists are sure to lose. This is the lesson of history.
Seeing Hitler’s fiasco, how do the Japanese Fascists feel? Do they still want to
try their luck in Vladivostok? There is certainly no pity there. The contradiction
between Japan’s actual strength and its ambitions will also surely shatter the
Japanese Fascists.
Notes
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 444–47, which is based on the editorial in Jiefang
ribao of October 14, 1942.

--- Notes

1. German Field Marshal Fedor von Bock (1880–1945).

2. Major General Aleksandr Rodimtsev (1905–1977) was head of the Eighteenth Division of the Red Army
at this time.